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ABSTRACT 
Oral Theory, which is the discipline that studies the oral tradition, has been characterized as 
a literary anthropology, centered on essentially two notions: tradition on the one hand, 
literature on the other. Though emphasis has moved from an initial preoccupation with oral-
textual form (as advocated by Parry and Lord) to concerns with the oral text as social 
practice, the anthropological/literary orientation has generally remained intact. But through 
its deSignation of a traditional 'other' Oral Theory is, at best, a sub-field of anthropology; the 
literature it purports to study is not literature, but anthropological data. This undermines the 
existence of the field as discipline. In this study it is suggested that the essence of orality -
as subject matter of Oral Theory - should be seen not in the origins of its creativity (deemed 
'traditional'), nor in its aesthetic process / product itself (,literature'), but in its use of 
language deriving from a different 'auditory' conception of language (as contrasted with the 
largely 'visualist' conception of language at least partly associated with writing). In other 
words, the study of orality should not be about specific oral 'genres', but about verbalization 
in general. In terms of its auditory conception, language is primarily defined as existing in 
sound, a definition which places it in a continuum with other symbolical/ meaningful sounds, 
normally conceptualized as 'music'. Linguistics, being fundamentally scriptist (visualist) in 
orientation, fails to account for the auditory conception of language. To remedy this, Oral 
Theory needs to set itself up as an 'aural linguistics' - implying close interdisciplinary 
collaboration with the field of musicology - through which the linguistic sign of orality could 
be studied in all its particularity and complexity of meaning. 
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ORALITY WITHIN ORAL THEORY 
* I wish to confirm that this study is entirely my own, as are the ideas expressed in it, 
except where explicitly indicated otherwise. 
The word oral quite simply refers to use of the mouth, and in this sense figures happily in 
a variety of human activities. ! can adntinister medicine orally, ! can pass an oral examination, 
I can have oral sex ... 
The adjunct -ity takes away this variety. Orality weds the oral to a particular field of human 
activity: vocal communication, hence language. As a consequence the oral's application to the 
mouth per Jle is at once narrowed down and broadened. On the one hand it pertains to the 
most specialized function of the mouth, namely ,that of the production of speech; on the other 
the meaning of the word comes to extend beyond the mouth so as to imply the totality of the 
'speech-making apparatus' (extending all the way from the trachea up to the nasal cavityl) 
if not, in fact - to believe those who see in orality the condition for a certain kind of rhythm 
and gesture - to the whole body2. 
But the term orality generally remains distinct from speech. Phoneticists do not talk about 
the apparatus of Orality(1; fact, orality has been of relatively little relevance to the study of 
language. Instead, it has been the focus of largely two fields, one essentially concerned with 
the study of societies not regarded as 'Western' or 'industrialised': anthropology, the other 
generally concerned with a certain' aesthetic' use of language: literature (literary studies). This 
dual association has led orality, in so far as it has come to be associated with an actual field 
of study, to be most frequently represented either as 'oral tradition' (emphasizing the 
anthropological perspective) or as 'oral literature' (the emphasis being on the aesthetic). John 
Miles Foley in this regard justly talks about a literary anthropology'. The term folklore, also 
sometimes used in this context, broadly relates to both these strands, though, perhaps, 
generally slanted towards the traditional. 
This interchange of orality with oral tradition on the one hand and oral literature on the 
other broadly describes the conceptual field of Oral Theory. Oral Theory has been 
conceptualized as such by Foley'. On an immediate level it presents itself, quite obviously, 
as a theory: the oral-fonnulaic theory devised in the writings of Milman Parry and Albert 
Lord'. From a slightly wider perspective, however, it is the discipline that Foley sees as 
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having come about in the wake of the oral-formulaic theory, following the 'expansion of 
[Parry and Lord's} pioneering efforts ... from ancient Greek, Serbo-Croatian, and ... other 
traditions to more than one hundred separate language traditions'". Foley characterizes the 
field as fundamentally interdisciplinary" noting, in addition to the numerous 'language 
traditions', the fields of literary studies, linguistics, folklore. history and anthropology as 
having contributed to its formation. Walter Ong, in an article entitled 'Orality-Literacy Studies 
and the Unity of the Human Race'S, adds metaphysics and 'theory and use of electronic 
communication' to this list. 
Not surprisingly, depending on the researcher's particular emphasis within this broad 
interdisciplinary domain, the discipline of Oral Theory has tended to go under a series of 
appelations that we can regard as broadly synonymous, reflecting differing degrees of 
attachment to the oral-formulaic theory as theoretical origin: 'oral studies' (within which this 
study is formally situated), 'orality-literacy contrasts9, 'orality~literacy studies"o, 'oral 
literature research', 'studies in oral tradition'. (Foley has himself also made use of the lasltwo 
appeJations}lI. 
In the present study 'Oral Theory' will generally be used as name for the diSCipline in 
question. But although we shall, like Foley, consider the oral~formulaic theory to constitute 
the general theoretical foundation of Oral Theory - the discovery which led, in Ong's words, 
to our 'new understanding of orality' 12 - we shall also come to include under the broad cover 
of 'Oral Theory' studies of orality taking relatively little account of the oral-formulaic theory, 
even overtly rejecting it. In other words, the oral-formulaic theory is assumed to be the basic 
theoretical impetus for Oral Theory, an impetus which, whatever the disagreement it gives rise 
to, continues to serve as a basic counterpoint - and in that sense as foundation - to subsequent 
theoretical perspectives 13. 
Bul why accord the oral-fonnulaic theory such special status? Quite simply because il 
provides - or claims to provide - the discipline in which this study situates itself with at least 
a relatively specific, more or less well-defined object. The oral-formulaic theory (also called 
the Parry-Lord thesis) asserts that a certain kind of linguistic expression is worthy of study 
not for its historical interest per se (important as that may be), nor for the insight it so 
obviously provides into a given culture, but - most profitably - fOf the fact that it is oral. In 
other words, where historical or cultural particularity may previously have been the main 
factors in attracting our attention, OUf interest now comes to focus on modality oj expression, 
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the being all the more enlightening for obvious - yet frequently ignored ways 
in which it us to consider the relativity of what we have so frequently regarded as the 
norm of linguistic expression - especially of the kind reflective of a certain 'culture'. not to 
mention of civilization itself - namely our deeply ingrained habit of representing language 
graphically. of Writi~n its revealing assertion of a specific mode of oral composition, a 
kind of form. the Parry-Lord turns from broadly synonymous 
to pre- or non-literacy into something definitive of a particular of linguistic production 
important its own right, and cannot be properly studied without recognition the 
centrality it affords the human voice and the means it employs to sustain and support it. In 
short, its of a peculiarly oral mode of creativity moulded by the resources of an 
on-going oral tradition, Parry-Lord thesis shows orality to be irreducible. 
The oral-fonnulaie theory, deriving the main from research into ancient Greek poetry 
on the one hand and Balkan folk songs on the other, has however relatively little to wirh 
regard to the majority of the world's oral 'literatures', not the least which that Mrica. 
The parricular features of form Parry Lord postulated as characteristic of 
not to mention their insistence on composition-in-perfonnance as the mode of oral 
composition, are from being attested in the vast number oral traditions documented and 
stu.ai(:~a in recent decades. addition to - and flowing - this lack of empirical support 
the Parry-Lord thesis has been questioned on grounds that attention to form and 
textuaJity in fact. a remnant of kind of literary attention accorded written text. Oral-
literary production been increasingly recognized as a process per definition resistant to 
the notion of the text-as-object on which the oral-fonnulaic theory largely depends. These 
criticisms been particularly strongly enounced Leroy Vail Landeg Whitel.'i. But 
there is more to this 
textuality and what does not, 
than a largely literary-theoretical debate about what constitutes 
by which irs aesthetic import should be appreciated. 
For the oral-formulaic theory's statement on oral textual ronn has also, within a particularly 
influential line of oral-traditional come to seen not so much as a statement on 
an oral aesthetics as such, than as a statement on an oral process of cognition or - to use 
Ong's term - an mindset. And it is here that we see Oral Theory - generally concerned 
with literature - making a strong anthropological statement that. while certainly deriving from 
view of the oral as grounded in tradition, also way beyond it: orality henceforth 
suggests as the lalest - and most viable - 'criterion' by which to account for a number 
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of developmental atlIibured to some of world's 'non-Western' After 
anthropology IlS logical vs pre-logical, vs magical, domesticated vs savage and 
abstract vs Oral Theory presents us literate vs oral. From denoting a mode of 
aesthetic creation, orality essentially becomes indicative of a stage of social and cultural 
evo/Ulian. other words. it a measure for accounting for anthropological difference. 
Against background the main aim of this study can be as follows: how can the 
notion of orality retain the kind of originality justifying that it studied as such (as the 
privileged object of interest of an academic discipline) without it being another variable 
in humanity's SUJ:'po:sea march towards the f\ff'6,.,~e~ and enlightenment we .....,..,,,""', ...... - as 
theorists and working in the institutions that have a like Oral 
Theory possible in the first place - with ourselves? Two considerations, going to Oral 
Theory's presumed status as 'literary anthropology', seem to me pre-eminent in this regard. 
I) As long as Oral Theory continues to see orality against background of a certain 
type of society (qualified 'traditional'), it is to all intents and purposes a sub~branch 
of anthropology. 
2) The at issue in this context is not really literature at all, but essentially 
data l6, It is rather that Oral Theory do not 
appreciate or criticize what they tenn oral literature, but instead 'conect' it Where we 
may read written literature in to be entert.a.ined or or to gain insight into 
our own experience, and feelings. we expect from oral literature to provide 
us with something more specific but also much more mundane: how people in 
a particular society live and think. 
Theory is not anthropology and that researchers do not Assuming that 
think (or want to of themselves as anthropologists. we may well be tempted to 
the question as the aim of this study by reducing (or denying) the anthropological 
in favour of the literary, saying something like 'literature is literature, some of it is written, 
some of it is oral', This would that the difference between and written text is 
a difference in medium, much as our differentiation (including for academic purposes) 
between, say, theater and little to do with questions of artistic merit per se but rather 
with matters of mode of production and technology_ And would this not refute the second of 




has to a greater or lesser extent been put forward by 
apart from the tendency towards 'othering' inherent in 
to 
theory, particularly so far as the latter has from area of textuality towards 
cognitive (Vail and White in this reS~Del::i talked of a 'psychologizing 
theory,17). But while the insistence that the oral can literary in the same way as 
written IS is a convenient argument - we do, all, want to play our role in 
breaking stereotypes - it is also, perhaps, a superficial one. For a start, it to a 
large extent denies point of view of the typical Oral ('critic'?) who is 
generally far less familiar with the oral as mode of literary than he is with the 
written, an unfamiliarity that reflects not merely lack of but also a form of cultural 
conditioning: the oral appreciation in terms of the the researcher's experience 
of other fields of artistic of writing has accustomed him to. By comparison, his 
activity employing divergent of expression is much more unified, On a purely 
technological level live and on-screen performance (film) may be as far 
1""' .. """'J"'n from each other as the oral from the written, but theater and film are much closer 
to other in terms of our determined appreciation of what constitutes than 
are written word to the oral (oral being not merely spoken - theater and are after all 
as well - but fundamentally unwritten or, perhaps more precisely, .. ""' ... , ........... by some 
or other technological instrwnent I9). Oral Theory has been 
jf we take with certain types of societies or 
our qualification of these societies as 
only. the fact remains that at 
with others. 
to modality of communication or 
of our thinking these same 
have , 'simple', 'archaic', 'less developed' etc. We may well not enjoy 
differentia.tion expliCit. but it would seem rather glib to pretend it was 
never reaHy 
What this study is to then, is not for Oral Theory to tilted towards the literary or 
aesthetic any more than it should towards the anthropological, but that it should, rather _ 
while retaining same subject maUer. i.e. oraJity itself along different 
lines. To paraphrase the OraJ Theory must move beyond notions of tradition and 
literature towards situating within the field of language language study. What 
we are saying is this: the difference of orality I warranting its isolation as specific 
object of study, lies not in the CIV'I""h, it represents nor in its mode of (' th t l.e. a 
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it is 'traditional'), nor does it lie in particular creativity it presents us with (as 
'literature'), but in the fact that it reflects a certain use of 
conception of language. 
deri ving from a different 
What would be the advantages of such a shift in 
is that the study of orality comes to replace the study of 
Perhaps the most obvious one 
(the study of a particular 
kind of oral 'text' or performance) with the study of oral verbalization in general, thereby 
doing away with a whole range of definitional problems that long beset Oral Theory. 
amongst these have been the relation between composition, improvisation and 
where to draw the line between performance and 'ordinary' use of language, the 
to be placed on the text-as-aesthetic object on 
~-'''V\_H'U practice on the other. In short, we basically 
"''''f'\/,\""""I those generally favouring a formalist I textualist 
one 
to more to an approach termed context- or n"' .. -r .... rrYI""np .. '_p •• n 





gain to be made in placing language opposed to text - be it 
as or as social action) at the centre of our perspective, is that it enables us 
to the difference we are ultimately concerned with in such a way as to avoid - at least 
to some extent - what we may call the evolutionist temptation. As Jack Goody has remarked, 
social (difference) is inevitably described not only in terms of process but as 
implying a judgment on our part21 . However we may choose to think oral text, 
and even if we insist on describing it 'on its own terms', this kind of evolutionist nPr·l1n~."t1 
is never far the formalist description of an oral text all too easily invites comparison with 
a text, which will in all probability show 
. A definition of the oral text as social practice same 
pitfall, albeit We may plausibly argue the 
to part of a social or historical dynamic, but this not come 
the evolutionist notion of an oral art that is definition 
functional, only culture being sufficiently 'detached' to be able to 'art the 
sake of art'23? hackneyed dichotomies of collective vs individualist, concrete vs 
are floating just below the 
The in circumstances, of locating the essential quality of orality in 
conception of language, stems, in fact, in no small way from what is frequently 
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to be one of the most frustrating of 
fully define what it is about. history of 
the history of new discoveries about 
sclenc;e of linguistics, namely its inability to 
linguistics' > Roy Harris tells us, 'is not 
unknown languages... [but of] conflicting 
views as to how we should set about the analysis of language'lA. Given our own theoretical 
orientation, we can think of language as being essentially signs (Ferdinand de Saussure), or 
sentences (Noam Chomsky). or acts of communication (John Searle). We may reject the one 
conception favour the other - no doubt in accordance with the intellectual fashion of our 
- but it will be a brave person who makes such a choice on the basis of some kind 
evolutionary criterion related to levels of complexity, generality or abstract 
course, even if we can have some idea of the kind of experience people culture 
have language, it is extremely difficult for us to know how they would of this 
expenence. can at the very best speculate about it on the of our own research into 
orality, but we shall most certainly have no reason to believe that their conception of language 
should necessarily be more 'primitive' than our own. We know that all the people of the 
world possess at least one language, and we know that all languages are extraordinarily 
complex, including 
'primitive'. We all have an 
that we may have been tempted to call 'simple' or 
view we all have a 
of using a language, and from that point of 
conception, whether conscious or not. The relation 
between the the can only be characterized by extreme relativity; so, for 
that matter, must the relation between conceptions of language. 
What can we for the purposes of Oral Theory. to be the definitive characteristic of 
an conception of language? In a word: it is au~Ii our study of what we call 
lS to have any justification, it seems to me most usefuHy derived from 
assumption that oral people do not see or visualize but that they it and 
represent it to themselves as sound. More fully than our own ............ ' ... 
could ever lead us to imagine (we most readily think of - even 
their constitution in graphic marks2S). language in its oral conception _ 
conception of language - is language that exists in sound. 
Hence the appeal in the title of this study to an 'aural 
of language 
in terms of 
is an auditory 
is vilal. of course, because linguistics is not about sound; if it it is about sound abstracted, 
so to speak, to its differential (the of sound you 'pick up' - perhaps more than 
actually - in distinguishing say, bin from pin, stick from stuck). Notwithstanding its oft-
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quoted 'doctrine of the primacy of speech', modem linguistics has, if not totally ignored, 
certainly succeeded in marginalising sound26• So we cannot say Oral Theory should primarily 
be the study of language and leave it at that. Once again, we have to be rigorously 
interdisciplinary, but instead of looking towards anthropology or literature (or psychology), 
we need to fundamentally incorporate into our reflection the one science dealing with 
meaningful sound (meaning not in the narrow sense linguistics has accustomed us to, but in 
a broader 'symbolical' sense): musicology. This brings us to what is perhaps our main 
assumption with regard to the oral 'auditory conception' of language: that it departs from a 
close association of the concepts 'language' and 'music' - an association linguistics, deriving 
from an essentially visualist conception of language, denies - which, on the level of meaning, 
actually amounts to an interdependence. Linguistic meaning as we think of it does not account 
for the meaning of orality. It is only reconceptualized as aural-linguistic meaning that it might 
do so. To this end Oral Theory, perhaps more than any other discipline, is in a position to 
give realization to the kind of cooperation between linguistics and musicology that has 
frequently been advocated - significantly not so much by linguisl~, it is true, but by 
musicologisl~21. 
A brief note on terminology may be appropriate here. Throughout the study I use the word 
aural only as a qualificative of linguistics, using 'auditory' in other contexts - auditory sense, 
auditory conception etc. Certainly, there may well have been other candidates for qualifying 
the kind of linguistics we are talking about, such as - most simply - 'oral', not to mention 
what, in the light of the collaboration between linguistics and musicology envisaged above, 
would no doubt have seemed perfectly logical, namely 'musical'. 
But quite apart from the fact that music as a concept is extremely difficult to apply across 
cultures (on these grounds I in fact frequently talk of 'symbolical sound' or 'meaningful 
sound'), I have been particularly wary of the common association of music with emotion 
which, in relation to orality, could all too easily lead to a kind of Rousseauian view of a 
'noble savage' to whom speaking and singing are all of a kind because his only needs are the 
ones 'to which the heart gave birth'28. The kind of complexity of meaning that J regard as 
distinctive of the aural-linguistic is eons removed from the 'passion' or 'feeling' which has 
been the hallmark of orality under Romanticism and its more recent gUises29• 
As far as the word oral is concerned, there is no real reason - though it misses the direct 
connotation with hearing or sound - why it could not serve the same purpose as the one 
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reserved for 'aural', especially, of course, in languages where the opposition oral - aural does 
not exist. As for the choice between 'auditory' and 'aural', it is by and large an arbitrary one. 
In the end the latter seemed to me slightly more elegant, while it also seems to convey 
something more than purely 'of the ear' or 'related to hearing', which I would like to think 
of as sound itself30. 
The study can seen as consisting of two parts, the first (Chapters I to 3) giving an 
overview of some of the major theoretical issues of Oral Theory in its basic guise of 'literary 
anthropology'. the second (Chapters 4 and 5), setting out how the literary anthropology (the 
'traditional literature' of the title) can be reconceptualized as aural linguistics. Some of the 
main points covered are the following: 
Chapter /: a reflection on the origins Oral Theory in the light of the Parry-Lord 
thesis and view of oral tradition and oral-textual form. This is followed by a 
broadly hermeneutic attempt at re-interpreting the Parry-Lord thesis in terms of what 
could, in the light of it, be defined as oral literature. 
Chapter the relation between anthropology and orality is explored, first in terms of 
general anthropological approaches to the study of oral texts, second in terms of more 
specific conceptions of the notion of tradition as it relates to orality within the 
framework of Oral Theory. The role played by the notion of tradition in Oral Theory's 
designation of a cultural 'other' is emphasized. 
Chapter the viability of the notion of oral literature terms of contributing to 
literary theory is discussed on two levels. The first level is termed 'modernist' in view 
of its concern with an oral aesthetic. Conceptions of the latter is reviewed both from 
a formalist (relating to the text-as-object) and performance-oriented (defining the 
essence of the oral text in terms of historical and sociological considerations) point of 
view. On the the 'post-modernist', the concern is less with an aesthetic 
of the oral text per se than with ways in which the oral text can be incorporated, 
alongside texts of Jiterate culture, into a literary paradigm reconceptualized as study 
of signifying practice, largely circumventing the modernist distinction between literary 
and non-literary text. 
Chapter 4: The COfISetmence of isolating sound as the essential feature of orality are 
discussed in the light of certain psychological associations with vocal sound, which 
translate into the postulated interdependence of thought and This association, 
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which underscores the notion of orality as mode of cognition, is questioned from a 
variety of perspectives. 
CluJpter The notion of an aural linguistics is explained in tenns of its underlying 
assumption of an auditory conception of language, as well as its interdisciplinary 
exploration of the language I music interface. There is, finally, a reflection on the 
characteristics of the aural-linguistic sign and its relation to meaning. 
As will be clear from this overview the present study covers fields that lie beyond those most 
commonly associated with Oral Theory. In addition to anthropology and literary studies (both 
dealt with in Chapter I, and respectively in Chapters 2 and 3), it touches on cognitive 
psychology (Chapter 4), as well as the disciplines of linguistics and musicology (Chapter 5). 
I cannot lay claim to a degree of specialization in any of these fields, and it goes without 
saying that much that has been said in relation to these areas could be far better motivated, 
and probably advanced with more conviction, than I have been able to manage here. In the 
end, however, Oral Theory, as many have stated before, is a fundamentally interdisciplinary 
field. Nonnally, of course. this interdisciplinarity is thought of as the collective contribution 
of scholars working within a given area of expertise. Occasionally, however, a single work 
covering a variety of fields in a relatively superficial manner can. at the obvious risk of 
offending the specialists. lead to a certain synthesis which may also be an insight. It is my 
hope that the present study can, on this basis, make some kind of contribution, not only to 
Oral Theory, but also to the way in which we think of those different to ourselves by virtue 
of their being 'less developed'. It has perhaps become more necessary than before to slI.ldy -
and value - what is oral not for its spontaneity, its concreteness. and its warmth of feeling, 
but for its organization, its abstraction, and its logic of analysis. 
At the end of a decidedly virulent attack on Jacques Derrida. particularly in regard to his 
'deconstructionist' notion of a primary writing". Robert Hall names Walter Ong' s Orality and 
Literacy as one of the 'best antidotes' against what he tenns the 'Derridian aberrations'. 
Dng's work, he points out. 'contains a sound and well-argued discussion of the relation 
between orality and oral-based culture, on the one hand, and writing, with its cultural and 
intellectual results, on the other·n . Certainly, one has difficulty imagining Derrida finding 
theoretical justification for a discipline dedicated to the study of an orality defined as such 
by reference to at least the relative absence of writing. At the same time, however. large parts 
J 1 
this study (in Chaplers 2, 3 and Chapter 4), constitute what is much a 
of Ong's influential version the relation between oral-based culture and culture 
or, as he phrases it himself, orality and literacy. Of course, Oral 
find greater theoretical a more clearly defined subject than in the 
writings of Ong. His willingness to questions of expression and to ascribe 
to the object of our interest 
whereas Derrida rather imperially 
does constitute a modality of 
processes of cognition sets it 
the line, Ong meticulously """',.1'1,.",,,,<, 
fundamentally different from that of writing. but this 
difference conveys - rather than determines· the mental process. In the end the Oral Theory 
we are trying to formulate can nO doubt be thought of as lying somewhere between the 
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See Harris (Roy), 1980:7-18. 
See in this regard particularly Seeger, 1977:434. 
Rousseau, in Gode (ed)., 1966:50. 
See Finnegan, 1977:3G-41. 
A second meaning of 'aural', deriving not from the Latin auris - ear - but from an 
original Greek meaning of 'breeze' or 'breath' is perhaps significant in this regard. 
See Derrida, 1967: 16. Aspects of Derrida's thought - and the criticism of it - are dealt 
with at various points in the study, especially in Chapler 3. 
Hall, 1987: 121. 
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CHAPTER I 
CONCEPTUALIZING ORIGINS ORAL 
1.1 Oral Theory and Tradition: Oral-Formulaic 
In The of Tales Albert makes the following 
after all has been said about oral composition as a technique of line song 
construction, it seems that the term of greater significance is traditional. 'Oral' tells 
us 'how', but traditional tells us 'what', and even more, 'of what kind' and 'of what 
This remark, the widely recognized status of The Singer of Tales as 'one of the classics 
in the study of oral literature,2 amounts, in a sense, to no less than an affirmation of the broad 
theoretical outline of Oral Theory as a 'new of its own,3, as discipline. 
What are the intellectual of Oral Theory? The so-called 'Parry-Lord thesis' has been 
widely seen as constituting 'founding moment', bringing about, the words of Ong4, 'our 
new understanding of orality'. Ong traces this development in history of the 'Homeric 
question': by what method was the Iliad and the Odyssey created, and how, given their near-
universal reputation as 'the truest and most inspired secular poems in the heritage" 
does one account for their 'received excellence'S? Dog points out6, 'each [had] been 
inclined to interpret as doing than what it conceived its [own] poets to be doing 
or aiming at', the point being, of course, that 'its poets' wrote their poems. The Iliad and the 
Odyssey were seen, somehow, as constitutive of our Western literary heritage, a 
entirely dominated by what is written. In this it is perhaps not surprising that the 
question of single as opposed to multiple authorship tended to dominate debates concerning 
Homeric question, debates that were rendered obsolete7 by the 'revolution' that followed. 
In the early 30's the American classicist Milman comes to the 'startling'S conclusion 
that every distinctive feature of Homeric poetry is to the economy enforced on 
it by oral methods of composition,9. It is the theoretical insight behind this discovery that is 
subsequently 'interpreted popuiarized'io in Lord's Singer of Tales, which offers a 
comparative study of the songs of guslari (ill iterate II Serbo-Croatian singers accompanying 
themselves on a one-stringed fiddle or gusle) and poems of ancient and Byzantine Old 
and Old French l2, 
What is theoretical insight, and what does it say about tradition? The Parry-Lord thesis 
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hinges on Parry's discovery thaI the ancient Greek poet had at his disposal, in the words of 
Foley", a 'diction' or 'poetic language consisting of substitutable "formulas" that enabled 
[him] to make his verses extemporaneously without having to depend on rote memorization'. 
This poetic language is further 'specialized' to the extent that it reflects a variety of dialects 
and archaisms!" The formula, defined as 'a group of words which is regularly employed 
under the same metrical conditions to express a given idead5 , is therefore part of a pre-
established repertoire of expressions, and is selected by the poet in accordance with the 
rhythmic requirements of the poem. As such the formula constitutes the main ingredient of 
Homeric poetry. The offshoot of this insight is equally important. The long-held view that the 
oral poet obviously had to memorize his poem prior to its performance can now be rectified. 
Thanks to the ready repertoire of formulas he disposed of Homer was able, Parry tells us, to 
compose the lliad and the Odyssey in performance. 
The oral-formulaic theory draws attention to the availability, independent of the initiative 
of the poet, not just of poetic form in a purely rhythmic sense, bul indeed of poetic content 
in so far as the formula (pre)determines actual combinations of words. What lies 'beyond the 
initiative' of the poet is, of course, tradition. The Iliad and the Odyssey, as Parry theorises, 
'were the collective creations of many generations of bards working not individually but 
within a poetic tradition' 16. As such, the main contribution of Parry and Lord's oral-formulaic 
theory (apart from proving that the production of lengthy oral poetry need not require vast 
efforts of memorization or rote learning) lies without a doubt in its reformulation of the 
relation between originality and tradition. As Ruth Finnegan 17 explains: 
[the] model of written literature with its emphasis on the text!8, the original and 
correct version, has for long bedevilled study of oral literature, and led researchers 
into unfruitful and misleading questions in an attempt to impose a similar model on 
oral literature, 
Through the Parry-Lord thesis, however, originality and tradition can now be seen as, in a 
sense, complementary, in so far as the oral poet is seen to make use of 'traditional patterns' 
(formulas) in expressing his own individual insights. Finnegan l9 , on the basis of Lord's 
research amongst the Serbo-Croate, puts this principle succinctly: 
The .ora.1 poet in Yugoslavia is always the 'author' of the epic he performs, by virtue 
of hiS Simultaneous performance I composition. But in another sense, there is also a 
multiplicity of authors: all those who contributed to building up the traditional 
patterns, the store of formulae and themes which the oral singer has at his disposal. 
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The oral-formulaic theory presents tradition, not just as a kind of background for creative 
acts, but as something basically creative in itself. It is in this sense that Lord20 can see Homer 
as not so much immersed in the tradition he is part of but as actually being the tradition. To 
paraphrase the remark by Lord on which we opened this discussion, 'tradition' becomes, in 
Oral Theory, the term of greatest significance. 
What are the limitations of this notion in so far as our understanding of orality as object 
of Oral Theory may be concerned? This question will be considered in detail in Chapter 2. 
For the purpose of the present discussion, we shall limit ourselves to those aspects of tradition 
that receive particular attention in tenns of the oral-formulaic theory. These could be 
described as presenting a dual view of tradition as, on the one hand, basis for creativity 
(transcending the ordinarily conceived boundaries between individual! original and collective) 
and, on the other, of tradition as mechanism which, in the etymological sense of the term, 
allows for information to be 'handed on' or 'transmitted'. (The latter aspect would In 
particular explain the oral-fonnulaic theory's preoccupation with technique and form). 
Finnegan2• situates the pervasiveness of the notion of tradition within the broad sphere of 
Romanticism, which provides, in a sense, the original impetus for interest into oral poetry. 
At issue is what she terms 'the Romantic stress on the significance of the "other" and the 
"lost"'22, which 'glamourizes' the oral to the extent that it is seen as manifestation of these 
notions. 'Oral tradition', 'oral literature', 'oral art', 'oral culture' (often under the collective 
labels - amongst others - of 'folk' or 'primitive,2J) are some of the most privileged 
characterizations of this Romantic yearning for what is perceived as different and exotic. 
To the extent that Parry and Lord's research engages the Romantic notions of 'other' and 
'lost' (the philological origins of the Iliad and the Odyssey had been 'lost' to Western culture, 
the South-Slavic guslari are 'other'), it would be difficult to deny the influence of 
Romanticism on Oral Theory itself. It is easy to imagine the seductiveness (in a 'Romantic' 
intellectual atmosphere already, in a sense, favourably disposed to it) of Parry and Lord's 
conception of tradition as 'a living, ongoing process,24, It may just have validated in a new 
way what was already fascinating. Many assertions as to the importance of Parry and Lord's 
research can be read in this light. Foley'S, for example, mentions as one of the (subsequent) 
fruits of Parry and Lord's pioneering work the demonstration that 'oral cultures are by no 
means primitive'. He continues: 
we cannot anymore smile benignly and admire the SimpliCity of the noble savage. In 
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the enonnous era preceding the relatively recent evolution of writing, cultures stored 
and transmitted all available knowledge orally, and they did so with considerable 
sophistication. 
As far as the lIiad and the Odyssey are concerned, this new line of research has, to again 
quote Foley26. awoken the academic world to complexities previously unknown: 
we have learnt that the Homeric epics served the society that perpetuated them as a 
set of oral encyclopedias, a digest of attitudes, beliefs, behavior patterns, and customs 
encoded in the exemplary actions of their heroes. Far from being simple folktales, the 
Iliad and the Odyssey chronicled the oral culture'S observations about itself, the kinds 
of observations that written cultures store in a shelf of reference books ... 
So much for the meliorative dimension of oral tradition as seen against Parry and Lord's oral-
fonnulaic theory. But in this 'new' conception of oral tradition there is also, in a sense, a 
downside. And it has, as we shall see, the effect of bringing into question this very complexity 
of oral culture that Parry and Lord's discovery seems to have uncovered. 
We have come to appreciate the ingenious means oral tradition devised, not just to transmit 
culturally important infonnation from one generation to the next, but indeed to stimulate and 
facilitate individual creation. (The oral poet expertly composes his creation in the course of 
performance). At the same time, however, the fonn through which this creativity becomes 
apparent to us (the foOllula), being part of what is essentially a ready~made repertoire of 
expressions (the 'diction' or 'specialized poetic language' discussed above) is, at best 
'standardized', at worst, as Ong27 wickedly calls it, 'devastatingly predictable'. Why 
devastating? Because Milman Parry's discovery has the effect of unceremoniously cuning our 
most classic poet down to size. Ong, perhaps more ruthlessly than most authors, emphasizes 
this anti-climax, in the process touching upon another very important 'principle' of 
Romanticism, namely 'that the way of putting the accepted truth had to be original': 
For the extreme Romantic, the perfect poet should ideally be like God Himself, 
creating ex nihilo: the better he or she was, the less predictable was anything and 
everything in the poem. Only beginners or pennanently poor poets used prefabricated 
stuffS. 
All modem notions about 'good' poetry lead us towards expectations of originality if not (as 
has become a cultivated ideal in twentieth century movements like Surrealism) surprise. For 
all his previously assumed greatness, Homer reveals himself, in the light of the oral-fonnulaic 
theory, not as a creator, but as an assembly-line worker with 'some kind of phrase book in 
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his head', 'stilching together prefabricated parts,29. So much for glamour, so much for good. 
And we see Parry's discovery (which, as we saw, was able to feed into romantic notions 
about the 'lost' or the 'other'), as in effect mirroring the paradox at the heart of 
Romanticism: 
.,. the paradox - often noted - that the [romantic] movement which laid such stress on 
the individual artist and his freedom should also be led to such deep belief in, and 
romantic respect for, 'tradition' and 'col!ective,30. 
In the Preface to their Power and the Praise Poem'l Leroy Vail and Landeg White draw 
attention to '[the] debate following Lord's persuasive presentation of Parry's theories', a 
debate which has been 'enormously influential, generating a large bibliography and 
encompassing many literatures, both ancient and modem'. That the field of Oral Theory is 
a debate is often obscured by the sheer domination of the oral-formulaic theory as its 
'founding moment'. Significant in this regard is the experience of one of the most widely 
travelled and critical researchers, Ruth Finnegan. She, as Martin Mueller'" points out, has 
more than any other researcher: 
[proved] that the Parry-Lord theory in its rigid form is a myth that does not fit the 
facls. She surveyed a wide range of oral literature, differing in genre, social function 
and geographical origin, and demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that it is 
impossible 10 identify a set of traits common to all oral literature, 
Yet, as reported by Vail and Whitell: 
[she] repeatedly acknowledges [that] she has no new theory to put forward and in that 
sense remains constrained by the tradition [the oral-formulaic theory] she is 
questioning' . 
At the heart of the debate amongst researchers of Oral Theory is what Vail and White refer 
to as 'ambiguities in Parry's original elaboration of his ideas', ambiguities which have given 
birth to 'two strikingly different - bul not necessarily wholly mutually exclusive - schools of 
interpretation, each claiming direct descent from Parry's work as interpreted and popularized 
by Lord '34, 
We have, in our discussion, drawn attention to a certain paradox in the oral-formulaic 
theory, which, simply put, pits the idea of an ongoing (creative) tradition against that of the 
rigidity (stifledness) of its expression. I believe that this 'paradox' overlaps with, and indeed 
accounts for, the 'ambiguities' referred to by Vail and White, which Foley35 describes as 'the 
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gamut [run by Oral Theory] of utility versus context-sensitivity - in other words, of 
convention versus originality'. More about this later. We also need to look at some of the 
forms this debate may take and, crucially, what could be said about oral tradition in the light 
of these. This will be the subject of Chapter 2. But before considering these divergences 
within Oral Theory, it is important, at this point, to deepen our understanding of its origins. 
This is particularly necessary in so far as the oral-formulaic theory itself (as opposed to the 
way in which it may be interpreted) is open to contestation. (We have already noted at least 
one author's discomfort in this regard). 
In treating of the validity of the oral-formulaic theoryl6 Finnegan broadly identifies the 
following areas of concern: 
I) To what extent is an oral-formulaic style indeed indicative of oral composition? 
2) Can the formula be sufficiently precisely defined so as to reliably constitute a 
(distinctive) feature of the oral text? (With regard to my use here of the word text see 
note 18). 
3) Must the oral text of necessity be 'composed in performance'? 
If the oral-formulaic theory provided the breakthrough in terms of our previously inadequate 
understanding of the mode of composition of the Iliad and the Odyssey (a.~ suggested by the 
debate concerning the issue of single versus multiple authorship), it does nol necessarily 
provide a criterion for determining whether or not a particular written text indeed derives 
from oral composition. :t;'innegan quotes two examples in this respect, the one from old 
English, the other from Xhosa and Zulu. While the form of Beowulf, an epic of the old 
English oral tradition, is highly formulaic, Benson37 has shown the same to be true for many 
written compositions of old English that show an equally high percentage of formulas. Closer 
to home Jeff Opland3i has found some examples of poetry written in Xhosa and Zulu to be 
as formulaic as the traditional oral poetry performed in the two languages. How seriously do 
examples such as these damage the validity of the oral-formulaic Iheory? Ong, who, like 
Foley, has insisted upon the oral-formulaic theory as theoretical framework of his 'orality-
literacy studies" finds Opland's observations to be perfectly in accordance with the oral-
formulaic theory. In connection with the reportedly formulaic style in which some Xhosa 
poets write their poetry, he remarks that' [itl would in fact be utterly surprising if they could 
manage any other style,39. (We can draw attention, at this point, to Ong's 'psychologizing' 
19 
interpretation of the oral-formulaic theory, which brings him to see the formal aspects of the 
oral text as reflective of a certain oral 'mindset' or mental disposition. This orientation lies 
at the heart of his differences of opinion with Finnegan and will frequently come to the fore 
in the following discussion. More about this in Chapter 2), The second of Finnegan's 
concerns, namely that of the definition of the formula, is without a doubt the more 
fundamental. We have already mentioned Parry's definition of the formula as 'a group of 
words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given 
essential idea'. The difficulty with this definition lies in its failure to provide a precise 'unit 
of measurement' for the formula, As Finnegan'" explains: 
Even if 'repetition' is taken as basic in defining a 'formula', there are differences 
between analysts as to whether the repetition is, for instance, of metrical, syntactic or 
semantic elements, differences also about how long a 'formula' can or must be, 
Of course, as any high school pupil knows, repetition is also an element of written poetry. 
Finnegan coins the phrase 'aesthetics of regularity,4l in this respect. This aesthetic, whether 
in the guise of paralellism, of 'paratactic duplication of incidents', or of, last but not least, 
'formulas' (however defined), is a constant of all poetry, not just the oral. Vail and White·2 
to some extent echo this idea. Quoting Finnegan, they remark that 'the Greek hexameter line 
for Homer has no equivalent in Africa'; whal is repeated in African oral poetry is not 
determined by 'metrical conditions") (as Parry's definition of the formula would have il), but 
by a variety of considerations that make repetition 'useful'. This apparent deviance from the 
Parry-Lord thesis is further complicated by the fact that these considerations are not 
necessarily a maUer of style or aesthetics, but may result purely from the physical conditions 
of peifonnance. The repetitions (formulas) in an African work song, for example, are there 
for no other reason than to 'provide a rhythm for communal labor, and the song [repetitions] 
lasts as long as the task does or until a different work song is taken up''', We are faced, at 
this point. with one of two options. We can, with Finnegan4\ come to the conclusion that, 
rather than being 'differentiated by a single crucial feature', the 'reality is far more interesting 
than if there were one special oral style'. (Even if this meant 'disappointment to those eager 
for large generalizations or abstract models applicable across a wide field'), Or we may 
obstinately refuse to be thus disappointed and, while not exactly in a position 10 formulate 
a clear-CuI formal distinction between the written and the oral lext, at least settle for a 
strongly tilted sliding scale between the two. The latter kind of reasoning is well illustrated 
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by Ong. to fonnula beyond 
'wider implications" Ong46 is 
definition of 'group of 
words' so as to loom in on to on the apparent 
parallel, mentioned by , between, on the one hand, 'standardized fonnulas' of the 
Iliad and the Odyssey on the other, its 'standardized : 'the army, the challenge, 
the despoiling of the vanquished, the hero's shield, and so on and so on', 'A repertoire of 
similar themes, Ong, is found in oral narrative and other oral discourse around the 
world'. And then the sliding scale, as an afterthought, appropriately in brackets: 
(Written narrative and other written discourses use themes too, of necessity, but the 
themes are infinitely more varied and obtrusive)4lI. 
But how valid find Parry's definition 
that the 'essential idea' .. v,,... ...... ccp·rt 
the formula? After briefly 
fonnula is subject to 'a kind Bynum' 
fictional [cluster] held together largely in the unconscious', Ong concedes, following 
Foley50, that 'exactly what an oral fonnula is and 
which it is used'. Yet, in the same breath: 'but... 
it works depends upon the n-grnTII'" in 
traditions to the concept valid'. The ideal of 
is ample common ground in all 
generalization or abstract .. ' .. 'UVA., 
is evidently not discarded. 
Or is it? a vehement attack on what they see as 'the notion of oral man' (to 
the n ... ·n ... " - notably as 'nt."'rn ..... t'~rI amongst others51 - would be 
Vail and White52 bluntly deny the relevance of 
poetry they have been studying: 
construct to the oral 
The oral poetry of south-central is not, in general, composed 
and essence cannot be understood through an investigation of the mechanics of its 
It is not dominated 'formula ' .... 
to the fonnula (the existence of which we can by now assume - to a or lesser 
degree - to a matter of 'the of the beholder'), its coronary 'composition in 
comes across as far more O)UO)"'VIJ to empirical observation. are indeed 
numerous oral poetry , in Africa, in which composition and 
are clearly separated, u .... '"'·"""" •• ~." .. J'" on the part of the nP.+n,,..,..,.,~ .. 
effort of memorization. Finnegan .... ,'v .. o " .. others, to the extensive study 
out by Andrzejewski and Lewis, who of Somal i oral poetry 
to many hours, sometimes even composing their works,s3 





Vail and White, whom we already quoted in mention Chopi 
migodo and Zambian kalela dance, together with a host of other songs • that are well known 
over wide areas or over long periods of precisely because they become popular'54. 
, for his part, addition to the above example of oral poetry, also quotes 
evidence from other the world, traditional Japanese Tale oj the the 
Vedic hymns of India, both of which are said56 to make extensive use of verbatim oral 
memorization. 
again examples of oral texts not to those on which Parry and Lord 
theory give to varying assessments of the validity of the oral-formulaic Of 
authors considered Vail and White's position is apparently the simplest; 
the oral-formulaic theory and find it regrettable57: 
Yet 
that scholars have been willing to work with a definition of oral literature [in terms 
of the oral-formulaic theory] that. through its stress on extemporaneity, must 
necessarily result the exclusion of so much African oral material. 
nature of Vail and White's rejection to be seen in a context. While it 
is true that their own provides them with ample evidence contrary to what the oral-
formulaic theory would lead them to expect (this is certainly Finnegan's case as well), one 
does the sense that their rejection of the oral-formulaic theory in particular (and, in 
of formalist approach in general) in the an 
conviction as to the form and 
analysis 
relation to the text than from their 
profound horror with the notional oral man they claim to have encountered in the theoretical 
postulations of Oral Theory. This broader context will be discussed more fully in Chapter 
entertains the possibility of the oral-formulaic theory being conditional 
upon the simultaneity of COlnD~)SltlOn and "''''',,.4',,.,,, ....... ,,, ... '''.'''', 
Yet 
wit 
[the] demonstration rote-memory need not be important in poetry has 
sometimes led students of the subject (myself included) to assume that it is never 
important. Parry and did not go as far as this .... 
immediately ........ "",rI",,<, fu)] evidence 'that works can be as implying it', to 
does not mean oral what is important is not the oral 
perfonnance but rather the composition during oral performance. 
Ong60 is content to concede 'the production of oral poetry or other verbalization by 
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consciously cultivated memorization is not the same as the oral-formulaic practice in Homeric 
Greece or modem Yugoslavia [Croatia and Bosnia].,,' (on which Parry and Lord based their 
conclusions). But the oral-formulaic theory holds true all the same in so far as composition, 
notably where it implies 'verbatim memorization' (the actual realization of which, as clearly 
illustrated in the history of the Vedas, is extremely difficult to prove anyway61) remains 
'formulaic', even if, in order to prove the latter, 'formula' is actually better rendered by 
'constraint'62. According to Rutledge6J, the compulsory musical accompaniment of The Tale 
of the Heike acts as a 'constraint to fix [its] verbatim oral narrative', while Francesco 
Antinuccj64 has shown the troublesome pre-composed Somali oral poetry to be similarly 
restricted, not by music this time, but by 'syntactic constraints'. Asserts Ong65 : 
This is certainly formulaic composition with a vengeance, for formulas are nothing if 
not 'constraints' and here we are dealing with syntactic formulas [which are also 
found in the economy of the poems Parry and Lord worked with]. 
]s this not a sleight of hand on Ong's part? We do seem to have moved some distance from 
Parry's original 'group of words." regularly employed under the same metrical conditions'. 
At any rate, Ong's conception of the formula as constraint clearly illuminates that side of the 
oral-formulaic 'paradox' mentioned earlier he sees as most important: rigidity of expression, 
which takes precedence over flexibility of tradition. A significant pointer in this respect, of 
which his discussion of the question relating to composition-in-performance versus prior 
composition offers us a glimpse, is Ong's transposal of matters of expression (which is what 
Parry and Lord's research was concerned with in the first place) to matters of thinking. Where 
oral poetry involves verbatim memorization, it is, in fact, not so much the oral expression 
which continues to be dependent on formulas (or constraints) as the 'oral noetic processes,66. 
From oral text to oral intellect. In Ong's hands the oral-formulaic theory has indeed become 
a 'psychologizing literary theory'67. 
Finnegan says sometimes, Ong says yes, Vail and White say no. To this we may add 
Folel' who, in a work published in 1990, regrets the simplistiC way in which the oral-
formulaic theory has been applied, necessitating it '[toJ be abandoned (at least in its present 
form)': 
The formulaic test as it has generally been carried out cannot prove oral provenance, 
for as long as scholars commit the egregious philological sin of importing models and 
definitions directly from ancient Greek to other poetries without taking account of 
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necessary differences in prosody and nothing can be proved. By 
counterposing Homeric phraseology to the diction of Old English, Old French, or 
whatever other poetry one chooses as comparand, without making adjustment for the 
individual characteristics of each poetry. one simply the extent to which the 
compared work is composed of Homeric 
All these strands of thought to 
of Oral Theory. But where does this 
under the heading 
with earlier, that the oral-
formulaic theory constitutes the latter's 'founding ? In advancing their thesis that 'the 
oral poetry of south-central Africa... is by a common aesthetic, a shared set of 
assumptions concerning the nature and purpose of poetry,69, Vail and White70 claim to have 
'set aside the theories that have dominated the study of oral poetry the last three decades' . 
No genera] appraisal of forms of expression no prof erred insights into oral style; 
these are obviously, to them, not what oral literature (Oral Theory?) should be 
about. This raises the question: have authors like and Finnegan, who - unlike Ong -
have been more than prepared to admit to the inadequacies of the oral-formulaic theory, not 
grossly overrated the importance of latter as conceptual impetus for modem research into 
the oral tradition? While Foley71 qualifies as 'the making of a discipline 
[called 'Oral Theory], the 'seminal work of and Lord' and its 'expansion ... from ancient 
Greek, Serbo-Croation, and, to a 
separate language traditions', 
'only a relatively small pel'cerlta~~e 
that continent's oral traditions 
that some of the 
White) 
of a discipline, at 
formulaic theory? Should 
of ora] forms and T.ec:nnlQllleS, 
other traditions to more than one hundred 
leUlel,ess concedes72 that, notably in the case of Africa, 
enormous amount of research and scholarship on 
shadow cast by Oral Theory'. Is it a coincidence 
oral-formulaic theory (such as Finnegan, Vail and 
not, in a very real sense, undermine 
of this discipline is considered to be the 
theory, in the face of an apparently 
been declared. if not actually ........ , ........... .. at 




peripheral) number of oral traditions? Finnegan may 
these 
closing her reflection on the validity of the 
are mostly detailed controversies within the oral-formulaic 
basic insights remain stimulating and fruitful, and the demonstration that 
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the oral bard composes with and within traditional patterns of various kinds will stand 
as a landmark in the study of oral literature. Provided that the more ambitious claims 
of some exponents are treated with caution, the Lord-Parry school provides a body of 
work which cannot be ignored by any student of comparative oral literature. 
Of course, we did remark earlier on in this discussion (primarily in reference to Foley and 
Ong, but also - and not least - to Vail and White), how Parry's discovery of the oral 
composition of the Iliad and the Odyssey was innovative and 'startling', and we saw Foley 
acclaiming subsequent elaborations (by Ong and Havelock) as providing proof that 'oral 
cultures are by no means primitive'. The temptation to seize upon this kind of assessment in 
our search for a fundamental consensus at the heart of Oral Theory is obviously strong. Yet 
once again Vail and White, as we shall see in more detail later on, will be loathe to go along 
with it. As far as they are concerned, the construction of a 'notional oral man' (on the basis 
of the oral-formulaic theory, and notably by those giving it a 'psychologizing' interpretation) 
ends up by presenting oral in exactly the same dichotomous relation vis-a-vis written (or more 
specifically, literate) as primitive vis-a-vis civilized74 • 
The tendency amongst theorists (Ong in particular), to characterize the oral-formulaic 
theory in psychological terms has been highly influential; a large part of it is also concerned 
with transposing these ideas on to the level of the societal I cultural. Eric Havelock is perhaps 
most often referred to in this regard. He argues that the Iliad and the Odyssey, composed 
through the extensive use of formulas, were instrumental, within pre-Platonic education, in 
'putting the whole community into a formulaic state of mind,75, Indeed, we may well ask 
ourselves how much of the enthusiastically acclaimed renewal the oral-formulaic theory is 
said to have brought about actually stems from what it has to say about the oral text per se, 
as opposed to what it could be extended to say about associated matters oral, from oral 
mentality to oral society I oral culture. The balance between the adjectives in the following 
remark by Ong76 is, perhaps, illustrative of this: 
[this] discovery [by Parry] was revolutionary in literary circles and would have 
tremendous repercussions elsewhere in cultural and psychic history. 
If Milman Parry's discovery, prior to its (rather problematic) hypotheses on oral composition 
and form, is to be regarded as providing a conceptual basis for a new field of study, we need 
to consider it as far as possible for what it is; within, so to speak, its original terms of 
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The notions art or oral are cardinal in this 
1 Oral Theory and Literature 
It is important to stress that I have no intention, at this point in our elaboration of the 
theoretical origins of Oral Theory, to problematize notion of literature per se. I want to 
the notion art I literature purely in so as it may constitute, in to 
Parry's discovery, the kind conceptual basis we set the to uncover. 
such the key to the literary theory against which I want to consider the possibility an oral 
literature is provided, not by literary studies, but, in fact, Oral Theory, or, more precisely, its 
central problematic of 'conventionality versus originality'. Crucial to my conception of art I 
literature is. therefore. the notion of creativity or even , placing my conception of the 
or literary within a humanist ('modernist') (much maligned, of m 
'post-modernist' literary at least in so far as I be led to a 
between the the non-literary. more ... ""r."" .. ~ discussion of the extent 
to which Oral Theory has, in realized the idea of the oral text as 'artistic' or 'literary', 
as well as the theoretical consequences this may hold, will be entered upon in Chapter It 
is then that we shall have occasion to revisit the notion of oral literature in the Ught of 
more recent 'post-modernist' perspectives on literature. 
If, in the wake and on the Parry's formulations, to use Foley's77 words: 
of have demonstrated similarities among ......... 1\, .... 
medieval and contemporary traditions, giving us reason to think, at least in the 
most general terms, an enormous body of 'oral literature' as opposed to the written 
texts on which most of us have cut our critical teeth, 
the most definitive contribution by Parry to the field of Oral would simply be that oral 
texts are artistic, are Hterature. But how does one promote such a 'foundation' in face of 
view (of which Vail and White's 'notional oral man' is perhaps most logical 
actually a dismissal art in favour of a 
model for the composition poetry'??!! A prerequisite, I would think, for locating 
the of Parry's discovery at its most fundamental is to avoid the temptation 
of simple equations or sliding definitions. This means that we to remind ourselves that 
art of tradition is not necessarily art of the peifonner which is not necessarily art in 
sense of a work of art. In other words, tradition' should not taken to simplisticaHy 
imply artist' or, for that 'art'. We need to carefully exactly where 
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in the broader field of orality (if anywhere), Parry's insight located oral art. 
Lord79 writes as follows about this art: 
We realize [now] that what is called oral tradition is as intricate and meaningful an 
art form as its derivative 'literary tradition'. In the extended sense of the word, oral 
tradition is as 'literary' as literary tradition. It is not simply a less polished, more 
haphazard, or cruder second cousin twice removed, to literature. By the time the 
written techniques come onto the stage, the art forms have been long set and are 
already highly developed and ancient. 
Earlier on, assessing the significance of a particular song undergoing changes in its 
transmission from one oral performer to the nextlID, Lord clearly has the oral performer share 
in the creativity of the tradition he is part of: 
... the picture that emerges is not really one of conflict between preserver of tradition 
and creative artist; it is rather one of preservation of tradition by the constant re-
creation of it. 
What Lord argues for is the creative character, the literary content inherent in the oral 
tradition, which makes the oral performer artist in his own right. More about the 'oral artist' 
and 'creativity' later. But to get back to tradition: can its being regarded as 'creative' suffice 
to fulfill the expectations of an audience concerned with 'art'? This seems to me an important 
question. 'Tradition', it must be remembered. no matter how 'real' or 'alive' we consider it 
as phenomenon, is, after all - as I shall argue in Chapter 2 - a conceptual/Dol used to 'make 
sense'. This is especially true within the framework of the academic discipline. Oral tradition 
is, then, essentially an abstraction, an ex postfacto reconstruction postulated by the researcher 
(who by and large excludes himself from the tradition) in order to account for particular 
aspects of a performance, jf not for the very fact that the performance has taken place. 
'Tradition' is therefore an explanatory term, developed by people who are by the very nature 
of their trade far more concerned with the resolution of problems related to an oral 
performance or 'text' (problems which they have formulated themselves - the Homeric 
question would be an excellent example), than with the actual appreciation of the latter. To 
qualify art as traditional is, in this sense, to have turned it into scientific data. Writing about 
the relation between the oral poet and his academic critic, Olabiyi Yatl puts it as follows: 
No communication seems to exist between the production I consumption of oral poetry 
and its criticism. More precisely, communication is unidimensional. When the creator 
of oral poetry and his academic critics are contemporaries the terms of the critical 
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exchange are unilaterally set by the critic. The poet is thus his status 
of creator to that of an informant. He can only contributions as required 
by the of the critic. 
One may of course counter, as regards the possibiHty of tradition the medium of art, 
that the audience (who, unlike the researcher, is part of the tradition) is not, for all its lack 
of an outside ...... ·" .... "i"t. unaware of the tradition. The spectators of an oral performance 
n .. "'."t' .... than what they see 
whose meaning endures over generations and which, in a very 
real sense to them, is of their society82. Werner notion of tradition as 
biospheres3 comes to mind this regard. Yet can our elaborated in Oral 
Theory) be the same as I believe not. "''''llVl'W of Theory, wherever he 
can never conceive of tradition in 'Traditional' always exists at a may come 
counterpoint to of the researcher, to the 'Western" the 'modern'. Were the 
, .... "'."' .... ..,"'r'" to be termed 'illiterate' or 'oral', the contrast with the researcher's own tradition 
literacy is immediate and inevitable. This is surely a presupposition of Oral Theory84 and is 
borne out by 
originality 
commentators, irrespective of which side of the convention versus 
they may align themselves with. therefore, that 'the oral text is art 
because the oral tradition is artistic' is, if not to hijack, to at undermine the scope of 
appreciation traditional audience. 
A to be made here corlcelm of audience to art. The only 
judgment on whether something constitutes in my view, that of the audience, an 
audience which excludes the researcher. Within this and seen in the light of our 
preceding observations on the question of the content' of tradition, the following 
remark by • made within the framework of future orientations of Oral Theory, 
is, a little idealistic: 
Of course, oral and oral-derived texts will not precisely the same underlying 
as such fully literary works as John Milton's Paradise Lost or James 
nor, indeed, should they. the coming years I would emphasize the 
of defining oral traditional art sui that is, of understanding 
on own terms. as it turns out, is well to 
that goal; having of such works in terms 
formula, theme, and story-pattern, we need now only identify the of 
unit~ .for. given ~or~ and tradition. I submit that this meaning must be found in 
tradition, 10 the continumg, extratextual of which any given performance is 
but one periShable avatar. 
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While Foley's caution to deal with the oral text on its own terms, to refrain from making it 
into something that it is not, is obviously appropriate, the fact remains that the 'aesthetic' 
uncovered following Foley's directive will not be our aesthetic, and, in that sense, will not 
be aesthetic in our judgment (in so far as we may at least be considered a potential audience 
of the text concerned) at all. Yet is it not our aesthetic, our conception of creativity and of 
art that has been underlying the conventiona1ity versus origina1ity debate? Also, determining 
the 'meaning' of a formula, theme or story-pattern smacks more of an anthropologica1 
(functiona1isf!l6) endeavour - what does this particular textual element tell me of the society 
within which it is found? - than of the artistic: how do I I we relate to if!l7? Not a11 meaning 
is necessarily artistic meaning. Instead of confronting the convention versus originality debate 
(or rather, as is our attempt at present, trying to find some area of agreement beyond it), the 
debate is, in a sense, skirted by recasting its major concerns in different terms. We are, in 
fact, invited to find that ora1 'art' is art, on condition that we agree to substitute our own 
long-held criterion of individua1 origina1ity and 'genius' (this is not the place to consider the 
validity of the latter) in favour of a to-be-elaborated criterion of convention-based harmony. 
A lot of interesting insights may be gained from this process, but they will not be artistic 
ones. 
Given the ambiguity of the notion of tradition, with regard to which the perspectives of 
researcher and audience are, then, particularly far apart, it could be advanced that the measure 
for an ora1 'art' must clearly He in the perfonnance rendered by the performer. At issue, in 
other words, are an actual work of art and an actual artist (or rather, of course, the possibility 
of a work being art and a performer actua1ly being an artist, depending on the audience's 
appreciation). 
We have termed the performance 'text' in the sense used by Foley (see note 18): 'an entity 
that exists both as a thing in itself and as a directive for its perceivers'. This text is heard 
(and, of course, seen) as an actual performance (such as the songs of the guslari col1ected by 
Parry and Lord) but a1so, closer to the common use of the term, read as the more or less 
faithful
88 
transcription of a performance (what Foley defines as 'ora1-derived texts,S9). 
Research done in Oral Theory (not to mention Parry's original doctoral thesis on the Iliad and 
the Odyssey) has of course been overwhelmingly concerned with oral texts for which it would 
be impossible to posit any individual artist. As put by Foley90: 
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the usual notion of context as a set of verifiable authorial facts enabling effective 
criticism proves largely impertinent to oral and oral-derived works of literature. 
This problem is, of course, bypassed in the Parry-Lord view of oral tradition in so far as the 
latter provides us with a model of collective authorship within which the individual (at least 
when compared to the Romantic notion of the artist) can be regarded as relatively 
unimportant. Yet this assertion, important as it is, can all too easily mask the obvious truth 
that the individual performer is not so much unimportant as he is unknown. The audience of 
a particular oral performance may well know the identity of the person performing in front 
of them, but a previous or different version of the text of which they are aware will in all 
probability be without such an individual reference. The literate person reading an oral-
derived text is, by and large, similarly in the dark91 . The oral text, in fact, overwhelmingly 
appears unaccompanied, its 'artist' being to a large extent subject to conjecture. This idea of 
an 'absent artist' as far as orality is concerned, is further enhanced when we consider the 
'truly' (in terms of the oral-formulaic theory) oral text, which is composed in performance, 
composed in text. Through the conflation of act of creation and object of creation, of 
composition of the text and existence of the text, the entire process of creation (revolving, per 
definition, around a creating artist) is, in a very real sense, collapsed into the text. The oral 
text can therefore be said to come across as an 'entity in itself in ways inconceivable for the 
written text, clearly abstracted from its act of composition92. In the case of the latter, factors 
external to the text (such as the 'artistic process', the identity of the artist, etc.) to some extent 
impose themselves upon the artistic appreciation of the reader (who may, of course - as could 
be presumed for the radical structuralist - choose to overlook them). Whatever 'art' may be 
conceived of with regard to an oral text, however, could logically not be located anywhere 
else but in the text. 
Of course, formalist or structuralist literary theorists will say the same thing of the written 
text. A (written) text owes its literary I artistic character to the fact that it is constructed as 
a 'special use of language'; the task of the literary critic is to lay bare the forms or techniques 
that bear out this construction, devices that are of necessity 'in the text'93. This formalist 
aesthetic is implicitly echoed by Finnegan94 : 
One of the qUalities of literature is that it is in some way 'set apart' from common 
speech or writing. This applies above all to poetry, where style and Structure are a 
kind of end in themselves as weJI as a signal to the audience of the type of 
communication intended. 
But the oral in the perspective set out above, no doubt 
formalist written counterpart. This is ironic, of 
spatial dimension by which a written work is 
novel, the short story, poem - all, at root, typographically 
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a better illustration of the 
for it so obviously 
as artistic text - the 
this pre-eminence oral art as text can be formulated on 
account of Nattiez's96 model of the 'symbolic latter (for our 
purposes, as having three 'dimensions', 
briefly the poietie (relating to a process of creation that may 
to summarize very 
or reconstituted), 
the esthesie to the construction of meaning on the part of a ) and, finally, 
embodiment of the the traee or 'neutral ' (which involves the physical and 
symbolic form). oral text merges poietie (creative process) and traee (object of creation) 
alongside the esthesie, which is the of the oral into a single 
performance by 
three-di mensional. 
"' ....... "'''''"'''''. As such, the oral symbolic act turns out to two-, rather than 
What implications 'collapse of the poietie' hold for the crucial 
to 'art'? been regarded as fundamentally ............ E various 
manifestations ""j:;'Ul,Ul'-' expression encountered by on their 
"'''''''''''''''' no verbal art, travels through illiterate which meant that these societies 
let alone any literature. Depending on the extremity of such a view, texts produced in 
such a society would as simply unworthy of study, whether a 'literary' or 
'sociological' perspective. This approach is termed 'dismissive' by . We have 
however also noted, in connection with the Romantic influence in different 
approaches to oral tradition, how such perceived artlessness, far from could 
in fact be 'gJamourized' as of 'the quintessence of emotional and natural 
spontaneity,98. But in a contemporary context (perhaps especially South African one 
within which I am 
emotionality of 
between the 
most well-intentioned99 affirmation 
comes across as paternalistic to say 
to oral tradition and the 'dismissive' 
which the oral tradition I text falls the evolution of 'civilization' (the 
in terms of 
definition associated with and literacyIOO), is therefore by and one of emphasis. 
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The general standpoint remained that the oral texl lacked art, lacked creativity. Finnegan 101 
explains this assumption as follows: 
On the extreme view, 'folklore' or 'traditional poetry' is a 'survival' from an earlier 
stage, a fossil preserved by unchanging tradition, not a part of functioning 
contemporary society or affected by conscious and individual actors. Even the less 
extreme view still tends to envisage oral poetry (under its categorization as 'folk 
literature' or similar terms) as communal or 'traditional', unaffected by ordinary social 
conventions and differentiation. This relates to the whole idea that such literature 
represents 'nature' rather than 'society'. 
If, as we assumed above, Oral Theory has at its core the idea of oral texts as literature, how 
does one conceptualize the innovation, against a background of broad dismissiveness (at least 
in so far as the study of the oral lext for its own sake is concerned), Milman Parry brought 
about? On the basis of our stated assumption we could say something like this. The original 
insight by Parry concerned a particular kind of text and the kind of consideration (or status) 
that should be its due. The text was oral, the consideration 'literary' or 'artistic'. But this 
would at best be an abstraction legitimated, perhaps, by our theoretical concern. In reality the 
process was quite the opposite. Parry's breakthrough came by virtue of his study of a work, 
the Iliad and the Odyssey, whose universal academic prestige!02 1eft no room for disputing its 
received status as literature. After careful philological analysis, particularly of the noun-epithet 
formulas used in its descriptions of gods and heroes, Parry was able, in Foley's words 101: 
to show with precision how these relatively large and unchanging elements were 
systematized by tradition and so made available to Homer and his fellows as part of 
a special traditional idiom. 
Having thus, in his two 1928 doctoral theses, highlighted the traditional nature of the 
Homeric poems, he finally came to formulate the vital linkJ04 (vital, that is, to the field of 
Oral Theory) between the traditional and the oral in his two 'Harvard essays' respectively 
published in 1930 and 1932. Parry himself mentions the decisive role played by Matija Murko 
and Antoine Meillet (under whom he had conducted his doctoral research) in leading him to 
this insight
105
• The link between traditional and oral is provided by the proof of necessilylO": 
the traditional is, in fact, of necessity oral in so far as the formula (for which the doctoral 
theses provided the theoretical grounding and which Parry has by now extended to the notion 
of formulaic system) 'serves the versificational and tale-telling needs of the poet composing 
in oral performnnce' lm. This can bring us to the following conclusion: Parry looked at a 
32 
particular literary I artistic text and found it to be of oral provenance. The written text he had 
analysed turned out to be merely a transcription of an earlier, 'truer' oral text I performance. 
This is, of course, an exaggeration. It is nevertheless important, for our present purpose, 
to consider Parry's renowned breakthrough in terms of, as it were, its fullest logical impact. 
With this emphasis on the originality of the oral text (in terms of Parry's findings). I am, of 
course, to some extent reflecting what has been the broad evolution of the field. As Foley 
explalns, studies in oral tradition have of necessity been constructed on the model of 'orality 
versus literacy', oral text as against the written. In agreeing with Kelber's critique of this 
. great divide' "'" between oral and written text. he nevertheless concedes (as does Kelber) that: 
such a powerful thesis was needed to break ground. to fracture the sinecure of textual-
chirographic thinking that reflexively dominated earlier scholarship!()9. 
We are equally concerned, at this point, with 'breaking ground'. and I am therefore 
deliberately setting aside, at least for the moment, the finer points of subsequent controversies 
relating to what, to a large extent, can be said to constitute the fallacy of a 'great divide' 
between the oral and the written. In this regard we have already noted the unhappiness 
surrounding a 'notional oral man' - more about this in the Chapter 2. 
There is another way of interpreting Parry's inSight We can relegate to 11 secondary level 
what he tells us about the traditional mechanisms of oral composition I formulaic character 
of the oral text (which appear so strikingly different to the mode of composition or form of 
the literate I written and have. therefore, tended towards controversy), and focus, instead, on 
what he says about literature and art. This amounts, in fact, to revisiting what was earlier 
referred to as the 'downside' of Parry's discovery, yet not so much to refute what was stated 
in relation to it (see Ong's description of Homer as an 'assembly-line worker', as 'stitching 
together prefabricated parts'), as to reconceptualize it in the light of what I have called above 
the pre-eminence of oral art as lexl. 
I! is true, as Ongl!O puts it, that Parry succeeded 'more than any earlier scholar' in putting 
paid to the 'cultural chauvinism' inherent in the general tendency amongst scholars. prior to 
his discovery, to 'impute to primitive l ! I poetry qualities that their own age found 
fundamentally congenial'. But does this mean that the 'received excellence' of the Iliad and 
the Odyssey is part of this cultural chauvinism? Must the fact that Homer's mode of 
production (if not his identityl!2) turns out to be radically different to what we conjectured it 
to be preclude us from conSidering the actual text as literature, as art? 
not seem to the question of 
that does Lord 113, Both of them situate the artistry 
art these 




formulaic conception of tradition. While the actual art of latter is obviously unconnected 
to the input of a particular 'creative' individual (if there is indeed question of genius it is very 
much confined by '[pre-]established lirrtits of 114), its most important ingredient 
would seem to in the fact 'artist' has, by way the formulaic Parry 
and Lord's research has brought to the fore, been more or less liberated 
mechanistic process of verbatim memorizatlon. It is in this sense, I would venture, that he is 
'artistic', that he creates 'art'. on this basis we can at best derive a negative of 
oral art: would be regarded as artistic I literary oral texts in whose production 
memorization by rote plays no role, or is at the most a rrtinor element. What is crucial, 
as we QU',,,,,,,,,,, saw in our .... "''''' .... ,,, .. ,,. on the validity 
oral performance but rather the composition during 
oral-formulaic 
performance' . 
'is not the 
note 59). 
An altogether more satisfactory conception of art to be gleaned from oral-formulaic 
theory situates the artistry of the performer in his ability, as Parry explains it (by way of an 
analogy with the mode of the Greek sculptor Phidias ll5), to '[fill] his work with 
a whole may well be the 'assembly-line worker' that Ong makes 
him out to be, but he combines the 'ready-made 
Foley'sl16 presentation of the sculptor in 
of oral formula 
analogy, to: 
a way as, to 
take into account the aesthetic heritage that in convention, patterns within 
which the sculptor far from being restrictive or even handicapping, are by their 
very nature filled with meaning, that meaning which they have through the 
and which they in the present 
conception of oral art as a collective could, I suppose, bring us more or 
towards what Tony 11 calls 'the universalising disposition of [our own] bourgeois 
concepts of art, literature and the aesthetic'. It can be argued that the oral performer, shackled 
by convention and, 
to assume the 
devoid of individuality, is for these very reasons well placed 
which elevates to a 'defining attribute 
118, The following characterization of .. .., •• UI'''' ...... judgmentll9 could in this way be seen 
to describe the position, not just of Homer, but also of his (traditional) audience: 
~or whe~ ~n~ is c,onscious that his delight in an object is with him independent of 
mtere~t, It IS mevltable that he should look on the object as one containing a ground 
of debght for all men. For, since the delight is not based on any inclination of 
Subject (or any other U ..... l:I...,...... 
in respect of the liking ".""£",,, .. 11 
personal conditions to which 
regard it as resting on what he may 
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feels himself completely free 
can find as reason for his delight no 
might party. Hence he must 
in every other person ... 
Quite apart from the criticism that Marxist in particular level1ed at the idea 
doubtful that Kant was in any way 
extent to which a conception of oral 
of a universal aesthetic 120, it is of course 
thinking of oral tradition when he wrote these lines. 
literature I art could be accommodated within the __ .,~,.,'~. (universalist or otherwise) of 
modern literary theory will be considered in somewhat more detail in Chapter 3. Suffice it, 
at this point, to reaffirm what we said earlier with .... " ....... ~. to the 'explanatory nature' of the 
notion of tradition and the inherent inability of the 'non-traditional' to conceive of tradition 
as a thing in itself. We may never quite have access to 
aspires to. 
Whither oral art? Our attempt at formulating the 
universality the oral performer 
contribution made by Parry in 
elevating oral to oral literature, worthy constituting a discipline, turns out to destined 
to if not actually to failure. 
moment, in fact. that Parry was 
the 'solution' was 
to 
right from start, from 
of a tradition and (of particular importance to 
on presumed ]iterate origins. But instead of 
the Odyssey as the 
....... ""1-"' .... turn his back 
characteristics of the 
art thus revealed (which is, to paraphrase Ong. devastatingly fonnulaic), and theorising about 
(problematic) consequences of these characteristics as the (apparent) artistry of 
texts of similar origin, we can follow a different route. We can take as our point of 
the fact that, at the time of Parry's analysis, the Iliad and the Odyssey had already 
been proved to be art. Moreover, it had acquired this status within our own (Western) culture 
through the very fascination that it exerted upon scholars and literature. Within this 
cultural framework (which is also the cultural framework within which needs to 
defined), a certain conception of literature has dOminated, latter is associated, 
if not with the extreme Romantic conception creation ex nihilo l21 (structuralism 
'post' -configurations have made such a conception seem ridiculously naIve), 
at with some kind of initiative on the part of an individual who is seen to author a 
exclusively recognized in this capacity_ It is 
a COltlCe:DUOI of literature that there can be a notion like , not to legal 
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construct of copyrightl2l. Against tbis background Parry's argument as to the totally different 
compositional basis of the Iliad and the Odyssey has the effect of unshackling literature and 
art from this association. As such, his revelation opens up the possibility of these categories 
being much wider than thought before. 
The question may rightly be asked whether the attention accorded the formula as indicator 
of oral composition (Lord's stated aim of 'quantitive formulaic analysis' 124 comes to mind in 
this regard) has not tended to obscure what was, after all, the real 'startlingness' of Parry's 
insight, namely that the Iliad and the Odyssey were the product of an oral tradition. Oral in 
the sense of not written was overtaken by oral in the sense of oral-formulaic, a shift 
commensurate, no doubt, with Parry's own initiatives to test his conception of Homeric oral 
tradition in the 'laboratory of South slavic oral epic tradition"25. Of course, no-one will argue 
that these initiatives were not theoretically called for. Foleylu draws attention to the likes of 
Friedrich Krauss, Gerhard Geseman and in particular MaUja Murko (to mention only 
researchers working on the South-Slavic oral tradition) as having been instrumental in 
orienting Parry towards testing his hypotheses concerning the oral-traditional origins of a 
classical 'dead-language' text against the observable reality of actual performances in a living 
tradition. But in introducing this comparative technique, which sees him move from the 
positing of orality on a basis of formulaic form towards the derivation of formulaic form from 
an observed basis of orality, Parry crosses an important threshold: the philological gives way 
to the anthropological. Parry's 1933 article on whole formulaic verses in Homeric and South 
Slavic epic, in which he 'shows how a verifiably oral traditional phraseOlogy operates in 
much the same way as does Homeric phraseology' and which can be regarded as 'the first 
visible sign of [his] engagement with the living analogue', is consequently of special 
significance. Foleyll1 summarizes its procedure as follows: 
The investigation is at root philological, in that it takes its cue from an analysis of the 
two traditional idioms, but the comparative dimension adds considerable weight to the 
argument, and soon the anthropological aspect behind that comparison would figure 
importantly in Oral Theory. 
We have interpreted Parry's breakthrough as consisting in his implied assertion that art I 
literature could also be oral. The possibility of a category of texts regarded as 'literature' 
having a much broader compositional basis than previously considered is opened up in the 
process. Of course, reversing the argument, one could also take this as meaning that texts 
previously exc1uded from (on the grounds of deriving from a hitherto 
of composition) could in fact come to be regarded as such. This is patently not the 
though, as saying that such texts should be thus qua1ified. Why not? Because attempt at 
(re-)categorizing a text in terms aesthetics would need to take into account, aside from its 
compositional origins (important as these may be), the actual way in which audience of 
the text relates to it, I.Jl\,;-\,..j(lIcl. ..... " it, 'gives it meaning'. In other words, one to sensitive 
to the text's 'horizons 
describe the 
criteria will help 
a tragedy or a 
regarded as poetic 
languages. 
. These, according to Selden 128: 
use to judge literary texts in any 
... _ ...... '" how to judge a poem as for an or 
in a more cover what is to be 
or literary as opposed to unpoetic or non-literary uses of 
It is in the Ught of 
problematic. Whatever 
earlier hypotheses 
consideration that Parry's foray into the amnn)DCI10Ii:UCru I)ecclmt:s 
'proof furnished by the Serbo-Croate oral regarding his 
the Iliad and the Odyssey, this could on the perceived 
relation between oral composition and fonnulaic style only. The 
by Albert Lord in his South-Slavic field-work in 1934, who was to 
no doubt imagine the conditions of 
(Parry was joined 
it after Parry's 
of the Serbo-death the following 
Croate epics to similar to those of the Iliad and the Odyssey, at prior to the 
latter f"I'UTlmIHTj:'r! to writing. (Who makes up an and actually occasions 
a perfonnance 
way to suspect that 
important indicators in 
epics could be subject, from the point of 
was surely no 
audience, to 
'horizons expectations' even remotely similar to those that, throughout the ages and most 
notably in ours, had bestowed upon the Homeric poems their 
Macherey has followed the same line of argument, observing that 
for us to what it must have been for its contemporary 'readers' 
we ourselves had written it'131, 
. Pierre 
Iliad was so different 
that 'it was as if 
In making point I am, of course, reaffirming the opinion Yai quoted earlier: 'no 




distinction between the oral-derived text note 89) and the oral text, 
to our argument thus far, now hP£'nn~ .. important. For while 
"""'''Art for the oral-derived be virtually identical (as is 
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Homeric poems and the oral epics of and Bosnia), the horizons of expectation 
to which the oral and oral-derived texts are subject in all probability differ radically. I shall 
not attempt here to describe the and built around the Iliad and the 
Odyssey in Western society. other than to point to the fact that these have tended. with the 
passage of time. to overwhelmingly formulated in the context of study (defined by Ong 
as 'extended sequential 
cry from the gatherings at 
continued to serve as the only context 
is more, institutionalised study. This is a far 
home, in the coffee house or in the tavern which 
texts of Serbo-Croatia I were 
'received' at the time of 
These gatherings took 
the objective of 
leisure from the work in the fields' 133 with 
where scholarly study of a classical text turns out to 
entertaining it is pretty much an bonus. One may well feel a certain satisfaction 
at having 'struggled through it' (we shall return to the notion of pleasure in Chapter 3), but 
the objective is inevitably tied not merely with the idea of personal advancement, but 
indeed measureable personal advancement: the mark in the upcoming examination or the 
material for the forthcoming or publication. 
Lord
l34 
evaluates discovery against the background of us having been misled 
'[f]rom ancient about the true nature of Homer'S art and 
the reason for this misconception 'that we have tried to read him in our own terms, 
which we have 
as a constant of 
same. Yet 
'Homer' at 
enjoining on him 
art"'. This assessment can no doubt be 
authors like Foley. Ong and Finnegan have 
is more an anthropological one than a 
In another, vastly context, 
modes of composition. To project upon him we would 
expect from artists our own society would be to condescendingly an anthropological 
the Iliad and the 
and particularly 
reality. Having this, however, have we not the right to 
Odyssey and to it in our own terms, as text? Are we not, as 
modem to contribute to the 'horizons of .... J'l.LJ .... "'lQ of texts? 
In asking this question we are, of course, exposing ourselves to bewildering possibiJity 
that the anthropological, the concern with the 'other' (with that which can only be perceived 
as being at a - in the final analysis - insunnountable distance), has displaced the philological 
(and with it the to the extent that the oral I oral-derived text is denied any kind of 
(modern) reader-orientation. is not part of the audience; he is definition 
not the 'possible reader' whom, as explained by Umberto Beo
135
: 
[the] author has ... to a model... supposedly able to deal interpretatively with 
the expressions in the same way as the author deals generatively with them. 
If the horizons of expectations of the oral text are definitively out of our (which would 
be another way of 
as a theoretical 
Theory) is 
about and 
in terms. This is 
oral text gives 
the Iliad and the 
that they do not exist), then our presentation of discovery 
as literature (conceived of as the moment' of Oral 
for Iliad and the Odyssey to 
and still to have no 'horizons of 
kind of contradiction that a rigidly 
if, on the other hand, we accept the 
seen read, thought 
of the 
of expectations' of 
- flowing from this - that our qualification of these texts as 
literature or art is as valid as that of any 'traditional' audience, we not once again swept 
the 'anthropological reality' that Parry confronts us with under the table? 
It is significant that Lord, in the passage quoted above (see note 134), talks about 'reading 
Homer'. Even if we 
anthropological 
how Homer composed his work, we (still) cannot 'read' him: the 
appreciating 
a 'genius' or an 
'horizons' in 
literature I 
between his world and ours makes it 
'artistry' he may (or may not) 
worker' is therefore to 
only basis upon which 
its manifestation as 'an entity that 
us to even attempt 
whether Homer is 
'expectations' of our own 
appreciated as oral 
both as a thing in itself and 
as a directive its perceivers': as text. paraphrase what we stated earlier (on the 
of Nattiez's model) with regard to the of the oral 'symbolic 
phenomenon': the compositional (poietic) dimension of the text is subsumed into a 
combination of the interpretative (esthesic) and (trace) dimensions. Whether 
an oral text is art is therefore determined by the I perceiver, or, more precisely, by 
latter's on the basis of his expectation of the text. To what expectations does the text 
give What kind of a response do these call upon on the part of the reader I perceiver? 
It is only at point that the notion of creativity becomes at all relevant: can the I 
resooirtse be creative as well? oral text is literature if it allows for a 
I original if response is not the I perceiver in a 
pre-determined. In other words, determining factor in distinguishing the literary from the 
non-literary is not, to whether Homer (the composer or poet) is an 
line worker, but whether the of the text is one. 
Given the prestige they have enjoyed in Western society the Iliad and are, of 
course, particularly 
While their particular 
oral texts in so far as their appreciation as art is concerned. 
as 'classical' texts indicative of a 'cultural heritage' 
is an obvious privileged position, there is a much more mundane and more 
immediate reason: written down before they were (finally) to be 
oral. 
The same reasoning should, of course, also apply to 
particularly that were written down a long time ago and r ... "" .. AT.""""" been received 
as part of a corpus of written texts (the case of the It is this factor 
more than anything which accounts for the greater enjoyed by the 'dead-
language traditions' as opposed to the 'Jiving oral traditions' within Theoryl36. The texts 
produced in a contemporary oral tradition are invariably as written texts by the 
researcher or field-worker. The latter may of course qualify 
literature' by analogy with the (written) literary text, and 
text thus received as 'oral 
does. Excluding himself 
analogy is, in fact, from the therefore blind to its horizons of 
the only option to researcher concerned with oral literature. We shall further consider 
this solution 3. Suffice it to at this point, that Oral Theory 
broadly understands the 'literature' of the oral in terms: the stronger the 
anthropological, the the Hterary. 
As manifested in the duality of tradition I 'living oral' tradition, the 
question of oral versus oral-derived is not without to the conception of tradition. 
More about this in Chapter 2. In conclusion to this chapter we are, however, now in a 
position to the preceding remarks on oral art I literature to the elusive 'founding 
moment' Theory. My argument in this boiled down to the foHowing: 
I) the controversial nature of the oral-formulaic theory's attention to form, 
2) 
basis of Oral Theory should rather be formulated around Parry's 
that we regard as literature I art can actually be oral. 
factor for art as 
as object and 
as is concerned is the text (which is 
expectations it to. 
3) 
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implicates the perceiver to the extent that he considers his to the text as 
oral-derived text is more susceptible to 
in so far as the researcher of Oral 
horizons of expectations. 
'Hterary' CotlceIDU<)fl the 
art I literature than the (purely) oral 
is more sensitive I amenable to its 
Oral Theory should provide us with a 
theoretical standard against which all oral texts could be defined in the same terms. The 
anthropological distance at which Oral Theory operates, particularly in relation to 
comparative study of contemporary oral traditions, however clearly precludes it from doing 
so. But to what extent does this conception of the theoretical origins of Oral Theory constitute 
an in comparison to the oral-formulaic theory as 'founding moment'? 
attraction of the oral-formulaic theory lies. in a sense, in the it addresses to: 
that stylistic form of In so far as it is able to provide a rigorous definition of 
the latter (which, as we have seen, is becoming more and more difficult), hypotheses that are 
made on the basis of oral-formulaic theory can be objectively , hence 'quantifiable 
.u .... "' ..... analysis', It is no doubt this the theory more than 
that has given it kind of far-reaching influence associated with the idea of 'founding 
a discipline'. 
Art lies in the eye the beholder. No matter how rigorously we may try to demarcate its 
area influence within a larger process of production (as the above summary should 
of the response wiH defy measurement. But if we take seriously 
Ruth Finnegan's view as to what is truly an unfathomable of oral texts coming from 
an ever-increasing number of oral traditions being brought into the realm of Oral this 
vagueness may, in a sense, be an asset. We cannot say, as justification for what we are 
doing, that all oral texts are artful and literary and at least as worthy of 
contemplation indeed as 'nr,I" (!f 11 O'U'" 00 , , as the art literature of our own society 
has been held to be (at least before the of 'post-modernist' literary theory). But the 
of the ultimately privileged oral text Milman Parry (rather than Albert Lord) presents 
us with, opens, at the possibility that other oral texts, from other, less prestigious oral 
traditions, could, different circumstances of reception, also be literature, also be art, 
is a advantage to relating to what we may call 'theoretical 
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coherence' done into oral tradition. An to the oral-fonnulaic theory 
as of Oral means, as we have seen - particularly in case of 
research in Africa - that a percentage of research scholarship into 
falls outside the scope of Oral Theory. Yet if we see breakthrough as essentiaHy 
providing a kind of theoretical space for the notion of oral literature, then all that 
deals with texts can be into line with Oral irrespective of the texts' 
formal or the (Jack of) concern lauer. 
In sense the Iliad and the Odyssey, texts of in society 
and not literate, but oral, serve as a kind of master metaphor for all other oral 
._n' ....... ""'" or 'purely' oral. comparison it invites not confer certainty. at least 
we are left with a virtual oral literature. This is a definite theoretical improvement on the 
common reflex to call oral texts 'literature' by mere analogy with our written (literary) texts. 
text is, after all, 
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2.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER 2 
ORALITY I ORAL TRADITION 
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Of greatest significance to the field Oral Theory is the notion of tradition. It was from 
primary insight that the Iliad and the Odyssey were traditional texts that Milman Parry was 
able to postulate that they were (also) oral. The idea of composition, which, in Lord'sl 
words, distinguishes the (truly) oral from 'ora] in any except the most literal , only 
came about because of its appropriateness to the traditional mode of composition I creation 
formulated by Parry on the of the formal characteristics of the Homeric poems. If the 
traditional text is necessity oral, it is because the oral is (pre )determined by the traditional. 
In other words, there is no orality that is not traditional2• As the traditional is already oral, 
the term 'oral tradition' is. in a tautology. 
We opened Chapter I with Lord's observation that oral tells us 'how', traditional tells us 
• what' . 'Tradition' can be said, then, to denote more than the actual oral text which it serves 
to 'explain'. It indicates a mode of being, a 'way of , of which the text will a 
traditional text the traditional artist, traditional culture. The reflection. Beyond 
traditional text is oral the oral medium best lends itself to expressing its traditional 
essence. The juxtaposition of tradition and orality in the title this chapter can therefore 
justifiably evoke the relation of substance to vehicle. Vital to the tradition (even exclusively 
so), the oral voice is at the same time secondary to it. It is this of the relation between 
tradition and oral medium that underlies Lord's3 reflection on the inadequacy of the written 
medium for the oral poet. The voice best serves the tradition: 
In putting a into Homer's hand, one runs the danger of making a bad poet out of 
him. The singer not only has a perfectly satisfactory method of composition already 
the highly developed oral technique of composition, but is actually hampered and 
restricted by writing. The method he knows came into being for the very purpose of 
rapid composition before a live audience ... Writing is a slow process even at best, and 
the oral poet would find it annoying, indeed, not worth the bother. 
Thus the oral-formulaic theory. In Chapter ] we noted a range of doubts as to the 
applicability of this theory in regard to its hypotheses on the specifics of oral form or 
technique, hypotheses which fail to address the ever-increasing variety of form exhibited by 
the oral text. Significantly. however. criticism of the oral-formulaic theory has to 
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confined to the latter's affinnation of the formula as compositional basis of the oral text. The 
overt interdependence the theory establishes between the oral and the traditional (in a sense 
the two are, in fact, equated - Lord asserts that Horner is the tradition) has gone largely 
unchallenged. Foley's description of the growth of Oral Theory as 'extending to more than 
one hundred separate language traditions' (as opposed to, say, one hundred separate 
languages) is something of a truism of Oral Theory. 
As a starting point for our assessment of the theoretical implications - for orality - of the 
notion of tradition, it may be helpful to consider a more or less 'general' (in so far as it 
addresses itself to the broad sphere of 'human sciences') definition of tradition. Michel 
Foucault' provides the following description: 
It [the concept of tradition) is intended to provide a determinate temporal status for 
a set of phenomena that are at once successive and identical (or at least similar); it 
[therefore) makes it possible to reconceptualize the scatteredness of history within the 
fonn of sameness; it allows for the reduction of the difference inherent in all 
beginnings, so as to extend without any discontinuity towards the ever indefinite 
assumption of origin. As a result of it [literally: ' thanks to it'] one is able to isolate 
all that is new against a background of pennanence, and to attribute its merits to the 
originality, the talent and the initiative that pertains to the individual. 
We can readily make out the essential assumptions of the oral-fonnulaic theory in the light 
of this definition. What is given a 'definite temporal status' within oral tradition is, of course, 
oral poetry (or oral texts). These constitute a ' set of phenomena' which are, on the basis of 
particular fonnal characteristics (the formula), seen as identical I similar in their 
successiveness. In the process all that could be conceived of as divergent can be 
(re)interpreted as manifestations of a certain 'sameness' - an essence which, we may advance 
here (we shall return to thi s point in more detail), tends to center around cultural stability . 
Parallel to these conceptions is the idea of the continuous pursual of undefined roots or 
origins extending ever further back into the past (remonter sans discontinuer dans 
I'assignation indifinie de I'origine), through which is absorbed whatever could be conceived 
of as 'new beginnings' or 'different'. Is it a coincidence that Parry's insight (he was a 
classicist, remember) carne about through his preoccupation with this original of Western 
civilization that is the Iliad and the Odyssey? The original, the 'classical', can only be 
conceived of in relation to tradition. 
The one element in the above definition that might, to some extent, seem to be at odds with 
the specifically oral tradition, is no doubt Foucault's View of tradition as providing a 
backdrop of stability and permanence, against which to offset the genius of the hero. The 
notion of 'author', let alone individual author, becomes largely untenable not just with regard 
to the oral-formulaic theory, but indeed with regard to the oral text as such (as was argued 
in the second part of Chapter 1). genius cannot be 'shown up' within oral tradition 
as something specific or individual; instead, the tradition itself is conceived of as 'creative'. 
Oral tradition can be about heroes, but it would per definition have little room for a Rimbaud 
or a Baudelaire (to name only examples from French poetry) who can said to have 
'revolutionised' or 'changed the course' of a particular type of literary expression. Literary 
heroes are written. (See Chapter I, note 91). 
Foucault, the philosopher of exclusion, of course questions the very validity of the notion 
of tradition. He suspects the latter, along with the other notionr by which (Western) man 
makes sense of his knowledge. to have become unreflective, a 'ready-made synthesis' 
obviating prior analysis. His objective of(re)theorising these notions requires a radical break 
with the very organization or coherence that these notions have come to imply, and engages 
us, instead, to consider them on a basis of 'scatteredness' and 'discontinuity' which may well 
be their true conceptual contenf. 
My concern in this chapter is by comparison extremely modest. The validity of the notion 
tradition as descriptive of a field of information (relating to the form, content and mode 
of generation a certain type of text) is not in question. What does make Foucault's 
conception of particular interest to our analysis, however, is his branding of 'tradition', 
beyond the information I knowledge it purports to characterize, as instrument used by the 
researcher for his own purposes. Instead of saying what 'tradition' means (or is), Foucault 
talks about what is intended by it (elle vise a), what is made possible by it (elle pennel, elle 
autorise) , what can done thanks to it (grace a dle, on peut). 'Tradition' offers a 
convenient means of classification of data, it is, as was already advanced in Chapter 1, a 
'conceptual tool', 
If this insight is to guide our exploration of oral tradition, the following question needs to 
be considered. What 'functions', apart from the general ones mentioned in the above 
definition, does Oral Theory specifically attach to the notion of tradition, and further, why is 
the notion of particular use to Oral Theory? 
The answer to the first part of our question is straightforward enough. Oral implies 
51 
(spoken) language, language implies communication; the oral tradition is concerned with 
transmission by means of the spoken word (as opposed to, say, transmission by imitation7). 
The primary function of tradition is, therefore, 'the transmission of the verbal elements of 
culture by oral means', conceived by Jack Goody and Ian Watt 'as a long chain of 
interlocking conversations between members of the group's. But this view of tradition (or 
rather, this emphasis on a particular verbal! oral kind of tradition) may well appear somewhat 
trivial. Communication (transmission) in 'face-ta-face contact' is surely a defining element 
of all social activity9 and in that sense can be focused upon by any number of the 'human 
sciences'. The 'tradition' of interest to the discipline of Oral Theory must necessarily be of 
a particular type. To say that the tradition is subject to transmission via the spoken word is 
not enough. The face-to-face contact that constitutes it must be a special face-ta-face contact, 
a special 'chain of interlocking conversations'. 
This brings us to what may, on the face of it, appear to be a circular statement, 
theoretically non-sensical: the transmission via the spoken word that delimitates the field of 
interest of Oral Theory is a transmission via the spoken word thai is oral. But the picture 
changes if we insist on 'oral' as having a special meaning not intended for 'spoken', a 
meaning that would take it beyond being the (mere) vehicle of tradition as characterized 
earlier in this chapter. Lord's much quoted "'Oral" tells us "how", but traditional tells us 
"what'" can, in fact, be misleading. The orientation given the term 'oral' within the oral-
formulaic theory relates 'oral' as much to 'traditional' as to 'spoken', if not, in fact, more. 
'Oral' does not only tell us that we are dealing with a tradition (exclusively) subject to the 
spoken word, it also elucidates the specific context (society) in which that tradition is found. 
It tells us 'how' and it tells us 'what'. 
A special meaning of 'oral' was of course already discussed at some length in Chapter l. 
The 'truly' oral is what is composed orally (composed-in-performance). The oral tradition can 
be understood, to paraphrase Goody and Watt's definition referred to above, as '3 series of 
interlocking performances I compositions'. (The performance is a conversation in so far as 
it provokes participation from the audience). But to regard this definition of oral tradition as 
constitutive of the object of study of Oral Theory would be wrong on two accounts. First, to 
limit the field of interest of Oral Theory to the relatively restricted number of oral traditions 
! texts lending themselves to the rigid application of the oral-fonnulaic theory implied in this 
definition would be self-defeating in so far as the constitution of Oral Theory as discipline 
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is concerned. (A more 'encompassing' view of Oral Theory was proposed in Chapter I, based 
on Parry's Homeric research yet avoiding the oral-formulaic theory as such). Second, it is 
impossible to postulate oral composition-in-performance on the basis of the observation of a 
particular performance (not to mention on the basis of the analysis of a particular written -
transcribed - text, the formula also being a feature of much poetry composed in writing). The 
person performing in front of you may well not be part of the composition-in-performance 
tradition. Lord 1o is clear about this: 
The collector ... must be wary; for he will find singers who have memorized songs ... 
In spite of authentic manner of presentation, in spite of the fact that the songs 
themselves are often oral poems, we cannot consider such singers as oral poets. They 
are mere performers. Such experiences have deceived us and have robbed the real oral 
poet of credit as creative composer... 
Oral composition-in-performance can only be advanced with anything approaching certainty 
after the study of a number of performances / texts, many of which may tum out not to fit 
the theory. Yet - and this is where the real 'special meaning' of 'oral' comes into play -
something would have attracted the researcher to the performances he observed or the texts 
he analysed before he considered their appropriateness to the theory in question. They are 
oral, yes, and they serve as the transmission of a tradition. But most important of all, they are 
expressions of what the researcher has pre-defined as a 'traditional' society I culture. The 
tradition of interest to Oral Theory is not so much a process of cultural transmission within 
a society I culture, as something (a particular set of data) by which a society / culture is 
qualified as traditional. If the substance of this qualification relates to both the terms 'oral' 
and 'tradition(al)', how, and on what level, is this relation envisaged? We shall attempt an 
answer to this question later in this chapter. First, however, we need to consider more 
pertinently the question of Oral Theory as study (theory) of the 'other'. 
In Chapter J we spoke about what we can now term a certain anthropological bias in Oral 
Theory, at least as it became formulated in and through Parry's (and especially Lord's) 
comparative research. (See Foley's description of Oral Theory as a 'literary anthropology'). 
The horizons of expectations of the oral text remain inaccessible to the researcher in so far 
as he regards himself as outside the tradition he is investigating. Our remarks above now 
enable us to take this exclusion a step further. The researcher is also outside the society, 
outside the culture in which the tradition is observed. If this society I culture is conceived of 
as inherently 'traditional', it stands to reason that the society I culture of the researcher is not. 
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In short, the one is different to the other, and it is this very difference that becomes the raison 
d'etre of the discipline. The researcher of Oral Theory turns out to be an anthropologist 
studying 'alien culturesd '; the discipline of Oral Theory is subsumed into the discipline of 
anthropology, 'dedicated to describing and explaining "their" cultures to "us'" 12 
I have taken what I identified as the 'anthropological bia~' of Oral Theory and, to use a 
well-worn phrase, 'drawn it through to its logical conclusion'. This is not entirely fair. Quite 
apart from important changes of emphasis within anthropology itself, tending towards the 
dissolution of the us:them dichotomy (if not completely so), the 'new understanding of 
orality' brought about by Parry's discovery has more often than not been interpreted as 
nothing less than a statement on the unity of man: 'Orality-Literacy Studies and the Unity of 
the Human Race' 13, reads the title of a well-known article by Walter Ong. Of course, the very 
same Walter Ong is castigated by Vail and White for the role that he would have played, 
within Oral Theory, in the theorization of a 'notional oral man' which, as far as they are 
concerned, epitomizes the hackneyed us:them opposition. Nothing better illustrates the 
complexity of the relation between Oral Theory and anthropology (or, more accurately, 
between Oral Theory and the conception of certain societies I cultures as 'alien') than this 
contradiction. 
It is through an exploration of this contradiction that we shall come to a fuller 
characterization of 'oral tradition'. But there is a more obvious (and, in a sense, less 
problematic) link between Oral Theory and anthropology, which becomes apparent when we 
disassociate Oral Theory from its oral-fonnulaic 'basis' so as for it to refer to the study of 
the oral text in general. A brief detour of some of the major theoretical approaches to the 
study of the oral text will clarify this link. 
2.2 Oral Tradition as Anthropology 
Ruth Finnegan, as we saw in Chapter 1, sees Romanticism as central to the study of 'oral 
literature', on which it has 'a profound and continuing influence>!'. Given the fa~cination of 
Romanticism with the 'lost' and the 'other' it is also strongly reflective of the evolutionist 
approach, in tenns of which 'societies progress up through set stages with "survivals" from 
earlier strata sometimes continuing in later onesoil . In tenns of Finnegan's analysis two 
elements of Romanticism stand out: 
A certain dissatisfaction (within Western intellectual history) with the 'extemally-
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imposed, mechanical and rationalist forms of the contemporary world', and the 
subsequent yearning for 'the world of organic and emotional unity' - echoes, in fact, 
of Rousseau's 'Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains'; 
The fact that the Romantic fascination for the 'lost' or 'other' is often accompanied 
by the assertion of a perceived national identity, broadly tracable to the French 
Revolution: 
The outburst of nationalism in Europe following the French Revolution and 
Napoleonic Wars ha~ often been remarked as one of the strands of Romanticism. 
Along with this went an emphasis on local origins and languages, accompanied by an 
enthusiasm for the collection of 'folklore' in various senses - what would now be 
called 'oral literature' (ballads, folk songs, stories) as well as 'traditional' dances and 
vernacular languages and 'customs', The political and ideological implications of this 
return to 'origins' are obvious ... l6• 
Alongside 'romantic and evolutionist theories' as approach to oral poetry, Finnegan also 
discusses the 'historical-geographical' school" (concerned with the tracing of the historical 
and geographical origins of the oral text), the sociology of Iiterature'S (concerned with the 
relation between the oral text and the society in which it occurs), and what we may call the 
'dichotomous model' approacht9 (in which the oral text is seen as reflective of a particular 
primitive 'ideal type' society understood in relation to a modem 'ideal type' society). 
In a detailed overview of 'the oral narrative theory' in relation to the African myth, Isidore 
Okpewho deals with the following: 
Evoiutionism20, which regards 'traditional tales' as reflective of 'an earlier world-view or set 
of ideas about man and his environment' (what Finnegan refers to as a 'survival'); 
Psychoanalysirt. which understands the myth as a manifestation of 'sexual wishfulfilment' 
(Sigmund Freud) or conversely, as a manifestation of the 'collective psychic substratum' (Carl 
Gustav Jung); 
DijJusionismn , which studies myths with a view to finding traces of cultural similarities 
resulting from historical contact and geographical contiguity between different peoples (see 
Finnegan's 'historical-geographical' school); 
Functionalism"l, in which the myth is seen a~ a particular societal need fOrming part of the 
'functional unity' of the society (see Finnegan's reference to the sociology of literature); 
Symbolism"". which considers the myth as a reference 'for a different and larger order of 
reality', a reflection of 'archetypal phenomena of mental activity' (Ernst Cassirer, following 
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lung); 
FOl7OO:lisml5, concerned with the classification of tales according to their 'morphology', Le, 
their 'component motifs' or 'functions', and regarded as crucial to any properly historical 
study of the origins of an oral tale (Wolfgang Propp); 
StructuralismU , in which the myth is conceived as 'unit of communication' within an 
unconscious cultural system analogous to Ferdinand de Saussure's formulation of the linguistic 
system (Claude Levi-Strauss). 
These approaches are reflective of three broad 'traditions of scholarship,27, namely the 
ethnological (focusing on 'the nature of human society in terms of the forms and ends of 
social activity' so as to 'draw conclusions about man as a cultural being'), the cognitionist 
(concerned with 'questions about the thought processes of man both individually and 
collectively'), and finally, the taxonimist (in terms of which 'the tale is picked to pieces to 
find out the units of ideas from which it has been put together and the order ... of relations 
into which these units fit'). While it stands to reason that none of the approaches surveyed 
owes exclusive allegiance to a particular field of scholarship2ll, a broad categorization 
according 10 predominant assumptions is nonetheless possible in most of the cases. The 
ethnologist field can be seen as chiefly represented by evolutionism and functionalism, the 
cognitionisl by psycho-analysis and symbolism, the taxonomist by diffusion ism and 
formalism. 
Okpewho also draws attention 10 a further distinction, relating 10 two 'generations' of 
theorists29, The first generation, which groups together evolution iSIs, psychoanalysts and 
diffusionislS, sees human culture 'from the perspective of individual units of ideas that [are] 
more or less disembodied virtues': evolutionists focus on 'elementary ideas', psychoanalysIs 
on 'mental symbols', diffusionists on 'motifs'. The second generation comprises functionalists, 
symbolists and formalists, and sees human culture in terms of 'related fonns' with a view to 
understanding either 'social organization' (functionalism), or 'cultural thought' (symbolism), 
or 'creative activity' (formalism). In other words, the ethnological, cognition is! and taxonomist 
fields of scholarship all broadly reflect the same movement. The myth I tale, first focused 
upon and analysed as isolated 'element' or 'unit' (phenomenon), subsequently tends towards 
being perceived as 'form' and analysed in terms of its relation to the society as a whole. 
Structuralism represents the fullest realization of this process. 
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How can Oral Theory as theory - deriving from Parry's discovery - be related to these 
approaches? Okpewho, unlike Finnegan, pays relatively scant attention to Parry and Lord, 
making no overt mention of the oral-formulaic theory in the work in question30. He describes 
as the 'burden,31 of Parry's research into the formula and theme of the Homeric poems (which 
he aligns to Propp's formalist endeavour of 'tracing the mode of arrangement of motifs within 
a recognizable class of tales') the demonstration that 'the oral narrator works with a limited 
body of material' (or - adopting a more structuralist tum of phrase in regard to the myth - that 
'the bewildering diversity of mythical motifs can be reduced to a very small number of 
schemes,32). Elsewhere33 he appreciates that Parry's philological concern 'for the subtleties 
(stylistic and otherwise) of a language' (despite 'the limitations of his statistical interest'), 
makes for a 'loyal' transcription of the oral text, and Parry is credited - perhapsJ4 - with 
showing a certain sensitivity to the aesthetic quality of the oral text. 
The association of Parry's philological method with that of formalism is, indeed, not 
without justification. Of course, the level of analysis generally differs. While Parry is drawn 
to questions of style, the form in which the tale is cast, its rhythmic properties as presented 
in the particular deployment of lexicon and syntax, Propp is concerned with the content of 
the tale, the identification of its constituent motifs as well as how they relate to each other 
in the development of the ploes. But the formulaic nature of Parry's oral expression also 
forms part of a more general formulaic system serving not just the 'versificational', but also 
the 'tale-telling needs' of the oral poet. The themes of the narrative are 'formulaic' as well, 
an insight that the formalist should find eminently useful. 
There is, of course, also the related matter of working with the text as lext. The taxonomist 
enterprise of 'picking the tale to pieces' should be broadly applicable to the view of the ora] 
text as 'thing in itself elaborated in the second part of Chapter 1. It is significant, in this 
respect, that Okpewho talks about 'creative activity' as object of understanding of formalism 
(when ethnologist and cognitionist enterprises respectively aim at an understanding of 'social 
organization' and 'cultural thought'). From this point of view formalism would no doubt 
come closest to establishing the kind of aesthetic horizons of expectations required in order 
to break down what we can now justifiably call the traditional 'otherness' of the oral text. 
(Let us not forget, moreover, the influence of formalism in modernist literary theory). This 
'traditionality' lies at the heart of Oral Theory's anthropological bias, a bias which we of 
course to some extent tried to circumvent in our attempt at locating the theoretical basis of 
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Oral Theory in its implied proclamation of the oral text as (virtual) literature. (See Chapter 
I). The initial impetus of Parry's research was of a philological or literary (formalist), rather 
than an anthropological (tending towards the ethnologist or cognitionist) nature. 
'Anthropological bias' can most certainly be the watchword for the 'oral narrative theory' 
Okpewho examines. One could argue, in facl, that the issue is less one of narrative theory 
than of anthropological theory based on narrative data. What unites the various perspectives 
is their neglect of what Okpewho terms the 'aesthetic principle' of myth in favour of an 
almost exclusively 'cultural' focus. 
Okpewho's book essentially concerns an elaboration of this (alternative) aesthetic approach, 
in regard to which he draws on G.S. Kirk's 'criteria' of laniary and ingenuitY6. His approach 
to the aesthetic I artistic character of the oral text follows a different path to the one 
elaborated in Chapter I, and seems to take little account of the Parry I Lord conception of 
what we earlier described as the 'ongoing process' or even 'creativity' of the oral tradition. 
Perhaps illustrative of this divergence is his assertion that 'myth is the result of the individual 
whim of the artist resisting the constraints of time-bound reality or the hackneyed resources 
of Iradilion,37, a view and a tum of phrase which - taking myth as oral poetry - it would 
certainly be difficult to imagine shared by Albert Lord. Did he not demonstrate that there was 
no such thing as a 'hackneyed' oral tradition? More about this later. Suffice it to remark, at 
this point, that the perception of a so-called 'primitive imagination' manifested in the 
anthropological approaches surveyed by Okpewho is at best one of ambivalence, with the 
ultimate stress being very much on lack of creativity_ Where a particular 'anthropological' 
reading of a tale does, in fact, point to creativity on the part of its originators I performers 
(Sir James Frazer's naturalist38 construction of the Egyptian god Osiris as a 'com spirit' 
implied, for example, that 'the "primitive" mind ... [had created] a fictive entity out of nothing 
and [endowed] it with the dimensions of observable life,39), such creativity is never integrated 
into a conception of the tale as art. This failure to take the aesthetic seriollsly is perhaps best 
summarized in the position held by structuralism. On the one hand structuralism can be 
praised40: 
by uniting a concern for the vivid details of life (ethnography) with an interest in the 
abstract structure of activity (taxonomy) in its search for the basis of human behaviour 
(cognition), it [structuralism] has provided by far the most challenging understanding 
of the most fundamental issues in cultural scholarship. 
On the other hand, however, Okpewho agrees with Henri Wald41 that 
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[by J reducing men to the station of a thing structuralism reduces time to the present 
and thus abolishes man's most human property: the freedom to contest and to create. 
Let us now turn to the 'cultural' aspects of myth as reflected in the various anthropological 
perspectives. Most outstanding amongst these would be the particular community's 'way of 
life' (ethnology) and its 'way of thinking' (cognition). Of course, the anthropological 
preoccupation shared by these approaches does not necessarily lead to the 'cultural aspects' 
supposedly illustrated by myth being evaluated in the same way. Appraisals of the 'other' 
vary considerably. Crucial in this respect is the balance42 between, on the one hand, the 
'parochial (or historical) imperative': 
the tendency to see cultural history in terms of individual societies or cultures and thus 
to explain cultural similarities across the world ... in terms of progressive historical 
contacts between one society and another, 
and, on the other, the 'universalist conscience': 
the understanding that human beings allover the world are united by one psychic or 
spiritual bond. 
The parochial and the universalist are identified by Okpewho as the two 'contending thrusts' 
within anthropological theory, at lea~t since the nineteenth century. They tend, to a large 
extent, to override the particular theoretical perspective adopted by the researcher. The 
ethnological cannot be regarded as per definition predominantly 'parochial', nor, for that 
matter, the cognitionist as predominantly 'universalist'. Even more confusingly, the two 
contTa~ting 'thrusts' (assumptions) do not necessarily give rise to similarly contrasting 
appraisals of the 'other'. We see, for example, the parochial (evolutionist) Herbert Tylor's43 
interpretation of what 'the history of civilization teaches', namely: 
that up to a certain point savages and barbarians are like our ancestors were and our 
peasants still are, but from this common level the superior intellect of the progressive 
races has raised their nations to new heights of culture, 
finding an undeniable echo in the universalist lung's (he elaborated the idea of a collective 
unconscious) qualification, on a visit to America, of people of African descent a~ the 'lower 
races' and 'barbaric''''. 
OUf appraisal of those we perceive as different to ourselves is not determined by the 
theoretical school we subscribe to, nor by our fundamental assumption as to the essence of 
human culture, at least as explained above (lying either in the universality of man or in the 
particularity of historical experience). Is there a determining factor in this respect, and, 
59 
perhaps more importantly, does Oral Theory bring any particular insights to the question? The 
pervasiveness, within Oral Theory, not just of the notion of tradition but indeed of traditional 
culture I society, obliges us, at this point, to take specific account of ways in which Oral 
Theory either confirms or modifies anthropological appraisals of the 'other'. 
2.3 Oral Tradition within Oral Theory 
The existence of Oral Theory as discipline is most often justified on the basis of the field of 
research inaugurated by its assertion of the particular nature of the oral text. This field of 
research would before either have been ignored as unworthy of study (Finnegan's 'dismissive 
approach '), or otherwise submerged in chiefly the fields of anthropology or classical studies, 
where the respective 'distinctive features' for purposes of academic interest would have been 
'cultural difference' and 'historical' rather than 'oral'. Given its variety of research interests 
(as reflected in Foley's 1988 overview of the history and methodology of Oral Theory - see 
Chapter I), any 'brief summary' of the field would no doubt be guilty of over-simplification. 
Yet, narrowly adhering to the much-heralded 'discovery' and its implications (Le. the Parry-
Lord thesis), I believe one could highlight two main areas of interest within the broader field, 
namely: 
the compositional basis of the oral lext in so far as it relates to a distinctive I 
alternative 'traditional' model of creativity, and, flOwing from it; 
the ways in which the stylistic forms of the oral text (deriving from its compositional 
basis) regulates or facilitates audience appreciation and hence, integration or 'uptake' 
into the oral tradition of a society, conceived of as its 'slore of knowledge'. 
At the risk, once again, of over-simplifying, the former of these concerns would be 
predominantly aligned to the literary orientation of Oral Theory, the latter to the 
anthropological. (The approach implicit these concerns is, of course, questioned by those 
authors emphasizing the oral text as social practice· this will be discussed in Chapter 3). 
Most of the work of at least some of the best-known authorities within the field of Oral 
Theory (such as Ong, Foley and Havelock) adresses itself to both of the above 'areas', which 
would seem to cover whatever theoretical justification Oral Theory may require. Yel there is 
a further justification, relating specifically to the perception of the 'other' (or what we earlier 
called the us:them dichotomy). Ong has been particularly adamant in this regard. 
We have already noted how he characterizes Parry's discovety as an undercutting of 
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'cultural chauvinism'. This relates, on a primary level, to the fact that Parry enables us to 'get 
into' (appreciate?) the Homeric poetry 'on this poetry's own terms, even when these ran 
counter to the received view of what poetry and poets ought to be'45, But Parry's 
demonstration has much wider implications, In his 1967 The Presence of the Word, while not 
exactly relating this insight to an actual (new) disclpline (in later works he will talk about 
orality-literacy studies), Ong is already in no doubt as to the enormity of the stakes, He 
notably qualifies Parry's work - as passed on through Lord and Havelock - as having the 
result 'that our entire understanding of classical culture ... has to be revised - and with it our 
understanding of later cultures up to our own time .. : 4". In short, at stake is a new conception 
of the 'other', whether it means those that have gone before us or those that are culturally 
different from us. (This distinction echoes the 'Romantic fascination' with the 'lost' or 'other' 
mentioned earlier). The qualification 'oral' therefore comes to extend far beyond the oral text 
or oral performer that were the primary object of Parry and Lord's initial research, 
I would like, for purposes of clarity, to isolate two more or less distinct elements in Ong's 
thinking in this regard, even though Ong himself will probably argue that the two 'elements' 
are interdependent to the point of being the same. First there is the idea of the oral (or oral-
aural) culture, in which the word, detached from any kind of visual representation or support 
(this conception will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 4) functions 'in its original habitat 
of sound'47. The most important effect that this 'state of the word' has for the culture in 
question, and which also lies at the root of its being different to our culture, bears on the 
relationship to time, and hence, memory. The 'purely oral' word cannot function (as it does 
when it has been committed to writing) as an 'aid to recall'; an oral culture possesses no 
actual records: 
In an oral-aural culture one can ask about something, but no-one can look up anything. 
As a result, in an oral culture there is no history in our modern sense of the term. The 
past is indeed present, as to a degree the past always is, but it is present in the speech 
and social institutions of the people, not in the more abstract forms in which modem 
history deals·S. 
Taken at face value (in direct relation to the oral-formulaic theory as discussed earlier), this 
passage does little more than provide an explanation for the formulaic nature of oral texts. 
If the past can only be accessed through 'speech and social institutions', people should 
obviously find ways to make their speech in this respect as 'memorable' (or mnemonic) as 
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possible. Under these conditions the expression of 'given essential ideas' (about, for example, 
the past) by means of groups of words 'regularly employed under the same metrical 
conditions' (Parry's definition of the formula) is hardly surprising. The formula serves the 
same purpose as the written record, and, in that sense, is broadly analogous to it. The 
'standardized themes' so characteristic of the Iliad and the Odyssey, which form part of a 
general 'formulaic system' favouring, in Parry's parlance, versificational as well as 'tale-
telling' needs, could be accounted for on the same basis, particularly where, as is common, 
they are accompanied by striking visual imagery. The latter is equally susceptible to recall, 
the 'ocular equivalents of verbal formulas'49. The particular kind of speech (text) Ong has in 
mind here is, of course, the epic (more precisely, the ancient Greek epic), which has been 
shown by especially Havelock to contain mnemonically patterned 'enclaves of contrived 
speech'sO through which, as Foley" puts it, 'the leanning necessary for the society as a whole 
is encoded' . 
What Ong tells us in the above-quoted passage is that the oral culture's different conception 
of history (and, to some extent, of knowledge) is attributable to the oral way in which its 
knowledge is stored. This is certainly an important ethnographic statement which, as Goodyl2 
has argued, may well be lhe crucial factor in the organization of society. However (and this 
brings us to the second 'element' in Ong's thinking), is it also - and, in fact, predominantly _ 
a cognitionist one? 
This is the crux of Ong's argument. Ong builds on Havelock's thesis with regard to the 
'rhetorical structuring,5] of speech in Greek oral culture, seeing it, however, not so much for 
its evocation of particular (oral) social practices as for its implication of a particular oral 
thought: 
In an oral culture the mnemonic procedures which we today ordinarily associate with 
verse are not only part of ordinary extrapoetic verbalization but actually detennine 
thought structures as well'·. 
After reminding us that the 'economy of storage' requires 'orally conditioned knowledge to 
be relatively rigid or typical', the link between thought and formula is made clear: 
The fonnulary character of oral performance is responsible for the development of the 
doctrine of the commonplaces or loci communes which dominated skilled verbal 
performance from oral-aural times until the maturing of the romantic age. The loci 
communes were essentially fonnulaic modes of expression derivative from oral 
practice and perpetuating oral psychological structuress,. 
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[!n Ong's 1982 Orality and Literacy: the Technologizing of the Word, a chapter dealing with 
the 'psychodynamics of orality,S6 brings thejde.a of peculiarly oral thought to explication ~~ 
advancing Ihe following 'characteristics': oral thought is additive rather than subordinativ~7; 
aggregative rather than analytic8; redundant or 'copious .s,} (it does not have an externalized 
"'line" of continuity'); conservative or traditionalis~ (oral thought lacks the freedom 'to turn 
itself to new speculation'); close to the hunuln lifeworlt:fl (it does not 'structure knowledge 
at a distance from lived experience'); agonislically tonetfl (rather than what one might call 
'disinterested' or 'neutral'); empathetic and participatory rather than objectively disumcecf3; 
homeostatic64 (rather than retentive of - let alone actually cultivating - what might be 
considered 'archaic' or somehow 'deviant' or 'curious'); situational rather than abstracfS. 
The 'oral man' against whom Vail and White have been warning us since the first section 
of Chapter I has finally arrived. The issue is not, however, to accept or reject him (depending 
on whether we agree that he exists), but rather whether - reality or illusion - he should have 
been allowed to board Oral Theory in the first place. If Ong opens the work in which the 
above argument is crystalised by a section entitled 'Milman Parry's discovery'. it is that he 
sees his own arguments as a logical development of the theory for which Parry is credited. 
But at least one eminent researcher, frequently drawn upon by Ong in the work in question, 
arrives at conclusions very similar to his, without according Parry anything like the 
prominence given him by the likes of Ong and others within the oral traditional field66 
(although he discusses Parry's research in connection with the 'oral' origins of the Iliad and 
the Odyssey). Author or editdr of, amongst others. works like Literacy in Traditional Societies 
and The Inteiface Between the Wrinen and the Oraf'7, the anthropologist Jack Goody does 
not feature in Foley's overview of the history and methodology of Oral Theory68, It may 
however be useful, at this point, to make yet another brief incursion into anthropology so as 
to place Ong's argument in a broader (and perhaps more satisfactory) context, and with it, the 
general question of OraJ Theory's appraisal of the 'other' (not to mention its understanding 
of 'tradition'). 
Towards the end of his Orality and Literacy69, Oog suggests that the 'less inviduous and 
more positive term "oral'" should replace the anthropological characterizations 'inferior' 
(Lucien Levy-Bruhl), 'primitive' (Franz Boas) and 'savage' (Claude Uvj·Strauss). which 
denote 'well-meant, but essentially limiting approaches'. Levi-Strauss's famous 'the savage 
mind totalizes' should become 'the oral mind totalizes '70, 1n his 1987 article referred to earlier 
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he repeats this plea: 
What happens when we substitute for 'savage' or 'primitive' or 'prelogical' or 
'inferior' or similar denigrating terms the term 'oral'? Basically, I would suggest, it 
can give us a new experience of the unity of the human race, diachronically and 
synchronicall/'. 
Ong starts with what is essentially a corrective of a 'misreading' of literature (Parry's 
discovery) and ends up by suggesting what amounts to new anthropological categories. Where 
Ong explicitly motivates his suggestion by reference to the 'unity of the human race', Goody, 
however, sees his own emphasis on the anthropological importance of the emergence of 
writing more specifically as a basis from which to rework previous anthropological 
oppositions between 'us' and 'them'. Cast in less idealistic, generally more 'low-key' terms, 
Goody's ideas reflect a mixture of his own observations made during extensive field-work 
(notably in Africa), as well as a strong interest in classical Greece, which he terms the first 
'Iiterate072 culture and (consequently) regards - linking up with Havelock13 - as offering the 
illustration of the 'implications' of literacy in a society. 
'Implications' as opposed to 'consequences'. In the introduction to his 1968 Literacy in 
Traditional Societies Goody thus 'corrects' the title of the seminal article written by himself 
and Ian Watt in 1963. noting that they had considered literacy as a 'potentiality' as regards 
changes in behaviour and social order rather than as a 'sufficient cause'. A recurring motive 
in Goody's work - one that is also recognized by his critics?· - is, in fact, his regular caveats71 
against the 'liberating effect' of writing (through the spread of literacy in a particular society) 
being seen as a kind of technological determinism. '[V]arious social, economic and 
technological factors' (unrelated to literacy) could assist this potentiality?6, just as many such 
factors could lead to it not being realized?? 
In the opening pages of his 1977 The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Goody 
unambiguously states the object of Ilis concern as '[the] way in which modes of thought have 
changed over time and space>1B. Crucial to our conception of change in this respect is the 
emergence of science, which (whether situated in Renaissance Europe, Ancient Greece, or 
Babylonia) 'is held to follow a pre-scientific period, where magical thought predominated'. 
The framework 19 adopted to characterize this process is howe\ler generally flawed in that 'it 
is either largely non-developmental or else simplistically so'. Goody's criticism recalls 
Okpewho's differentiation between the 'parochial' and 'universalist' perspectives. The latter 
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has to some extent gained the upper hand over the former, in so far as, departing from 'the 
appealing premise that all men are equal'so: 
anthropologists and sociologists ... have tended to set aside evolutionary or even 
historical perspoctives, preferring to adopt a Idnd of cultural relativism that looks upon 
discussions of development as necessarily entailing a value judgement on the one hand 
and as over-emphasising or misunderstanding the differences of tne other. 
At the same time, however, while earlier evolutionist and historical perspoctives (such as 
tnose held by Tylor and Frazer mentioned earlier) nave (rightly, one assumes) been sel aside 
in favour of 'functionalist and structuralist critiques ... [whicn imply] the necessity of proving 
rather than assuming difference' , dichotomies of the evolutionary kind have persisted all the 
same: 
... we nevertheless fall back upon a mode of discourse. a set of categories, such as 
primitive and advanced, simple and complex, developing and developed, traditional 
and modern, pre-capitalist etc. which implies change of a more or less unidirectional 
kind. Any resort to comparative work necessarily raises the evolutionary issue. Even 
specific field studies of contemporary social bfe in the Third World cannot dismiss 
the question of short-term and long-term changeSl , 
Having thus explained his own preoccupation with change (or, for that matter, difference), 
Goody sets about the task of justifying the development of writing I literacy as important 
anthropological variable. This he does by to some extent juxtaposing it with Uvi-Strauss's 
ostensibly non-developmental distinction between 'two strategic levels at which nature is 
accessible to scientific inquiry [as opposed to what the evolutionist may call two different 
stages in scientific thinking]: one roughly adapted to that of perception and the imagination 
["Neolithic"]; the other at a remove from it {"modern"]'!'. The Neolithic level, Uvi-Strauss 
argues, is as 'positive' as that of 'contemporary science', to the extent thai it presupposes a 
'theory of the sensible order... which continues to provide for our ba~ic needs'S'. At the same 
time, however, the Neolithic is distinct from Ihe modern. The former 'proceeds from the angle 
of sensible qualities' (the concrete), the latter from that of 'formal properties' (the abstract). 
Abstract vs concrete, concept 'liS sign, domesticated vs wildS<!. Whatever Uvi-Strauss's 
insights as to the fact that 'primitive peoples' are also 'scientific' (that they, as Brian StreetSl 
phrases it, 'do not simply construct words and meanings in relation to felt needs of everyday 
life [an idea anribuled to the functionalist Bronislaw Malinowski] but classify according to 
more general intellectual interests and concerns'), in the final analysis his non-evolutionary 
conception of 'alternative' levels of falls into the same dualistic as 
expHcitly evolutionist, dichotomies. Recalling his own field-work people of 'other 
cultures' (notably LoDagaa of Ghana), Goody claims to 'have never experienced the kind 
of hiatus in communication that would be the case if [he} and they were approaching the 
physical world from opposite ends' (as 
have led him to expect). He continues86: 
opposition of abstract to concrete could 
That this ex.perience is not seems apparent from the contemporary changes 
occurring in developing countries where the shift from the Neolithic to modem science 
is encapsulated into the space of a man's lifetime. boy brought up as a bricoleur 
becomes an 
key-word in all of the above is no doubt 'classify'. Goody seizes upon 
assertion as to the classificatory practices of both Neolithic and modem man in order to 
introduce the concept of language inlo the debate. '[The system classification, he 
advances. is surely .nn,,..r ... in the use of language itself and whatever potentialities exisled 
In primate world, it was this new instrument communication that vastly extended the 
.,;::::=--
process of conceptualization'8l~,oting that '[m]any have seen the deveiopment of 
languages as a prerequisite of thought itself'sa, the specific system of I 
conceptualization constituted provides, then. a more 'particularistic level' at 
which differences in modes of thought can be assessed, 
there is a C::PI",r.nrl key-word, equally important communication. Prior to its conceptual 
function. basic to all social institutions. to all normative behaviour,Si), 
Fundamentally it serves to communicate. It is with this principle in mind that the conceptual 
function can be seen as equally in all languages, and that Whorf's 
relativist notion, linking aspects of the world view and cognitive 
group to the actual structures of their language (this notion will be re-examined 
in Chapter 4), can 'deliberately [set] aside': 
languages appear to display few in their potentiality for adapt ion 
to development Whatever there may be in the language of 
'intermediate' and 'advanced' peoples, apart from vocabulary, these 
have little effect in inhibiting or encouraging social change90• 
At this point 
Thinking is a 
classification I conceptualization to communication becomes clear. 
thing
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, it happens in the of communication. Changes in mode 
of thought can therefore be studied, not in the light of differences between languages, 
differences between the means of communication of linguistic groups. To study the means 
communication is to study the 'technology of the intellect', a teGhnology in which 
as a means of communication from the oral - and particularly in its most 
alphabetic form - represents 
to terms with: 
for change that Goody has been at pains to come 
For those studying interaction, developments in the teGhnology of the 
must always be crucial, the next most important advance in the 
lay in the reduction of to graphic forms. in the development of 
we can see not one leap but a series of changes, many of them ,.. ........ "'1'1 
a process of diffusion that can reconstructed in broad terms and which 
in the relatively form of alphabetic writing in widespread use 
With the cognitive advance by writing (more specifically: writing having 
both 'internalized' on an individual level and 'widespread' on the level of society as 
process greatly facilitated by the 'relative ease' of the alphabetic system), firmly in 
we can now revisit our definition - provided by Goody and Watt - of asa 
'series of interlocking conversations'. We are in a position, in other words, to provide a more 
or less specific answer to the 
'tradition(al)' in attracting 
posed. earlier, as to the specific interplay of 
attention of the researcher of Oral Theory. 
and 
Goody Watt's characterization, in fact, only becomes equal to oral tradition if we 
attach to it 'in the general absence of writing' • or, for that matter, 
'in a we can also say: 'series of interlocking conversations 
in a traditional . We have reached the point us 
how, but "tradition" 
where 'oral'. in so 
more or less 
us what' can, at least to some extent, be stood on 
(neGessary) vehicle of the tradition, can be seen as 
by the latter, we now see 'oral' clearly transgressing onto 
'what' (the of the tradition. The face~to-face conversations that Ihe 
ora.) (or 'spoken') traditionjUnction differently according to whether the society in which 
tradition occurs is 
inconsistency -
permanent impact, 
or not, literate or 'oral'. Goody puts it as foHows: 
the cultural tradition functions as a series of interlocking 
which the very conditions of transmission operate to 
past and present, and to make criticism - the articulation of 
like)y to occur; and if it does, the inconsistency makes a 
is more easily adjusted or forgotten ... In literate 
interlocking conversations on; but they are no 
so far as writing provides an alternative source 
orientations it favours awareness of inconsistency~3. 
'Goody's main concern" Vail White tell us, '[isJ with 
non literate , oral man,94. concern is not with d..'Io1>'I;;.:'O';)llIl 
extent than Ong. see 'oral' and 'non-literate' (illitera.r:e) as 
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man's only dialogue; and in 
the transmission of 
impact of writing 
would, then, to a 
synonymous. (More about 
this later). What Goody says regarding the 'consistency between past and present' in an 
society of course, not new to us. It strongly recalls Ong's affirmation of the different 
conception history in an orru of its past being very much 'present'. Of particular 
interest, however, is Goody's ,.,.....,,' .. ,.,.'" of this idea into the COIlceOI of tradition. 
is a overlooked IS 
it depends on face-lo-face 
.... , .. ", .... ,,, tradition {oral in so 
is also a feature of literate society. But the 
as 
Iconditions of transmission' obtaining in the non-literate society causes this tradition to, in 
a sense, behave differently (in so far as it particularly favours between present 
past) to 
Of ....... 'II~'" 
of 1'1 .. , .......... 
tradition in the literate 
this difference between 
notion of tradition op.rlp.N:I 
the background of permanence' [isoler 
and non-literate 
allows for 'the 
can only be a matter 
of what is new 
nouveautes sur fond pennanenceJ (Foucault's 
definition), a permanence that is temporal, the past continuing into the present, also as far as 
we are concerned. But - and this is where Foucault's conception itself to be particularly 
simply. nothing that is new, useful ~ in case of the (non-literate) oral tradition there 
nothing to juxtapose against the tradition, nothing to isolate background of 
the advent writing. In 'reducing 
the possibility of records - see Ong's 
scrutinise discourse, favouring 'the 
what is inconsistent (or 'new') to the 
all-embracing. 
to graphic form I (thus providing man with 
point), writing makes it possible to actually 
in scope of critical activity,9S. In other words, 
tradition is made explicit crucially - given 
tradi tio n • s on a conception of ",.", ..... , .... - given actual durability. at least 
s ufficien tI y 
, ....... ~- .. " (if, actually. 
considered), the 
(especially) once has been achieved, earns the capacity of n""",.,.",,,. 
strong. sufficiently permanent, to effectively the old. When this 
because there are - as Goody and Ong acknowledge - other factors to 
present becomes distinguishable from the tradition loses its oraJity, the chain of 
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interlocking conversations (merely) the spoken tradition of literate society. The 
following would now serve to describe the way it functions: 
The content of the cultural tradition grows continuaHy, and in so far as it affects any 
particular individual he becomes a palimpsest composed of layers of beliefs and 
attitudes belonging to different stages of historical time. So too, eventually, does 
society at large, since there is a tendency for each social to be pa..rticularly 
influenced by systems of ideas belonging to different periods in nation's 
development; both to the individual. and to groups constituting society. the past 
may mean very different things%. 
In terms of its actual definition the most salient aspect of the oral tradition which is 
subject of this chapter is, therefore, its relative predisposaltowards consistency. By contrast 
to the literate tradition which, at the very least, can be said to allow for 'layers of beliefs and 
attitudes belonging to different stages of historical time', the oral tradition maintains a 
conceptual cohesion. It is in this sense that is best understood the 'tendency of oral cultures 
towards cultural homeostasis,91 asserted by Goody. In this regard Ong uses the term 
'structural amnesia'. which refers to 'the homeostatic process of forgetting or transforming 
those of the tradition that cease to be either necessary or relevant,98. We shall return to 
the concept homeostasis further on in our argument. 
Much of the criticism directed at Ong (somewhat unfairly perhaps) also reverberated 
on to Goody. Vail and While, while to some extent setting him apart as 'an anthropologist 
a record of field-work in Africa '99, and drawing attention to the fact (noted earlier) that 
~oody is concerned 'with the impact of writing itself (as opposed to characterising those 
witho~t ."!!Lting). nonetheless integrate his arguments fully into the intellectual lineage of the 
'notional oral man' which, through McLuhan, Havelock and Ong. they see as 'rooted in the 
unlikely field of literary criticism' 100. In his critique what he terms 'the autonomous 
model dOl of literacy. Brian Street devotes a separate chapter to Goody for the apparent reason 
that he regards Goody's version of the autonomous model as the 'most influential,W2. This 
chapter follows a first entitled 'Literacy and RationaJily' in which Street. primarily with 
reference to the field of education. strongly criticize\general conclusions as to the cognitive 
advantages of literacy. Somewhat surprisingly. he does not mention Ong at all. Yet he 
that 'other authors [to the ones dealt with]IOJ could have served the purpose equally 
well' and that his criticism should not be seen as specific to lhemJ04 , 
criticism against Goody and Ong is. at root, relatively simple. A developmental model 
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centred around the perceived evolution from the oral to the written (from the non-literate to 
the literate) is merely a continuation of 'anthropology's decades-old preoccupation with 
defining boundaries between us and them"05. The basis of comparison it introduces amounts 
to nothing but a rehash of previous (discredited) dichotomies and perpetuates the perceptions 
served by these, namely the division of the world between what is 'Western' and superior 
(civilized, modem, rational) and 'non-Western' and inferior (savage, traditional, emotional). 
Not just does it identify an 'other' in relation to an 'us', but it continues to term 'other' the 
very same people previously typecast as such 1M. The 'other' has not as much as changed 
seats. 
From this point of view the issue is not so much the implied new literate vs oral dichotomy 
as all developmental I evolutionist anthropological modeJs, which per definition depend on 
a 'value element'. We already know Goody's response. Change is inevitably described, not 
just in terms of process, but progress I rtI , All comparative work necessarily raises 'the 
evolutionary issue', irrespective of the terminology used to cushion the harshness of the 
judgment. Popular oppositions of the type developed vs developing, First World vs Third 
World come to mind. While sensitive to the dangers of a 'simplistic' developmental model, 
Goody, at various points in his work, disapprovingly refers to the denial of differences thus 
encountered as the result of either a 'diffuse relativism' or 'sentimental egalitarianism'los, 
'The challenge', Goody asserts. '." is not merely to criticize the existing framework (1M! is 
never very difficult) but to offer an alternative account that explains more,loo, Although, one 
feels, very much intended as criticism, the foHowing appraisal by Vail and White llO gives 
quite an accurate assessment of Goody's position: 
---A.lt!l~ugh critical of the long tradition of binary oppositions between us and them, his 
{Goody's} criticism [is] primarily directed. not at the fact of oppositions, but only at 
their absolute nature - their inflexibility - which [has) resulted in a neglect of dynamic 
sociaJ changes ... 
In contrast to Goody (not 10 mention Cng. whose views on the shift from orality to literacy 
as a 'fundamental turning point in human history,lll they clearly consider as particularly 
extravagant), Vail and White adopt a strongly anti-developmental, and indeed, 'relativist'1I2 
position. Predorrtinantly appreciating oral literature for the insight it provides into how 
societies 'cope with change, whether brought about by the presence of economically powerful 
Europeans or by other • some of their reflections this regard come across as a virtual 
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defence of the 'other': 
... we have found the notion of oral man useless. Instead, we have been struck with 
the flexibility of these societies, not their changelessness, with their openness and 
. h . . III sense of history, not t eu conservatism... . 
EqualJy critical of the 'great divide' established by 'traditional representations of the 
differences in thinking between members of different cultures,ll\ Street's analysis 
nevertheless manages to go beyond it in so far as he addresses the specifIC underpinnings of 
Dog and Goody's orality-literacy paradigm - what he calls the 'autonomous model' of 
literacy. In relation to Goody the following points of criticism stand out: 
1) The kind of 'purely oral' society envisaged by the 'autonomous model' (even if by 
implication), hardly exists. Quoting Finnegan Ill: 
... there are few, if any, historical cases where we have detailed and solid (as opposed 
to speculative) evidence about the processes of communication in a purely 'oral' 
society. It is in practice the 'mixed' rather than the 'pure' type that in one form or 
another provides the typical case and - furthermore - the available evidence for 
analysis. 
2) The process of 'forgetting or transforming those parts of the tradition that cease to be 
either necessary or relevant', which Goody associates with the homeostasis of oral 
,/ 
society, is far from absolute'''. Many aspects of communication in an oral 
environment point to the 'fixing' of definitions, meanings and historical knowledge: 
formalized patterns of speech, recital under ritual conditions, the use of drums and 
other muskal instruments, the employment of professional remembrancers'll7. The 
very basis of Goody's larger assertions (more about these later) as regards the logic 
of literate society being related to the latter's relatively greater capacity for storage 
(and hence, for deriving 'abstract' meaning as opposed to the 'immediate' or 
'concrete' meaning in oral society), can 1fJerefore be questioned. 
3) To see writing as favouring 'the articulation of inconsistency' (and hence. the 
development of scepticism or the ability to re-interpret historical fact - in short, the 
ability to be 'objective'). is to underestimate the role played by ideogical self-interest. 
The distinctions between myth and history reputedly made by the historians of 
classical Greece (Goody's 'defining example' of the value of literacy) are not of 
themselves reflective of objeclivityl18. 
4) 'Goody's claims for changes in perceptions of the past as II result of the development 
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of literacy in Greece appear to refer specifically to scholars and intellectuals 
rather than to the society as a whole"19, 
makes in regard to Olson, Hildyard and 
links up with an important point Street 
namely their tendency to ascribe 
to literacy the properties of 'analytic thinking' and , when the latter 
ities see point 3 above) only are, in fact, ostensible ideals (as opposed to actual 
the restricted ideological context of certain (academic) institutionsl20, The essay-text, 
for instance, is less representative of literacy than it is reflecti ve 07rtain 
political or ideological functions' within a specific contex:t l2l . 
Goody is himself very much aware these limitations to his argument - a readily 
acknowledged by Street - but tv .............. " .... "'''' 'proceeds to base fundamental far~reaching 
aspects of human reasoning and achievement on the distinction between and literate 
cultures'l22. Once again, we are drawn into a contestation of the developmental model per Sf, 
reminding us of 's. opinion (quoted above) that the criticism such a framework 'is 
never very difficult', If we could regard Street as more or O'r,,' .. rn''''.H with the oral -
literate paradigm (at least in so far as the latter may be an on previously fonnulated 
paradigms), then his 'criticism' would, course, amount to a refinement of 
But there seems little justification for such a view. Street's criticism of 
I 
the appears, at closer inspection/to be a criticism of the very notion of divide, 
of difference. His alternative 'ideological model' of literacy, which 
.. , assumes that the 
it is embedded;, .. (and 
have political and me:OIClll 
depends upon the social institution in which 
,,,-r,,,f'V can only be known to us in forms which already 
m 
is primarily intended to relative value of literacy, importance of 
the Jatter having been in the pursuit of ideological extent that 
this is always the case (here we get back to the 'value Goody talks about), literacy 
ends up being disqualified as anthropological variable. However, Goody's 
been project of 
less 
of difference. this 'disqualification' may well, one 
at this pOint, to Ong's 'psychodynamics of orality'. To what extent does Parry's 
authorise them? Vail and White, as we saw in Chapter I. argue cogently 
that the 'oral man' elaborated on the discovery (by McLuhan, Havelock and 
Ong), owes his existence (0 'ambiguities in original elaboration of his ideas'. On the 
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one hand, Parry stressed the formal exclusivity of the oral text and conceived of style as 'the 
form of thought'I25. On the other, he could describe his field-work amongst the South-Slavic 
oral (which. in our terms, represents the origins of Oral Theory's anthropological bias) 
as 'a starting point for a comparative study of ora} poetry which sought to see how the way 
of life of a people gives rise to a poetry of a given kind and of a given degree of 
excellence'I1.6. This leaves us with an oral poet or narrator who, in the words of Vail and 
Whitel17; 
'" is seen no longer as a mere 'memorizer', but as an artist, improvising brilliantly 
the formulas of his or her tradition. 
n ...... '...." than explore the 'brilliant' improvisational skills of the oral poet, Gng and olhers 
.,"' .... L..,U upon the particularity of oral fonn, equated it with oral 'form of thought', and made 
jump from oral formulaic expression to oral fO~laiC thOUg~ile ostensibly indebted 
to the oral-formulaic theory. one of the main consequences of this procedure is that the very 
notion of the formula as 'building block' of oral composition (which. on the strength of Parry 
and Lord's authority. is vital) lS considerably watered down, sometimes to the extent of 
retaining very little of its original formulation. From 'words repeated under the same metric 
conditions' it has moved to 'unconscious pattern [or cluster] of narrative and imageryd2&, 
From philological to psychological 'insight'. While Parry and Lord's definition of the 
formula is far too narrow to account for oral poetic expression in general, some of its 
subsequent definitions have been less inspired by the need to account for new philological 
data, than by a preoccupation to reflect the supposed characteristics of 'oral noetic processes'. 
This is to some extent illustrated by the 'psychological' application enjoyed by Ong's 
definition of the formula. As pointed out by Opland!29, Ong does away with 'the nebulous and 
subjective concept of "usefulness'" (crucial nonetheless to Parry and Lord) and makes no 
reference to meter. Finding little evidence in Xhosa oral poetry he surveys of Lord's 
'strict' definition of the formula (the latter is not as necessary to the Xhosa izibongi as it is, 
for example, to the South-Slavic epic poets), Opland comes to apply Gng's (much extended) 
definition and makes a significant distinction: 
Xhosa izibongo ... seem to satisfy more happily Ong's criteria for primary oral 
noetic processes than Lord's criteria for oral poetrylJo. 
Parry's discovery provides an extremely tenuous theoretical basis for the kind of 
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psychological theorising that Ong engages in. At the same time, however, it would be 
simplistic to contend that the 'alternative' interpretation of Parry (strongly favoured by Vail 
and White) should necessarily make the spectre of 'oral man' go away. In so far as we may 
take at all seriously Lord's emphasis on the notion of tradition, it seems to me inescapable 
that the field of interest he and Parry have opened up revolves around an 'other' perceived 
as distinct from ourselves. But does this 'other' necessarily have to be the 'dehumanized 
1m "I 11,131'1 stereoty pe own as ora man . 
At this point we may usefully reintroduce what we conceived of in Chapter I as the 
paradox at the heart of the oral-fonnulaic theory. An ongoing tradition, serving as a basis of 
continuous creativity, is set against the restricted nature - or 'stifledness' - in which it is 
expressed. Whereas Parry and Lord's oral tradition liberate creativity from its narrow 
association with the solitary individual pensively waiting on his Muse (to use a Romantic 
image that is still current), it at the same time confines it to a largely preset expressi vity. On 
the one hand we have what Foley calls a 'diction' or 'specialized poetic language', on the 
other the 'substitutable fonnulas' out of which it consists. The one eddies and flows, the other 
repeats. 
II is from the latter aspect - from the comparative restrictiveness of orality - that 'oral man' 
has been derived. The fonnula has served as theoretical framework for the 'psychologizing 
literary theory' developed by McLuhan, Ong and others, and the fonnula alone. 
Comparatively little is said about tradition, other than that it is something collective or 
communal by which individual behaviour is regulated. and. in fact. sanctioned. As such, the 
notion remains very much within the conception of a 'folk psychology'. Even if it is a means 
of transmitting knowledge and values. tradition is first and foremost an instrument for 
enforCing codes of behaviour. Little attempt is made. in fact, at distinguishing 'tradition' from 
'custom'; even if tradition is a means of communication (Goody's 'chain of interlocking 
conversations'), it is, above all, an inSlrument of censure. We are left with an image of 
tradition which is perfectly consistent with the restrictiveness of the fonnula. 
Yet this was most certainly not the framework adopted by Parry. He started from a certain 
manifestation of creativity: a text (which had moreover been attributed to an individual) and 
tried to explain how tradition had brought it about. What was demonstrated was how tradition 
serves as a basis of creativity, a creativity, it must not be forgotten, recognized as such by 
the long-held prestige accorded the Homeric poems within modern society. As such, the Parry 
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I Lord view, while not necessarily contradicting the tenets a 'folk psychology' (the 
demonstration after all, that the Iliad and the Odyssey were not created by an individual 
'author'). certainly provides a corrective of Wundt's concept, at least in so far as latter's 
extreme emphasis on restriction and constraint is concerned. 
'Oral man' could just as and - from the of view of Oral Theory, far more 
productively - from the notion of tradition as basis creativity. But while 'oral 
thus conceptualized I would contend, far from a 'dehumanizing stereotype', is still 
very much 'other'. It is in understanding what this otherness consists of that Goody's 
formulations - at those specific to - come in helpful. 
The otherness in question relates, in fact, less to what may be considered as characteristic 
of oral people, than to what may be considered as of oral society. What is 
'other' to us is social, not cognitive deportment If we accept the implication of an 'other' by 
Oral Theory (through insistence on 'tradition'), then Goody's quali of society 
as 'homeostatic' comes closest, I would advance, to presenting Oral Theory with an object 
of interest which - while different - is nonetheless within reach of the aesthetic appreciation 
m which the discipline originally its inspiration. 
t can, of course, be that Goody, albeit impJicitly, uses the 'model' of two traditions, 
one orru and veered towards homeostasis, the other literate and accentuating divergence, to 
account for the associated occurrences of individualism and logic, both of which he sees as 
originating in classical ....... ~ __ ._ 'soon after the ,,,,,,11,-,'->. for the first time, of a rich urban 
society in which a substantial portion of the population was able to read and writed ,12. It is 
at this point, I would that Goody parts company with Oral Theory, at least in as much 
as, from the relative or logic attributed to literate we may be led to 
infer the 'collectiveness' or 'illogicality' the oral. Admittedly sllch an would be 
undesirable from Goody's own point of view - it would be 'drawing the line too 
sharply·ll3. does Oral Theory even need to preoccupy itself with notions like 
individualism and I believe not. In so as Goody's detailed description tradition 
may serve as a kind of 'conceptual background' for 'creative' conception of tradition 
developed by Parry and Lord (not to mention as a corrective to the of a 'folk 
psychology'). Oral Theory has much to gain from him. But in admitting that Oral Theory has 
an anthropological bias orienting it around a conception of the 'other'. we should 
careful not to overslate this bias to the extent that it a barrier to our appreciation of 
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'other' (Le. of the other text) from the important literary I artistic point of view. 
The researcher who imports notions like individualism or logic into the of oral 
theoretical speculation runs the real risk of falling into very trap that has enabled 
US to avoid, namely of seeing the oral text as the product of a 'folk psychology' denying 
the very possibility of individual creativity, or - at an even further remove from what we 
perceive to be - as product of an illogical or irrational min~This would be 
contrary to project of Oral Theory. relative to from very much within 
Oral Theory. this is of course a risk that Ong has been prepared to take. 
What does il mean to that the 'other' (oral society) is homeostatic? Not that the people 
living in that society interact with make sense of world in any less logical or rational 
fashion than I people living in a literate do, nor that are - by reason their 
orality - any individualistic. Oral peopJe be just as wont to assert individual interests 
and ambitions, and to and cultivate peculiar socially quirks or 
eccentricities. As such, the oral society should exhibit as much of what could be , .. nn .. n 
as the society. 
A particularly interesting example of this individuality, which to a extent 
contradicts the view of oral as an inherently 
is found folklore of the JuJ'hoan. a hunter-gatherer 
around the northern part the Namibia - Botswana border. 
mode of cultural storage. 
encountered in a broad area 
reported by Megan Biesele':l4, 
Jul'hoan culture abounds with accounts of 'otherwise ordinary people' who have been 
'inspired' (in a religious or mystical sense) to perform certain songs which then 
communicate to the people as revelations from 'great god'. The people who have been 
thus inspired are known by name, and are widely seen as the originators of songs or 
stories concerned. even if may be difference of opinion as to the of a specific 
song as as considerable variation different versions. Richard leeDS relates the 'high 
tolerance for individual contributions' found in Jui'hoan culture to 
society. whose norms are enforced not by dogma but by the 
members', 
'egali tarian nature 
participation of aU 
While marginal may be equally present in both. oral and literate society will, however, 
not Iy accommodate it in the same way. The marginal will tend to juxtaposed or 
in the literate society following Goody. we can see relative durability 
of writing as a crucial factor), while the oral society tend to absorb or integrate it (see 
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the 'tolerance' of the JuI'hoansi mentioned the cultural equilibrium that 
Goody speaks of. An important qualification to be made here. To say that the oral 
society tends to absorb where the literate to accentuate should not necessarily 
mean that oral people are more literate people, a distinction commonly 
made aJongside other dichotomies. In is 'highlighted' in the literate society may 
also be what is ostracised. Literate not cultivate or applaud what is different to the 
norm any more than do oral people, 's tendency to integrate marginality could 
justifiably be interpreted as the of the two. To say, as we saw Goody 
strongly imply earlier, that literate society 'favours'. or 'is relatively disposed' to 
'inconsistency' (what we have now come to describe as the marginal). relates to the facilities 






down to, in the final analysis, is that 
to change. We can briefly 
so far as inconsistency (whatever 
comprises potential for 
writing. it acquires the kind 
form (can 'objectified') through 
durability needed to effectively impact on and the 
permanence of the 
makes it possible for the 
. ~ other words, writing favours change in so far as it 
to which social inconsistency has been relegated to be 
overcome in time. If sufficiently durable (which will depend, obviously, on a host of social 
and historica1 factors by which it may in acceptance and prestige), the marginal will 
eventually take possession of mainstream; change wjIJ have occurred. In all of this writing 
and literacy may well turn out to be a relatively minor element, but in radically transforming 
the relation of 
Theory with a 
expression to time, its role, at least in so far as it presents Ora] 
elusive 'other', is crucial. 
An 'other' who relatively changeless. This is clearly a dangerous thing 
to say. Many, particularly those critical of Goody and Ong, will tend to align it with the kind 




continent; it shows neither change nor development' 136. We can, in 
our argument by pointing out that 'change' refers, at any rate, only to 
to the researcher. The criteria by which change can be 
may well not apply to an oraJ society, for which such criteria 
not as yet properly conceptualized. Of course, this does not mean that 
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change does nOI occur in those societies. (Jan Vansina137 has clearly demonstrated how the 
oral tradition can serve as a source of recoverable history). While I believe that the conception 
of the 'other' I have set out above is far less reified than that proposed by Ong (and, to some 
extent, Goody), it seems 10 me unavoidable thai Oral Theory. for as long as it conceives of 
the oral text in relation to a specific tradition, will continue to be vulnerable to accusations 
of this eype. This is far from an ideal situation, and one for which we shall attempt to find 
some kind of solution in the latter part of this study. 
For Ihe time being, however, we need to face up squarely to the 'other' designated by Oral 
Theory. 'Any study of a comparative nature [and the researcher of Oral Theory cannot 
approach the oral text but vis-a-vis his own - literate - textual experience] raises the 
developmental issue', says Goody. Vail and White affirm with no less certainty that 
'anthropology's decades-old preoccupation with defining boundaries between us and them 
[has] waned' 138. While it is true that the framework for research into the oral tradition, in the 
light of developments particularly in anthropology (see note 138), has become generally 
relativist - the emphasis being on understanding the texts of a particular community within 
the specific historical and geographical context in which that community operates - it remains 
in many instances subtly connected with the question of economic I technological 
development (or the lack of it). The ghost of evolutionism is still with us, even if its influence 
could, to a large degree, be described as metaphorical. Two recent appraisals, made from 
different theoretical viewpoints, yet of the same 'other' - southern African hunter-gatherer 
societies - may provide some sense of this. 
We have already referred to Biesele's research amongst the JuI'hoansi of Botswana and 
Namibia. While clearly placing her study within an evolutionist framework 139, she is 
nonetheless sensitive to the impression of 'changelessness' this approach might create of the 
hunting and gathering society she is concerned with. After reminding us that the hunter-
gatherer type of economic organization dates back to the Paleolithic Era of ten thousand years 
ago, she immediately places us on guard against the implications of this view l40: 
Recognition of this fact should not blind us ... to the historical experience of 
contemporary hunting and gathering cultures. These cultures have evolved, just as that 
of Europe has, and great care should be taken in generalizing from present-day hunter-
gatherers back to the European Stone Age. 
The alternative to this kind of generalization is however not set out. The point is, of course, 
that even though Biesele is not overtly engaged in a comparative study, the economic 
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resemblance'41 between the JuJ'hoan of the twentieth century and the Paleolithic ancestors of 
modern Europe is simply too strong to overlook, even if the historical and geographical 
conditions are so obviously different. Under the circumstances-the above-quoted 'warning' 
can hardly be more than an expression of the kind of 'sentimental egalitarianism' Goody finds 
so unsatisfactory, which is less the result of actual experience or analys-is· (how the culture of 
the JuJ'hoansi has evolved 'jusl as that of Europe has' is not discussed any further) than the 
result of feelings of discomfort brought about by - inevitable - evolutionst juxtapositions of 
'us' and 'them'. 
Yet another hunter-gatherer society is subject to an evolutionist perspective in lohan van 
Wyk's recent article 'Dream Writing ol42, albeit in a more indirect way. Similar to Biesele, 
Van Wyk sees a contemporary hunter-gatherer society. the lKung of Botswana, as 
illuminating aspects of the remote past. As an example of the kind of 'semiotic practice I 
illustrative of what he regards as the 'mythological' and 'archaeological' origins of 'poetry, 
drama and narrative in South Africa', he discusses a particular kind of 'somatic energy'. 
called nlum. The latter is cultivated by the 'medicine owners' of !Kung society for the power 
it supposedly bestows upon them (notably of healing, rain~making and control of animals), 
and provokes a 'rhythmic response' in the body, which Van Wyk, drawing on Julia Kristeva, 
equates with 'the rhythmical aspects of poetry and poetic language'. These rhythmic 
responses, he observes: 
... [are) rooted in the infantile and in the period before language acquisition. It relates 
to the pleasure and pain experienced especially in the oral and anal regions of the 
when the infant interacts with the mol her and other family members l43 • 
In this case the evolutionary distance between us and them is couched in the terminology of 
psycho-analysis. Their poetry (which is, of course, an oral poetry), relates to a particular 
psychoanalytic stage of the development of the child, a stage that has been largely surpassed 
in our poetry. The evolutionism apparent here is alJ the more noteworthy in that it forms part 
of what is very much a 'progressive' (relativist) project, namely to unshackle the notion of 
South African literature from its written bias and broadly Eurocentric orientation!44, in other 
words, to break down the barriers between 'us' and 'them', 
Oral Theory's conception of tradition emphasizes the latter's relative changelessness, which, 
all relatiVIst ap<)logies made, also becomes a characterization of perceived otherness. This has 
been the main thrust of the present chapter. The preoccupation with otherness has been 
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related, on one level, to the basically anthropological nature of studies of the oral text in 
general (as we discovered through Okpewho), and, on another, to Oral Study's particular 
'oral-traditional' view of the oral tex!. With regard to the latter, we are left with a 'definition' 
of tradition which says as much about creativity (Parry and Lord) as it does about stability 
or homeostasis (Goody). This is as close as we could get, I believe, to the actual 'functions' 
which Oral Theory attaches to the notion of tradition, functions which can only be understood 
in relation to each other. 
Why is the notion of particular use to Oral Theory? The obvious answer, which is also the 
answer of the oral-formulaic theory, is of course that it allows for a different conception of 
literary creativity. But the arguments we have reflected upon have brought to the fore a 
second answer, more mundane, but troublesome at the same time: 'tradition' Of 'traditional' 
are notions through which the researcher of Oral Theory is allowed to set apart from himself 
the objects of his attention as relating to people who are different. We do have tradition (just 
like them), but we are not defined (i.e. confined) by it. We speak. but we also write. We have 
literacy, they have orality, 
In his ultimate justification for Oral Theory, the already-mentioned 'Orality-Literacy Studies 
and the Unity of the Human Race', Ong suggests that. at least where 'applied to an entire 
culture'. the term 'oral' be preferred to 'illiterate' (non-literate), in so far as the laller 
'(designates] a culture by something it lacks that we have', He goes on: 
orality is a positive trait, which literate cultures also have - though in a different way. 
We still talk, perhaps even more than our ancestors in primary oral culTUres. But we 
do not talk in the same style or out of the same thought forms '45• 
Concerned with proving unity, Ong momentarily suspends his psychologizing interpretation 
of Parry's discovery, allowing 'oral man', as it were, to open his mouth: he talks, we talk. 
<'ll~t orality, loOng, is not really about talking, it is about thinking."ijis 'orality-literacy' is 
about actual differences in mode of communication or expression only in so far as the latter 
'reflects' Ihe differences in thinking he lays claim 10. In this sense Ong's view of the age of 
'primary orality' (the spoken word with no written representation) '[forming] a continuum' 
with the age of 'secondary orality' (the spoken word in the context of the 'electronic age' _ 
the telephone, radio, television and the computer) would perhaps be better conceived of as 
the continuum between ages of primary and secondary speaking. For, if anything. 'secondary 
orality'. in representing a further technology to that of writing and print, has increased the 
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in thinking between 'us' and 'them': 
of secondary oraJity has maximized oral utterance ... in ways 
""'"'",1./ ..... ". and yet at the same lime has maximized the analytic, 
to oral 
processing of 
thought expression which writing initiated ... 146. 
Of course, I with Dng in so far as his 'psychodynamics of orality' 
characterizes the 'other' in terms of ways of thinking. But in breaking the link between 
'orality' and 'tradition'. as is by his conceplion a wholly modern 'secondary 
orality', he is, in my view, guHl:y of very kjnd of confusion criticized by Foley; 
orality becomes 'a typology that unfairly much more than it can hope to 
distinguish;... a false and very misleadi ng 
framework that Parry and Lord elaborated may 
147. Orality within the conceptual 
.. about thinking (as I have 
but it is not, for that matter, about We but we are not oral. 
this is a dangerous thing to the 'great di vide I I am not 
that characteristics of oral texts are not also found in written that 
are not also found in literate society, that traditions in oral and literate 
do not function in much similar ways. But for the oral and the literate to co-exist in such 
WllY as to minimise the 
we also speak, to 
not just the 'how' that may 
In his Interface between 
- that 
dichotomy, it seems to me more useful, instead of saying 
we are also traditional. In that way. to paraphrase Lord, it is 
by and 'them'. but also the 'what'. 
, 
Written and the Oral Goody remarks - somewhat casually 
we sometimes speak of an oral and a literary 
society, identifying the former with popular culture 




pointed out that, '[tJhough... initially direcred to rural and supposedly 
in Europe and America' (these being largely analysed in terms of 
romantic mode)'), the study of folklore has, in fact, come to concern 
far more with 'urban context': industrial songs, protest verse, etc. These 
a identification of the 'modem' (as 'popular') with the 'traditional'; to 
extent can Oral Theory account for this identification? If the relative 'changelessness' we 
at the root notion oral tradition amounts, indeed, [0 a rei fication , a 
• dehumanizing next down the barrier between 'us' and 'them' 
should be to consider tradition, not so much what it to stabilise, 
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but for what it is: popular. This will be an important area of reflection in Chapter 3, in which 
we shall attempt to assess the notion of (traditional) oral literature against what has become 
known as (modem) popular culture, the latter having to some extent become part (it would 
seem - although this is also open to question) of a revised theoretical paradigm of 'post-
modernist' literary theory. 
We can conclude with a few brief remarks on some further perspectives on the notion of 
tradition which, though not specifically relevant to the issue of the traditional as 'other' we 
have highl ighted in this chapter, are nonetheless worthy of consideration. Towards the end 
of Chapter I we noted the 'greater prestige' enjoyed by the 'dead-language traditions' relative 
to the 'living oral traditions' within Oral Theory. Apart from distinguishing between the oral 
tradition 'proper' (occurring in oral society) and the oral tradition that is 'spoken' (occurring 
in literate society), I have regarded the notion of tradition as basically indivisible, and there 
certainly would be little, at least in the work of authors considered here, upon which to found 
a theoretical distinction between a 'dead-language' and 'living' oral tradition. The explanation 
I advanced in Chapter 1 pointed to the texts of the 'dead-language tradition' being inevitably 
received as written texts, making their 'horizons of expectations' more accessible, at least 
from the point of view of the researcher. Foley himself'5o points to the obvious fact 'that the 
field [Oral Theory] began with the Homeric epics'. But the difference in prestige could, no 
doubt, also be explained in terms of the us:them dichotomy; that the 'other who has gone 
before' (the dead-language tradition) is somehow regarded as closer to 'us' than the 'other 
who is culturally different' (the living tradition). Put differently: the anthropological bias of 
Oral Theory has been less prominent in the philological studies of classicists working with 
texts of dead-language traditions (what - to recall Finnegan's terminology - has been 'lost'), 
than in the obviously anthropological orientation of studies of contemporary oral traditions 
(what is - genuinely? - 'other'). 
This would to some extent be supported in the light of differences of emphasis regarding 
a 'great divide' between 'literacy' and 'orality'. The arguments considered in this chapter, 
whether more or less in favour of - or at least resigned to - an evolutionist paradigm COng, 
Goody) or totally against it (Vail and White, Street's,), were generally preoccupied with a 
'great divide' in the world as it is, in other words a division between 'us' and 'them' on the 
grounds of synchronically perceived cultural differences. But the debate surrounding the 'great 
divide' has also taken a more specifically diachronical I historical form, which relates 
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specifically to the distinction between the (purely) oral and 'oral-derived' text'52. This debate, 
largely the preserve of researchers working in 'dead-language' traditions, to some extent 
implies a refonnulation of Parry's original discovery of the oral origins of the Iliad and the 
Odyssey. 
As we already saw in Chapter l, the basis of Parry's demonstration has been freely 
accepted in so far as it was regarded as necessary to, in Foley's words, 'fracture the sinecure 
of textual-chirographic thinking that dominated earlier scholarship,l5J. But from having been 
concerned with the originality of the oral, the focus of scholarly attention has shifted towards 
a consideration, not of the difference, but of the actual point of contact between the oral and 
the written text. Kelber sums up this concern as follows: 
lilts impressive explanatory powers notwithstanding, the thesis advanced by Parry and 
Lord is not without its problems. Media rarely present themselves in essentialist 
purity. If it is claimed that the Homeric epics were composed without the aid of 
writing, what impact did dictation and writing have on this oral, traditional 
civilization? Are the Iliad and the Odyssey conceivable simply as graphs of what the 
bards had recited? What caused these narratives to be wrenched from a history of 
centuries of oral compositional perfonnances and transposed into [written] 
textuality?lS4 
The upshot of these considerations has to a large extent been to problematize Lord's original 
conception of the compositional exclusivity of the oral artist I text: 
[Homer] is not a split personality with half of his understanding and technique in the 
tradition and the other half in a pamassus of literate methods. No, he is not even 
'immersed' in the tradition. He is the tradition .... His vividness and immediacy arise 
from the fact that he is a practicing oral poet. Those who would make Homer a 
'literary' poet, do not understand his 'literariness'; he has none of the artificiality of 
those who use traditional themes or devices for nontraditional purposes'''. 
After a detailed comparison between the Homeric poems and West-African epics or 
'legendary stories', Goody comes to the conclusion that the epic, contrary to what he tenns 
'long poems' or myths whose content is generally more 'sacred', 
seems to be characteristic not so much of purely oral cultures, ... but of those more 
complex situations ... where writing was employed in restricted ways and yet had some 
influence both on the content and the fonn of such compositionsJ56• 
While he concedes that Homer was in all probability not literate, Goody sees the Iliad and 
the Odyssey as examples of an 'early literate' genre, 'affected in form and content by the 
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existence of writing.t57. 
In an article published in 1986 Lord similarly comes to accept the idea of 'mergings' of 
oral tradition and literacyl58. Kelber, for his part, wams against the notion of tradition 'as 
exclusively textual processes of production, transmission, and transformation, depersonalized 
and diagrammatically traceable through space'159. Recent views on the Gospel, for example, 
point to writing and speech being interlinked in ways 'that our typographic apperception of 
textuality will never let us know'. He continues: 
Our text-centrism has blinded us to imagining ways in which speech could emanate 
from chirographs or in tum generate writings. But once we think of tradition as an 
interactive process, we concede the presence of a dynamic that is other than either 
orality and literacy, for which we have no name and about which we have lillie 
experience'6/). 
From an initial fascination with the oral provenance of a text (in the sense of it being part of 
an oral tradition), one can therefore discern a movement towards defining the conditions under 
which the oral becomes oral-derived, where the traditional is 'taken up' in writing. But if 
concern with this particular complexity - which is of a textual as well as compositional nature 
- has tended to be the province of historical studies, we can also draw attention to a 'political' 
approach to oral tradition which is firmly planted in the here and now and on occasion even 
looks 10 the future. As Finnegan has already told us, concem with the oral is often tantamount 
to a 'return to origins'. In this case the interest in oral tradition does not so much envisage 
a beller 'understanding' of an oral 'other' (whether from a universalist or parochial 
standpoint), as that it seeks to assert a certain cultural and political identity with which the 
researcher would like to identify. Jean-Pierre Makouta-Mboukou, for example, regrets that in 
the cause of anti-colonialist struggle, 'Black writers ... [have] preferred to use more direct [i.e. 
wrillenjliterary forms like poetry, the novel, and the political pamphlet', and sees a rekindling 
of interest in the oral tradition as the means through which '[t]hey will be able to verify the 
wealth of their own heritage and make use of it to clothe the heart of their people in a new 
pride' l6l. This affirmation of identity offers a framework for much current research into oral 
tradition, notably on the African continent. 
But it also offers the possibility of manipUlation, in which the role of research should not 
be underestimated. The ideological effect of tradition I have tended to focus on in the course 
of this chapler has been its function as differentiating factor between 'us' and 'them'. ThaI 
is the point of view of Oral Theory. But whal is invented as epistemological category by the 
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academic (at least ostensibly), can be reinvented as political category by the politician: as 
bearer of identity tradition is often a trump-card in the excercise of power. Nowhere has this 
been better illustrated than in Swaziland where loyalty to the throne of King Sobuza II 
became the major rallying point for Swazi nationalism162• Central to this process was the 
'formulation of a set of Swazi 'traditions>l63 which, as Vail and White hypothesise, coincides 
with the lack of continuity between praise poetry (tibongo) of the pre-Sobuza era (Sobuza II 
acceded to the throne in 1921) and the songs later performed in his honour. So significant is 
the change in content of these praises that they can, in fact, be seen as neo-traditional!"'. What 
is more, 
the surge of specifically academic interest in Swazi history and customs on the part 
of white anthropologists, many of whom were South African liberals in search of 
evidence demonstrating that Africans could rule their peoples rationally in accordance 
with 'traditional' principles l65 
was a crucial factor in this (political) resurgence of traditionalism: Sobuza knew how to 
identify 'powerful allies'. Not only this: Sobuza also, through ample use of the tape recorder, 
managed to 'correct' the oral accounts given by indunas of the role of their chiefdoms in the 
history of the Swazi nation!66. The invention of tradition (neo-traditionalism) is also a 
































The phenomenon of 'secondary orality' (see Ong, 1987) would seem to contradict this. 
Yet the theoretical relation between 'secondary orality' and the oral-formulaic theory 
(on which this discussion is based) can to a large extent be questioned, as will be seen 
later. (See note 147). 
Lord, 1968: 149. Emphasis added. 
Foucault, 1976:31. My translation. 
The notions of development, evolution, mentality (culture?), spirit, as well as the 
grands types de discours of 'science, literature, religion, history, fiction, etc'. 
(Foucault, 1976:32-3). 
'Rather than allowing them [these notions] to apply as of their own accord [ies laisser 
valoir spontamiment], it should be accepted, for the sake of method and as a first step 
[en premiere instance], that at hand is nothing but a population of scattered events' 
[population d'evenements disperses]. (Foucault, 1976:32). 
See Goody and Watt, 1968:29, where 'cultural tradition' is characterized as follows: 
'[the] society passes on its material plant, including the natural resources available to 
its members. Secondly, it transmits standardized ways of acting. These customary 
ways of behaving are only partly communicated by verbal means; ways of cooking 
food, of growing crops, of handling children may be transmitted by direct imitation'. 
Of primary concern to us here is the verbal communication of 'ways of actil1g'. 
Goody and Watt, 1968:29. 
Goody and Watt, 1968:58: '[flor, even in a literate culture, the oral tradition - the 
transmission of values and attitudes in face-to-face contact - nevertheless remains the 
primary mode of cultural orientation'. 
Lord, 1968: 14. 
See Damton, 1984:3. 
Vail and White, 1991:4. 















:wo examples will. suffice. ~iffusionism, taxonomist in its methodology (compiling 
tale-types and mOllf-mdexes ), makes strongly ethnologist claims in so far as indexes 
are seen as re~ectiv.e of a particular 'culture area', (Okpewho, 1983: 19). Many 
functlOnaltsts, dIvergmg from the 'structural-functional' model of society so as to 
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concern themselves with the conflict of social interests, interpret tales as 
psychoanalytic symbols (cognitionist) rather than as expressions of 'functional need' 
(ethnologist). (Okpewho, 1983:23-4). 
29. Okpewho, 1983:20. 
30. We have already noted how research done into African oral traditions generally falls 
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CHAPTER 3 
ORALITY / ORAL LITERATURE 
3.1 Introduction 
Compared to its written counterpart, which has seen the flourishing of a virtual academic 
industry ('literary theory') almost entirely devoted to its ever-elusive definition, oral literature 
has rarely been given a specific definition - specific, that is, outside of its (obvious) relation 
to tradition'. Okpewho's 'universalist' and 'parochial' anthropological orientations come to 
mind in this regard, through which, as we saw in Chapter 2, the oral text is generally given 
a functional as opposed to an aesthetic (if for the time being we take 'aesthetic' as broadly 
definitive of literature) interpretation. We can also - perhaps somewhat generously· explain 
this lack of definition by the fact that academics who 'read' (Le. encounter) oral literature, 
generally come from disciplines other than literary studies (anthropology, history, linguistics 
etc.), and may not want to define something in which they are not specialized. 
The crux of the matter is that the oral text, though quite commonly called 'literature', has 
tended not to be appreciated as a particular kind of (aesthetic) text, but, rather, collected as 
evidence of a particular type of culture. This point is well made by Karin Barber. Reflecting 
specifically on African oral literature2, she decries the lack of any 'developed criticism' in 
regard to the latter, as a result of which 'scholars [who have trained in the tradition of 
'mainstream criticism'] ... have tended to abandon the attempt to criticize oral literature and 
have fallen back instead on the mere collection and annotation of texts'). The reason for this, 
she advances, 
is to be found in the political situation of oral literature in generaL. Oral literature 
everywhere has been or is being marginalized with the displacement and 
impoverishment of its bearers, the illiterate peasantry4. 
In relation to oral societies, then, the term 'literature' has by and large taken on a different 
meaning to the one associated with it relative to literate societies. Looked at from the 
'mainstream' (i.e. 'modernist' - more about this presently) point of view, the idea of literature 
as consciously constructed object may either have been completely denied (as would be the 
case in a wholly 'romantic's approach to the oral as 'close to nature' - the term 'folklore,6 has 
been particularly prevalent in this instance), or else (within the perspective of oral tradition _ 
as, for example, set out in Chapter 2) more or less underplayed. Allowing for variances with 
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regard to 'tradition' (on the basis of Parry's revised idea of tradition as 'on-going' and 
'flexible' rather than 'unconscious' or 'communal' - the latter being generally associated with 
folklore), the common identification of 'oral literature' with 'oral tradition'? has by and large 
denied oral literature the kind of critical differentiation to which written literature has been 
subject 
A noteworthy attempt at defining the oral text not as 'text', but as literature, has been 
made by Ruth Finnegan. In a 1973 articleS she describes literature as 
that part of culture which we would normally regard as among the most valuable parts 
of our intellectual heritage and perhaps the main medium through which we can 
express and deepen mankind's intellectual and artistic insight. 
Having thus highlighted what she sees as the literary 'function' of 'intellectual expression ,9 -
broadly defined as 'communication of insight,IQ - Finnegan considers a wide range of ora! 
texts, from Zulu praise to Mozambican satirical songs, from a song by a Yukagir girl from 
northern Siberia to the dirges of the Sea Dyaks of North Borneol 1 , and asserts that these, by 
virtue of the insights they communicate, are 'at least analogous to our (written) literature,n. 
Recognizing the insufficiency of this statement (much as we did towards the end of Chapter 
1: the fact that they are 'analogous' does not necessarily make oral texts 'essentially 
"literature" in our own sense of the term,13), Finnegan extends her conception of intellectual 
expression to 'the more tangible aspects of thinking like self-awareness, detachment [and] 
intellectual probing''', and broadly reaches the following conclusions: 
'Detachment' can be as validly ascribed to the oral as to the written text, both from 
the point of view of the performer in relation to his subject matter (the idea of 
'standing back and seeing things intellectuallyd5), as from the point of view of the 
performer in relation to his audience. Through the various means by which the 
performer can set himself apart from his audience'6, his discourse achieves a certain 
privilege that distinguishes it from ordinary communication. 
The 'individual's vision and urge to create>!? informs the oral text as it does the 
written, albeit in a different way. While inscribed in a tradition, each performance is 
unique; the narrator of traditional tales' ... becomes not only a "repeater" but also a 
"creative" originator of each story'!8. 
While the oral aesthetic text may well have a wider use than the written in so far as 
it is produced within and for particular social situations'9, there is nothing to suggest 
that its function is per definition 'pragmatic ,20 - and therefore relatively less aesthetic. 
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(See Okpewho's criticism - referred to in Chapter 2 - of the exclusively 'cultural' 
approach to the African my/h). 
Finnegan proves, then, that oral literature exists. It shares with written literature the same 
intellectual functions of self-awareness and probing, the same aesthetic ones of being, 
somehow, 'privileged' - it has a certain objectivity vis-a-vis those to whom it is addressed and 
that of which it speaks. These are all conventional ('modernist') considerations. But assuming 
that the oral text can be as 'literary' as the written, can it not also make as strong a 
contribution as the written to theoretical discourse, to criticism? For, on the face of it at least, 
there is no reason why Finnegan's definition, given the intellectual categories she employs, 
should not only be of relevance to the commonly held conception of 'literature', but, indeed, 
challenge - if not change - it: oral literature, recognized as such, also shows important 
differences - already encountered previously - to the written model: 
Within the context of their delivery in performance, the textuality of oral literature is 
particularly marked by repetition and 'well-known formulaic phrases and runs,ZL 
Given the immediacy of the audience, the latter is 'more involved, more imbued with 
literary creativity than is possible when communication is through the more remote 
medium of writing,n. Or, to put it differently: 'participation by the audience ... is 
integral to the artistic style of a given oral poem,Z3. 
In the absence of a written record to act as 'yardstick of accuracy' there is, on the 
whole24, a lesser concern with 'verbal fixity' in oral literature than in written literature. 
In an oral context where originality and tradition are, in fact, complementary to one 
another (their relation having been reformulated by Parry and L{)fd - see Chapter I), 
the idea of a 'correct version' of a text is considerably watered down. 
These points raise expectations as commonly associated with literature as the need on the part 
of the author or poet to avoid cliches, the interpretative role of the reader, as well as, at least 
to some extent, the emphasis (particularly associated with New Criticism) on verbal precision 
within the context of the literary text as 'well-wrought um'2l. What is the position of oral 
literature with respect to these assumptions? In her earlier Oral Literature in Africa Finnegan 
makes a strong case for the appropriateness of the notion of literature to the oral text, not just 
in so far as such texts obviously exhibit literary qualities, but 
because it has been found that to approach instances of oral art [oral texts] as literary 
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forms and thus proceed to ask about them the same kind of questions we might raise 
in the case of written literature, has in fact been a productive approach leading to both 
further appreciation of the oral fonns and a deeper understanding of their role in 
society2 •. 
Yet if such a comparative approach has benefitted our understanding of the oral text, has it 
similarly rebounded on to the written text, on to what has been considered, in our own 
culture, as literature? The answer has to be no: a challenge to the most taken-for-granted 
aspects of the general notion of literature on the basis of insights provided by oral literature 
has generally failed to take place. Literary studies has been questioned and profoundly shaken 
by a variety of theoretical paradigms (we shall see some of these later), but Oral Theory has 
not been one of them. Whereas 'post-modernist' literary theory has come to engage the notion 
that literature may, after all, not be the consciously constructed object conventional theory 
made it into, its complete disregard of oral literature has in this respect been particularly 
ironic: could the interpretation of oral literature nOl, in many ways, have led the challenge 
against the modernist paradigm? What particular form this challenge could take (or, rather, 
could have taken) will be hypothesised at a later stage in our discussion. But the crucial point 
is thai, no matter how widely the notion is accepted and the terminology used, irrespective, 
even, of how frequently the oral is projected as literature 'in its own right', oral literature has 
by and large remained excluded from literary-theoretical discourse. 
Finnegan's 'specific' definition quoted earlier does not escape this. As is made clear by the 
title she gives her article: 'Literacy versus Non-Literacy: the Great Divide? Some Comments 
on the Significance of "Literature" in Oral Societies'. she uses the applicability of the notion 
of literature to oral societies primarily as a counter-argument to the idea of an 'oral mindsel' 
a la Walter Ong. What oral literature tells us about thinking is stressed at the expense of what 
it tells us about literature: 
... the implication that non-literate societies do not have 'literature' turns out to be 
without foundation. This literature, furthermore, can achieve the same range of things 
we expect frem written literature, with aU that this means for the mode of thinking in 
such contexts". 
The use of the notion of literature to illustrate a certain mode of thinking brings us to what 
is, perhaps, the fundamental problematic of oral literature within Oral Theory. namely thaI 
it is not really studied as literature but as anthropology. This ambiguity can be usefully 
explained in terms of the interplay of notions this study has so far insisted upon: orality as 
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oral tradition I oral literature. The fact that orality - per definition traditional, therefore 'other' 
- is also literature, casts the very difference ascribed to the oral in the light of actual 
similarity. Strange and exotic in relation to the written and the literate, the oral - by virtue of 
its literariness - turns out to be reassuringly familiar. We can therefore - a bit ironically no 
doubt - define the aim of the present chapter as follows: if Chapter 2 focused on how the 
notion of tradition sets orality apart, the present chapter will look at how the notion of 
literature brings it back. 'Tradition' defined the divide between 'us' and 'them'; 'literature' 
will break it down ... 
The question has to be, of course, how far? But this is also an ironic question, for as long 
as 'literature' presents itself as a counterweight to the anthropological bias of Oral Theory, 
as long as it comes across as a defence against the typecasting of the oral as traditional 
'other', as an attempt at rehumanizing the 'dehumanized stereotype known as oral man', it 
will not be literature at all. As was the case with Finnegan above, it will be anthropology. 
Once again, the oral artist or poet will be an informant, the oral 'literary' text nothing more 
than data. In fact, once we have accepted that 'oral man' possesses literature 'just like us' -
in other words, once our universalist view of a common humanity has been justified - we may 
well forget oral literature altogether and continue talking about literature in total ignorance 
of it. How to break oral literature out of this 'defensiveness' so as for it to become fully 
appreciable not just as text, but as literary text, indeed, as literary theory, must be the real 
objective of our discussion. 
Amongst the researchers dealt with in this study Walter Ong stands alone in his rejection 
of the notion of oral literature. It will be appropriate, at this point, to briefly review his 
critique in this regard28 which, while ostensibly focusing on the relatively straightforward 
matter of terminology, actually goes way beyond it. Right at the outset Ong draws attention 
to the 'ideological consequences' of 'the scholarly focus on texts'29. Of course, Marxist 
literary theorists have long insisted on the fundamentally ideological character of literature, 
but it can be argued that this ideological 'embeddedness' receives at least a peculiar twist in 
the case of oral literature. 'Literature' is always a loaded term, but given the added _ and 
obvious - connotation of oral literature as 'literature of the "other"', it can no doubt be said 
that 'oral literature' is loaded in more ways than one. (See Barber's reflection on the 'political 
situation' of oral literature earlier). Ong's perspective in this regard differs from my own in 
important ways (as can be expected given our disagreement on the matter of orality as mode 
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of cognition), but it offers a useful point of departure. 
'Literature' derives from the latin literae (letters). Finnegan sees this as inconsequential: 
' ... the term [,oral literature'] is now so widely accepted and the instances clearly covered by 
the term so numerous, that it is an excess of pedantry to worry about the etymology of the 
word "literature" .. .'30. Counters Ong: 'concepts have a way of carrying their etymologies with 
them forever'. Furthermore '[w]riting ... is a particularly pre-emptive and imperialist activity 
that tends to assimilate other things to itself even without the aid of etymologies,]'. This 'pre-
empiveness of literacy' makes it virtually impossible for the literate person to arrive at a 
proper conception of a text (my term, not Ong' S32) solely dependent on the spoken word. The 
term 'literature' compounds this difficulty by reinforcing the pre-empiveness of literacy; a 
self-explanatory circumlocution such as 'purely oral art form,]3 would be more appropriate. 
What is a purely terminological (and, as such, trivial) issue to Finnegan, is clearly much 
more to Ong. On one level we may choose to dismiss Ong's argument in so far as it restates 
his view, criticized in Chapter 2, of the cognitive differences between literate and oral people. 
Drawing on Havelock's notion of the oral text as repository of cultural values and knowledge, 
Ong sees the need of oral societies '[tol invest great energy in saying over and over again 
what has been learned arduously over the ages .. .' as establishing' a highly traditionalist and 
conservative set of mind that with good reason inhibits intellectual experimentation,34. His 
overwhelmingly functional perception of the oral text (inspired by his insistence on the 
pervasiveness of the formula as mnemonic device) leaves little possibility for the oral text to 
escape the above 'need'. In other words, oral texts will generally be characterized by a lack 
of intellectual experimentation. Add to this the 'aggregative rather than analytic' (to mention 
but one of the 'oral psychodynamics') nature of the oral mind - '[o]rally managed language 
and thought is not noted for analytic precision', says Ong3S , the latter being essentially the 
fruit of writing (see Chapter 2, notes 58 and 143) - and relatively little remains of Finnegan's 
'intellectualist' definition of oral literature. Apart from the odd reference to the 'wisdom' of 
oral cultures, which he relates to 'a total [totaliZing?] and relatively infrangible social 
contex!'36, Ong's 'psychologizing literary theory' is hardly preoccupied with Finnegan's 
literary functions of self-awareness, detachment and intellectual probing. While it would be 
wrong to assimilate his views to the romantic I evolutionist idea of orality as 'close to nature' 
(Ong freely talks about the beauty and complexity of oral art), he ultimately has a rather 
reductive view of the cognitive processes of people in an oral culture. We are left with the 
98 
suspicion thaI the real reason why we should not talk of 'literature' in regard to their 
linguistic creations has Jess to do with the distortion that the term may impose on the latter. 
than with the fact that oral people lack the intellectual means to produce anything as 
'creative', as 'meaningful' or as 'sophisticated' as literature. (V'.fe shall deal extensively with 
the questioll of orality and cognition ill Chapter 4). 
If, as is very much the gist of Vail and White's critique, the ideological overtones in the 
above reasoning could justifiably be called 'racist', it would nevertheless be unfair to seize 
upon Ong's argument solely for its concem with cognitive difference. On a more 
'progressive' note, there is, of course, as we briefly saw in the previous two chapters, his 
concern with undercutting cultural chauvinism, which he to a large extent presents as Parry 
and Lord's mostiasting contribution. Was our application of the term 'literature' to the Iliad 
and the Odyssey (as reflective of their canonised status in our society) not at least partly 
responsible for our (rather arrogant) misreading of these texts 'as if we ourselves had written 
it?' (Sec Chapter I, note 129). A large part of Oog's insistence on the literacy vs orality 
dichotomy can no doubt be justified against the background of a modem scholarship that 
glibly understands, explains and appreciates the products of another culture in the light of its 
own - limited - experience. We take the model we built in our own backyard, we extrapolate 
from it, generalize from it, and more or less ruthlessly apply it until it becomes the model that 
everybody built in their own backyard, One such model has been constructed from our 
experience of reading and writing a certain kind of text, and called 'literature'. Yet if 
contemporary literature were to come about in the same way as the Iliad and the Odyssey, 
would we recognize it as such? Chances are we will not call it 'literature', but 'popular 
culture' or 'folklore', Surely Our newly found humility obliges us, as far as the oral is 
concerned, not only to explicitly recognize what we tended to ignore all along, but, moreover, 
to abandon the 'literature' framework of that ignorance? 
It may be useful to recall here what was the major point of our earlier discussion on oral 
literature (Chapter I), namely that the literariness of a text depends on its 'horizons of 
expectations'. I argued then that the earlier 'misreading' of the Homeric poems, derived from 
our familiarity with the written literary text with which these poems - having been been 
received as writing - had been assimliated, was valid in so far as it resulted from - and 
pointed towards - changing 'horizons of expectations'. This view obviously contradicts the 
very idea of a 'misreading'. at least in so far as the latter might have been attributed to 
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cultural unfamiliarity. No matter how 'unknown' or 'foreign' the origins of a text, once it is 
received as 'literary', the 'horizons of expectations' upon which such a reception is based 
must stand. (If cultural unfamiliarity does not pose a problem - a situation that hardly applies 
to Oral Theory - the way in which a text is received may well be less relative. We shall 
attempt to circumscribe a literary reading - at least in the' modernist' sense - later on). I also 
asserted, however, that in the case of a given oral text (particularly the contemporary text that 
does not exist in written form), a literary reception I reading could not be taken for granted. 
(Such would be the case if the oral text is conceived of as 'literature' by analogy with the 
written). Rather, given the example set by the Iliad and the Odyssey as literary model of the 
oral text (of the text that Oral Theory engages with), the possibility of such a reception is 
opened up. As such, we are left with a 'virtual' oral literature. 
Hopefully my reluctance to talk about an oral literary text by analogy with the written 
would make this particular conception of oral literature less prone to the charge of cultural 
chauvinism. One point of criticism that can be levelled at it, however, is that while it 
recognizes the distinctiveness of the oral text to the extent that the latter's reception as 
literature is postulated as 'virtual', it does not explain why, apart from the obvious factor (in 
so far as the oral constitutes the traditional 'other') of cultural difference, oral and written text 
should be distinguished from each other as such. A similar reasoning to the one outlined in 
Chapter I could also be applied to the written texts of any hypothetical (literate) culture 
completely unfamiliar to the researcher (and of which one particularly 'privileged' text has 
been given a literary reception in the researcher's own culture). Not being in a position to 
ascertain the ways in which the texts he comes across can be read as 'literary' (and not 
wishing to proceed by analogy with what is thus considered in his own culture), he will see 
in the texts merely the possibility of literature. As FinnegatlJ7 has argued, the question of 
whether a particular culture has literature or not does not necessarily have anything to do with 
the presence or absence of writing: 
It is very hard hard to believe that people very different from us can really have 
anything approaching the depth of understanding or grace of expression that we know 
in our society and its literature. This barrier cuts us off to some extent from all other 
cultures. 
Of course, the failure of the above appraisal of 'oral literature' to pinpoint what is specifically 
oral appears, on the strength of recent scholarship (Ong's view of 'cultural chauvinism' 
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aside), to be of relatively minor importance anyway. Foley (see Chapter I, note 107) has told 
us thai a 'great divide' between oral and written text was needed, at least at first, to 'fracrure 
the sinecure of texrual-chirographic thinking', the implication being that Oral Theory is, by 
now, sufficiently well established to fruitfully deny this divide. Finnegan, for her part, has 
from the outset - in spite of her stated admiration for Lord's The Singer of Tales and her 
recognition of the importance of the oral-formulaic theory - steadfastly maintained the 
position that 'it is misleading as well as unfruitful to attempt to draw a strict line between the 
verbal art of literate and of non-literate cultural traditions')S, Further criticism of the literate 
vs oral dichotomy, notably that of Vail and White, was noted and discussed in Chapter 2. The 
following characterization by Karin Barber and P.P. de Moraes Farias,9 neatly encapsulates 
the fundamentally contradictory reputation the literacy vs orality paradigm (attributed to Parry 
and Lord's 'notion of the sheer incompatibility of written and oral modes of literary 
expression') has enjoyed in recent times: 
On the one hand ... our writing-centred view of the world goes deeper than most oral 
literature specialists acknowledge. It is not just a question of our habit of ignoring the 
musical or vocal aspects or the expressive functions of body movement, so often a 
significant feature of the 'performance' of a 'text'. Our scriptocentrism may blind us 
to the most fundamental constitutive principles of the texts' literariness: a blindness 
made inevitable by the way we define the literary object under scrutiny. On the other 
hand, however, this very writing-centred scholarly tradition has also produced an 
extreme notion of a gross cultural and psychological dichotomy between 'oral culture' 
and 'literate culture': divided by a gulf whose existence is by no means confirmed by 
the empirical evidence. 
As Goody told us earlier, '(t]he challenge is not merely to criticize the existing framework, ... 
but to offer an alternative account that explains more'. (See Chapter note 107). Whether 
such an alternative account, justifying the study of oral literature as oral, has, in fact, come 
to the fore, will need to be considered. But before moving beyond Ong's objection to 'oral 
literature' - an objection premised, as we have seen, on the 'originality', 'distinctiveness', 
difference of what it means to be 'oral' - ,it is useful to remind ourselves of what is, after all, 
the aim of this study, namely to offer a view of orality that is sufficiently distinct for it to 
serve as basis of Oral Theory as discipline. From this perspective the tendency, as reflected 
in Barber and De Moraes Farias' comment, to take note of (and, indeed, appreciate) the work 
of Parry and Lord (if nOI, also, thai of Ong~, only 10 reject it afterwards - wilh more or less 
force - is obviously self-defeating, however justified it may be from the point of view of 
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empirical research. (We earlier noted the reluctance41 of a researcher like Finnegan - who to 
a large degree exemplifies the position of 'empirical research' in this regard - to put forward 
new theoretical models to rival that of Parry and Lord, remaining 'constrained by the tradition 
she is questioning'. See Chapter 1, note 31). 
What is at stake, ultimately, is precisely the 'undercuting of chauvinism' that Ong talks 
about, of which the most noted consequence is no doubt the opportunity it offers to abandon -
or at least to correct - this model of written literature which 'has for long bedevilled study 
of oral literature, and led researchers into unfruitful and misleading questions in an attempt 
to impose a similar model on oral literature' . (See Chapter I, note 16). One can, in fact, see 
the relative setting aside of the Parry-Lord paradigm, with the consequent dimunition of the 
oral text as something specifically and positively oral (tending, instead, towards being merely 
'spoken' or 'unwritten'), as a retrogression: Oral Theory is subsumed into its original areas 
of research (anthropology and classical studies), where, as I put it earlier, the respective 
'distinctive features' for purposes of academic interest are 'cultural difference' and 
'historical' . 
Yet this is clearly, given the sheer proliferation of variously named fields all centred around 
the qualificative 'oral' (oral traditional research, oral narrative research, oral studies), not the 
intention. What can be envisaged, instead, is a more or less selective approach to the criteria 
for orality formulated by Parry and Lord, in respect of which the oral text, even if relatively 
less distinctive, retains a certain autonomy. Two possibilities come to mind: 
I) The general preoccupation of the Parry-Lord thesis with style or fonn (particularly its 
emphasis on the fonnula) is set aside in favour of an approach seeking to determine 
how the text relates to the social I historical conditions in which it arises. In other 
words, there is, in regard to the interpretation of the oral text a~ literature, a 
movement away from the fonnalist aesthetic. 
2) Lord's famous dictum: 'traditional tells us "what'" is suspended in favour of a 
perspective on the oral lext as something 'modem', i.e. as an integral part of what 
could also be the expressivity of literate society. (See Goody's remark, at the end of 
Chapter 2, about the association, in a literate culture, between 'oral tradition' and 
'popular culture,42). 
In the first instance the association between text and tradition is more or less left in tact (at 
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least in so far as 'tradition' is interpreted in the Parry-Lord perspective as something 'on-
going' or 'flexible'; 'tradition' also - as we saw in Chapter 2 - implies oral: at issue is the 
literature of 'oral societies'), while in the second the oral is broadly considered for its 
predominantly formulaic character. Of course, a third possibility could be envisaged, in which 
both the 'traditional' and 'formal' aspects of Oral Theory are rejected, roughly equating 
orality with speech. As such, Oral Theory would be a branch of linguistics, its object of 
interest being the utterance. We shall have more to say on this possibility in Chapters 4 and 
From the point of view of orality in relation to 'oral literature', however. the notion of a 
text. as linguistic expression somehow set apart from 'ordinary extrapoetic verbalization,4l 
or 'everyday speech forms''', seems to me of fundamental importance, no matter how 
problematic it may be (as we shall see). Is it not, indeed, on this notion (oral text) that the 
argument of the Parry-Lord thesis concerning the formal properties of oral expression depends 
. at least before it was incorporated into the 'psychologizing literary theory' of McLuhan, 
Havelock and Ong? 
A further clarification needs to be made in regard to our above division of research into 
oral literature. Broadly speaking. we can assimilate' l' (the text is traditional but its formal 
properties are not emphasized) to a 'modernist' approach to literature, and '2' (the text is 
assimilated to the 'modem' but the presumption that it is 'formulaic' continues to be 
significant) to a 'post-modernist' approach. In so far as modernism (the 'conventional' 
approach to literature) strongly foregrounds textuality and form, our association of 'I' 
(characterized as a movement away from the formalist aesthetic) may seem particularly odd. 
Similarly strange would be the association of an approach which retains a qualification such 
as 'formulaic' (an obvious association with textual form) with post-modernism. The categories 
modernism and post-modernism are, however, relevant to the division in question in so far 
as they relate to the inherently controversial nature of the notion of literature itself. a 
controversy, I believe, that should also be confronted from the point of view of orality. 
Literary studies, as Anthony Easthope explains";, has conventionally taken its cue from the 
Aristotelian notion of the tragedy as an imitation of 'an action whole and complete'. The 
modernist reading has, therefore, 
continued to think of the lit~rary text as seeking a self-consistent unity and as 
something to be valued accordlllg to this implicit criterion"". 
This characterization is obviously at odds with the idea, formulated in 'I'. of moving away 
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from the formallst aesthetic in order to determine how the 'text relates to the social I 
historical conditions in which it arises'. But what is even more important than the 
preoccupation with textual unity per se, is the underlying assumption that there is such a thing 
as a literary text (conceived of as 'aesthetic'), and that the latter can be readily opposed to 
a non-literary one. The approach formulated under' I' is associated with modernism not on 
the basis of any particular textual consideration, but merely in so far as the oral text is 
regarded as 'literary' in the more or less narrow sense defined by Finnegan of 'standing back 
and seeing things intellectually'. (The implication is, obviously, that there are oral texts that 
do not conform to this). At issue is the oral text as something specifically aesthetic; not just 
the oral text but the oral literary text. We shall further define this aesthetic (or rather the 
'reading' it requires) later on. 
A similar reasoning underlies the association of '2' with post-modernism. The modernist 
paradigm of literary studies has come under severe pressure notably in the second half of this 
century47 (some of these factors will be briefly reviewed in the second part of this chapter), 
opening the door towards a post-modernist literary studies Easthope refers to as 'cultural 
studies'. What is particularly relevant to us as far as post-modernism is concerned is the basic 
fact that it undennines the conventional opposition between the 'literary' and the 'non-
literary'. Specific arguments with regard to textuality are, for our purposes, secondary. Of 
vital importance in respect to '2', then, is not so much whether the oral text can be considered 
as literature (that question becomes largely irrelevant), but rather, whether the notion of oral 
literature can function in - and contribute to - the post-modernist literary paradigm. 
Obviously, this methodology in no way suggests that the two 'categories' of investigation 
I have proposed are fundamentally distinct Notions like objectivity, textuality and ideology 
are applicable to both. What makes this approach useful, however, is that it purports to 
analyse interest into the oral text along lines more or less mirorring those of what has 
arguably become the major source of controversy in contemporary literary theory, namely the 
opposition between 'high culture' or 'literature' on the one hand and 'popular culture' or 
'popular fiction' on the other. If 'oral literature' is to have any chance of becoming an 
integral part of our general theoretical discourse on literature, it would be self-evident that it 
be considered in relation to both of these polarities. 
Crucial to this process will be the need, also, to assess these approaches to oral literature 
in terms of their preconceptions concerning that most ambiguous of notions: the 
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'distinctiveness' of the oral. The duality we highlighted in Ong's rejection of oral literature 
can be summarized as follows. There is his 'progressive' concern with undermining cultural 
chauvinism, at the same time his 'racist' explication of these differences - which are, to a 
large extent, the very differences which justify his injunction against chauvinism - in terms 
of a 'notional oral man'. The degree to which this duality can be resolved in favour of the 
'progressive' side of the ideological scale (as more or less reflected in our own 'universalist' 
view of a 'common humanity') will determine whether oral literature - in the light of either 
one of the two approaches considered - can truly be a literary theory. 
3.2 Oral Literature as Aesthetic 
Let us begin our inquiry with some brief remarks on the notion of text (both oral and written) 
which, as we have so far insisted, is foundational to the notion of literature. (Foundational, 
that is, from the modernist point of view). An important point to make, at the start, is that the 
word 'text' in oral text I written text do not necessarily have the same value. Whereas 'written 
text' is commonly analysed as literary text on the one hand and non-literary text on the other 
(in other words, 'text' can be opposed to literary text), such a distinction has only rarely been 
the subject of speculation in the case of the oral. The notion of oral text - just like oral 
literature - has been generally used and is, as such, valid (which does not mean that it is not 
problematic - difficulties relating to orality as text will be duly considered), but the notion of 
an oral literary text is, by comparison, relatively unfamiliar. We have already hinted at this. 
The conventional differentiation between the literary and the non-literary - the object of a 
considerable body of theory - has by and large been restricted to written literature. 'Oral 
literature' is not just founded upon the notion of text, but is, indeed, to a large extent defined 
by it. This is a surprising discrepancy between written and oral literature (between written and 
oral text), which raises, once again, the issue of oral literature as literature of the 'other'. 
In Chapter I I equated the oral text with performance. A more detailed version of the brief 
definition - provided by Foley - may now be appropriate. Foley48 again: 
In using this term ['text'] I mean to indicate a real, objective, and tangible score, an 
entity that exists both as a thing in itself and as a directive for its perceivers. In this 
second sense I take advantage of current critical notions of the 'activity' of a text, the 
dynamics of chemistry of its parts when brought together and to life by the reader. 
Both senses of the word are important... : the text serves as an object and as a libretto 
for the reader's or listener's personal 'performance' of the work. 
Given my particular view of the 'collapse of the poietic dimension of the (oral) text' as 
central to the appreciation of the 'art' associated with the latter, I to a large insisted 
on Foley's 'first' sense of text as thing in itself (Nattiez's 'trace' dimension). through 
the 'esthesic' dimension (the construction of meaning on part of the 'receiver' of the text), 
Foley's 'second - the text as directive for perceivers was consistently present: the 
'response' the reader I perceiver on the basis 'horizons of expectations' of the text 
fully coincides with Foley's view of the text serving as a 'libretto' for the reader I listener's 
own 'performance' of it. 
Foley on49 to insist, 'in addition to the dual nature the text as objective and 
subjective', on 'its special identity in relation to the oral tradition from which it derives'. It 
is in the tradition - as Parry and showed - that are generated the of generic form' 
insuring the recurrency of the text over time space. But it is at this level the oral text 
seen as from a tradition-based generic form - that the idea of oral text I 
performance as literature runs into trouble. In this respect it may be iHuminating to briefly 
what, to some extent at amounts to a discrepancy between our perception of 
what is, on the one hand, fundamental to literature (as set out here), and, on the other, 
fundamental to being oral50• Admitting that at the heart of literature lies text I 
performance, the latter (as performance) may well, from the strict Parry-Lord position of 
composition-in-performance, not 'oral' (at least in a defini tional sense) at all. (See Chapter 
note 10). This 'discrepancy' is at to a degree reflected in difference in emphasis 
"'''I1 .. ,,,t in treatment of the term 'oral' in her Oral Literature in Africa (l970) and 
Oral Poetry (1977). The former I , in which is not at all referred to Lord only by 
means of a footnote, sees performance confidently as the 'basic characteristic' of the 
'oral aspect of African unwritten literature,52, composition (presented as improvisation) 
and transmission being introduced in relatively secondary fashion as 'related' aspects 53. In the 
latter this order is reversed, largely. one assumes, in the light of oral-formulaic 
theory. the overview of Finnegan's analysis of validity oral-formulaic theory 
Chapter 1). three ways in which a poem can most readily be called oral, Finnegan 
asserts, are in terms of (l) its composition, (2) its mode of transmission, and (3) - related to 
(2) - its performance' 54. course, Finnegan duly problematizes these notions and can in no 
way be said - hesitancy as regards the formulation of a 'new' theory notwithstanding _ 
to 'follow' the oral-formulaic theory. Yet it is significant that the emphasis the latter places 
on the specific nature oral composition (which both necessitates the notion of traditional 
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'generic forms' and derives from it) in a sense - and inevitably - de-emphasizes the text, so 
crucial from a literary point of view, 
We earlier reviewed Vail and White's disagreement with the oral-formulaic theory in the 
light of - primarily - their criticism of a 'notional oral man' as derived from the 
'psychologizing' interpretation of Parry's notion of a specifically oral textuality, From this 
initially 'broader' view, we can now narrow our focus towards their alternative suggestions 
regarding the aesthetics of orality, The oral poetry of south-central Mrica which is the subject 
of their book is - as we have already seen - generally not composed in performance (also the 
case, indeed, of Mrican oral poetry at large), and an investigation of the 'mechanics of its 
performance' (i.e. the generic forms - formulas - facilitating its composition) cannot reveal 
its essence as literature. (See Chapter 1, notes 51 and 56), Instead, Vail and White see the the 
oral text (at least in Africa) as having a 'common aesthetic' reflecting 'a shared set of 
assumptions concerning the nature and purpose of poetry' (see Chapter I, notes 68 and 69). 
To what extent does this constitute an alternative literary paradigm to the particular brand of 
formalism of Parry and Lord? 
A 1987 conference held at the Centre of West African Studies at Birmingham University 
(the proceedings of which - including a paper by Landeg White - were published under the 
title Discourse and its Disguises: the Interpretation of African Oral Text:r l ), provides an 
interesting vantage point from which to begin our assessment of this question. In their 
introduction Karin Barber and P.F. de Moraes Fariasl6 thus describe the 'problem' addressed 
by the conference: 
On the one hand, literary critics and folklorists have taken up a stance which combines 
a limited contextualisation (the emphasis being on 'performance' and the immediate 
conditions of performance) with a formalist analysis of texts (with emphasis on the 
incidence of wordplay, repetition and other literary devices); thus ignoring what the 
texts actually say. Historians, on the other hand, seem increasingly to be regarding oral 
texts either as raw material which, subject 10 a certain amount of processing, will yield 
historical information; or as the unmediated voices of an alien past. The 'Let the texts 
speak for themselves' approach tacitly denies the properties of a text as a text... 
Quite apart from the lack of empirical evidence their own research uncovers for the idea of 
an exclusively oralfonn, the main reason why Vail and While do not accept this 'determinacy 
of form' is - as put by White in his contribution - precisely because, in formulating his 
theory, 'Parry broke the link between performance and history,l? In this regard he finds the 
conclusion reached by Svetozar Koljevic in his review of Parry and Lord's South..slavic 
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research 'profoundly relevant'; 
Oral epic singing at its best was both a way of coming to terms with history and a 
means of getting out of it. That is why its ultimate significance canot be grasped in 
the analysis either of the technique of its composition or of the diverse historical 
sources of its social concepts, motifs and themes5s• 
Thai oral epic is both a way of coming to terms with history and a means of gelling out of 
it interestingly echoes what Okpewho - within the context of his 'aestheticist position' 
emphasizing 'fantasy and ingenuity' - has to say about the African myth59; 
In the oral tradition the recourse to fantasy is essentially a flight from the constraints 
of time-bound, objective reality [history] in the search for something more fulfilling 
or reassuring. For whether we tell a lie (as in the popular derogation of the term 
myth), or we put a historical ancestor in an exaggerated romantic light, or else we 
assign an aspect of our social morality or ecology a genesis that is not measurable by 
the laws of physics or conventional logic, we are simply preferring to escape the 
rather uncomfortable facts of objective truth in order to embrace truth of a more 
metaphysical design. 
It is precisely the modalities of this 'escape' - in the light of which the oral text comeS across 
as inherently evasive or ambiguous - which, as we shall see later, provide a kind of common 
ground for the perspectives surfacing at the above-mentioned conference. Yet to say that the 
'ultimate significance' of a text cannot be understood by reference purely to the formal 
aspects of the text is clearly not the same as saying that the formalist approach is entirely 
without value. Neither, for that matter, can Barber and De Moraes Farias' position quoted 
above be described as a rejection of the formalist aesthetic. In fact, looked at closely, the 
'requirement' that Barber and De Moraes Farias speak of in relation to the literary study of 
the oral text probably has less to do with the reformulation of a - generally dominant -
formalist aesthetic, than with the reformulation of what has been an equally dominant 
definition of the oral text. Instead of - or rather, apart from being - thing in itself (as argued 
earlier), the text is - should be - inseperable from history. In short, what needs to be 
recognized is that the text is defined by its relation to history as much as it is defined by its 
formal properties as discourse set apart from everyday speech forms. This inherent historicity 
presents itself in the following ways60; 
[tjexts are produced in specific, historical circumstances the imprint of which they 
bear upon them; secondly, texts are transmitted through time, bringing with them 
elements of the past but also undergoing a process of erasure and layering as they are 
refashioned in accordance with new concerns; and thirdly, some - indeed many - texts 
are also about the past and its relation to the present, a relation which may be 
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presented in narrative or non-narrative form. 
The historicity of the oral text, even where the text has no overt historical intent (or 
'historical intentional message'), is of course a prime assumption of the historian. Indeed, 
from the point of view of historical veracity such 'unintended materials' are, according to 
Vansina6', frequently more trustworthy than texts intended as historical accounts, But given 
that the historical approach towards the oral text is inadequate - at least from the literary point 
of view - precisely because, as Barber and De Moraes Farias assert, it fails to take into 
account 'the properties of a text as a text', how does the literary scholar integrate his 
acknowledgement of the text's historicity into an aesthetic that properly accounts for these 
properties? 
Nearly a full chapter of Oral Tradition as History62 is devoted to the question of textual 
form, from the basically linguistic (versificational) through the morphological (the sequence 
of action) 10 the concept of genre. As Graham Furniss6) puts it, 'taking into account 
complexities of form and meaning is a necessary part [for Vans ina] of seperating the wheat 
from the chaff in the search for reliability of evidence in the construction of history', Yet this 
kind of attention to form is clearly not appropriate for the student of literature. What Vansina 
calls the 'study of form and structure' is, at best, a first stage in the methodology of the study 
of oral history (preceding the analysis of meaning or content on the level of the 'literal' and 
the 'intended""). From the historian's point of view the relation between the historical 
(content) and the formal (aesthetic) is, in fact, generally one of contradiction: 
As a general rule of thumb one can say that the more artistic [aesthetic] any narrative 
is, the less it probably reflects a succession of events or an accurate rendering of an 
historical situation6S, 
A third phase in the methodology of the study of the oral text (or 'message') as history after 
the initial study of form and structure and the analysis of literal and intended meaning _ 
relates to the aim of the text. Vansina makes the important observation that, even in the case 
of a text presented as an historical account (the 'historical intentional message'), the 
'historical aim' is secondary to what he terms 'present-day concerns', The recitation of a list 
of royal ancestors, for example, is less intended as information about the past than it is to 
'prove that the present king is the rightful incumbent of the throne and that kingship is the 
rightful and normal political order of the day'. Other concerns may include the advancement 
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of 'group consciousness' or the association of a group with 'the overall worldview of the 
community,66. Indeed, with the possible exception of professional historians, a text which 
conveys infonnation of past events for the sole purpose of furthering knowledge about the 
past does not occur in any society. Vansina's 'historical intentional message' turns out to be 
less about history as 'knowledge of the past', than it is about the way in which such 
f I · . ,67 knowledge is employed: 'as an argument, as proo ,as egltlmacy . 
Furniss - referring to Vans ina - uses the tenn 'bias' to describe this 'motivated c1ouding-
over of true evidence'68. The historian must recognize bias, account for it, then set it aside. 
But what is ultimately discarded from an historical point of view can very well be the 
touchstone of the literary. Central to Furniss's argument is the idea that it is the way in which 
a text is defined as 'loaded' - in other words, that it is seen as subject to 'the manipulation 
of evaluative judgments' or perceived as part of 'the social process of argument and counter-
argument,69 - through which the dual nature of the text as fonnalist entity on the one hand 
and historical entity on the other may be reconciled within a single literary (aesthetic) 
paradigm. Cautious not to present his view as an alternative to the 'explication de texte' 
(fonnalist) and 'limited contextualisation' (historical) approaches, Furniss summarizes his 
comments as follows70: 
they amount to the suggestion that we try a step further in one direction among many 
- a return to one of the primary meanings of 'rhetoric'; to look for the context of the 
text as a representation and re-evaluation of people, circumstances, knowledge of 
many kinds; to see the text as a piece in a debate ... 
So far, then, we can broadly identify three 'aspects' contributing to our overall description 
of a text: it is fonnally and stylistically set apart from 'everyday speech fonns', it is 
embedded in history, it forms part of an argument. The relative nature of each one of these 
aspects (criteria?) stands to reason. In his 'rhetorical' definition of the text, Furniss, for 
example, singles out the funny story or children's game as - perhaps - 'evaluatively 
innocuous' and, as such, falling outside the scope of his proposed aesthetic7l • Surely the 
children's game is not 'a piece in a debate'? Yet this consideration obviously depends - as 
would any consideration relating to the comprehensiveness I validity of the above 'criteria' _ 
on a certain kind of 'reading' (or listening) of a text as a creation that is both conscious and 
unified. This approach is what I have thus far - on the strength of Finnegan's original 
definition - tenned the conventional or 'modernist' approach to literature. But there are other 
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approaches. On the basis of a (post-modernist) psychoanalytic reading of a text as 
manifestation of the unconscious. for example. it could be argued that the notion of the 'bias' 
of a text can plausibly be extended to the text as expression (or 'slippage') of repressed 
desire. Thus interpreted, it would be virtually impossible to describe any text as 'unbiased' 
or 'evaluatively innocuous'. and Furniss's idea of 'looking for bias' would be of little help 
in defining what is 'literary'. (Then again, as we have already observed, the very need to 
distinguish between the literary and the non-literary is very much a modernist concern anyway 
- we shall see 'alternative' readings to the modernist in the second section of Ihis chapter). 
For the time being, however, we remain within the modernist paradigm, premised on the 
notion that the text, be it something historical or ideological! argumentative or - in fact -
both, exists as an object that is at least relatively autonomous. It is this assumption of unity 
that makes it possible, finally, to set apart what is literary from what is non-literary, giving 
validity to the idea of developing literary 'criteria'. 
Another word for unity is closure or 'sense of ending': through some 'inner formal 
requirement' the (literary) text 'prepares [prepares the reader] for its own closure'. This, 
according to Barber72, is an essential characteristic of the literary text, distinguising it from 
'other discourse'. Olabiyi Yai picks up on essentially the same characteristic, which he calls 
'finiteness>13. But where the notion of the text as object may thus far have appeared to be 
more or less compatible with the emphasis on the historicity or rhetorical nature of the oral 
text, it now becomes problematic. And where the idea of the text as historical entity and 
rhetorical device could, at least to some extent, also be applicable 10 written literature (the 
case - respectively - in Marxist literary criticism and, to a degree, formalism74), we now come 
across a conception of the (finite) text that effectively excludes at least in some cases (as 
suggested by Barber), if not, in fact, in its totality (as strongly implied by Vail - the 
appreciation of orality as literature. In other words, the 'distinctiveness' of the oral is once 
again in the foreground. 
The specific case (genre) which leads Barber to question the notion of the closure of the 
text is the ortki, known as the 'praise-poetry' of the Yoruba7l• Barber describes the oriki _ 'a 
collection of discrete and disparate epithets belonging to or attributed to a subject, Whether 
a person, a lineage. an orisa Cgod') or an object or natural phenomenon,16 - as essentially 
fragmentary: 
an orikl corpus is characteristically a concatenation of intense contrasts, Where great 
II I 
wars are shoved up against personal foibles; obscure, humorous and scandalous 
incidents against statements of reigning communal values, Maximum disjunction and 
contrast is precisely what a orild performance thrives on 77, 
This performance, furthermore 
appears to lack unity - 10 be a centreless agglomeration of only tenuously related 
items, with no detenninate inner formal relationships between them, It appears to lack 
closure and boundaries, going on and on in an undifferentiated stream until some 
external reason, rather than an inner formal requirement, brings the performance to a 
halt'S, 
If the orild of the Yoruba are 'bafflingly impenetrable,,9 from the point of view of formal 
analysis, an historical one fares beller, on condition that it does not confuse historicity with 
narrative. Orfld do not in any way chronicle events of the past Instead, their historicity lies 
in the fact that, in serving as a continued (continuous) expression of 'certain elements 
preserved from the past', they represent 'the past in the present', pUlling within the reach of 
the living community 'the accumulated powers, art and scope of its inheritance'so, It is from 
this perspective, in fact, that the rhetorical nature of orild comes to the fore. Orild, Barber 
tells us, to a large extent serve as an 'aggrandisement' of the subject in relation to whom they 
are performed, notably in the case of the so-called 'big men': 
The living big man is ... built up by an intensive bestowal of fragments accumulated 
from the past - fragments that recall the greatness and uniqueness of the lineage, the 
mighty deeds of the big man's forbears, and the almost mystical, final and 
incontrovertible claim to being a real social being through identification with a place 
of origin [an 'on1e']81, 
Contrary to Furniss, who, as we saw, is cautious to present his 'rhetorical' approach to the 
exclusion of others, Barber strongly advocates the rhetorical as the only vantage poi nt from 
which OrOO, at least, may be interpreted: 
... orild, by being ultered, effect transitions between one being and another, one state 
and another, one time and another. Only a rhetoric which could take into account what 
a text is 'doing' at this level would make discussion of orild possible82, 
She also states quite unambiguously, given 'the extraordinary disjunctions and juxtapositions 
of onlU texts ['texts', one assumes, taken as utterances], their centrelessness, their 
accommodation of multiple voices and "points of view"', thaI 'an orikl text is not a literary 
object'S;. From the point of view of our own stated altemptto relate the oral text to an oral 
literature that is part and parcel of general literary theory, this is a somewhat troubling 
statement. In so far as it derives from a questioning of the notion of text (as object, as 
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closure), it would seem, at its most superficial level of interpretation, 10 reflect the idea that 
'without a lext, there is no literature'. Yet Barber does not deny that Or£kl do indeed 
constitute 'literary discourse'jW; her argument is, rather, that this literariness cannot be ascribed 
to any of the properties or functions nonnally (that is, from the point of view of 'conventional 
literary criticism') associated with the text. And even if Barber, in the article under 
consideration as well as in the introduction, makes - also on the strength of the other 
contributions - a resounding case for an interdisciplinary approach to the oral text, the notion 
of literature clearly continues to infonn this interdisciplinarity, and not 'merely' as an 
aesthetic element of the interdisciplinary process (alongside historical and social 
considerations) either. In fact, in a very real sense the interdisciplinary approach she advocates 
is a literary approach which. '[in acknowledging] simultaneously the historicity and the 
textuality of oral texts, [in combining] a sociology with a poetics of oral literature'S', arrives 
at a new poetics. a new conception of oral literature. There is, then, no reason to believe that 
the oral text is necessarily less literary (in tenns of Finnegan's definition) for invoking modes 
of interpretation that fall, strictly speaking, outside that of the interpretation of the literary 
texl. Its literariness may well rely on historical and social insights (more so than is the case 
for the written? - we shall return to this question), but it retains its qualities as literature. 
So orlkl are, in a very real sense, literature without being literature, or, more precisely, 
literature that is not recognizable as such. This contradiction brings us to the edge, so to 
speak, of the 'modernist' approach to oral literature. But we cannot investigate this 
contradiction and the theoretical consequences it may hold· not just for oral literature, but, 
indeed, literature· without definitively setting aside other questions that may, in one way or 
the other, influence Barber's assessment of orikl as literary I non-literary. 
To begin at the beginning: when Barber says that 'the orlkl text is not a literary object' she 
is, obviously, far removed from the 'dismissive approach' to oral literature against which we 
earlier saw Finnegan offer oral literature as defence. Neither are her views to be confused 
with those of Ong: written and oral modes of literary expression do not differ by virtue of the 
different cognitive processes they employ. (We have seen Barber's objections to a 
'psychological dichotomy' between literate and oral). We can reflect on a third possible 
interpretation, namely that the orrkl are simply an eKample of a (predominantly) 'non-literary' 
oral genre (co-eKisting with literary ones· much as non-literary and literary teKts co-exist in 
literate societies). Having earlier set aside this distinction, this may be an opportune moment 
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to look at it more closely. 
In the introduction to her Oral Literature in Africa Finnegan86 observes that criteria for 
delimiting what is truly 'literature' are much the same for the written and the oral text. To 
a large extent it is a matter of opinion, which may differ as much between individuals and 
different age and social groups as between different periods of history. As such she refuses -
all the more so, one suspects, for being an outsider - to distinguish between literary and non-
literary oral genres, opting instead for a distinction between 'clear-cut' and 'marginal'. The 
former relates to cases where 'the African [oral] examples are clearly comparable with literary 
genres recognized in familiar European cultures', such as panegyric poetry, for instance. In 
the case of the 'marginal' literary texts there is no such (formal) parallel, but other aspects 
may be taken into account, such as local perceptions of the particular genre in terms of the 
prestige accorded it relative to others87, and whether or not its form, even if it is 'clearly 
marginal: obviously not "literature" in [its] own right', in some or other way reflects 'an 
appreciation of the artistic aspect of language' and is, therefore, 'not irrelevant to literary 
formulation and composition,88. Examples of these 'clearly marginal' forms include 
metaphorical names, elaborate greeting forms and proverbs89. 
Finnegan's evocation of a marginally literary reflective of 'an appreciation of the artistic 
aspect of language' is, from the point of view of actually delimiting what is literature, 
obviously flimsy. Language is in itself a symbolization, a 'distancing' (this point will be 
further elaborated in the latter part of this study) and, as such, all intelligible discourse 
becomes 'marginally literary', even within the conventional modernist paradigm. That all 
discourse is (marginally) literary (rendering perfectly superfluous the distinction between 
literary and non-literary) may well be conceded purely with reference to the written text, 
notably in the light of the post-modernist questioning of literature as a separate category of 
expression. Yet, even if this critique were to amount to an actual 'destruction' of the notion 
of literature (and this is, as we shall see, hardly the case), the 'literary', however unstable its 
criteria, continues to be commonly distinguished from the 'non-literary' or 'popular': the 
modernist view may well be more tenacious than its critics would admit. From the 
perspectives that Finnegan advances here it would appear, however, that a non-literary oral 
text (in a context where the oral text is regarded as potentially 'worthy' of a literary 
interpretation) is, frankly, inconceivable. But, once again, are we talking about literature or 
anthropology? 
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'Inconceivable' is only a slight exaggeration. Tending to ignore even Finnegan's watered-
down opposition between clear and marginal texts, the literary perspective on oral 
text is v"'"."', .... 
everywhere, 
text. In a recent Noleen Turner90, on the authority of the Zulu Language Board, gives 
a largely fonnalist description of literature as used with particular care in tenns 
of images and words chosen', and lists imilolozelo (lullabies), amahubo (poetry as song) and 
izibongo ( poetry) as the different of Zulu poetry, izinganekwane (folktales), 
izisho or (idioms and proverbs) and iziphicaphicwano (riddles) as the of Zulu 
prose. heavily on Dundes and Ong. are given a strongly 'functional' treatment, 
with little it would seem, the obvious differences in 'care in and 
words chosen' between the various catJe~C'fl of text. 
Vail White's aesthetic of 'poetic license', which offers a radical departure from the 
fonnalist definition of oral literature (this conception will be considered more fully later on), 
shows a similar reluctance for delimitating the 'literary'. Their assessment of the African work 
song to a extent il1ustrates this. To with, it is a work song (the 'Paiva' song of 
Mozambique's Zambesia Province) that is credited with making them aware of the aesthetic 
of the first pJace91 , is at first noticeable obscenity. revolving 
ribald insistence on the of the man referred to in the a functional 
point of view, the characteristic obscenity of the work song had accounted for on the 
basis that the chanting of obscenities manual labour more appealing and that the 
relaxation of restrictions - in this case of what otherwise was a taboo 'helped to get 
laborious tasks done efficiently,92. in the Paiva song the functionalist interpretation takes 
a back seat. As Vail and White explain, the song In described as a 'map of 
by those who individual to whom 
Paiva ",uuv.,v partly founded one of the major sugar 
as such, a metaphor for the industry as a whole. Through the 
makes reference (Jose 
region and oe<;Ollles. 
use of further metaphor 
in Vail and White's 'becomes a symbolic representation of the people's 
of company rule over four generations', with the obscene jibe nsondo wache 
standing 'as a pennanent repudiation of the company's values ,93. Echoing Koljevic's 
assessment of the South-Slavic Vail and White see song both as a 'reading of 
history and... a way to transcend that history'. Finnegan's of self-awareness and 
liS 
detachment are not out of place. 
At same time, however, purely functional dimension of the work it 
'provides a rhythm for communallabour'94. Allowing for the that the Paiva (or at 
versions of it) is out as being important,95 (in words, 
other songs are less so - see note 87), the postulated aesthetic is not 




the Paiva not benefit a more discerning use of the term 'Hterature' in 
important' texts, particularly of the work variety? To return, to 
article quoted at beginning of this ""n'",",''''''' can, however 
may be to pinpoint an oral text that is not literature, to some extent be seen as implying the 
existence such a text. Seeking to 'prove' that oral literature it is no doubt 
- to refer only to the example she provides from the Zulu tradition - that she chooses to 
highlight, not the proverb or the folktale, but 'the lengthy praisepoems', and then 
for 'their studied use of parallelism and their richly figurative style,97. When the (Jiterary) 
chips are the modernist to a formally text centred a 
consciously and creative ('studied') subject shines through. 
Having much insisted on the modernist assumption of textual unity, it may be useful, at this 
point, to look somewhat more closely at the consequences this assumption as as 
'literariness' is concerned, and then particularly from the point view of the reader I 
Easthope talks about the 'features' the modernist reading in regard. Flowing 
assumption '''''''." .... unity, the considerations are particularly important. Firstly, 
the text is not as transitive but as intransitive, it is not 





meanings, in fact, but 
for analysis" is amenable to 'all 
be significant - of the text, formal (the signifier) and 
signified) as well as interrelations between the tw098. 
It is especially the latter consideration that concerns us here. For even if Easthope sets out 
to prove that the literary vs non-literary dichotomy can be seen as irrelevant on the basis of 
post-modernist (these will seen further on), there are texts that 
the modernist . This he illustrates through an juxtaposition of two 
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'readingsdOO, one of Edgar Rice Burrough's Tarzan of the Apes (a 'popular' text), the other 
of Conrad's Heart of Darkness (a 'literary' text). Easthope labels the former 'a pleasure', the 
'hard work', the difference lying the textuality of the two novels. That of Tarzan of 
the Apes is generally 'literal and denotative, [holding] meaning onto represented event, and 
so, signifier onto signified' 101, giving reader immediate certainty of meaning 
(,gratification'). In Heart of Darkness, however, reader is required to 'track' the 
possibilities of 'signjfiers that open onto multiple signifieds' 102. Meaning is forever 'deferred' , 
for Heart of Darkness is 'an ironic text, always meaning more than it 
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Besides its requirement as to the 'closure' of the literary text, the modernist perspective can 
therefore distinguish a literary from a non-literary on the basis of meaning: connotative or 
'multi-layered' in the case of the former, denotative or 'straight-forward' in the case of the 
latter. (This is a simplification of course - see note 10 I). But to return to the oral text: will 
the researcher of oral literature (who, as we have seen, is generally trained within the 
modernist paradigm), be able to teU the difference between an oral text that admits of a 
modernist reading and one that resists it? Given the obvious disadvantage, not only of cultural 
unfamiliarity and linguistic incompetencelO4, but also of 'scriptocentrism' 105 (Ong refers to the 
'pre-emptiveness of literacyd06 in this respect), this would seem to be a tall order indeed. As 
such, it will be exteme1y arrogant of our to - without consultation of 'local opinion' 
- bluntly adjudge a particular oral text as non-literary. But it is equally unacceptable for that 
researcher, this time acting at the behest of these disadvantages of which he is acutely aware, 
to go and proclaim as 'literature' whatever oral text he comes across. To my mind this 
transgresses the narrow line between, on the one hand, attributing certain qualities to 
something and appreciating it in the light of those qualities as deserving of appreciation 'in 
own right', and on the other, merely 'applying double standards'. Goody's view that 
comparative research necessarily involves a 'value element' (it not only raises questions of 
process, but of progress) is worth repeating To unquestioningly call oral text 
'literature' is to ignore process in order to progress. As such, it is a kind of political 
expediency, with all the ideological presuppositions that along with it. Opting for a 
'virtual' oral literature (as described in Chapter I) may, once offer some kind of way 
out. 
What is ironic is that the procedure to equate oral text with oral literature actually 
undermines the artistic integrity of the latter (the sense in which it may be perceived as 'art') 
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in largeJy the same way as the 'dismissive' approach to orality, if not quite to the same 
degree. (See note more absolute our contradiction of the dismissive approach 
to be, the more absolute its linking of tradition to text. In other words, the simplistic 
framework employed by the dismissive approach is perpetuated. For in making 'literature' and 
interchangeable one ultimately makes 'literature' and tradition interchangeable. Granted, 
the tradition may - thanks to Parry and Lord - allow for the text to actually have been 
composed in so far as the text is an improvisation on a creative model that is not staid, but 
flexible. (In the 'dismissive' view this model is characterized by its rigidity, meaning that 
text is less composed than it is - above all - 'passed on', transmitted), But at the end of the 
day 'traditional tell us "what"'. Presupposed as tradition (as opposed to being qualified by it), 
the oral text that is automatically literature can never be more than folklore. As such, it is 
never really literature, always anthropology. also notes I and 3), 
To return to Barber's 'orfkl text [that] is not a literary object', In the introduction she and 
De Moraes Farias call for 'a sociology of textual production', affirming the decline of '[t]he 
idea that "a society" or "a people" has a monolithic and homogeneous culture, equally shared 
by all its members', and drawing attention to 
the extraordinarily complex cultural differentiation of some societies, ... [and] 
the impossibility of assigning a single determinate 'translation' to any ideological 
phenomenon in any societylO1, 
In other words, we cannot talk about the oral tradition of a particular society without first 
clarifying the social group or cJass within that society to whom the tradition specifically 
relates. This view obviously ........... ""." a generally more 'conflictual' model of oral societies, 
representing a movement away from the conception of oral societies as necessarily tending 
towards harmony, stability and homeostasis. (See Chapter 2, note 28). Where Oral Theory has 
generaHy been premised on the notion of tradition as something relatively unified and simple 
(as set out Chapter 2), the latter can increasingly be shown as multiple and complex lO8• 
But there is no reason to believe that Barber's projection of the on1d text as falling outside 
the notion of literature has anything to do with considerations of social stratification and 
wielding of power within Yoruba society, As 'praise poetry' on1d are obviously a crucial 
element not just of the expression power, but indeed of power (and prestige) itself. 
Moreover, they are performed across the spectrum of society, by ordinary individuals (both 
men and women) and specialists alike '09, The particular ambiguity of the orfkl as 'literary 
discourse' that is not a literary object is not of a social or historical, but a textual nature. And 
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we anive, perhaps, at the main reason for the 'impasse' in the interpretation of the oral text 
highlighted by Barber and De Moraes Farias"o. The idea of the text as 'given', Barber tells 
us, lies at the heart of 'the mainstream [modernist} traditions of written literary criticism in 
which all scholars of oral literature hove been educated'"!, Yai tt2 offers a similar reflection, 
noting thaI 'written literary criticism serves as the bedrock to oral poetry criticism, the latter 
being perceived as the former's appendage'. Once again, the point is worth stressing: however 
justified the call by Barber and her co-contributors' for an interdisciplinary approach to the 
oral text, their concern is essentially with the oral text as text - a text that may well resist 
definition as (artistic) object, but which nevertheless remains distinct from social information 
(society) or historical data (history). In the final analysis theirs is the impasse, not of the 
historian or anthropologist, but of the literary scholar"'. 
As such, then, Barber's testimony amounts to a Critique of a particular literary theory. In 
terms of the 'modernist' literary paradigm one cannot give a satisfactory account of onld, not 
because this particular kind of praise poetry is not literature, but, quite simply, because the 
theoretical paradigm is inadequate, What is significant, however, at least from the point of 
view of conceptualizing oral literature, is the route Barber follows to get out of this dilemma 
In an earlier article - published in 1984 - 'Yoruba Onld and Deconslructive Criticism' 
(already quoted at the beginning of this chapter), Barber, having noted the inappropriateness 
of the modernist paradigm, 'read' the orfk'i against what she termed the 'chief adversary' of 
conventional criticism - namely deconstruction - only to find the latter equally wanting tt4 , 
(We shall see her reasons for this later on), While she suggests, in conclusion to the article, 
thaI the conception of literature as 'social practice' be the 'real alternative' to the conventional 
approach'!', her constant concern with the notion of criticism (as reflected in the title) 
ensconces the argument firmly within the field of literary theory. But if Barber, in the 
'Interpreting Orfk'i as History and as Literature' we have been reviewing, bases her argument 
on exactly the same theoretical inadequacy of modernism, she - following up on her earlier 
suggestion of Iiterature-as-social practice - now turns for a solution not so much to (pOSI-
modernist) literary thoory as to an interdisciplinary collaboration with sociology and history. 
The text is seen as a 'species of social action'; literary study is assimilated to the science of 
rbetoric, which constitutes a way 
of getting at the capacity of the text to activate spheres beyond the confines of its own 
texluality, and be implicated in social and pOlitical action tl6 , 
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The following questions come to mind: why, given the essentially literary concerns of Barber 
and her collaborators, is the battle against the 'modernist' paradigm not fought within literary 
theory, as literary theory? Why is the orfkl text, given its resistance to closure, its 
'infiniteness', not redefined in these terms as text rather than projected - as non-text 
(remember that according to Barber on'kl are not literary objects) - 'beyond the confines of 
its own textuality?' In short, instead of pointing out that the assumptions of conventional 
criticism (and of post-modernist criticism for that matter) exclude the on'kl, why not say that 
these assumptions are wrong and proceed to point out how they should be changed? 
It may be objected that these considerations are trivial - and, in fact, rather quaint - in so 
far as they insist on the very kind of hegemony - of order - that the post-modernist (in South 
Africa temptingly overlapping with post-apartheid) view has liberated us from. Surely it does 
not matter in which 'field' oral literature is interpreted, as long as this is done properly? But 
'literature' has an ideological dimension, and to advance an interdisciplinary historical! social 
approach as the only (as opposed to an alternative) mode of interpretation of a given literature 
runs the risk of (subtly) devaluating the latter. (On the assumption that everything may be 
significant the modernist reading, as we saw earlier, presupposes a text whose 'signifiers open 
onto multiple signifieds' - is it not that the oral signifier is, somehow, incapable of 
engendering such wealth of meaning?) It is important, for our purposes, that this risk be faced 
head-on: we are talking, after all, about the literature of the 'other'. And this risk becomes 
particularly acute when the oral text is denied as object: how do we know that the extra-
textual interpretative dimension brought out by Barber's interdisciplinary rhetoric is not 
merely functional? In freeing the oral text from the (written) literary paradigm, are we not, 
in fact, reverting to the 'cultural focus' Okpewho objected to in Chapter 2? 
Of course, Barber at various points draws attention to the importance of textuality (taking 
into account the properties of a text as a text), and in a sense her whole argument is played 
out on the proverbial tightrope between, on the one hand, the centrality of the text as basis 
of a literary! aesthetic interpretation and, on the other, the extreme fluidity of the oral text, 
a fluidity due not so much to the fact that it is, as performance, less 'objective' than its 
written counterpart, than to the relentless (at least from the point of view of the observer) 
social ! historical demands the oral society makes upon it. But that does not mean that the 
utterance cannot also, at some point in the range of interpretation to which it appeals, exist 
as a text - more precisely: an object - for the historical I social expectations ('functions') to 
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which the oral text is submitted can in no way be said to preclude the possibility of aesthetic 
I literary ones. 
There seems, in fact, little reason for the onld not to also be 'literary object', no matter 
how fragmented, disjointed and 'decentred' the latter may be. For a start, orikl constitute a 
recognizable genre within Yoruba culture itself - the interpretative category of 'praise poetry' 
was not created by the researcher for the purposes of his own scientific distinction, but is 
lived by the people who perfonn the onu. Furthennore the orikl, though coming across as 
unconnected fragments, are related through the mere fact of being attributed to a single 
subject: the one to whom the perfonnance is addressed. Orikl are epithets, they constitute a 
'dynamic process of naming'. Names, as Barber points out, 'are self-sufficient with their own 
internal significance .. .'II7. Surely the understanding of onld as names (rather than words or 
'units') provides them with a kind of textual unity? In her 1984 article Barber puts this more 
clearly: 
It would be going too far to claim that on1<l are made up of a random assortment of 
unrelated units. Such an assortment would surely be impossible to perfonn. There is 
a clustering of units, through habit and through a kind of thematic drift; and there is 
a consistency of style which smooths the transition from one unit to another ll8• 
Orikl can then be recognized in tenns of a style, and it is not impossible to relate them to a 
theme, even if the latter is not easily summarized. At the end of the day on1<l seem, in fact, 
to provide an excellent example of the oral text that is not reducible to some kind of extra-
textual role, and which Barber and De Moraes Farias earlier singled out as a particular focus 
of their study: 
we were interested in the properties of oral texts that make them evasive and 
ambiguous: their capacity not only to take on radically different significances from 
one historical moment to the next, but also to accommodate at the same moment 
incompatible significances, with an effect of dynamic ambiguity ... "9. 
These properties are also those of the on1<1. But are they not also those, as Finnegan put it 
earlier, through which literature is 'distanced'? Conditional in this regard is that the utterance 
is somehow 'set apart' - that it be textual object. 
In conclusion to our overview of the orikl, let us consider an aspect that Barber has no 
hestitation in relating to the lack of 'closure' of the genre, namely that orikl are' a collection 
of diverse voices. Different bits were composed by different people"w. Yet the multi-
compositional nature of orikl is, on the evidence provided, little different to that associated 
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with oral texts in general. This brings us right back to the notion of tradition, which, as 
explained by Parry and Lord, does not only define the ultimate distinctiveness of the oral text 
vis-ii-vis the written, but also, in a very real sense, guarantees the unity of the text Seen as 
traditional texts - which they are l21 - the fragmentation and decentredness of the orikl are 
immediately qualified. Foley's view of the oral text as simultaneously 'thing in itself and 
'directive', gleaning its identity from tradition (a view strongly inscribed in an oral-formulaic 
theory relatively poorly - as we have seen - adapted to Africa i22), may well ring true even for 
the orOO. 
OJabiy i Yai echoes Barber's critique of the text as object, noting that the notions of 
spatiality and unity, basic to the definition of text, 'are not necessarily relevant in oral 
literature,,23, The conventional formalist and structuralist approaches to oral literature, useful 
in certain respects 12·, are therefore inadequate for the study of oral literature, What he terms 
'the context of situation' (also the 'ethnography of performance') approach - attributed to the 
development of pragmatics and semiotics - ultimately fails by the same token. While this 
approach rightfully abandons the idea of the text as self-sufficient unit of analysis (thing in 
itself and directive to its perceivers?), it still hinges on an opposition of 'text' to 'context' 
which is foreign to orality: '[tJhe lextl context dualism may be a function of the "alphabetic 
ideology" [scriptocentrism?] of the Western world .. .' 125, 
In a sense, then, Yai's dissatisfaction with the modes of interpretation of the oral ullerance 
can be seen as going beyond that of Barber, whose view of literature as social practice 
reflects, if not exactly a dichotomy, a kind of 'interplay' between the notions of text and 
context (to be conceived of as discourse on the one hand and power and ideology on the 
other"6) in respect of which it could be argued that the text as object remains more or less 
identifiable. Barber's argument as to the inadequacies in relation to the oral of both 
conventional and post-modernist literary paradigms is essentially a methodological one, but 
Yai lodges his objection on a deeper, epistemological level: 
The reason for the relative failure of the linguistic [structuralist] and semiotic 
[pragmatic 1 approaches to oral poetry criticism is that, whatever their methodology, 
theIr presuppositions enshrine a serious epistemological confusion. Since we are 
dealing with cultural products expressed in linguistic medium, the use of the written 
modality which is known to be antithetic to orality for apprehending the latter should 
appear as prima-facie suspicious scientific instrument127• 
Where Barber took us to the edge, so to speak, of a writing-centred conception of oral 
122 
literature, Yai takes us to the edge of the modality of criticism of oral literature, which is 
writing itself. The distinctiveness of the oral, which in this instance owes nothing to the 
fonnalist hypotheses of Parry and Lord, is pushed to the limit, and the prognosis for a proper 
oral literary criticism is nothing if not pessimistic. Arnold Krupat's 'courageous' admission 
'I do not believe that our textual culture ... can develop an oral poetics,l28 receives the 
following jusification: 
... the very enterprise of a written criticism of oral literature has an intrinsic violence, 
as well as an assimilationist parti-pris, at its root. Thus all the theories so far examined 
have produced criticisms of oraliture [oral literature] that are but various versions of 
written literature criticism. They cannot fail to miss their target129 • 
The inherent inability of the researcher of Oral Theory to give a particular oral text a literary 
'reading' (reception) has already been discussed, earlier in the present chapter as well as in 
Chapter 1. This inability results in the existence - to us - of but a 'virtual' oral literature, 
which takes its example from the literary horizons of expectations of the ultimately 
'privileged' Homeric poems. As 1 stated in Chapter 2, this particular conception - in so far 
as it relates to the theoretical origins of Oral Theory - can be seen as an attempt at setting 
aside (or bypassing) the 'anthropological bias' of Oral Theory. Of course, it is a vain attempt, 
for the 'literature' in question remains at the level of pure possibility. But at least it 
recognizes the need to remove the study of oral literature from its anthropological cradle. Yai, 
more than any of the authors we have dealt with, is sensitive to this. Reflecting on the 
approaches to oral literature earlier criticized, he is able to justify them within the framework 
of a particular 'modality of writing': what he tenns 'the Western university tradition'. He 
continues: 
They [these approaches] will still be of use, but their practitioners should bear in mind 
their status. As long as their role is to inform us about the mechanisms of a literature 
whose natural audience is not familiar with such discourse, these critical approaches, 
we must emphasize, are part and parcel of anthropology or elhnology130. 
An interesting twist that Yai gives my earlier argument is the attention he focuses, not on the 
distance between the researcher of oral literature (whom 1 shall now call a potential critic) 
and the text he encounters (due to cultural I linguistic unfamiliarity and the failure to come 
to tenns with the oral medium - 'scriptocentrism'), but, instead, on the distance between the 
oral text's 'natural audience' ('traditional' audience) and the mode of interpretation employed 
by the 'critic', Of course, the two 'distances' are really one and the same, but Yai's 
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formulation goes straight to the core of the matter, which is - in the terms we used earlier -
the exclusion of the 'critic' from the text's horizons of expectations. As such, as Yai puts it, 
'the student's [critic's] participation in the creative process of poetry is thrown overboard'. 
To re-use, albeit in a different context, Ong's vivid image: as researcher constantly on the 
look-out for information (data), the 'critic' of oral literature is nothing more than an 
assembly-line worker, in other words, not a critic at all. 
At this point Yal takes the dissolution of the text-as-object a step further. Apart from their 
historicity and ideology, oral texts are inherently critical, they 'often already contain the 
germs of a theory of themselvesdJl . Beyond the dichotomy of text vs context, Yai is, in fact, 
concerned with another one, equally scriptocenlric, and, as far as the oral text is concerned, 
equally false: literature vs criticism. The Geli:de society of Western Yorubaland, for example, 
knows a particular kind of 'pre-performance criticism,132, where two or three artists with 
complementary talents (either specialized in melody or in words and metaphors) assess songs 
proposed by individuals. A song may be re-evaluated afterwards, before being submitted for 
assessment by the 'collective', a procedure known as igbale. According to Yai, this criticism 
is 'conceived as a communal exercise, a collective production'. As an example of a form of 
criticism contemporary to performance, Yal mentions the dialogic mode of the Iyere !fa 
(divinatory poetry), where the responsorial form of the chant enables the audience to register 
their approval or disapproval of the participant's song at the end of each 'line'. 'Poetic 
contests' offer yet another - extremely pervasive - example of oral poetry that is 
simultaneously oral criticism. 'Unlike the criticism of written ness which is in essence a 
criticism of mediation', Yai tells us, 'oral poetics is indivisible with its poetry; it is self-
productive'. He describes the criticism of oral texts as generative, expansive and ameliorative: 
Its objective and function are not only to make poets do better and to arouse more 
poetic vocations, but more important, to make each poet excel his predecessors and 
his contemporaries or to give self-transcending performances at every occasion. It is, 
in several respects, participatory. From the point of view of oral poetics, oral poetry 
should not even be described. We know it by practising it and by contributing to its 
making 133. 
What is noteworthy in this particular critique of the 'finiteness' of the textual object is that, 
different to Barber, Furniss and - as we shall see - Vall and White, Yal does not refer to some 
kind of interdisciplinary 'beyond', but declares himself squarely within the field of literature 
and literary studies. Unlike formalist, structuralist and pragmatic 'literary' approaches, the 
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'oral poetics' described here is not anthropology, but literature. 
Or is it? The logical outcome of Yai's argument is 'an oral approach to the criticism of oral 
poetry where it is being taught': at university. This will, for the first time no doubt, afford 
the oral text an interpretative framework in many ways distinct from that developed in the 
anthropological pursuit of gathering data on traditional societies. But this is easier said than 
done. Yai mentions courses introduced at universities in TIe-Ife (Nigeria), where oral poets 
themselves teach different modes of oral poetry with the emphasis on 'performative 
acquisition'. This innovation ellicits the following comment, worth quoting at some length: 
A meeting-point has indeed been created between the university ivory-tower and the 
contexts of oral poetry elaboration but the traffic is one way. Contrary to the usual 
course of oral poetry apprenticeship, the young poet does not go to his master but the 
master leaves his village in search of his pupil in an institution where he feels de trap. 
From a central authority in his village, he becomes a peripheralised master, as it were, 
in the university circle. In a sense a traditional poet teaching in a university patterned 
on Western models of education is a hostage of the peasant world in a 'modem' 
island. This, of course, affects patterns of mutual perception between poet I teacher 
and student. Students do respect the poet for his art and talent but they hardly regard 
him as a regular teacher. The relationships of camaraderie that constitute the norm 
between teacher and pupil in the village situation do not exist here, as pupils do not 
belong to the same socio-cultural background and do not interact outside the 
classroom. To a considerable extent, creativity is consequently muted in both teacher 
and pupils and the threat of 'fakelore' becomes more serious l34• 
Yai imagines a 'more flexible and dialogic situation' where the pupil goes to work with the 
master in the village and immerses himself in the 'ecology' of oral poetry. But he concedes 
that 'this would require a complete rethinking of our educational tenets' and a questioning of 
'the validity of the entire structure of the neo-colonial society with its characteristic urban 
bias,135. Our response can only be the following: the context in which Oral Theory has come 
to be postulated is simply not part of such a revolutionary project, no more, at any rate, than 
would be the case for any other academic 'discipline', whatever its degree of 
interdisciplinarity. Yai's conception of a true oral poetics, while courageously asserting the 
equality of the oral creator and his critic and to a large degree showing how it could be 
achieved, brings out in full relief, not just the distance between 'us' and 'them', but the 
ideological stakes involved in 'oral literature'. At issue, as Barber and De Moraes Farias put 
it, is 'the power imbalance which caused the rupture between producers [of oral literature] 
and Westernised critics in the first place'136. An oral literature theorised and critiqued not as 
information, but literature, remains at best an ideal. 
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Yai and Barber - the latter perhaps to a slightly lesser extent - attempt to elaborate a 
theoretical paradigm for oral literature in full recognition of what we earlier called the 
'distinctiveness' of orality. Indeed, the failure of previous theoretical models to interpret the 
oral text (i.e. to critically interpret it as literature), is attributed precisely to their assumption 
that oral and written texts could share the same critical apparatus. In the light of our earlier 
interpretation of Ong's argument against the notion of oral literature, we can say that Yai and 
Barber both emphasize that part of oral difference that goes to 'cultural chauvinism'. The 
arguments advanced by Vail and White, however, are best understood as stressing the divisive 
('racist') aspect of Ong's views. As such, then, their concern is not to establish - as Yai 
attempts to do - a specialized 'oraliture' criticism, but rather, as Alan Thorold puts it, 'to 
erase the distinction between the oral and the written in southern African Ii terature' 137 
White does Ialk about the need 10 develop 'an aesthetic deriving not from external models 
or theories of orality but from the evidence of African lexls and from the comments of 
performers and audiences in Africa about the nature of the literature they value,m. This 
sounds very much like Yai. In fact, there is little question of Vail and White 'disagreeing' 
with Yai or Barber, and they strongly endorse Yai's complaint as to the lack of 
communication between the producer and critic of oral poetry. (See Chapter I, note 80). But 
in advocating an historical approach to the study of African oral poetry - more specifically 
in terms of this pcetry's 'common aesthetic' of poetic license - they say nothing that, in 
essence, cannot also be said about criticism of written literature. According to While, 
[t]he phenomenon that oral pcetry in its various forms is permitted a freedom of 
expression which violates normal conventions has been noted throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa139, 
An historical approach, he further tells us, 
conforms very well with the testimony of African informants. A good oral poet is 
usually described as one who roots his performance, directly or by implication, in a 
coherent and comprehensive view of the past and present!4\), 
The important point to make is that the appropriateness in question here relates less 10 orality 
per se than it does to Africa (or southern Africa) as cultural area At issue is less what is 
appropriate for oral, than what is appropriate for African literature (poetry), As such, of the 
numerous advantages that Vail and White attribute to their interpretative framework of poetic 
license, namely . to mention but a few - that it 'strengthens and makes more specific the 
customary claim Ihat oral poetry is a kind of social action' (see Furniss and Barber), that it 
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'makes redundant the distinction between text and context (see Vail, between formalist 
analyses of literary devices and social analyses of content, in short between poetics and 
history'!", one advantage stands out: 
it enables us to recognize important lines of continuity between oral and written poetry 
in southern Africa 142. 
Vail and White's virulent criticism of the role of the oral formulaic theory in the creation of 
a 'notional oral man' leads - inevitably one suspects - not just to a denial of the literacy vs 
orality dichotomy, but to a denial of the difference between written and oral text. Their denial 
of anthropological division translates amiably into a literary universalism that owes nothing 
in particular to orality. 
Or does it? Vail and White have already made abundantly clear to us that they are not 
interested in the formula, even as an aid to improvisation I composition. (See Chapter 1, note 
51). Neither can the essence of oral poetry be interpreted 'through an investigation of the 
mechanics of its performance', in other words - in the terms we developed earlier - through 
an investigation of the mechanics of its textuality. It may be worth reflecting briefly on Vail 
and White's use here of the term 'essence'. Two possibilities present themselves. Either we 
take essence to refer specifically to the meaning of the oral text ('oral meaning', in other 
words), in which case the very historicity of the text is regarded as being, in a sense, an effect 
of oral textuality regardless of whether the oral and written text are formally different: the 
oral text lends itself to an historical approach in ways that the written text does not. Or we 
may understand essence to mean simply 'meaning' (at issue is simply a text, not necessarily 
an oral one), in which case formal differences between the oral and written text are entirely 
inconsequential given the over-all importance - as far as meaning is concerned - of the 
relation between text and history. Where our first interpretation of the term 'essence' reaches 
beyond what may (or may not) be common to oral and written literature (the textual) so as 
to address the specifically oral (historicity), the second ignores what may (or may not) be 
specific so as to address what it sees as common to literature in general. 
The perspectives developed in Power and the Praise Poem would seem to provide 
justification for both interpretations. With regard to the first one, we have already seen 
White's assertion, based on the views of his African informants, as to the particular 
appropriateness of an historical approach to the African oral text. In other words, we may 
justifiably talk of a specifically oral literary paradigm without feeling guiUy about our 
of concern for textual considerations as such, This position will be revisited later on. 
second interpretation is, in a sense, more problematical of the two in so far as it 
or glosses over - the of the oral. It will be useful, at this point, to on 
this in somewhat more detail. 
Vail and White may well 
the oral text is likely to 
amongst these are 
predominance, 
where historical events are 
for the direct speech of 
third l43, These factors all 
considerations, Vail and 
the formalist paradigm, but they nonetheless that 
by certain formal features rather than others. Foremost 
sentences that are 'short and fairly in "'Ul'C'M , a 
, of the present to tenses (even 
described), and, given its greater immediacy, a 
and second person rather than the indirect speecn of the 
to the 'mechanics of performance'. In addition to these 
are not necessarily averse to a description ora] text in 
terms of the way in which it is patterned. Central to this is metaphor. Through its 
elaboration into of interpretation>l44, it 
come[s] to stand as the bearers of history and remain[s] in the 
evaluative the 'evidence' to be deployed by 
interpret that historyl45. 
concerned as 
poets as they 
There is a analogy the conception of the metaphor as 'evaluative precedent' 
answering to a interpretation, and the idea a , generalized 
to striking visual poetic ........ LAV'U a la Parry. Ong, as we noted 
imagery (which is what the metaphor frequently amounts to) as 'the ocular 
equivalent of the Chapter 2, note 49). Vail and White are to 
this analogy, for they immediately raise their guard: 
It should that metaphors are not 'formulas', 
..... 1A,a.L~A..I expressions, for the general diction need not or in the sense 
'essential ideas', for their value is that they provide 
the currency for new ideas, for reassessment and for reevaluation. Metaphors, by 
fusing abstract concepts with concrete images, have the characteristic of uniting 
physical and metaphysical elements into a rich compound of meaningl47, 
So, by 
Okpewho's 
in order to 
concepts with concrete images' it is the metaphor that - to recall 
remark (see note 56) - provides the means of from objective truth 
'truth of a more metaphysical design'. Not only the metaphor constitute 
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the point where physical reality gives onto the metaphysical, but, from an interpretative point 
of view, it also stands at the very juncture where the properly textual I formal merges into 
the historical, and Vail and White leave us in no doubt as to the supremacy of the latter, This 
despite their recognition of the importance of the 'skills of the performer
d48 
and their 
acknowledgement, at least in the case of the Paiva song, of the way in which form has 
contributed to its 'popularity and memorability' 149. In fact, this acknow ledgement of textuality 
is relative to say the least, for only a few pages later we are told that 
[i]n the final analysis, the long popularity of the Paiva song ... has had little to do with 
its form ... 
And the metaphor is explicitly shown to derive not from considerations of form, but of 
history: 
[i]t [the popularity of the Paiva song] has depended on what is widely believed to 
have been the audacity of its original protest at a historical moment the people still 
cherish, and on the absolute precision of its central metaphor in expressing the 
plantations workers' complaint about the sugar company!5o. 
Contrary, then, to what the perspective on oral jorm, not just as mode of expression, but 
essentially as mode of cognition would have us believe (see Chapter 2), the visual imagery 
that makes up the metaphor is not about how people think (emphasizing what is easily 
recognizable or 'memorable') but, rather, about what they think (in relation to their own 
experience f history). This is an attractive proposition. But if, in Vail and White's view, the 
metaphor is, so to speak, at the service of history, it is also subjected to it. The metaphor 
derives from history and comes to terms with it, but it seldom - if ever - transcends it. And 
here we arrive at what is no doubt the crucial difference between written and oral literature, 
namely their different relation to time: 
Where a poem reaches its audience through print... [w)e take it at our own pace, 
appreciating its completeness as a work of art. Even when the points it makes are 
topical, we tend to praise it for achieving timelessness. Some oral poetry resembles 
this. There are songs and poems that have been preserved over long periods because 
they express perfectly what people feel on certain subjects, the words remaining 
largely unchanged because 'they corne from our fathers'. There are others composed 
well in advance of performance and polished to perfection in rehearsal. The songs of 
the Chopi migodo ... are good examples. In general, though, the tendency of oral poetry 
is to be concerned with the drama of the moment'''. 
Apart from its - surprising - concession to a Kantian universalist aesthetic (the timelessness 
of the text reflects the disinterestedness of the author - see Chapter I, notes 117 and 118), not 
to """''''H"", the modernist sake' aUILI<LI\J, in the idea a performance 'polished 
to , this is notable for its contradiction. The basic point that Vail and 
White are trying to make is that oral poetry is time-bound of its concern 
with 'the drama of the moment' - its historicity. At the same time, though, they aHude to a 
kind of historicity that is itself. in a sense, 'timeless': some songs are because 'they 
perfectly what on . The point of course, that 
are historical ones: the meaning of a particular text can only become 
within an historical perspective. But the inherent historicity of the oral text is not only 
condition of meaning, it also turns out to be its condition of longevity. of 'timelessness'. 
implications of this view brings us close to idea of the relative 'changelessness' of 
and so exp1icitly though events themselves do not 
surely the way feel about them constantly do? As Vail and White themselves 
demonstrate, the oral text is historical not it reflects - or even attempts to reflect 
the significance of history, but because it interprets, and re-interprets, that significance. 
many an oral text takes on a kind of momentum that propulses it beyond its historical 
embedded ness. wiH have no accounting for momentum: it is what 
makes the text 'aesthetic', what sets it apart from everyday discourse - in short, its textuality, 
its Being, as we have seen, by no means a strict adherent of formalism of Parry and 
she may well with Vail and White that historicity is the vital ingredient of textual 
I interpretation. But the of that (or that meaning) into 
'communication insight' seems - to me at from of 
detachment that is prerogative of form alone. 
Faced with the contradiction of a historicity that is simultaneously and 
timeless, Vail and White are, however, extremely reluctant to attribute to form any such 
importance. Their in the quoted above, to Chopi migodo ngodo) 
is particularly in this the ngodo, to the 
accompaniment of the timbila (xylophone) as well as choreographed , boasts, 
by Vail and White's own account, very much the kind of formal complexity and elaboration 
that would be the hallmark of any 'true' art that successfully transcends the conditions of its 
own creation. ngodo, we learn: 
IS an eXl[en41ea and complex DOC~UcaJ form ... musicians 
rather than by laborers and cultivators, and ... devised lengthy public entertainment 
rather than to accompany communal or work-gang activity, they [migodo] are much 
more thematically and aesthetically ambitious than, say, the Paiva song ... 153 
their curtsy to modernist ideal notwithstanding well in of 
performance... polished to perfection'). Vail and White are not to be dissuaded. Their 
throughout, is for an aesthetic of oral text in which form plays as little a as 
possible. Hence - one may suspect - 'poetic license': 
we have been describing our own [historical] account of poetry in south-central 
Africa as constituting in itself an at the of which is the concept of 
poetic license 154. 
license, as we already seen, to the notion that certain types of 
(what we have caHed ) is permitted a freedom of expression would normally 
violate convention. In so far as we may talk of an aesthetic of poetic license, poetic license 
is logically also that which turns the oral text into oral literature. their endeavour to 
",.:>.al..ll • .:>" an alternative to an aesthetic form, Vail and White not the 
as to whether this does not - perhaps tend to coincide with certain types of text 
(differentiated by form) rather than others. We shall shortly return to this point. Instead, it 
would seem that poetic license is the effect of purely social I historical considerations, ..... ~.~,~ 
to 'expectation' of audience 'that something of public interest is being said, and said 
in a manner worth attention,I;S. 
Vail and White's highlighting of the political notion of public interest would, of itself, to 
a extent distance 'expectation' in question here from the 'horizons of expectations' 
we talked about earlier l56, Yet in the very same paragraph Vail and White make the point that 
this expectation is '[i]mplicit the very mechanics of performance', in other words, implicit-
at to a degree - formal properties text Lest this comes across 
as a contradiction of the fundamentally social nature of Vail and White's aesthetic, it may be 
useful to make a few further observations on the notion of form. In question is not so much 
whether the latter is a 'criterion' in of the literary, but, rather, the nature 
of the form that may be thus considered. Assuming that Vail and White's conception of oral 
does relate to of form, necessarily the kind of 
conducive - at as far as Finnegan is concerned - to 'literature'? 
We qualified the formalist aesthetic as pertaining to 'a special use of language' 
characterized by certain uncommon to discourse or 'practical language'. 
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(See Chapter I, note 92). Against this Parry's notion of an archaized 'specialized poetic 
language' characterized by the formula has obvious formalist implications157• But where the 
formalist device is generally justified in terms of the 'literary' effect it produces (see 
Finnegan's 'communication of insight' - Viktor Shklovsky's notion of defamiliarization no 
doubt offers a good example in this regard '58 ). the explanation for the oral style described by 
Parry is frequently much more humble: the forms employed by Homer were less to serve 
poetry than to serve memory. 
In an article on the structuralist poetics of Roman Jakobson"9, George Mounin explains 
what he sees as the preference of the latter for 'the poetry of those countries ... where 
traditional forms have survived"'" on the grounds that Jakobson 'mistakes structures that are 
aesthetically pertinent for mnemotechnic structures ,'6'. According to Mounin, the 'metric, 
prosodic, phonic, grammatical and semantic' devices that permeate lakobsonian analyses are, 
as Sunday Anozie puts it: 
neither intrinsically musical nor intrinsically poetic, but are instead mnemotechnic, that 
is, they are invented by civilizations and cultures ba~ed upon oral transmission to 
enable the memory to conserve certain discourses '62• 
Anozie, while conceding that 'there is a strong point' to Mounin' s argument, qualifies as 
'arbitrary' Mounin's distinction between poetry and memory. Whether this distinction is 
indeed arbitrary need not concern us here, but what is important is that Mounin is far from 
alone in having made it. The vexed notion of the distinctiveness of orality ha~ generally been 
interpreted (as we saw in Chapter 2), not in the light of oral-textual forms deriving from and 
supporting poetic insights, but in the light of textual strategies required to facilitate memory 
recall in the absence of writing. Even where Vail and White show their appreciation for the 
'skills' of the performer (see note 148), it is undoubtedly the latter interpretation that holds 
sway in their contention that the expectation of the audience is implicit in the 'mechanics of 
performance'. Crudely put, the audience wants to know what is in the 'public interest', the 
performer wants them to remember, Form is, to Vail and White, essentially useful in so far 
as it enhances the text's longevity. The aesthetic function of form as effect of 'detachment' 
is of comparatively little concern. 
If poetic license can be regarded as in itself an aesthetic, it is because the 'pernlission' it 
depends upon should have as little to do with textual form as possible, This is the crux of 
Vail and White's position. Yet ever attentive to the possibility that an outright rejection of 
formalist considerations looks suspiciously like a privileging of the social over the aesthetic 
(and the text must, after all, speak as text), the notion of form is never far from the surface. 
And where we drew attention to a certain contradiction within Vail and White's notion 
historicity (implying the time-bounded ness of the while also - at least in certain cases -
guaranteeing its longevity), we can now see the notion of as at least equally ambiguous. 
At some point in history, Vail and White muse, 'oral poets in southern succeeded 
formalizing [the] expectations [on the part of the audience on what is of public interest] 
into a convention of poetic license that privileges poetry and song above all other forms of 
oral discourse .. : 163. 'Poetry and song' juxtaposed with 'forms of oral discourse' clearly imply 
textual form: 'mechanics of performance'. But what to make of the relation between the latter 
and the idea of formalized expectations? (Expectations, it must be remembered. that are 
essentially political). Why should formalized expectations (historicity) coincide with 
formalized discourse (textuality), and then with certain forms discourse rather than others? 
formalist I modernist answer would be relatively simple: the text 
is set apart from ordinary discourse and therefore subject matter (content) to be 
distinguished ('distanced') history even though it is rooted in it. Certain forms simply 
achieve this detachment (without which artistic appreciation is impossible) better than others. 
But this response, one feels, could hardly be acceptable to Vail and White. As it turns out, 
however, they do not provide an alternative one. The expectations at heart of their 
aesthetic of license are, in the final analysis, recognized as such precisely because of 
the existence of the forms (identified as 'poetry and song') in which they are cast. The 
expectations are not formalized as history but as text separated from history. 
One element in Vail White's aesthetic of poetic which - in absence 
specific statements to this - would to support above conclusion, is their 
insistence that 'it is not the poet who is licensed by literary conventions of the region, ... 
[but] the poem'IM. advantage of this emphasis, they argue, 
is that it enables us to into account the wide variety of different performances the 
prevailing aesthetic can encompass and to locate this broader range of poems in a 
more complex set of social circumstances [than if the was vested in the 
person of a specific kind of performer]l65. 
the aesthetic attaches to the text rather than the performer (who, like the imbongi, may well 
enjoy official the text can be legitimately given an historical interpretation even if it 
occurs from the cultural context in which it was - or is normally - performed: 'not 
only ... [in] the village, dancing arena, homestead, the spirit-possession ceremony, but 
also ... plantat ion, township, the mining compound, or black trade-union meeting'. 
The historicity text can u-anscend its context of performance. But conception of 
license of necessity implies a recognition of the text as textual object which, in 
transcending a cultural context, also transcends the particularity of historical event. 
fonnal ""-,,,,,,",n,,ac by which the text is recognized as text is to this extension of 
historical meaning. 
Parry's determinancy of fonn 'broke the ]ink between performance and history'. (See note 
57). But it is not particularly difficult to construe arguments we have - highly 
critical of the fonnalist stance - as implying the more or less rigid distinction between social 
! historical and textual! fonnal. oral (and in the face of the fundamentally 
skewed balance of power between written study and oral the actual viability of his 
critical paradigm must seriously questioned). it can be usefully argued that 
actually requires the separation of history performance. 'break' between perfonnance 
history would have two dimensions, intimately related. First, there is the question as to 
whether the can be sufficiently 'objectified' to be as text (textual 
Object). The notion of textuaJ object particularly untenable on the of 
Barber's oriki. which appear as little more than and haphazard utterances. Yet in the 
very 1 k of form they reflect to the untrained eye 1 the which the oruel 
to all purposes, as text. True, the unity of the orrJd as 
text is larly dependent on insight into and historical context. established, 
can also be distanced from the latter. This brings us to second aspect 
of the 119 etic separation text and history, namely the degree to which the text is 
detach from its historical reference (including particularity of its performance 
! perfonner) to exist as 'thing in itself. Not only are they ambiguous'. but the 
ortki reflect a concern with their own textuality: Barber remarks that they 'draw to 
their own fragmentation d66• The formal of the orf'ki may well obscure, but it is as 
vital an element of their meaning as the question of historicity. Moreover, this formal basis 
can only on condition the link between performance and history being - if 
not broken - at least temporarily 
In Chapter) we briefly alluded to the possibility that White's rejection of the 
formalist paradigm as interpretative framework of the oral text is, in fact, result of the 
'notional oral man' which they attribute to Yet, in spite of Parry's reference to style 
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which he sees the formula as the main ingredient) as the 'form of thought', there is ample 
evidence, fully recognized by Vail and White, that Parry intended his theory to draw attention 
to the creativity of the oral performer so as to, in Vail and White's words, 'insist... on the 
nature of literature as literature'. They find appealing the idea of the oral artist 'improvising 
brilliantly within the formulas of his or her tradition', and they note, interestingly, that it is 
'consistent with the obvious fact of the historicity of oral literary traditions .. .' 167. 
But for its definitional problems (reviewed in Chapter I) and the lack of evidence African 
oral literature seems to provide for it (as noted by Foley, only a relatively small amount of 
research in Africa can be related to the oral-formulaic theory - see Chapter 1, note 72), the 
dual conception of the formula as characteristic of an oral style I indicative of an oral mode 
of composition is, then, not without its merits. Unless, of course - and this brings us back to 
the 'distinctiveness' issue - postulations as to what is considered specifically oral are 
summarily rejected on the grounds that - as Vail and White maintain - 'there is no essential 
difference between oral and written literature,168 [i.e. beyond the fact that the one is spoken, 
the other written]. The effect of this assumption of similarity would be to make the formalist 
approach redundant, at least in so far as the latter is obviously geared towards uncovering 
differences between the oral and the written (even if these are merely of a textual nature) and 
hence, to draw attention to the fact that the orality of the text is a crucial element in its 
interpretation. 
Yet we have noted the strong insinuation on the part of the authors reviewed in this section 
as to the inherent time-boundedness or historicity of the oral text; for the interpretation of the 
written text, historicity would, by implication, be less pertinent. And, crucially, all of them 
work within the specific framework, not of literary tradition, but oral tradition. The literature 
that is the object of their interest is not merely spoken, but the product of an orality to whose 
historical and ideological ramifications the authors are particularly sensitive: not only is oral 
literature marginalised literature (as would be the literature of, say, a particular sub-culture 
in an industrialised society), but it is the literature of the historically powerless, the non-
literate peasantry. (See note 3). 
For no reason other, therefore, than that the literature we have come across in this section 
continues to be qualified, before anything else, as 'oral' - implying the distinctiveness of the 
oral as oral-traditional - the setting aside of the formalist perspective would seem, however 
justified the pursuit of alternative approaches relating to rhetorical force or historicity may be, 
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impossible to achieve. After pointing out failure of both new criticism structuralism 
to come to terms with oral literature (as a result their shared erroneous - preoccupation 
with a 'fixed' or 'established' text 'insulated from history'), Vail White turn to post-
structuralism, which 
has returned the unstable text to history only by undermining the authority of the 
poem's language, an authority basic to aesthetic we have been describing '69• 
We shall consider notion of the 'unstable text' more closely in the next section. But 
accepting that the authority of the poem's language is fundamental to and White's 
proposed aesthetic, is it possible to talk about language without talking about textuality. 
without talking about form? At end of the day, is the aesthetic of poetic IlCI:ms,t: not 
founded on an earlier, formalist one? But apart from being unachievable, the abandonment 
of the formalist aesthetic is in all probability also premature, for it is far having been 
exhausted. For why should the formalist approach be restricted to a seemingly endless variety 
on well-known of 'groups of words regularly employed to express a idea'? 
What if formalism could extended beyond this - initially useful - framework, to address 
factors of oral textuality to which our scriptocentredness - or cultural chauvinism -
continually blinded us? Why, in fact, should our concern with language necessarily be 
concerned with words as words? What about words as rhythm, and - beyond the familiar 
preoccupation with metrical pattern - words as sound? That such an overwhelming amount 
of oral literature is not so much spoken as, in fact, sung, has been so frequently noted as to 
have """,,' ..... ..,.,.'" banal. But rather than pass on this ""U'\,;.\,;.L of the performance to the 
musicologist, the time has perhaps, to regard it as parcel of this 'authority of 
language' which is the domain of the literary scholar. This may be a particular authority that 
is privilege, exclusively. of Oral Theory. Instead copying models of written literature, 
the criticism of oral may well be in a position to go beyond and then without 
having to projected, as would 'beyond the confines of own textuality'. 
oral text may be more "n"HP''''' than we suspected. will be further considered 
in 4 and 5. 
Oral as Popular Culture 
In coming to associate the oral (which is also the traditional) with the 'popular', I intend 
moving our exploration of the notion of oral literature beyond the conventional 
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paradigm into what is known as post-modernism. Briefly, this means that the notion of the 
textual object endowed with 'closure' and 'finiteness' (as earlier characterized by Barber and 
Yai respectively) loses its hold on literature: henceforth the text is 'unstable'. As a result, 
meaning itself is set free, and where the modernist perspective would impose on us the 
continual questioning and refinement of interpretative 'frameworks' (which may also involve 
setting aside what is regarded as redundant and inventing what is necessary) so as to progress 
towards an evermore 'appropriate" evermore 'valid' interpretation, post-modernism expects 
of us merely to accept meaning and interpretation in all its plurality. 
As I already stressed earlier, the choice to consider oral literature in the light of post-
modernism (the idea of a post-modernist 'framework' would, in the light of the preceding 
characterization, be contradictory), should not be seen as implying that post-modernist 
perspectives may necessarily be belter adapted to the interpretative context of orality than 
modernist ones. More about this presently. What is of particular interest to us, though, is the 
opportunity that post-modernism provides to question - if not actually break down - the 
familiar opposition (strongly current at least within written literature) between literary and 
non-literary, and thus to free ourselves from the preoccupation with the 'aesthetic' upon which 
this opposition has always depended. Crucial from the point of view of orality is the 
recognition that the undermining of the literary vs non-literary dichotomy can, in fact, be 
conceptualized as the ideological project of addressing the political imbalance between 'high 
culture' on the one hand and 'popular culture' on the other, a 'progressive"70 project which 
shows remarkable similarities to the universalist ideal (highlighted earlier) of breaking down 
a literacy vs orality dichotomy which has increasingly presented itself as a 'great divide' 
between a literate 'us' and a non-literate 'them'. OUf attempt to align 'oral' with 'popular' 
should therefore not be seen as an admission of defeat: caught up in a critical discourse 
which, due to its anthropological bias, cannot but fail to appreciate its aesthetic quality, the 
oral text, forever denied literary status, settles for the next best position offered by literate 
society, namely to be considered 'popular'. No, the point is that the distinction between 
'Literature' (henceforth with a capital 'I') and 'popular culture' is, strictly speaking, an 
illusion, with little justification but the ideological interests of an ostensibly 'disinterested' 
bourgeois humanism (see Chapter I, note 119), which has appropriated literature (as Literature 
- and with it, literary studies) to put forward the self-serving notion of what Easthope 
describes as a 'best self' promoted and universalised 'beyond the bounds of class, lOcality, 
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time or country' 17I. In other words, the Literature vs popular culture dichotomy reflects, at 
heart, the same kind of 'cultural chauvinism' that led so many, unwilling to question the 
presupposed 'truth' of their own experience, to assume the oral text - oral literature - to be 
of necessity composed and appreciated according to the written model. But is it really the 
same chauvinism? Put differently: can the 'great divide' between a literate 'us' and and an 
oral 'them' not just be parallel, but indeed assimilated to the divide between Literature and 
popular culture? Such would be the condition for overcoming the anthropological bias with 
which oral literature has had to contend, but - more than that - it would be a way for the 
notion of oral literature to fully take its place within the dominant literary-theoretical 
discourse of our time. 
In this regard Easthope's argument will be particularly illuminating. But before considering 
the theoretical underpinnings of his proposed cultural studies (as a literary studies in which 
the literary and popular text can be read and appreciated 'alongside each other'172) and 
speculating on the possible place of the oral text within it (literary theorists do not generally 
talk about the oral, and Easthope is no exception), some closing remarks might be in order 
on the other way in which the notion of oral literature could be - could have been - part of 
literary theory. From the point of view of post-modernism, oral literature as popular culture 
turns out, in fact, to be the only way of conceptualizing it. 
Let us briefly return to the two articles by Barber (1984 and ] 989) referred to earlier. Both 
articles emphasizing the inadequacy of the modernist literary paradigm for the ortki text in 
question, the former investigates the viability of a particular post-modernist approach, the 
latter that of an approach broadly termed rhetorical or social in which the text is projected 
'beyond the confines of its own textuality'. The rhetorical approach being advanced as the 
'real alternative' (not just by Barber but, in fact, by all who declare themselves dissatisfied 
with the modernist approach), we have been critical of it in so far as it runs the risk of taking 
the study of the oral text outside the field of literary studies, something Oral Theory (at least 
in the way we have characterized it) should be trying to avoid. But why should post-
modernism also have failed the oral text? 
At the beginning of this chapter Finnegan drew our attention to ways in which oral 
literature is unlike the written, relating mainly to textual form, the role of the perceiver and 
the notion of authenticity. Setting aside, at least to some extent, the idea of an oral textuality 
characterized by 'well-known formulaic phrases and runs' (which depends on a conception 
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of the text as object), these considerations also figure prominently in Barber's overview of 
deconstructive as the 'chief adversary' of the modernist perspective. But where -
situating herself within the latter Finnegan was concerned with differences between oral and 
written the very characteristics of the oral which showed up these differences now tum 
from the post-modernist point of view, to be characteristic of texts and literature in 
general. Referring mainly to Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes 173, Barber highlights the 
following aspects of the deconstructionist argument: 
The text is no longer (,Pl1tp1rprI around a conscious or creative author. Rather see 
the text as 'isolated self-sufficient artefact', deconstruction (following the lead of 
structuralism) 
turned critics' attention to the system of codes - linguistic, literary. and cultural -
without which no literary text could be generated or read. By this gesture, the sole 
authority of poet as originator of the text is undermined 174. 
What is important is not the unity or identity of texts but their interrelatedness, 
accounted for in the notion of intertextuality. Texts exist only in relation to each other: 
a text is 'a tissue of quotations from, and allusions to, other texts', As such, the text 
is always incomplete, 'not accidentally as a result of 
essentially ... ' m. 
poet's limitations. but 
This inherent instability allows the reader to become as active a participant in the 
production of textual I intertextual meaning as the author. Given the endlessly 
referential relation between texts (which is, in fact, the endlessly referential relation 
between the signifiers of language), variants of meaning are themselves No 
meaning I reading can be regarded as more 'correct' or 'valid' than another176• 
The appropriateness of these arguments to Barber's description of the ortki (disjunctive, 
fragmentary and decentred texts that are not literary objects) speaks for itself. Of course. 
Derrida and Barthes, like do not talk about orality. Yet, as Barber enthuses, 
[d]econstructive criticism, despite its rhetoric of writing, of inscription and textuality. 
appears to have moved... into a position from which oral literature takes on a 
paradigmatic quality; oral texts are what the deconstructive critics all literature is _ 
only more so177, 
For once, as Barber clearly implies, oral literature is compatible with a theoretical paradigm 
to the point of actually being (potential) model. It is all the more surprising, therefore. that 
Barber should find it necessary to set aside the deconstructionist approach as well. Ironically 
139 
however, in destroying very conception of text and at the level of 
literary criticism, always the oral, deconstruction recreates - at different level of 
abstraction,17s - a of textuality which, as far as Barber is manages to be 
even more exclusive the oral text than the modernist: 
lilts [deconstruction's] roots in the presumption of 
perhaps even than those of the conventional 
textuality even more alien to oral Hterature179• 
writtenness of literature are 
it attacks, its view of 
Derrida's famous it n'y a de hors~texte (,there is nothing outside the text') - quoted by 
Barber - any vestiges, not just of modernist text as thing in 
the text as directive-itself (the points 
for-its-perceivers. 
would have put paid to that), but 
its initial engagement of as 'libretto for the 
reader's or personal "performance" of the 
text will - in its aec:onSffiICUOmS[ guise - engulf 
(Foley's terms - see note 48), the 
to the point of turning him into 
just another in its endless play of meaning. a play which the individual is powerless 
to influence and from which there is no escape: 
history. psychology - everything that is usualJy counterposed to literature -
are texts themselves. systems of signs which only. and endlessly, to other 
Yet we ne(:es~;arll'Y assimilate the 'text' 
unstable one which Barber regarded as so 
deconstructionist text, expressed by CoHn 
an assimilation: 
to the decentred, relational, 
of fo]]owing 
would seem to question the validity of such 
transformation ... of every kind of language-using into an honorific 'text' ... 
is a verbal sleight of hand which allows him to eliminate the 'experientiar 
dimension from his theoretical picture 
From a clearly reducible to concrete 
model, it must be 
actual performances), we 
speculation about what - at least as far as 
the realm experience: meaning, or, more 
(Barber's embracing of the 
was made on account of her own 
moved to a 'text' intended to facilitate 
is concerned - per definition ls2 "'"t"'", .. 
the relation between 
signified) and the chain of signijiers that is 14U:I!Uilll:!.C. 
however, does not make this distinction. in spite of her awareness of the 
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level of abstraction' at which the there-is-nothing-outside-the-text conceptualization operates. 
Rejecting - as her insistence on the social I historical relevance of oral literature would lead 
us to expect - the deconstructionist vision of the author I critic 'reduced to impotent self-
reflection ,'83 (Falck in this regard talks about the structuralist I post-structuralist ' abolition of 
reality""), she comes to the conclusion that deconstructionism 
is a view that could only have been entertained in a culture where texts are divorced 
from both producer and consumer and can therefore appear to exist as a vast system 
in their own right, pushing human participants into the margins. In other words, a 
literate culture'8s. 
That the post-modernist notions discussed above should have come about with reference to 
a specific type of society (and consequently, to the exclusion of others) is obviously a valid 
argument. 'Deconstructing' Western culture's 'metaphysics of presence' '86 has no doubt been 
Derrida's most persistent endeavour; Falck, on a more philosophical level, alludes to the 
possibility that the post-modernist disenchantment with meaning ('truth') may well be 'the 
legitimization of a metaphysical or ontological void which existed at the heart of our culture 
already"8'. What is somewhat surprising, however, is Barber's readiness to, as it were, 'throw 
out the baby with the bath water'. And yet there is an explanation. The ease with which 
deconstruction ism slips from text to intertext to nothing-outside-the-text (which is nothing 
short of humanity - or Western humanity - itself) in a very real sense mirrors Barber's 
willingness (and that of other authors on oral literature disenchanted with conventional literary 
criticism) to interpret the text - notwithstanding their purported concern with what the text 
says as text - in the light of historical or social considerations to which the question of 
textuality is, in the end, largely incidental. And we get back, in the end, to the vexed matter 
of oral literature as anthropology. For just as post-structuralism is less interested in a text than 
in demonstrating how it is generated by the all-encompassing intertext, what lies at the heart 
of oral 'criticism' is not the performance, but the society in which the performance occurs. 
In the final analysis 'oral literature' has to be what it is not: as ill-suited to the finiteness of 
the modernist aesthetic as it is to the abstraction of post-modernist meaning, oral literature 
is caught up in an interpretative nomansland that can only be called: anthropology. 
Or, perhaps, popular culture. One of the surprising things about Easthope's cultural studies 
is that it seeks to offer a unified interpretative paradigm for Literature and popular culture 
without attempting to deny that literature, in fact, can justifiably exist - at least at a certain 
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level - as so doing Easthope to some extent sets himself apart from the more 
radical view his fellow Marxist critic Terry persuasively in 1983 that 
'literature is an illusion" and with it, literary theory (or studies)188. The problem 
encounters centers on two interrelated aspects: on the one hand the purportedly 
nature of literary is compromised by its profoundly character. on the other 
the aesthetic object it seeks to investigate can also not defined without recourse to 
ideology, Bennett phrases this problem as follows also his comment on Bourdieu, 
Chapter I, note 120): 
The inherent instability of the science I ideology couplet undermines the ground 
to secure a conception of either as a form of writing 
from ideology or as a form of writing u/fIj,,,,..., 
from ideology is the configuration of the 
ideology in general l89, 
The end-result at best, a 'literature without ae:stn,eu(:s • or what Bennett asa 
'non-literary U'",.n~, of literature which will object as a set of social rather than 
formal realities and processes', We may justifiably why retain the notion of in 
all of this? If the essence of the text (any text) it being 'a set of social ... 





- dimension called • aesthetic'? 
same route out of this both essentially offer 
any 'essentialist' definition (based on the conventionally oresul1neO 
literary text, i.e. the modernist " .. <'th~'h,... they nevertheless accord the 
autonomy necessary to justify it being studied as such. again: 
while its [the concept of literature's] conventional understanding as a uniquely 
privileged kind of writing cannot sustained, the term does ,,~~.~-. designate a 
Easthope, 
but non-unitary, field of institutionally organized practices - of writing, 
commentary and pedagogy I 90, 
his part, talks about literature 
a function' 191, Yet Uell1ne:u 
(even, to some extent, ~ .. ,,,,,.~ •• y. 
'not as an essence, an a thing, but 
Easthope's on the existence of 
as process rather than with it an 
implication which places their view outside the frontiers of the conventional modernist 
aesthetic
l92
: the insights and methods JCV'IJIUIIII:;U in the reading of literary can be usefully 
to texts falling outside the 'canon' (as well as to fields than 'literary 
studies') so as to develop a new literary paradigm (but which, from the point of view of the 
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old, will be non-literary) in which, in Bennett's words, 'the way is opened for a theory of 
literature that will construe object as a historically specific, socially and 
maintained field of textual uses and effects' 193. This corresponds, of course, to the ambitions 
of Barber and her colleagues in relation to an interpretative framework for the oral text. 
and it is here, one suspects, that Bennett and Easthope may regard their initiative as having 
a er .. " .. ,,,· .. chance of accomplishment than that of similarly inclined critics of oral text -
'discursive space'. as described by Bennett, 
requires that use made of the resources to hand - resources which, for the most 
part, have been shaped by and within aesthetic discourse .... [The new positions] can 
organized only by prising them away from aesthetic conceptions literaturel94 • 
Barber, Yai and Vail and White did not really have these resources. But Bennett and Easthope 
do. as we saw in his entertaining juxtaposition of Heart of Darkness and Tarzan 
of the Apes, that not all texts admit (at least to the same degree) of a modernist 
reading based on the assumption that everything is significant. As such, the notion of textual 
complexity (and hence, any emphasis on textuality se) has generally been the preserve of 
a literary studies defined the conventional modernist way. Easthope not with this; 
his 'revised paradigm' of cultural studies in which Literary and popular are read alongside 
each other should 'recapture some the subtle powerful experiential force literary 
studies [as conventional seat of textual analysis] always claimed as its speciality,195. The 
alternative methodology (which would neglect textuality on the grounds of '[putting] 
politics first' or 'privileging ideological critique') runs, according to him, 
from it. 
risk of 'leaving 
Easthope's the prevailing discourse of knowledge untouched' - being 
emphasis on textuality as opposed to ideology (and his linking of textuality with 
'experiential force' - see Derrida's apparent disdain for the concept of experience mentioned 
earlier) be regarded as reactionary, Easthope is quick to cal] to his assistance the notion of 
poHtical efficacy: by excluding yourself from the 'prevaiHng discourse of knowledge' (of 
experience?) 'your politics is weakened precisely because you are likely to remain v ... ",,..\J ..... 
that discourse'I96. By, as it were, using the weapon of the erstwhile oppressor (high culture 
I Literature), the politics of cultural studies (breaking down the high culture I popular culture 
divide at the heart of capitalist society) will be 'more effective'. 
Apart from the political justification finds for it, emphasis on textuality as 
something distinct from ideology can also be theoretical1y accounted for, and notably within 
a post-modernist I Marxist time Derrida 
support. His notion of infinite polysemy (dissemination -
staunchly in 
- of meaning) that 
the text cannot be interpreted in the light of any particular intention. This 'universality' of the 
text has the capacity to 'break with given context, and engender infinitely new 
contexts,m. While this view does not the essential truth have a in 
a context and only a context'. it does mean, according to 
that texts cannot be adequately analysed in relation to a definition of a particular 
social and historical context. They that context not only diachronically, always 
temporally beyond a given reading, but also synchronically, always available 
to another at the same time, even in the supposedly 'original' moment when 
they were first produced 198, 
view of independence text (textuality) vis-a-vis context (politics) is 
corroborated in Louis Althusser's view of history as a 'decentred totality'. A synchronic 
examination of a particular social formation does not reveal all its elements to be 'in an 
immediate relationship with one another, a relationship that immediately expresses 
internal essence'I99. Just as space (existing as differences) is centreless, so time not 
according to a chronology: 
for each production there is a peculiar time and history. punctuated in a 
specific way by the development of productive forces; relations of production 
have their own peculiar time and history, punctuated in a way; the political 
superstructure has own history ... 2oo. 
In terms of our own of assimilating oral I traditional to the popular, 
(relative) separation text and social I historical context is, in crucial, for the study of 
'popular culture' been nothing if not politicised - and within the particular 
socio-historical conditions of Western capitalism. 'Popular culture is made by subordinated 
De()DH~S in their own .... t ......... "." out of resources that also, contradictorily, serve the economic 
of the dominant', writes John the idea - by Antonio 
,; .. "',.....,,,,.., - that, as Helrme:tt puts it, 'cultural ideological relations between ruling and 
subordinated classes in capitalist societies consist in the domination of the latter by the 
former than in the struggle for hegemony ... between the ruling class working class'202. 
The ruling class 'seeks to negotiate opposing cultures onto a cultural and ideological 
which wins for it a position of leadership,203, hence the - to reca]] Fiske's 
- for the peoples' to that they) act in own interests'. 
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While the 'negotiatory' aspect of this model to some extent refines the emphasis on actual 
repression in terms of 'structuralist' and 'culturalist' models of popular culture204 , it remains 
within the broad sphere of what Easthope refers to as 'dominant ideology': 'popular culture." 
[is] a set of imposed and constrained meanings ultimately determined by economic power,20S. 
Economic power means capitalism, and to study how the latter oppresses, cajoles and pussy-
foots in order to retain its privilege is, also, to fight it: studies of popular culture are per 
definition 'left', 
In the light of these considerations Easthope' s insistence on the importance of textuality 
for his 'cultural studies' is no less than surprising. Yet it can be argued that, as a 
consequence of his arguments, the specific historical experience of living in a highly 
industrialised, capitalist society becomes relatively de-emphasized. This is a vital point, for 
though people in oral societies have been colonised by Western capitalism, this historical 
experience cannot be said to of itself turn them into the exploited 'working class' Marxist 
theorists talk about. To say that would be to play straight into the hands of those who regard 
oral societies as changeless and stunted - until, of course, Western technology gives them 
history, 'civilizes' them ... 
If the modernist reading as such - given the fact that it favours a certain kind of textuality _ 
tends to highlight the Literature vs popular culture divide, Easthope suggests a certain 
number of 'post-modernist' readings through which Literature is not so much destroyed as 
repositioned in relation to the conventional non-literary I popular. These 'readings' place the 
literary and non-literary text at the same distance vis-a-vis the theoretical issue read against, 
thereby undermining the relative privilege and exclusivity the modernist literary text has 
enjoyed under humanism. Literature, in other words, is cut down to size. The 'theoretical 
interventions' in question are the following206; 
reading the text as sign system (structuralism)207; 
as representation of ideology (post-1968 Marxist critique); 
as representation of gender (post-1970 feminist critique); 
as manifestation of the unconscious (psycho-analysis - overlapping with the text as 
representation of subject position); 
as reflective of a particular institution, and, finally, 
as broadly reflective of those defined as 'other' within the 'discourses concerned with 
race' of a self-substantiating European subject208 • 
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With reference to the structuralist definition of language as 'system of signs', Easthope 
defines the text as 'an organization of signifiers from which certain effects and meanings 
[signifieds] are produced in and for the reader,209, a definition which enables the literary and 
popular text to be analysed in common terms: as forms of signifying practice210, 
Totally independent of actual 'medium of expression' (one of the foremost signifying 
practices of our time is the cinema, and even as conventionally non-textual a thing as Sean 
Connery's eyebrows are - as signifying practice - subjected to Easthope's analysis2ll), 
Easthope's 'signifying practice' is extraordinarily well-adapted to the oral text, not just as 
text, but as actual (visual) peifo1"l1!ance, And we discover other elements in his argument -
besides his reticence to favour specific ideological I historical considerations over textual ones 
in the process of interpretation - that would seem to make the eventual incorporation of the 
oral text into cultural studies as revised literary studies a foregone conclusion: the question 
of pleasure and - closely related to it - of 'formulaic and repetitive nature', 
That the oral text is pleasurable is not so much an attribute as a defining trait. Apart from 
the fact that the oral performance frequently occurs as leisure activity (the performances of 
the gus/ari in Croatian coffee houses come to mind - see Chapter 1. note 132), one could 
forcefully argue that pleasure is to a large extent the very condition by which the oral text 
is also traditional texill2: of the horizons of expectations to which the oral text invites, the 
expectation of pleasure - which, if realized, will ultimately translate into the text being 
reperformed - is undoubtedly one of the most pervasive. Of course, the association between 
oral text and pleasure has tended to be overstated at the expense of aesthetic considerations, 
particularly on the part of those commentators who have interpreted orality as mode of 
cognition, Yet within the framework of an alternative reading to the modernist, some of their 
arguments can be usefully assimilated to our own. To quote Havelock2B: Homer was able to 
give his auditors 
nOt only pleasure but a specific kind of pleasure on which they came to depend, for 
it meant relief from anxiety and assuagement of grief, It is this power, .. of which the 
poet is most conscious, and naturally so, for, although he might be consulted in his 
didactic role as a source of knowledge and guidance, he was far more continuously 
applauded as the great releaser. 
We earlier saw Easthope equating the idea of immediate certainty of meaning (as generated 
by the 'literal and denotative' nature of the textuality of a Tarzan of the Apes) with 
'gratification'. But there is a more specifically pleasurable connotation to 'gratification' _ 
though certainly deriving from the idea of certainty of meaning which Easthope to 
the preponderance of 'physical action and external event' the content 
I signified) of Tarzan of the Apes, and in comparison to which the level of the signifier 
(actual form) strikes the as relatively insignificant: it is 'effaced' 214. Another 
element strongly Oe{nC(lllW to pleasure is visual representation, which 
sees as 'predetermined towards rather than thought'. The 
melodrama' which characterizes Tarzan of the Apes is further indicative of the 'dominance 
of the iconic'. The latter, strongly dependent on immediacy of meaning - a sign is 
when there is 'a relation of resemblance between signifier and signified,215 - is virtually a 
trademark of popular culture. the example Easthope hypothesises 
that cultural discourse, with dependance on visualization and the of the 
of the body, is predisposed towards wish-fulfilment instead of duty'. As 
a result its iconic feature, moreover, the pleasure of popular culture may well that 
of Literature216• 
(traditional) and the popular are further intertwined to the extent that the above 
pleasure is reinforced, according to Easthope, 'by what has often been noted in popular 
culture, the formulaic and nature of the . This reminds us, of not 
the 'formula' as such of words'), the notion of formulaic theme 
...... ' .... " .. nt .. rt in the 'striking visual imagery' considered by to be the 'ocular equivalent' 
of formula. (See Chapter note 49). In fact, the textual differences that Easthope's 
modernist reading uncovers between Heart of Darkness and Tarzan of the show a 
resemblance with Ong's 'psychodynamics of orality'. (See Chapter note 56 _ 
it must remembered that derives these 'dynamics' from what he as the 
...... ,~ ..... .,,, of oral expressivity). To name but a characteristics of of 
of the Apes: it is concrete (,situational'), expHcit (,agonistically toned'), literal ('close 
to human life-world') ... 218. 
And yet, in spite of all these favourable factors, Easthope - in whose book the word 'oral' 
not occur even once - still manages to effectively exclude the oral text from the popular 
one. exclusion comes in form of what amounts to something of a throw-away remark, 
connection with 'visual melodrama' culture One of 
the features of iconicity, as Easthope explains, is that it favours the occurrence narratemes: 
'little scenic and narrative epitomes such as turning at the door at the end of 
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with the Wind and saying: "FrankJy, my dear, I don't a damn"'. Another example, 
• ~I' d h f fe t' . 'M you Jane'219. For Easthope particularly easily VISUrulze - t ere ore e lec lve IS e 
the narrateme, generally the preserve of popular culture, the effect of actually 
the connotative poverty of the popular text by a 'shared collectivity': 
a univocal [denotative] meaning gives rise, by virtue to 'a commonplace 
the same way (or thinks they do) ... [which] excites connotations 
to differently at the level of phantasy'. Strongly contrasting with 'the 
individual path through to their own interpretation' which connotative plurality of 
oral to 
Unfortunately 
its to follow, the narrateme is, in 
""'."" .. ,,""" what could so easily in assimilating 
that the narrateme resembles 'myth in traditional society'220. 
immediately qualifies this statement, in the displaying the very 
evolutionist view of the oral text the latter can do so well without: 
[b]ut with this difference. Myth, one could say, of nature and necessity rather 
than culture and freedom; the popular cultural narrateme moves beyond nature into 
culture it is thorougly a construction22l • 
Of course, on the society, the mythical may well account only a relatively 
expression. Yet myth I the mythological is so commonly associated small part of oral 
with orality that 
(traditional) texts 
fUllrnc'u HIT juxtaposition, in this case, amounts to a "t .. t""rn",.,t on oral 
The traditional may well be popular sense of 
'well-liked but then again, it simply is not LH •• H.",. 223 
That Studies explicitly to the 
under the circumstances, cold 
excuse his of the oral text on these grounds would only be to 
the 
overcome; an nt .... "" ...... """ 
of oral literature we have tried, throughout this chapter, to 
that continues to dictate that 'only an anthropologist can be expected 
to understand, or to oral literature'. Our brief exploration of post-modernism on 
the basis of its seeming dissolution of the literary vs non-literary dichotomy was, to some 
extent no doubt, simplistic: the fact that it should provide the theoretical (and ideological) 
framework within which 
post-modernist literary 
a dissolution can take place does not necessarily mean that 
accords the same critical attention to the non-literary 
- conceived of as popular culture as it does to Literature224• Yet even accepting bona 
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fides of the 'progressive' project of breaking down the hierarchy between a self-substantiating 
bourgeoisie on the one hand and a perpetually manipulated working class on the other, the 
great divide which is our concern, namely that between 'literate' and 'oral', 'modem' and 
'traditional', remains as firmly entrenched as it is ignored. And the literature that is the object 






















The association of 'oral tradition' with 'oral literature', which, from the point of view 
of Oral Theory at least (and also for the purposes of this study), is founded in the 
Parry-Lord thesis, has of course also been a general feature of research into the oral 
text. In this broader - strongly evolutionist - perspective, 'traditional' is frequently 
rendered by terms like 'folk', 'communal', 'primitive' etc. (For an overview of the 
intellectual contexts in which these terms have been applied - largely reminiscent of 
that of Okpewho extensively referred to in Chapter 2 - see Finnegan, 1970:26-47). 
See Barber, 1984. 
Barber, 1984:498. 
Barber, 1984:497. 
As explained by Finnegan (1977:36), '''[o]ral literature"". is seen as arlsmg in a 
spontaneous way and handed down, relatively unchanged, through unconscious "oral 
tradition" into which conscious choice, judgment and "art" do not enter'. 
Finnegan (1970: 14) sees this as a 'derogatory interpretation'. The general overlap of 
'folklore' with 'oral literature' has, in fact, been of little help in so far as an 
understanding of the oral text as literature is concerned. In Oral Poetry (1977:36) 
Finnegan makes the point that 'whatever the controversies about its [folklore's] exact 
meaning, all scholars, it seems, agree that it includes (most of) what could be termed 
"oral literature" and the majority would probably see oral literature as comprising a 
major part of "folklore"'. The same 'general overlap' would seem to apply to the 
African oral narrative. See also Gorog-Karady, 1984, as well as Makouta-Mboukou's 
(1973) description of oral literature as 'folk literature'. 
See Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds). 1973: 113-4. 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., 1973: 118. 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., 1973:122. 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., 1973: 115-7. 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., 1973: 117. 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., 1973: 117. 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., 1973:114. 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., 1973: 118. 
This distance derives most obviously from the specific status the poet or raconteur 
may enjoy in certain societies (such as the official bards of the Zulu king). But there 
are also numerous narrative or dramatic devices that achieve the same distancing 
effect, such as - as is common in Africa - the relation of the content of a story to 
animals, or the use of musical accompaniment or masks. Even, in some cases, the 
stress on authority: 'we learn this from the ancestors'. (Finnegan, in Finnegan and 
Horton (eds)., 1973:119-21). 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., 1973: 124. 
See Mbiti, 1.S. 1966. Akamba Stories. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 26. Quoted in 
Finnegan, 1973:125. The descriptions given by Lord of the 'truly oral poet' of course 
make the same point. (See also Chapter I, note 90). 
Among the Maori, for example, songs would be composed and performed within the 
context of specific everyday occurences, 'and [for] many other purposes of an unusual 
natur~ from our point of view'. (See Best, E. 1934. The Maori as he was. Wellington: 
DOlllinIon Museum, 147. Quoted in Finnegan, 1973: 134). 













'practicaJ function' of the oral aesthetic text as follows: '[p]erhaps the literature has 
a magical or religious purpose? or is in some way up with fertility? or satisfies 
some deep psychological need in mythic other writers it has been 
fashionable to represent its function as very "sociaJ": perhaps with a 
conscious sociaJ purpose like education or moralizing, perhaps an unconscious 
function such as upholding the social structure. This kind of pragmatism is often 
contrasted with the idea of "art for art's sake"'. 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., 1973: 1 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., 1973: I 
Finnegan, 1977: 122. 
Finnegan, in Finnegan and Horton (eds)., ] 
will obviously be important in pre-composed, ITlPITl('1.t"! 
apr.rPc of SomaJi poetry. (See note 52, Chapter 1). 
Vail and White, 1991:322. 
1970: 17. 
1970:36. 
contrary, verbal accuracy 
texts, such as in certain 
I I Emphasis added. For a similar frP!Um,pnr notion of oral 
language 
Limba of Sierra 
aJso contains a reprint of 
the broader context of attitudes of 
see Finnegan's 'Speech, language and 





Ong, 1986: 12. 
]6. See also Finnegan, 1970:17. 
Chapter 1, note 18. Ong, in fact, also has problems with the term 'text' which, in 
of its greater etymologicaJ proximity to the oral than 'literature', is still thought 
of 'by analogy with writing'. (Ong, 1986:13). 
Ong, 1986: 14. 
1. Emphasis added. 
104. See aJso Goody, 1977:49-50. This assertion was 





Moraes 'Introduction' , and 
one, as the 'key texts' of the literacy vs oraJity 
Lord and Milman Parry, and 'less definitively more 
Orality and Literacy'. (White, in Barber and De Moraes 
.. "', ..... "' .... by 
Moraes 
42. See aJso 
43. Ong, 1967:30. Chapter 2, note 54. 
44. I 1 
45. See Easthope, 1991 
46. Easthope, 1 1 









































See Finnegan's discussion (1977: 16-24) on 'What is "oral" in oral poetry?' 
See Finnegan, 1970:2-7. 
Fi nnegan, 1970: 15. 
See Finnegan, 1970:7-12. 
Finnegan, 1977: 17. See also note 44. 
See Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989. 
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Barber and De Moraes Farias, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989: 1. 
White, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., ] 989:34. Also Vail and White, ] 991 :32. 
See Koljevic, S. 1980. The Epic in the Making. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 320. 
Quoted in White, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:35. 
Okpewho, 1983:262. 
Barber and De Moraes Farias, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:2. 
Vansina, 1985:92-3. 
See Vansina, ] 985:68-83. 
Furniss, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:24. 
Vansina, 1985:68. 
Vansina, 1985:78. This is not an absolute rule, however. Vansina is quick to add that 
'[a]ny such conclusion should be tested against a generous collection of various 
versions' . 
Vansina, 1985:92. This may well remind us of the notion of 'structural amnesia' 
discussed in Chapter 2. elsewhere criticized by Vansina. (See Chapter 2, note 116). 
Vansina, 1985:92. 
Furniss, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:25. 
Furniss, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:26. 
Furniss, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., ] 989:32-3. Emphasis added. 
Furniss, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)" 1989:27. 
See Kermode, F. 1967. The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. Referred to in Barber, in Barber and De Moraes 
Farias (eds)., 1989: 18. For an overview of the debate surrounding the question of the 
unity / identity of the text, see Easthope, 1991 :22-42. 
Yai, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., ]989:63. 
At least, I would suggest, in so far as Furniss's 'bias' can be related to the formalist 
notion of 'defamiliarization'. See Selden, 1985:8-] l. 
Barber, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., ] 3. 
Barber, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., ] 989:] 5. 
Barber, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., ]989:]6. 
Barber, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:17-8. 
Barber, in Barber and De Moraes Faria, (eds)., 1989:15. 
Barber, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., ]989:20. 
Barber, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989: 19. The inherent 'disjunctiveness' 
of on1<l however also allows for other elements, unrelated to this 'dynamic of self-
aggrandisement' and even contradictory to it, to be incorporated. (See p.22). 
Barber, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:23. 
Barber, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:22. 
Barber, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:22. 
Barber and De Moraes Farias, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)" 1989:1. 
86. Finnegan, 1970:22-5. 
87. See also Finnegan, 1 'in many poetic traditions some are recognized as 
less innovative and [than others]'. Vail and White (1991 :56) make the same 
point with regard to the oral genres of south-central Africa: oral poetry is 'more 
serious' than moralities or trickster tales. 
88. Finnegan, 1970:23. 
89. From the local perspective the proverb is, however, frequently thought to be as 
'serious and "literary" as more lengthy forms'. (Finnegan, 1970:23). 
90. Turner (1994), Makouta-Mboukou (1973), Cauvin (1980) and Opland (1983). 
91. Vail and White, 1991 :40. 
92. Evans-Pritchard, 'Some Collective Expressions of Obscenity in Africa', in 
Pritchard, 1965. The Position of Women in Primitive Societies and Other 
in Social Anthropology. London: Faber & Faber, 101. Quoted in Vail White, 
1991 
93. Vail and White, 1991 :42. 
94. Vail and White, 1991 :28. 
95. Vail and White, 1991 
Vail and White remark, in fact, that the song 'achieved nothing pOSItiVe, only 
occasionally becoming art', its major importance lying in the fact that it defined 
tiny area in which laborers and their families [had] a separate history', a 'small 
of the mind that [refused] to completely' . (Vail and White, 1991 
Emphasis added). 
97. Finnegan, 1973: 127. Emphasis ................ . 
98. Easthope, 1991: 1 17. 
99. 1991 
100. Easthope, 1991 :80-103. 
101. Easthope, 1991:89. Acknowledging Barthes' argument that discourse is inherently 
connotative, Easthope is quick to point out that the denotative quality of Tarzan's 
textuality is only so relative to that Heart of Darkness. 
102. Easthope, 1991 :90. 
103. 1991:91. 
104. What is important, in this respect, is ability of researcher to notice, as Vansina 
puts it, 'choices of expression to a performer'. True linguistic competence 
will not just be to what is but to see what could have been given. (Vansina, 
1985:84). 
105. Barber Moraes Farias, in Barber and De Moraes (eds)., 1989:3. 
106. 1986: 12. This terminology will more extensively dealt in Chapter 
107. Barber and De Moraes Farias, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:2. This 
statement is made with particular reference to Mamadou Diawara' s account of the 
representations the past by women in a particular 'highly stratified' society. 
Diawara, in and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:109-37. 
108. It can be fruitfully argued that this to a large extent undermines the very meaning of 
'tradition' as an 'interlocking chain' Chapter note 8), making the notion - to 
an extent - redundant. But if, as was indicated in Chapter Ora] Theory relates the 
term 'oral' not to 'spoken' fact, to (what it conceives of as) 'tradition', the 
latter itself becomes primarily oral. Whatever its contradictions or the notion 
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Yai, in Barber and De Moraes Farias (eds)., 1989:59. 
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made extremely difficult given the fluidity of oral textuaJity), as, in fact, the society 
in relation to which the text I becomes a constitutive element. Uvi-
Strauss's Structural Anthropology; Okpewho, 1983:36-44). 
208. In motivating his isolation the text reflective the (racial) 'other' as particular 
theoreticaJ reading, Easthope (1991: 134-5) makes the point - similar to the one we 
made earlier - that 'while undeniably meanings with a raciaJ intent can be seen to 
derive from economic institutions and their politicaJ expressions in nationalism and 
imperiaJism, and whiJe again they become established as inherited forms of 
ideology, they function in modes calling for specific analysis'. 
209. Easthope, 1991 :66. 
210. Easthope, 1991: 1 
211. Easthope, 
212. in respect - albeit in a strongly evolutionist perspective - Turner, 1986. 
213. See Havelock's Preface to Plato, p.l40. Quoted in Vail White, 1991 1. 
21 Easthope, 1991 :93. It is important to distinguish this view of the pleasure of the 
(popular) text from Barthes' notions of or jouissance. The text of 'unsettles 
the reader's historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, ... brings a crisis to his 
with language'. (See Barthes, 1975. The Pleasure of the Text, transl. R. 
Miller. New York: Hill & Wang. Quoted in Selden, 1985:76). In 
perspective the above 'crisis' will the result of a Literature 'always meaning more 
than it says'. (See note 103). 
215. This definition is taken from Charles Peirce. (Emphasis original). Given the 
relation between signifier and signified, iconicity is - strictly speaking - a theoretical 
impossibility. Yet, as Easthope points out, discourse Tarzan of the Apes is 
'iconic' in so far as it contrasts to the highly symbolic (ironic) discourse of Heart of 
Darkness. (See also note 10]). 
216. Easthope, 1991 :93. 
21 Easthope, 1991 :91. Emphasis added. aJso Stiebel, 1992:49. 
218. Easthope, 1991 :89. 
219. Easthope, 1991:94. 
220. Easthope, 1991 :95. Emphasis added. 
1. Easthope, 1991:95. 
222. WiHiams, R. 1976. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. London: 
Fontana, 198-9. Quoted in Easthope, 1 1 :76. 
223. Barthes (1973: 154) to a large degree makes a similar distinction - on the basis of what 
is 'natural' vs what is 'constructed' - between what he terms a 'bourgeois' and a 
'rural' myth. Affirming that 'myths tend towards proverbs', he contends that 
'[p]opular, ancestraJ myths still partake of an instrumental grasp of the world as 
object'. 'Bourgeois aphorisms, on the other hand, belong to metalanguage; they are 
a second-order language bears on objects already prepared ... 
statement is no longer directed towards a world to made [nature]; it must overlay 
one which already made ... [constructed]' . Emphasis added. 
224. Interviewed by Attridge - see Attridge, D. Interview with Jacques Derrida', 
in Attridge, D. (ed). I Acts of Literature. London: Routledge - Derrida, for one, 
displays, in Easthope's words, a '[h]igh Modernist aesthetic [which] would attribute 
inherent properties to certain aesthetic texts - richer, denser as much as any Kantian 
or Coleridgean aesthetic. And its all high for there is not a trace here of popular 
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culture'. (Referred to in Easthope, 1995: 13). Easthope adds: '(I've not come across 
anything to suggest that Derrida has ever sat in a cinema or watched television),. 
225. It may be suggested that the isolation of oral literature as perpetual 'other' can be 
addressed - at least to some extent - by (re)conceptualizing it asfolklore, particularly 
in so far as the latter is increasingly studied as a phenomenon of modern industrialized 
societies. With reference to so-called 'urban legends' Bengt af Klintberg, for example, 
argues that there is 'no reason to conceive contemporary legend as ... separate from 
traditional legend'. (See Af Klingtberg, in Rarich and Wienker-Piepho (eds)., 
1990: 123). Even where recognized as 'modern', folklore continues, however, to 
command a theoretical scope generally distinct, not just from literary studies (whether 
modernist or post-modernist), but indeed from popular culture (Easthope's exclusion 
of the traditional should be illustrative in this regard). As such, it remains strongly 
aligned to anthropology. (See also notes 1 and 6). 
4, I Introduction 
CHAPTER 4 
ORALITY / SOUND 
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As performnnce orality is a multi-faceted discourse involving a variety of media (the vocal, 
instrumental, dancing, gesturing). At its most obvious level, however, orality means the 
production of vocal sounds. This is, of course, especially true for the (hypothetical) Oral 
Theory researcner wl10has little or no knowledge of the language of the 'oralliteralure' he 
is studying, and as a result finds himself unable, not only to know what a particular utterance 
means, but indeed to tell whether it constitutes 'language' at aiL Unable to speak nor 
understand any of the languages normally associated with the 'living oral traditions' that have 
been the stuff of Oral Theory, such will indeed be my experience. But even if I have to rely 
on an informant or translator not just to understand, but even to be sure that the sounds I hear 
are, in fact, linguistic sounds, I will per definition be able 10 listen to the performer and hear 
the vocal sounds he emits, This will be a significant first impression, and all the more so 
when this impression is the fruit, not of attendance at a live performance with its pervasive 
visual component, but - as is frequently the case - of having listened to oral literature 
'collected' by means of electronic recording. 
Given its predisposition to 'literature', Oral Theory has tended to neglect oral vocal 
production as sowuJ. Where the latter is specifically noted, it would generally be in a 
secondary sense, as 'stylistic device', As an area of interest to Oral Theory, sound is 
considered mainly - even exclusively - in relation to the meaning of the text, which is, of 
course, made up of words. (This point will be further explicated in Chapter 5). 
In two particularly engaging passages in his The Power of the Word and Orality and 
Literacy, Ong' momentarily suspends this subordination of sound to linguistic meaning. Of 
concern to him are the perceptual properties specific to sound. In this regard we can highlight 
the following aspects: 
I) Sound is 'more real or existential than other sense objects '2, in spite of - or, in fact, 
because of - its greater evanescence, Sound can only exist in its process of production, 
as event; it cannot reveal quiescence; - there is no equivalent of a 'still shot' for 
sound
4
• As such, sound, relative to other sensory phenomena, provides a privileged 
reflection of the 'here-and-now', hence, of presence. 
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2) Sound is 'a special sensory key to interiority·s. Contrary to our other senses which all 
have to interiority in order to reveal it (one first has to open a container in 
order to feel or look - or smell - inside it), our sense of can reveal interiority 
as such: we know simply by the sound 
full, or of what materials it is made6• 
closed ,",UII~o.J.lJ\Jl whether it is empty or 
3) Relative to other sensory phenomena - especially with reference to light - sound is 
notable for the extent to which it immerses the perceiver in his sensory perception. 
Whereas light is perceived unidireclionally (there has to be a given 'line of sight'), 
sound is perceived simultaneously from all around us. Given its evocation of presence, 
sOlJnd establishes the perceiver 'at a kind of core of sensation and existence'. Dng 
talks about the 'centering of sound7 in this 
While he concedes that 'truth can come into man's possession in ways other than 
conceptualization'S, one of the most fundamental of Ong's theses is the alignment I'u>.rw;'! .. '1'l. 
-UT!sory perception and thought. Our apprehension of reaJity is largely dependent on the 
_peculiarity each of our senses; our sense of sound, example. may lead to a 
conceptualization of reality different to that by the other senses. Ong does not 
explicitly state the epistemological model subscribes to, but two possibilities - overlapping 
to a large degree - would seem to present themselves. 
We could the above arguments concerning the properies of sound within a broadly 
representationalist epistemological model. To briefly characterize: in his J:,VI4u:nc,:e of the 
..:>t:Ti:ses David Kelley describes this view of the consciousness and object of 
consciousness as constituting a kind of midway between. on the one hand, epistemological 
realism affinning the of , and on the other, epistemological idealism 
committed to the 'primacy of consciousness', The following analogy is useful: 
denies that we can perceive this world directly: the senses". are 
like teJevision cameras, bringing news of the outer world but subject to an the 
distortions that medium is prey [0 10, 
As Kelley makes dearll, the 'outer world' at here is not a physical object but an 
the idea being simultaneously mode and object of consciollsness. In terms of the 
'theory of ideas', the 'content of our thought' is conceived of as having both a fonnal and 
a eDl'esemt~U1olnal nature, the latter being an aspect of the fonner. Once a well chosen 
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analogy: 
A detenninate mode of consciousness ... is like a single frame of movie film projected 
on the screen. The projector (the mind) casts a beam of light; light in general, like 
consciousness, is the essential attribute of the projector, and the different shades and 
patterns are its modes. The light illuminates an image on screen, it has an object. But 
the image is not something distinct from the light by which it is seen. The projector 
is not a searchlight, illuminating objects independent of it. The image is conveyed by 
the light itself, the image is 'in' the Iightll, 
The notion of the primacy of consciousness (what we are conscious of is our own 
consciousness, and what we perceive exists within it) tended to dominate post-Cartesian 
philosophical discourse. with realism (the primacy of existence) holding comparatively little 
sway!3. Kelley's own thesis., however, is very much in favour of the latter, although he 
distances himself from more radical 'mirror of nature' fonnat l4• There is, on closer 
inspection, no reason why this particular realist view should not also be applicable to Ong. 
Realism is founded upon the idea, in Kelley's words, that 'consciousness is not 
metaphysically active, it does not create its own objects, it is a faculty of identifying wMt 
exists,IS. At the same time, however - and this is an aspect that frequently been denied, 
both by 'traditional realists' and their critics - realism does regard consciousness as 'active 
epistemologically in processing these contents (objects]': 
What we are aware of is determined by reality there is nothing else to be aware of -
but how we are aware of it is detennined by our means of awareness l6• 
the two representationalist analogies quoted earlier both refer to the visual is a matter 
of coincidence; Kelley is concerned with sensory perception as such - of a 'colored, sounding, 
odorous wodd'17 - and does not offer a perspective on how different senses may lead to 
different ways of making sense. In other words, Kelley advances no particular 'hierarchy' of 
the senses. As we noted at the outset, this is not case with Ong: the different modes of 
perception - and notably the sense of sound - are akin to different conceptions of reality. 
Certain modes of perception are predisposed towards certain modes of conceptualization, 
certain modes of think..ing. Where one sense could be regarded as 'dominane in a particular 
group of peopJe, it would follow that their cognitive processes would influenced 
accordingly. 
Of course, I have already argued (see Chapter 2) that the elaboration of a peculiarly oral 
way of thinking (whether described as pre-logical, concrete, collectivist etc.) is not only 
'" 
l-re!r ".,.",r>Cd. but ift' ' . r ..... 1b< ~ "",l1li/1;"""" pa .......... 01 On! 
n..ory . coo merp"'''II<''' ... ThO """ .. Ion """ rip.ly be .. k<d of wI .. , 1.-"" J'""''''''''' 
_ cl_ . ..... lUi", ditkrenl crileri • • could bo at lhiI poi ... BUt i' <mI TheOl'/ 
1110 " ... ,,' ;" .... ,1\11 up. ~ ...., far iti<1l beyond. 1k1arJd, v..-o< if ... 
conltOdktcry ""'"'" of '0 .. 1 Ii,",",.",' (_ I tried to _ in Ooapoa 1i, ~ I. crucial -""" ~ ._ 00' nKv_1on 01 cho .... ,\<_.hich ~ it, ....... 11 ..... rwI. 
" In (llli .. ,ord o..c', rrik<:"" GO ....... diatio .. _......:1 (""" Olhe< K.....,. pt 7' .... 
may ... 11 offer I ... ful poi"' 01 dlepanun:, Our in ....... ' .. '011 01 ,he .i~n,r1C.....,. or Ihc: .. 
din .... · ~ .. Ib< _, 01 Oral "Ilocco:y willob>iouo/y difret r""" his; )'d it ill i. lilt 
Cf111C~ ",rectiOn upon. It ... oomooflkd<lAil ;, 0... .• ___ Il>oo __ 1'· ","'" 
find .... f<II«&I .. tli ... of .. , 0 '"' • . 
0., ails Ihc: IOIIJ., 01_', pacc; 7 .1 .. perC .... Iho 'WE ....... The IAun ( .. _ 10 
..,.... _" OIl "ready hi.ted .... ;do .... """"""<III 01, ...... I<rin&. tauno! 10. • .. Ido ........... • 
Ii",,) <tis ... , .... I .... I .... c'*'"1"""" 01 rulity libelled '~or' ond ' , bll1li.1'''. "'" 
...... teSII ..... F' ....... y, 01 Ill< ",t.; ... pIIH1I'Ii""""" 01Il00 00IIJei 01 ho.wiac .-I .;.;.. 
"ThaI 0., "","Id In .hi. "'J "",I< "'" ""';1\1""" vi,,,,,, does "'" mean 1l\oI ... di .... """ 
Ih< ather ........ In fa<t, . <OnSidenobio pHl'V iI doOGled La • ~ 0/ -. 1M 
"'r/pI. ond. nnally, 11'0: .1<CI""'ic}~. ~ be ooncei .. d of in Ie ..... of tho enol, .w NOd g.:RiIoI 
.... oIl're\ofti. p',d_,uol ... ""Iopo.*, .... Wi L "M by ,_h ODd ..... 11. B., Onl', 
." ....... ",...;",;1_ 0I1hc0<l 0Iwtit>n11O_ oI"'~.-.do I"' ...... "" 
one of 'he pulll." ho •• pl.,... ). ;. h"~ Il10''' ,han ..... po.ary nirwi(ln .... iIh .... 
·1Iw ........ 1!· _ of Fo, ""M ..... ,.. ccnonxl ..... 'r _1Ml 1" ...... ti<Ir\ 10 .... UcreI(I<)' 
0IId ...... 111 b, .. ' il . ... "'~ aploiwioo 01 • ...,..... ...t t il ,I 'de," -i.n '. For .... CII_ 
IQ "hom F",od IIddrnoed him>elf • • foa h.oppil~ • .,IOOded. oa:onIinllO On" b)' 'Fn:udi •• 
_'va' · "-' ~ ........ , by d; .. of_ <ffon won.c.J .... If...., _.., ....... dlfI'Ic" , 
uploilMl<n of. hi&hly oudilO<)' ond " .... a1iM ... > ",111'~ ,. fo<I. On''''''1y ba. If" 
POYC"""""1'1O for .... b< ... r" of hll 0 ... ","""I) ..... '.,ion;" .... " 0: 
F«,...".... ptpO td .. ,<:ieaciflC, po~1 ............. 01","....,. 'pro.lmiy 
....... wIIidI Fmodion ........". iI .. 1f has ...... _ .. pmcientif .. ond flol l 01.,.",.. 
for ......... !hI .. ;",. Foo- POYC/lOln.OlY'" lou I""",ed "'" .... for .... n.. 01 
<;.mn'Ion, .............. b< impoo«I on l1li"' .... povldln, VUI« bodily pie ... ..... 
I ..... " _ of 011 ... well ................. II~ """ ....... lIICDIion ...... be: Ji ... 10 
........... mb/i"" 1-....... .1) ........ 1IICh .. be";"l ond. _*1)', .;pr. 
162 
It could that the on behalf of psychoanalysis made here by Dng are, in fact, 
reminiscent of its Jungian rather 
collective unconscious. not to 
Freudian ''''''''''''''''-, Jung's universalist view of a 
his later distinction between directed as 
'conscious, and creative') and non-directed thinking (the latter being 'associative, 
uncoordinated and uncreative')2A. would seem particularly amenable to Ong's expressed 
preoccupation with 'the rise of civilization', In any event the Dng's argument is 
enough: concomitant to (or underpinning?) the evolution in the 'communications 
which, on a conceptual is the condition the rational and the abstract, is a 
in a sense more immediate evolution in the sensorium. Man moves from a the world 
of acoustic space (the verbomotor) to a world of 'pure' space (the visualist): 
space comes rather late into man's sensorium is ..... "'ra<ln in some 
at least, to ear and the eyelS , 
What clear, at this IS parallel in Dng's thinking with regard to vocal sound 
and expressive (The relation between expressive form and noetic process was with 
in Chapter If observations on the form of oral has appropriately been 
described as 'psychologizing' (see Chapter I, note 67), it should come as no surprise that his 
insistence on the of that as sound should have a similar orientation. 
Previously Dng arrived at the oral mindset on back of the formula., this time his 
will sound16. 
At this point we need to our overview of S: verbomotor ~ paradigm to 
include views of another prominent author 
sound, namely Marcel Jousse27, is best known 
psychological effects of vocal 
his view that, in certain oral cultures 
at least, the movement of the closely allied to respiratory rhythm, takes on a 
certain 'gestual' which a distinctive oral style. described by 
nothing short of a literary genre. The term 'verbomotor' is, in coined by Jousse, is 
mainly to 'ancient Hebrew and Aramaic cultures surrounding culrures, 
which knew some writing but remained oral and word-oriented in lifestyle 
than object-oriented,29, will expand the term so as to incorporate 'the oral type 
context' in general. 
well before ParryJO (his Style oral rylhmique et mnemolechnique chez les Verbo-
moteurs was originally published in 1925), Jousse is acquainted with the role of the 
formula (what he terms the 'oral propositional cliche']!) in oral composition, with to 
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which he quotes at from - amongst others - Antoine Meillet (who, as we saw in 
Chapter I, was research supervisor), But what is particular interest to us -
and no doubt to Dng - within the context of the oral as sound, is Jousse's notion of oral 
vocal production as gesture - what he refers to as 'Iaryngo-buccal lation'. In effect, this 
notion takes the qualities we 
of the present - not as a 
effect') a decisive 
saw Ong associate with sound (its privileged evocation 
as an event - its special 
beyond its particular 
v.a'.'UlI to interiority. 'centering 
as a means 
of communication (a to some extent 
" 
is asserted as 
a special the psyche. 
both Ong and Jousse see as intimately connected with the psyche, it is important 
to stress, however, that their conception of the laner is far from Dng is, as we shall 
see, altogether more generous his appraisal of (the cognitive effects of) writing than Jousse. 
But the root of the two authors' divergence (even if their in important 
ways) lies, in fact, within would seem to be different 
we shaH need to pay attention to the following: 
I) the re1ation perception to 
2) the re1ation consciousness to conceptualization (thinking); 
the way in which 
above. 
oral and written) can be said to 
models. In this 
with the 
We can introduce our discussion of Ong and Jousse's conceptions of vocal sound (underlying 
their conception of verbomotor man) with some brief remarks on their appraisals 
of writing which. to both, constitutes the essential watershed between verbomotor and the 
visua1ist. Man is 'speech-driven' to ..... ".'VB'"' the 'verbomotor' metaphor a bit - to the extent 
that the 'vocal gesture' is nothing 
verbomotor people,)2, asserts 
our basic act of .... V''''' ... IVU 
as we have 
are 
makes 
same distinction a verbomotor (oral) man and a visualist (literate) man 
as The perspective elaborated by on the cultures he observes in fact, 
a example of the evolutionist yet 'glamourizjng' - 'Romantic on the 
of the "other" and the "lost''' earlier discussed by Finnegan. ), note 
22). (Finnegan, in fact, qua1ifies as biological' Jousse's view of 
societies being <instinctive of "Ie rythme vital"'. a view that comes 
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close to the 'dismissive' notion that oral literature 'would ultimately he analysable in physical 
and instinctual rather than cultural terrns,33 - see Chapter I, notes 97 - 98). Alternately 
described as 'undisassociated' and 'spontaneous', oral cultures are thus qualified by Jousse 
in contrast with our 'disassociating' one, which has alienated us from 'the profound and 
subtle spirit of things'34. The unmistakably Rousseauian character of this line of argument is 
confirmed, finally, when we are explained the cause of this contam.ination, namely writing35 : 
with the development and spread (of writing, and especially of its use in composition 
itself) a sort of parasitic language comes into being ... [This] written language has 
succeeded in establishing itself as a bastard variation of the primary language36• 
In terms of the foundational relation he establishes between 'real [oral] language' and 
consciousness (we shaH examine this shortly), Jousse is in no doubt as to the negative 
cognitive consequences of this process: 
This parasitic written language ... is now out of key with present-day ideas; it demands 
a tiring cerebral tension and very quickJy exhausts the mindJ? 
Jousse's romantic acclaim of the 'spontaneity' of oral people - not to mention his pessimism 
regarding the onset of literacy ~ is to a Jarge extent, one suspects, indicative of the age in 
which he Hved38, Ong lives in a different age, and finds orality considerably less glamourous: 
There is hardly an oral culture or a predominantly oral culture left in the world today 
that is not somehow aware of the vast complex of powers forever inaccesible without 
literacy 39. 
It could also be argued that the 'disassociating' (alienating) character of the technology of 
writing so decried by Jousse is to some extent 'remedied' in Ong's concept of secondary 
orality (although, as we have seen, the latter is but a further stage in the development of the 
literate 'mindset' - see Chapter I, note 144). Ong is at pains to stress how the technological 
age has in many ways intensified face-lo-face contact on a scale far greater than that of oral 
man
40
, what with conventions, 'brain-storming' sessions and the like (not to mention the 
revolution in verbal communication brought about by electronics: '[v Joice, muted by script 
and print, has come newly alive,41), Also, the possibility of 'sequential analysis' which is the 
fruit of literacy (see Chapter I, note 132) favours the kind of reflectiveness through which 
'the pristine human consciousness which was not literate at all' can be reconstructed. Even 
if the shift from oral to literate culture is irrevocable (Barber's observations on the progressive 
marginalisation of the illiterate - Chapter 3, note 4 - are relevant here) the written word can, 
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after aU, to recover the - at least to a t'I-""""""" 
Let us now return to a consideration of the central epistemological Jousse's 
understanding of orality is grounded in his conception as 
Our intelligence has only one mode of action. Whatever fact it apprehends, it is 
always in the domain of experience (reception) that it finds it I cannot know what it 
means to think, feel or want if 1 no longer experience (or revivify) in thought, 
emotion or volition. Involved in my interior and also in the impressions 
which come to me from there is a of the and it is in 
the concrete fact, once it experienced, that I perceive the notion and 
grasp abstraction43• 
The dual juxtaposition of experience with the 'receptional and revivivlscene calls for 
particular comment. The concrete nature of consciousness excludes any notion of experience 
that is not primarily experience of the body. One of the most of Jousse's conceptions 
in this regard is that of perception as a muscular ............... Ull. what is perceived is 
by muscles'44. This 'gesticulation' represents the physical harnessing of 
experience. It is the re-enactment (,revivification') of this 'reception' which constitutes 
consciousness. 
Consciousness is therefore the constant re-enactment by the of its own to an 
original sensory impact The key element of this re-enactment - and of 
consciousness - is 'Iaryngo-buccal gesticulation', the production of vocal But 
consciousness is something fundamentally social, a factor, one may assume, that serves 
to distinguish vocal gesticulation from what would be the production. by means of vocal, 
of mere sound (noise). Gesticulation ...... ,."' ... ,,"'''' 'semiological' - in other words: """0<>"1< so 
as it comes not so re-enactment of own 
<gesticulation consciousness'. but. essentially, through the conditioning4S of the latter as a 
result of the gesticulation of consciousness he observes in others: '[gestural] tendencies 
relating to one's own body ... are analogous to one's reaction to the bodies of one's fellow 
men .46, argues .. v ....... ",,,,. 
We earlier qualified Ong's epistemoiogicaJ perspective as representationalist to 
some extent at least, realist (in the sense of the 'epistemologically active' consciousness 
supported by Kelley). In the case of Jousse. however, there is simply no such ambiguity. 
concrete consciousness is nothing if not ist, and then strongly so: the 'gesticulation of 
consciousness . our prior of a physical What is 
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our muscles' derives not from ourselves. but from outside ourselves. s <outside' is, by 
contrast, much harder to down. Perception might consciousness chronologically 
(as the 'primacy of existence'), nothing is perceived that is not already received within 
a conceptual framework. To speculate on what Ong would consider to be 'the profound and 
subtle spirit of things' would therefore, strictly speaking, a contradiction in terms. Man 
could never - could never have - 'spontaneous'. for there is nothing that has ever 
uncluttered by human consciousness. 
Or, for that matter, by thinking, if not, In language - at least as far as Ong is 
concerned. For if it is difficult to distinguish the perceived from the epistemological, it if 
anything. more difficult to isolate what is epistemologically active from what is thought (Ong 
talks more or less interchangebly about writing restructuring thought I writing restructuring 
consciousness4'), not to mention what is thought from what is spoken (at a level of 
the sensorium: from what is written). 
This us to what lies at the root of the epistemological discrepancy between Ong and 
Jousse: the relation of language to thought. This of course, a highly controversial issue. 
Moreover, It is .significance to our elaboration of a 'theoretical for Oral 
Theory that - as title of this work suggests - beyond the distortive notions of 
'tradition' and 'literature'. For if both notions are underscored by a division of world 
into an 'us' and a 'them' (albeit from different perspectives - as we at beginning 
of Chapter tradition apart' while literature 'brings back'), it is precisely because they 
are built around a of oppositions in which cognitive continues, in one form or 
another (and even if its area of deployment has in this century evolved from an overtly racist 
intellectual capacity [0 a more relativist cultural I sociological context), to be the most 
persistent variable. That the orality - literacy continuum revolves around a change in 
communication is something of an axiom of Oral Theory. But the medium - it oral 
or written ~ is, in the final analysis, always reducible to language. As such, the notion of an 
mindset, as far as Oral Theory is concerned. cannot come about without idea that 
language and thought are causally linked ~ at least at a certain level of development. On the 
face of it the evidence there is some link between thought and language seems 
At the same time, however, man's intellect has also been described as 
interdepend t with other fields of human endeavour by and large unrelated to communication 
(such as e manipulation of objects). Language may but one of a variety of 
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'characteristics' of man that relate to thought, and not necessarily the privileged one. This is 
an important argument that we shall need to explore further. 
4 .2 Orality / Sound / Language / Thought 
Over the years the question of the relation of language to thought has received particular 
attention in research on the learning capacity of non-hearing (deaf) people, research which is 
certainly not without relevance to the oral - literate controversy we are concerned with. 
According to Adrienne Harris, the long-standing concern with this question has rested on the 
following assumptions: 
First, language is equated with speech, correlative perhaps with an asumption that 
without speech one cannot think .... Second, this research concentrates on ... the 
matheric functions of language. What is under examination is the capacity of language 
to represent experience, to observe, to conceptualize, and to categorize
48
, 
Certainly, virtually all of Ong's reflections on the nature of language (including the 
specifically written language of literate culture) can be related to either one or both of these 
assumptions. To support his assertion that there are no 'instances of languages which are not 
in one way or another constituted in sound,49, he quotes a survey by Bertha Siertsema50 
according to which 'the primacy of sound {in language] emerges as quite incontestable'. (And 
yet the primacy of sound has since been contested - more about this further on). Ong 
moreover advances with a great deal of certainty, not just that there is a relation between 
speech (sound) and thought. but that thought is, in fact, dependent on itsi. It is worthwhile to 
briefly review Ong's argument in this regard. 
We earlier discussed Goody's insistence on the communicative nature of language as a 
prerequisite for its conceptual function. (See Chapter 2, notes S(r8. It is the fact that writing 
is fundamentally a medium of communication which makes it the agent for social change 
Goody considers it to be, and which enables it to be such a crucial factor in the development 
of conceptualization). Goody's perspective in this regard can be adequately summed up in the 
Durkheimian notion of thinking as a 'social thing'. If thinking is indeed social. there is no 
doubt excellent reason to link it to the development of Ong's 'distancing' senses. (See note 
21). More than any of the senses developed by man, hearing and sight allow, as Claude 
Hagege puts ii, 'for a deferred reception in space,S2; these are the senses that have historicaJly 
~ served man's particular capacity for social organization (culture) from which the development --of language is to all intents and purposes indistinguishables3, And - significantly - it was 
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hearing (rather than sight) that came to be the preferred motive force of human 
communication, hence of language. Historically anyway. 
The reasons Hagege finds for justifying the domination of hearing over sight as far as the 
development of language is concerned are predictable enough: vision is badly impaired at 
night and light cannot go around things. Sound, by contrast, does not require the sun (or the 
moon) to shine, and is generally undeterred by physical obstacles"', (See the 'centering effect' 
of sound Dng talks about). In so far as thought is social, this inevitably means that thought 
itself would have become associated with 'soundedness' (even if the sound is not actuaily 
verbalized) rather than with visualization, To these reasons Dng adds two less obvious - and 
in that sense interesting - ones. The first goes primarily to the 'interiority' of sound: 
Voice [as sound]. .. manifests interiors as interiors and unites them [the 'centering 
effect'], Since thought arises in a human community [thought is social] and since a 
human community is essentially a union of interior consiousnesses .. , it appears 
understandable that that particular sense world which is by its natur~ost directly 
interior would be the most readily exploitable in direct connection with thoughf:'i5 
By its very nature, then, sound is 'attuned' to the interiority of thought, at least in so far as 
we agree with Dng that thought and consciousness are basically the same thing, (II is doubtful 
that Jousse, for one, will concur with this - presently more about his position in this regard). 
The second reason goes to the privileged relation of sound with the 'here and now', hence, 
with time itself, Ong's reasoning here is, however, less seductive, for it requires of us to think 
of Ihinking - in the sense of 'formal intellectual cognition' - as essentially time-bound, a 
process rather than a state'6. The interiority of thinking (or, rather, of consciousness) to a large 
extent speaks for itself. That thinking should be essentially time-bound (in the same way as 
sound) seems, by comparison, rather disputable. 
Perhaps the most persuasive of Ong's arguments in favour of the thought - sound link is 
his reflection on the 'Ialling' stage in children", which is characterized by a relatively 
undifferentiated sensorium through which everything the child perceives is but a 'big, 
blooming, buzzing confusion', During this period the child surrounds himself with 'a 
persistent effluvium of sound,'3, Although this also involves kinestetic sensations (burbling, 
gurgling, crowing, playing with the lips), it is essentially through the sounds the child makes 
that the world around him begins to take some kind of conceptual shape, This happens when 
the child utters sounds that - through cnafl1;e-· actually correspond to words, and ends up 
attaching concepts 10 these sounds through the 'positive reinforcement' (to use the Skinnerian 
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terminology) of the social body (the and others around The sound 'mama' has 
been particularly well documented in this regard, no doubt because the formation of the 
concept of mother with which it comes to be associated brings the child to 'some 
sort of unified being> the general sensory confusion, a process crucial to his eventual 
recognition of himself as a unified subject. 'Which did the child learn asks Ong. He 
Did he learn first to isolate 'mama' from the confusion of the sensory world and 
to think mama first or did he the word mama first? The question appears 
quite impossible to answer. If anything, the word came first and the concept after. 
Only the word was not really a word until the concept accompanied it. Previously it 
was just a SOUruf9, 
According to Ong, can then be to be conditional thought in so far as it 
constitutes identifiable unit (as sanctioned by the body) to which concepts are 
attached: ' have no instances of conceptual thought arising in complete independence 
of words,60, But this does not mean. as points out, that thought is necessarily 
with a 'chain of verbalization in all or even most instances!6l, This is an important distinction 
and one which Ong himself perhaps passes over rather quickJy. We 
in more detail. 
return to this point 
In the meantime, however, it will useful to make a brief detour through Jousse, whose 
position on the language - thought controversy provides, at to a 
counterpoint to that of Ong. We concluded earlier that the 'semiological 
degree, a 
that is 
speech constitutes our very act of consciousness. But that mean that it also constitutes 
our thinking? The cognitive consequences Jousse aUributes to writing note 37) would 
seem to suggest that he does regard language and thought as causally linked, Even if it is its 
'bastardised version» writing after all, still derived from 'real' language, in that sense 
is certainly reducible to it. Also. it is through writing that we come to disassociate 
ourselves from the 'true spirit of things' , a that implies a change in thinking. 
If written language so changes (i.e. coincides with) thought. why not the oral? 
as we seen, by and large consciousness with thinking note 47) 
within the framework of Jousse's 'gesticulation of consciousness' > should have Iitue hesitation 
equating language with thinking. But there are instances where Jousse seems to distinguish 
quite dearly between language and thought, and, that between consciousness and 
thinking - at least if we the latter the more Or less narrow definition of 'formal 
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intellectual cognition' occasionally used by Ong. Jousse is, in fact, far more prepared than 
Ong to entertain the possibility that thinking could be purely derivative of what is visualized. 
If consciousness derives from laryngo-buccal gesticulation (Le. vocal sound), there is certainly 
a kind of thinking that approximates it in so far as it comes to 'mimic in a deferred way' the 
original laryngo-buccal movement. 'By a process of substitution to which the mind of the 
child very soon grows accustomed' (the notion of conditioning is once again important here -
see note 45). this process comes to reflect 'the infinite variety (of mental dispositions vis-a-
vis) things, ideas or feelings." ,62. Yet there is a second kind of thinking, functioning, so to 
speak, at a remove from the (auditory) sensory bias of consciousness, which makes use of 
'visual reviviscences of objects' and does not need 'to resort to the help of corresponding 
verbal expressions,63. Crucial in this regard is the fact that the 'reviviscence' (or 're-
enactment') has nothing to do with the ability to write. It is not a spatial representation of 
language, but of the 'object' ('things, ideas or feelings') itself. Given this independence of 
thinking from verbalization, Jousse is not at all troubled by the fact that 
[t]here are certain thinkers who, although they are very intelligent, never succeed in 
expressing themselves welJ64• 
Ong, not surprisingly, hardly entertains this possibility. In keeping with his view on the close 
link between speech and thought, he prefers to state the opposite: 
the most literate persons [Le. who think in literate terms] are often enough 
extraordinarily fluent oral verbalizers as we1l65 . 
Of course, it could be argued that Jousse's great thinker but poor speaker (for whom 
'language is an obstacle rather than an aid to thought,(6) merely constitutes proof, not of the 
independence of thought from language, but merely of the independence of thought from 
language as a 'chain of verbalization'. This raises the question of the 'mathetic' function of 
language (see Harris' second assumption of the language - thought relation quoted above), at 
least in so far as we take this function as relating, not just to the postulated link between the 
individual sound (word) and the formation of concepts but, indeed, to a link between 'world-
view' ('rnindset', 'synthesis' - see note 26) and what linguistically lies beyond the word: the 
lexical, morphological and syntactical categories that make up the linguistic system. Again, 
Adrienne Harris: 
Mathetic functions arise as the child separates himself from the environment and 
comes to interpret experience." [They] serve in the construction of reality undertaken 
by the child and most importantly lead the child to learn about language itself? 
171 
deeper into this question, we need to carry Jousse's contention 
thought is not necessarily nested in speech a little bit (Harris' 'first assumption' 
again). On this point certain developments the conceptualization of the 
congenilally (i.e. people who are deaf from birth) are particularly illuminating. 
Ong even in the case of the non-hearing, intellectual development goes 
side by side with to sound as such: 
deaf from those who themselves are participate 
indirectly in a world held together by voice68, 
The fact that the non-hearing have, in the frequently grown 'intellectually subnormal', 
is consequently ascribed to the 
deaf-mutes more thoroughly, if always 
pedagogicaJ techniques to '[introduce] 
oral-aural world .... 69. Ong joins 
forces with a long-held notion in on cognitive development of the non-hearjng, 
namely that problems with to such development are the result of 'language deficiency'. 
to Adrienne Harris, this linking of process to language prowess has 
in Russian psychoiogy. in which the work of A1eksandr Luria (on whom Ong 
his 'psychodynamics of orality see Chapter 2, note 65) has been 
noticeable'o. That the development of the intellect is dependent on the integration 
of subject into world' is beyond question'l our <Jailing' stage 
above), but this world necessarily have to be experienced - it indirectly - as a 
'~-sounded one? A significant change in emphasis with regard to problem, as phrased by 
Lynn Liben, of 'why deaf with normal inteHigence typicaHy perform reJatively poor)y 
on cognitive and social , would seem to suggest that the answer is no. concerns 
the suggestion, attributed to , that impaired cognitive development the non-
hearing is the result, not of " but rather of 'a blending of emotive, 
and intellective neglegt' or 'experiential deficiencies'. 
This loosening of the language - thought bind is. from our point of view, an important 
There are, however. two 
movement towards the experiential rather 
contradictory ways of motivating this 
development, 
an oral mindset. 
Ong. namely: 
I) that 
the linguistic as prime factor in 
each in its own way relates to our attempt at setting aside the 
motivations respectively attack the dual notion so strongly 
and thought are fundamentaJly 
of 
by 
2) (hat language is fundamentally sounded language. 
We need to briefly review both motivations, as well as the impact they may have on 
orality - literacy question. 
The first motivation for experiential rather than 
very title of Furth's 1966 work: Thinking without 
deficiency is suggested by the 
.. (see note 73), In spite of their 
in standard middle-class American (they not nrfl,nP.rl\J possess a natural 
sounded - language), 'the majority of deaf individuals [in the 
adjust to world. They marry, raise children. pay taxes. contribute to 
adequately 
of the 
community ...• 74. In words, non-hearing people do think, and generally think "'_ •.• n .... ...,. 
well, even though they to a extent language. (Of course, Furth is overloolcing 
language, which is the very point to made in the second motivation). To explain how this 
non-language based thinking takes Furth relies heavily on Jean Piaget's75 cognitive 
model according to which 'sensorimotor actions - not - are assumed to lay the 
foundations for logical thought'71l. This is not the to enter into a detailed discussion of 
Piaget's conception, which would lie way beyond the and interest - of this study. But 
of his more fundarnentaJ notions are nonetheless of r.1'-;,""""~"<:' to us in so far as they 
or seem to ~ to some of the notions used by Ong in his description of the 
the brief foray into cognitive psychology. mindset, 
Essentially postulates that intellectual growth in children takes place in 
.'-
and invariant Se<:lIUCllCC of . The firses, the sensorimotor, extends from to about 
two years of and is by the child gaining acquaintance with his environment 
through sensory perception movement. second, called intuitive or pre-operational, 
takes the child to about seven years of sees him beginning to assimilate concepts not 
directly vehicled by the senses, such as the reialivity of number and space: more or Jess, 
nearer and farther, elC. But the child can only pay attention to one at a time. and 
'beginning to inlernaJise actions into thoughts,79 this presently), can 
only work forward in his thinking. Piaget talks of the in this regard: 
we should note that this logic is limited in two essential such or 
cannot as 
or setting up of correspondances does not involve reversibility. so we 
f" ,80 o operatIons... . 
The third (roughly u... ..... ...,.... 
more fully logical: 
[The child] now 
the ages of seven and ten) is, by contrast with the <;;popnnn 
things in and understands that in Hning them up, say, 
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in order of increasing size, he is at the same time arranging them in order of 
decreasing size; the transivity of relations like bigger than, and so on, which 
previously went unrecognized or was noted as a mere matter of fact, is now something 
of which he is explicitly aware ... the conservation principles which earlier were 
lacking are now established ... 81 • 
What Piaget calls 'conservation' relates to the child's newly-acquired ability 10 compare 
particular configurations of a certain number of objects or quantities with previous ones, 
without allowing his initial measurement of the number or quantity to be influenced by it82• 
The child can, for the fist time, consider two or more aspects of a situation simultaneously, 
yet his thinldng remains confined to 'concrete Situations'S" hence Piaget' s qualification of this 
slage as concrete operational. The la!ter handicap is, however, overcome in the fourth/annal 
operational stage, which sees the eleven to twelve year old finally abJe to manipulate 'abstract 
symbols or ideas'. Reasoning is fully 'reversible' (see stages 2 and 3 above) and the child can 
also 'reason by implication,84. 
Where does language fit into all of this? The answer is: nowhere - at least in the 
foundational sense that Ong (in regard to thought) and Jousse (in regard to consciousness) 
would prefer to think of it. To understand the 'role' Piaget assigns to language within the 
cognitive process, we need to revisit the 'stages' described above, but this time not from the 
point of view of their actual (differential) sequence, but from the point of view of the 
'mechanism' that enables the child to make cognitive progress, both within a particular stage 
and in his passage from one stage to another. Such a perspective is notably adopted by Fodor, 
who describes Piaget's model as involving 'the assimilation of a series of "logics" of 
increasing representative power,as. 
The sensorimotor child possesses a 'logic of action': he reasons on the basis of a 
'generalization of actions,s6. What is going to determine his cognitive progress is precisely 
the assimilation Fodor refers to, defined by Piaget as 'the integration of new objects or new 
situations and events into [the result of] previous ... [generalizations]'!'. At the very initial 
stage of the child's development, assimilation hinges purely on the child's recognition 
('comprehension') of an object. Having been face to face with, say, a hanging object before, 
the child is subsequently able to recognize such an object whenever he sees it. But from the 
child's second year (i.e. still within the sensorimotor stage). assimilation begins to become 
possible !lot only through 'the integration of an object to a scheme of action' (see note 87) _ 
i.e. through recognition - but through what Piaget tel1ns 'extension'; the ability to evoke, that 
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is, 'to think of something that is not actually and perceptibly presenC&ll. In other words, the 
child acquires the capacity to assimilate into his generalizations that which is absent. And this 
capacity, which is fuBy the capacity to represent, results from the fonnation of what Piaget 
conceives to be 'the symbolic or semiotic function'. And of this semiotic function 
language is a particular case ...• but it is only a particular case - particularly important. 
I do not deny - but a limited case within the totality of manifestations of the symbolic 
functiontl9 • 
Other instances of the semiotic function (existing, so to speak, side by side with language) 
include 'symbolic play' ('play evokes by means of gestures a situation that is not current, 
not perceptjble'~ and to some extent already implied in the idea of 'play by means of 
gesture' - imitation. With respect to the latter Piaget interestingly echoes notion of 
semiological gesticulation as a 'miming of the muscles' note 44): 
I mean by imitation not the imitation of a person ... but the imitation of an object, that 
the by gestures the characteristics of that Object (for example, the object 
has a hole that must be enlarged, and this enlargement is imitated by the motion of 
opening and closing the mouth). This imitation plays a very large role because it can 
be motive at the outset .. , but it continues later on as an interiorized imitation. I claim 
that the mental image is nothing more, at the beginning. than an interiorized imitation 
that creates ensuing representations91 . 
]ousse, as we have seen, aligns the 'mimicking' by means of gesture (j.e. 'Iaryngo~buccal' 
gesture) to the act of speech (language) and sees it, in 'deferred' (onn, as the substance 
of thought itself. (See note 62). But imitation can also derive from 'visual reviviscences' (see 
note 63), leading to a thinking largely independent from language. Unlike Jousse, Piaget does 
not assimHale imitation to language, but sees it as functioning parallel to it within the broader 
semiotic process. But at least to extent that Piaget's 'mental image' is an interiorized 
imitation 'at beginning', one can no doubt justified finding it largely reminiscent 
of Jousse's 'deferred mimicking' of 'visual reviviscences·92 . 
terms of the thought - language controversy. Piaget's characterization of language as a 
limited - yet important - 'case' of a broader representative function. can obviously be 
interpreted according to which of these adjectives one wishes to In this regard a 
distinction has been made between the concrete operational and the Jormo.J operational stages, 
to the effect that. while language is not in the course of cognitive development as 
such, it is the same, in Furth's words: 
a principal and preferred medium of thinking for a developed mind, for a mind that 
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has reached ... the fOlTIlal operating stage93, 
An essentially similar reading of Piaget is provided by Liben: 
,., even without language, the child's interactions with the physical world should 
permit the development of fundamentally nOlTIlal cognitive skills, at least through the 
concrete operational period". 
Piaget's position with regard to the thought -language relation at a fully developmental level 
can then at least to some extent be said 10 approximate that of Lev Vygotsky's Thought and 
Language95 • Thought and speech have different ontogenic roots and evolve along different 
lines throughout the child's development At a certain point, however, 'these lines meet, 
whereupon thought becomes verbal and speech rational'%, 
The fOlTIlal operational stage represents, as we saw earlier, the hUman intellectual capacity 
for abstraction, Our thinking is fully 'reversible' and we can reason by implication, To the 
extent that language is the most elaborate - and, in that sense, the most abstract - of the 
semiotic functions identified by Piaget, not to mention the fact that it functions according to 
readily deductible and predictable rules (more about this point in our discussion of the 
mathetic aspect of language), the association between language and a fully 'rational' reasoning 
seems perfectly fair. At this point, however, the following question comes to mind. Even if -
taking an essentially Chomskyen line - language is regarded as 'rational' (and therefore 
conducive to rational thinking), how sure can we be that our thinking - as adults - is itself 
intrinsically rational? This is, once again, not a question that we can entertaIn here in any 
detail. But the following comment by David Green97 sheds some light on the complexities of 
this question, specifically in so far as it refutes the taken-for-grantedness of notions like 
rationality and abstraction in relation to fOlTIlal operative reasoning. In a 1972 article Piaget9l! 
advances, reports Green, that 'adults solve problems according to the principles of 
hypothetico-deductive logic'. Yet 
, .. it became clear both from work on human reasoning in the sixties and from 
research on human judgment... that such a claim is incorrect. Indeed, it is perhaps as 
well that we do not think according to the canons of fOlTIlal logic for our thinking 
would be maladapted to the world in which we live ... where relevance is mare 
important tMn logical equivalence. 
As a result, 
... our capacity to reason effectively is crucially dependent upon relatijJe~y specific. 
rather IMn context-free, problem representations9'l, 
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Does the idea of a 'relevant' or 'relatively specific, rather than context-free' reasoning not 
take us back, at least [0 some degree, 10 the COllente, object-oriented logic of the child in 
which - as we have learnt - language is a relatively unimportant factor? one's 
reponse to it, this question is useful in so far as it the further issue of the actual validity 
of (and others') essentially developmental model of a 'staged' human cognition. We 
can conclude this first segment of our reflection on Ong's sound J speech J language J thought 
approximation by briefly considering an alternative to such an evolution. 
One of the more pointed of Piaget comes, fact, from Fodor. who the 
v"' .............. · s notion of a progression through increaSingly complex conceptual systems on purely 
logical grounds. Side-stepping the myriad of schematic syllogisms Fodor offers us. we can 
broadly nail down his argument to the following. Concepts as such can only be learnt through 
'the and confirmation of hypotheses,loo if - as would obviously 
with small children - the latter are never actually verbalized). Yet for the 
case 
to have 
advanced in the place means that the concept to be 'learnt' must have been present 
in it from the start. In other words. the subject merely learns which of a range of C01[lCe~p(s 
he already best fits his experience of a given situation, or, as Fodor phrases it, 
'which of locally coextensive concepts is criteria) for the occurrence of reward'. Hence 
Fodor's emphatic conclusion: 'one can't learn a conceptual system richer than the conceptual 
that one starts with,IOI, 
The only thing that can, in fact, become more powerful, is the of expressiviry of 
conceptual It is at this level that the child's learning of a Janguage becomes useful. 
But rather than relate the latter to factors of cognition (factors of intellecrual competence). 
Fodor essentially links language to the relatively extraneous factors of intellectual 
perfonnance like capacity and the ability to focus attention lO2• Conceptualization as 
such is the province, not of language the natural languages children learn), of 
what Fodor conceives to be 'an internal representational system' or 'private language' 103, And, 
no matter how crude this may the representational power of this conceptual system is, 
'to all intents and purposes! innately determined,I04. Fodor concedes that he uses the term 
'language' in relation to this 'inner code' by way of ana)ogyI05. The fact is that while 
this conceptual system can possibly be regarded as representational in a way to 
language (no doubt as part of a semiotic function), it is fundamentally not learnt 
The that Piaget discusses cannot be differentiated in tenns of the child's ability to learn 
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concepts and - important as far as we are concerned - conventional (natural) language has, 
strictly speaking, nothing to do with how we think. 
We can now tum to what we earlier identified as a second motivating factor in the move 
from language deficiency to experiential deficiency as a means of accounting for perceived 
cognitive problems of the non-hearing, namely the contention that - contrary to what Ong 
believes - language is not necessarily associated with sound. Here, however, we have to enter 
a note of caution. The mere fact that language becomes disassociated with sound obviously 
does not of itself imply that thought and language are unrelated. It is in this sense that I 
earlier described the two motivations for experiential deficiency as 'contradictory'. This 
contradiction is borne out in Furth's argument, mentioned earlier (see notes 73 - 74), that non-
hearing people are able to think even though they do not have language. While largely 
supportive of his contentions as to the independance of thought from language, both Moores 
and Liben are critical of Furth's assumption that language means vocal language. Non-hearing 
people, even those who know little or no vocal language, are not 'alinguistic', and attempts 
to motivate the relative independence of thought from language through research on non-
hearing subjects are, as Moores puts it, 'misdirected,I06. But to say that non-hearing people 
who use manual signs are as 'linguistic' as hearing people who use vocal signs does not for 
all that mean that the language deficiency argument is to be reintroduced at the expense of 
the notion of experiential deficiency. The effect of this assertion is, rather, to take language 
out of a perceived 'natural' (because of being sounded?) relation to the psyche, so as to place 
it more fully in the world 'out there' into which the developing child has to integrate. In other 
words, it brings into clearer perspective the non-private, social nature of language, the fact 
that language is itself part of a more general experience that children need in order to develop. 
Liben, having argued against the notion that language learning amongst the non-hearing 
should necessarily be equated with leaming a vocal language, thus summarizes the main 
implication of her views: 
[rlather than proposing that language affects thought directly,... language... is 
~ypothesized .to hav~ its effect on cognition indirectly, being mediated through 
interactIOns WIth famJiy, peers, teachers, and society in general 107. 
What is particularly important for our purposes, however, is that the idea of a non-vocal 
language may also have impications for om perspective on writing. We can, therefore, expect 
it to s\led light on the relation between oral and written language. 
When Ong asserts (on the basis of Siertsema's 'findings' - see note 50) that '''languages'' 
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making no acknowledged or overt use of sound always depend ... upon languages which are 
built in sound""', he seems unlikely to be thinking of American Sign Language (Ameslan), 
or otherwise is obviously dismissive of it. Recognition of Ameslan as a language has, in facl, 
been comparatively recent. AI least prior to 1960, as Ronnie Wilbur reports, Ameslan held 
little or no interest for linguistic theory, as it was generally considered not to be a language109• 
It was seen, in the words of Ursula BeHugi and Edward Klima, as just 'a loose collection of 
gestures - gestures that have no systematic internal structure and thaI are strung together 
without hierarchical syntactic organization,lW To some extenllhis conception has continued 
to cloud matters, all the more so, il would seem - and this perhaps explains Ong's own 
ignorance - that users of Ameslan make extensive use of non-systemic gestures like 
pantomimelll , facial expression and body posture ll2 to convey their information, and 
frequently mix Ameslan with forms of fingerspelling (such as 'manual' English) or sign 
systems (such as 'signed' English)1U thai imitate the grammatical aspects and word order of 
a spoken language and are, in this sense, obviously 'dependent' on languages 'bUilt in sound'. 
But Ameslan, whose signs represent concepts as opposed to words, is not. Bellugi and Klima 
summarize its main features (most frequently subject to confusion) as follows: 
American sign Language is not a derivative or degenerate form of written or spoken 
English. It has a lexicon that does not correspond to English, but must be considered 
a different language. The granunatical principles governing the modification of 
meaning of signs are different, in form and content, from the grammatical processes 
in English and in spoken languages in general. [It]. .. is in no way limited to 'concrete 
ideas'. It is a fully-fledged language with the possibility for expression at any level 
of abstraction .... [It also] ... is not a universal form of pantomimel!4. 
Apart from its structural qualities, it is important to note that Ameslan further resembles 
spoken languages in so far as it can, in fact, be learnt as 'a primary natural language' , at least 
in situations where the parents of non-hearing children are themselves non-hearing ll5 . The 
process of language leaming itself, then, can take place as something basically oriented 
around the visual li6• 
What significance could a sign language like Ameslan - fully a linguistic system - have for 
Oral Theory, given the laller's concern with the interplay of the ofal and the written? 
Following a deconstructionist train of thought, and on the assumption that Ameslan is, at foot, 
a 'language of gesture' ('[i]t seems plausible ... that at least certain aspects of [Ameslan] ... 
originated from some form of pantomime or iconic representation', Beliugi and Klima tell 
us·
17
), one could perhaps argue that Ameslan is a kind of writing; more precisely, the kind of 
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'primary' writing that, as Derrida speculates in the opening pages of his De la grammal%gie, 
could 'precede' spoken language - if not in a historical sense, at least from the point of view 
of representation of meaningJl8• But such a view, quite apart from watering down the 
definition of writing to a level where it becomes frankly unusable (at least in terms of the 
issues and arguments that have animated Oral Theory over the years)!!?, would also fail to 
account for the necessity, identified by George Sperling, of developing a writing system that 
actually represents Ameslan as Ameslan!:!(). No, writing is fundamentally a graphic 
representation of language'>!, Ameslan is not. And while, as Naomi Baron puts it, there is in 
the case of writing 'some connection between the visual representation and the spoken 
language,122, Ameslan is, in theory at least, wholly independent of such a connection. (See 
note 113). 
Where Ameslan does link up with writing, however, is that it is, just like writing, an 
undeniably visual means of linguistic communication. Of COurse, writing and Ameslan are not 
visual (or, indeed, visible) in the same way. The visibility of writing is durable, becomes an 
object; that of Ameslan moves through time in the same way as speech. It is there one 
moment, gone the next. Also, writing, at least in so far as it has a phonetic base, makes 
visible sound; Ameslan makes visible concepts. But, quite apart from the enormous 
differences in the way they actually appear, writing (al least in so far as il has been 
'internalized' as literacy) and Ameslan (al least in so far as it has been learnt as a natural 
language by a congenitally non-hearing person who knows no other language) can at the very 
least be assumed 10 share one quality: that of enabling - and, in fact, forcing - their users to 
'see' their language, to think of it as something visual. This can be best explained by 
reference to how we may represent abstract concepts to oursel ves, concepts, in other words, 
that do not correspond to any readily imaginable referent in the world of objects. ('Represent' 
in this sense needs to be clearly distinguished from 'associate' - at issue is not the mental 
association of abstract concepts with more concrete ones but their representation as such). 
The 'native speaker' of Ameslan, upon thinking of a particular abstract concept, will be able 
to see, in his mind's eye, a gesture or series of gestures linguistically representing thaI 
concept. The literate person will represent the same concept to himself as a written word, as 
in the following example given by Ong: 
A literate person, asked to think of the word [concept?] 'nevertheless', will normally 
(and I strongly suspect always) have some image, al least vague, of the spelled-out 
word and be quite unable to think of the word ... without reverting to any lettering but 
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only to sound123. 
Ong sees this as iHustrative of what he terms the 'pre-emptiveness of literacy'. (See Chapter 
3. note 106; see Ong's comments on the nature of the shift from the 
oral to the literate). Apart from our differences with Ong as as the the 'pre-
emptiveness' is concerned (to what is pre-empted by literacy is, of course, very 
of conceptualization). we can, for our purposes, given that we have also 
discovered visibility in a of linguistic that is not written, substitute 
with 'the visual'. What is important to us in the above example is not that the word 
'nevertheless' is seen as a series of letters, but, more fundamentally. that it is seen. 
concept of 'introducing something more or less contrary to what been stated' implicit in 
'nevertheless' will similarly be seen by user of Ameslan, even if the concept is not in 
same way distinct or seperabJe from others as existence of word 'nevertheless' would 
make a user English inclined to Both writing Ameslan can, in this way. be 
said to a visual conception of language, on account of the fact that both writing and 
Ameslan tum language into basically spatial. It is in this sense, this sense 
only independent of the actual mechanisms of thought - that the visual could be regarded 
as 'pre-emptive' in the given by language, on the contrary - at least 
as it is perceived by the - can only be as sound, inextricably bound up with 
the of This notion will be further developed in Chapter 
This brings us to significance of an to Oral Theory. already noted, the 
: representation of is not in same way durable as that of writing, and to the extent 
I that durabUity is seen as the crucial the postulated effect of writing (it is 
because it is durable, for example, that writing can as a record - see Chapter 2), 
Ameslan wHl, in all probability, not be aligned to writing at At the same it is 
obviously not speech. which no explains why AmesJan (or sign in a broader 
sense), has tended to be in the oraJity - debate. But Ameslan 
characteristics of both: speecn it is bound to like writing it is visualizable - and 
- in space. And it is fundamentaUy, not a means of communication, but actual 
It is as 1 that Ameslan may cast shadow over Oral Theory. 1n order to 
arrive at an 
Theory' s most 
of its significance, we need, therefore. to 
assumptions about language. 
ourselves of Oral 
These are inevitably presented as it as actual differences (oppositions) or as 
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polarities in an interplay or continuum: language is oral or written; hence, language is heard 
or seen; hence, language is temporal or spatial. Most importantly, the second terms of the 
polarities (written, seen, spatial) are always evolutions of the first Not just are they 
evolutions, but actually consequences. To make sense of this we need to take a step back, as 
it were, and reintegrate language into the broader field of interest of Oral Theory. To review 
Oog's argument: written language J literacy has the revolutionary effects it has on society and 
the individual psyche precisely because it is, as representation, 'grounded' in oral language 
I orality. In other words, writing, which is something visual (spatial), would not fulfill the 
functions it does, would not have the influence it does, were it not the representation of 
something auditory (temporal). Logical and abstract thinking. for example, depends on the 
ability to think in terms of space (,visualist' space which is 'pure' - see nole 25). At the same 
time, however, thinking is essentially depen.dent on the 'interiority' and 'centering' of sound 
(,acoustic' space, which is decidedly temporal). 
The major insight to be gleaned from the evidence provided by Ameslan is, in this context, 
that language is not per definition subject to the kinds of polarisation around which it has 
appeared in Oral Theory. The parallel evolutionary passage between ora] and written, auditory 
and visual, lime-bound and spatial does not have to be theorised on the basis of some internal 
condiJ.ion of language and language usc. It is. rather, not unlike the factors that originally led 
to language being vocal rather than visual, rooted in the practical, in other words, in the 
contingencies of a history which - had it evolved on the basis of linguistic data provided by 
Ameslan - could have been very different. (See note 54). 
Essentially the same point - albeit in a different way - is made by Roy Harris in his critique 
of the lip-service paid by modem linguistics to the notion of the primacy of the spoken word 
(see note 121), while it 'has itself remained consistently and irredeemably sCriptist in 
orientation'l2S. (This critique will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 5). Harris lists four 
1-
'respects' in which speech is considered morc fundamental than writing: ,all human 
L.~ 
communities have had spoken language before they have had 'a corresponding 'i.vritten 
language' ('phylogenetic priority'); any normal child learns to speak his native language 
before he learns to write it ('ontogenetic priority'); speech 'serves a wider range of 
communicationa1 purposes than writing' (,functional prioriry'); writing is originally a 
representation of speech ('structural priority'). Significantly Harris does not, a la Derrida (see 
note 118), attempt to stand these priorities on their collective head (although some would 
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argue that Derrida actually willfully ignores !hemt~. He does, however. remark that the 
'doctrine of the primacy of speech ... is itself a curious amalgam', for 
it does not follow from any of the priorities that the use of articulated sound as a 
medium of expression must be treated as criterial. to the exclusion of writing. in 
defining what a language is .... [Tlhe priorities as such say nothing about the crucial 
question for any analytic science; namely, the interrelation between the two forms of 
co-existent behaviourlli , 
Harris does not bring Ameslan into the equation at all. But if he were prepared to accept our 
notion of the relation of speaking (at least in the context of primary orality) to writing as 
essentially that of an auditory to a visualist conception of language, he would express the 
same kind of theoretical relativity as regards what is 'truly' (fundamentally) language as we 
have found on the basis of the linguistic evidence provided by Ameslan. 
One aspect of this insight is of particular interest to us: what we earlier decribed as an 
auditory (temporal) and visual (spatial) conception of language can no longer be equated with 
different stages of an evolution, The different languages of the world studied by linguistics 
may well be constituted in sound, justifying the concern of modem linguistics with speech 
rather than with writing. But from the point of view of the definition of language as a multi· 
layered system of discrete units '2S , there is no reason why the ear should be regarded as more 
original, more primitive, than the eye129. The issue of the 'pre-emptiveness' of the visual (as 
literacy - see note 123, also Chapter 2, note 106) turns out, therefore, to be largely irrelevant. 
That orality (an auditory conception of language) can actually be 'dominant' in a literate 
person, is, of course, to some extent suggested by Ong himself when. on the basis of the 
frequency of oral-formulaic form in the writing of certain literate poets (see Chapter I. note 
39), he points out that '[o]ral formulaic thought and expression ride deep in consciousness 
and the unconscious, and they do not vanish as soon as one used to them takes pen in 
hand' tW, What Ong here ascribes to thought on the basis of form of expression, we would 
ascribe to an auditory conception of language on the basis of language primarily experienced 
as sound. This conception mayor may not be altered by the experience of writing, depending 
on the intensity of the latter. The Significance of Ameslan is, if nothing else, that it suggests 
the possibi lity that the respective sense-based conceptions of language can yet tum out to be 
no more than mere alternatives, deriving from different linguistic experience. 
In conclusion to our appraisal of the thought - language relation, let us now consider what 
we earlier referred to as the mathetic function of language: the capacity· of language 'to 
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represent experience, to observe, to conceptuanze, and to categorize', or, put differently, to ( 
'serve in the {mental] construction of reality'. (See notes 48 and 67). Of course, this presumed t 
capacity has to a large extent already been dealt with and, in fact, contradicted. (See in 
particular our overview of Piaget and Fodor). But our present discussion would not be 
complete. I would argue, without considering conceptions as to how language as internalized 
structure (as opposed to language as a means of expression or communication. or language 
as consisting of words relating to concepts) can be said to impact on our ability to construct 
mental categories concerning the world around us. From a more concrete perspective, this 
involves revisiting Ong's earlier distinction between thinking 'as words' and thinking as a 
'chain of verbalization', (See note 61). It is especially the latter kind of thinking that would 
engage notions like verbal category and grammatical structure. 
This brings us face-to-face with the controversial thesis originally developed by Edward 
Sapir and Benjamin Whorf, namely that language structure to a greater or lesser extent 
detennines thoughtl3l , Ronald Wardhaugh distinguishes between a strong and weak statement 
of this thesis. The fonner purports 'that language structure detennines thought completely and 
controls the way a speaker views the world'. the latter 'that the structure of a language makes 
certain kinds of perception easy and others difficult, but does not make anything impossible'. 
The weaker version, in other words. sees language as predisposing the speaker towards a 
certain conception of the world rather than determining this conception. 
Once again, Ameslan can provide us with useful insights. The Sapir - Whorf thesis was 
Obviously fonnulated with vocal languages in mind; our thinking is determined by the 
concepts produced - rather than vehided - by the language we first learn to speak. In this 
regard we could usefully distinguish two kinds of concepts, those attached to individual (i.e. 
lexical) elements of the linguistic system (what we would broadly call words), and those that 
do not attach to lexical items as such (although individual words frequently represent theml32), 
bu.t rather to the way in which words can be linked to each other. The term 'grammatical 
marker' can be used for the latter. As mentioned earlier, the signs of Ameslan represent 
concepts, not words. But Ameslan is also, like spoken language, a 'first order' linguistic 
representation (it does not, like writing, represent the elements of a linguistic system that 
exists prior to it). so it comes across, in a very real sense, as a language of concepts. What 
is more, the concepts of Ameslan would, at least relative to those of vocal languages, be of 
the 'lexical' rather than the 'grammatical' variety. This essentially reflects what Edna Levine 
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lenns a 'thinking in pure meanings', obviously independent from the influence of language: 
Largely eliminated by Ameslan are the struggles to en cage what goes on in the mind 
in rigid rules of English grammar, We may hypothesize that, with this obstacle 
eliminated, the 'syntax' of unadulterated Ameslan is closer to the 'syntax' of pure 
thought than is the syntax of verbal languagem. 
As reported by Wardhaugh l :l4, there has been little by way of research data in clear support 
of the Sapir - Whorf thesis, even taken in its relatively watered-down version. In one 
experiment, 'Nahavo-dominant' and 'English-dominant' children between the ages of three 
and ten were asked to match together objects differing in shape, size and colour, the 
hypothesis being - from a Whoman perspective - that the Nahav(}-dominant children would 
tend to group objects according to their shape, given the obligatory grammatical markers that 
Nahavo atlaches to 'verbs of handling' according to the shape of the object to be handled. 
Significantly however, differences in how the children matched together the objects 
corresponded, not with language background, but with age distribution. Older children from 
both language groups tended to favour shape, while younger children favoured colour. 
Wardhaugh points out that. on the assumption that reliance on shape rather than colour is a 
sign of cognitive development, one could assume that such development would benefit from 
a special grammatical category for shape in the children's language. At the same time, 
however, there would be other equally important supporting factors, such as, for example, a 
relatively privileged middle-class environment (The group to most strongly opt for shape as 
organizational criterion was, in fact, a control group made up of middle-class English-
speaking children), If grammatical structure is a variable in cognitive development, it is one 
amongst several. and certainly not the most prominentJJ5 
Speaking of thinking as a process, Ong draws attention to its main ingredient, which is 
judgment. (See, in this regard, Fodor's reference to concepts that are 'criterial for the 
occurrence of reward' - note 101). Ong does not talk about reward but about truth, and 
judging whether something is true or not always implies a statement: the union of subject and 
predicate, which is, as Ong muses, 'buried in the origins of language itself 136, In other words. 
the essential ingredient of thinking has, in this sense, been bequeathed by language, but not 
by the word as such (coinciding with the concept), but by the syntagmatic relation (to use the 
Saussurian tenninology) that lies beyond it. For all this, Ong does not enter into much 
reflection on the possible coincidence of thought and linguistic structure, yet we undoubtedly 
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see such an assumption at work in certain instances. 
Within the conte~t of e~plai!ling the psychological effect of the time-boundedness of sound, 
Ong finds at least some of Whorf's research (notably that on the Hopi language and culture) 
eminently useful. The Hopi people, we learn, 
do not think of today as a part or section of time as coming after another part or 
section of the time-mass designated yesterday. They do not picture today as 'next' to 
yesterday ... but rather think of time in terms of its perpetual 'getting later'137. 
The question of orality I literacy (or verbomotor I visualist) does not directly enter Ong's 
discussion here, but we can assume the Hopi (as quintessential 'non-Western' culture l3!), to 
more or less conform to Ong's conception of an oral people, This is certainly what Ong 
implies, and the evidence quoted above relating to the Hopi notion of time would certainly 
fit Ong's general characterization of the oral mindset as event rather than object oriented, But 
we know, of course, that Whorf was far less interested in literacy as a determining factor of 
cognition than in language structure. Ong, momentarily, shows a similar inclination. Wanting 
to make the point that literate people have a more spatial conception of time than oral people 
(at least this is what we can assume he wants to say), Ong settles, instead, for drawing 
attention to what in a Whorfian perspective would be a telling difference between English and 
Hopi: 
English, like modem Western languages generally, is impoverished in qualifiers 
derived directly from time"B9 
Why should Western languages be qualified as 'modem' here? One could be pardoned for 
infering from this that Hopi is not modern, which, from a linguistic point of view, would be 
non-sensical; Hopi is as 'living' or contemporary a language as English, BUI in another 
passage we get a strong indication (even if it is never explicitly admitted) that Ong integrates 
contemporary languages into by and large the same evolutionist paradigm as he does the 
matter of orality - literacy, Ong assumes that the subject - predicate relation that is the subject 
of thought translates into the linguistic categories of noun (substance) and verb (action)l40 
which, at least in a language like English, are expressed in distinct words. Yet there is 'some 
evidence', Ong tells us, 
that in the earlier stages of languages nouns and verbs are not so completely disjoined 
from each other as they are in later stages of linguistic development'4l, 
Certainly, the 'evidence' referred to here would to some extent be borne out in the 
development of a modern Romance language like French from its 'classical' ancestor, Latin. 
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Whereas both languages are regarded as 'inflectional'142, French is certainly more 'isolating' 
than Latin in so far as it generally assigns different grammatical functions to different words, 
Latin by comparison concentrating a variety of such functions within a single word, typically 
the verb. At the same time, however, the quintessential isolating language is Mandarin 
Chinese, and what about the many agglutinative languages (where a single complex word 
expresses what in an isolating language would require a sentence'·3) in use the world over? 
Are we to assume that the latter represent an earlier stage of linguistic development? 
As already indicated, Ong does not clearly commit himself on this point. But if we see the 
Western languages Ong talks about against the background of the history of alphabetic 
writi ng, a certain parallel between the way Ong presents these languages and his view of the 
cognitive processes of the literate or visualist becomes clear. Most obviolls in this regard, is 
the likeness between Ong's notion that a clear distinction between noun and verb is 
linguistically the most developed, and his notion that literacy favours abstract 
conceptualization. Indo-European languages clearly set apart noun and verb, and they (or 
rather their speakers) have arguably the longest history of alphabetic literacy. (While not 
downplaying the very real differences in linguistic structure between Indo-European languages 
and other language families, it could of course also be argued that our awareness of these 
languages as 'isolating' is to a large extent aided by what is after all a convention - a habit -
of graphic representation I .. ). 
A similar parallel between the presentation of a certain type of (Indo-European) linguistic 
structure and the postulated effects of literacy has been remarked by Brian Street145. The 
cognitive quality at issue this time is pertinently the matter of objectivity. On the basis that 
'[Ilanguages can be legitimately analysed in terms of their greater or lesser context-
dependence and culture-dependence""", John Lyons, as reported by Street, makes the 
observation that indication on the part of a speaker of his social status, as well as his attitude 
as to the actual truth of what he is stating is, in many languages, not just left to the choice 
of the speaker within the particular context of discourse, but actually encoded in the linguistic 
system itself. In other words, the speaker is grammatically and lexically obliged to make 
explicit what is very much a subjective qualification, a fact which makes it difficult for users 
of such language-systems 'to approximate to neutral, objective statements,j,? This brings 
Lyons to reflect on the absence of such structural requirements as far as English is concerned. 
Once again, the parallel is straightforward. Just as literacy favours the development of 
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objectivity through its spatial objectification of language, so the linguistic structure of English 
favours objectivity through its 
ti ve attitude. 
non-insistence on grammatical markers of status and 
typical member of an oral culture on whose cognitive """,,""",i:> the assertions of the 
model' of literacy (see Chapter 2, note 10 I) are not 
isolating Western 
of literacy in 
language. Relatively few studies have been done on 
1"·,.,."....'1" languages. one of which - on the Vai language of West 
an 
deviated from the autonomous model in so far as it attributed certain more developed 
cognitive skills shown by subjects in Vai script, not so much to their literacy, as to 
the fact that they were receiVing formal education in a school environment (See Chapter 2, 
note 120). A similar explanation suggests itself one notable instance where Ong finds 
justification describing as 'oral-based' the thought processes of a English speaking 
person. differentiated between, on the one hand, what terms the 'restricted 
linguistic code' (or 'public language') of the 'lower-class English .... , .. ,,""""" 1n on 
the other, the 'elaborated linguistic code' (or 'private language') of the 'upper~c1ass 
Basil Bernstein goes on to remark that expression of the speakers of the 'public language' 
studied is characterized, as paraphrased by Ong. by 'a formula-like quality and [that it] 
thoughts together not in careful subordination like "beads on a frame'" 14S. Ong 
points out that the subjects of this particular study were 'messenger boys with 
no education', while a group of 'private studied 
by Bernstein cognitive performances were largely superior - were 'from major 
public schools'. unhesitatingly suggests that the linguistic code of [he 
be regarded as 'oral-based" that of the as 'text-based', by and the same 
distinction he habitually draws between the and the literate. Amazingly, the vast in 
the social and educational en vironment two groups (quite apart from differences in 
and writing ability) receives no mention from Ong in terms of accounting for their 
p.rP,nl'~><;: in cognitive performancel"~. 
makes the point that wherever linguistic criteria employed in support 
of a division 
importance). 'it has 
'advanced' and 'primitive' (the exact is of little 
ly 
Whorf, in fact, finds as much 
or logical analysis in the I 
so within a very superficial Whorfian 150 
- and, in certain cases, morelS) - of rational thinking 
structure of Hopi as he does in that of English. 
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refuses to be drawn to any kind of binary psychological differentiation on the basis of 
linguistic structure, even where, as with the broadly 'extraversion - introversion' model 
suggested by the Irish linguist James Byme l52 , the basis of differentiation is nDt the all-too-
familiar logical vs pre-logical or analytical vs totalising. (See Chapter 2, note 69). Certainly, 
there is little justification for interpreting the Sapir - Whorf thesis ~. a statement on the 
evolution of Janguages or, for that matter, of thought. 
As such, the occasional references Ong makes to the kind of linguistic data that would be 
of interest to Whorf speak of the same superficiality. But in making these references, Ong not 
only distorts what Whorf says, but to a large extent also undermines the theoretical basis of 
his own assertions as to the significance of literacy per se as a variable in the evolution of 
conceptualization. As it turns out, nothing would express more clearly what we earlier called 
the 'anthropological bias' (biasedness?) of Oral Theory. For through these references to 
Whorl', the whole question of Oral Theory's focus on the oral rather than the written, on 
orality rather than literacy, comes across as but an attempt to further legitimize what, notably 
through the input of anthropology (particularly in its earlier versions - see Chapter 2, note 
111), had become something of an intellectual convention: that what really orientates our 
research is the difference we see between what is modern and Western and whatever is not 
If a Whorfian perspective, however superficial, can aid this cause (even at the ex.pense of the 
actual factor of orality J literacy taking a backseat), so be it. 
views we have surveyed in this chapter, from Jousse to Fodor. from Piaget to the 
various perspectives on the non~hearing. not to mention, finally, the inconclusivity of the 
Sapir - Whorf thesis, all suggest that language and thinking are basically independent from 
each other, and that where a particular type of thinking does coincide with language, it also 
coincides with a multitude of other social factors. There is, then, no reason why the 
objectification of language achieved in its spatial dimension (either, to use Baron's 
terminology - see note 121 - as secondary representation, i.e. writing, or, for that matter, as 
primary representation, i.e. manual signs) should necessarily favour the occurrence of similar 
processes on a conceptual level. There is no reason to believe that our thinking will become 
more 'object orientated', that we will tend to think more in visual or spatial terms, that our 
thinking will become more discriminate or analytical in the same way as our sense of vision 
might be said to be more discriminate or analytical (,dissecting') than our sense of hearing. 
Of course, as we indicated earlier, we actually need to detach language from thought if we 
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are going to succeed in Theory beyond the twin beacons of 
literature. So, is the above interpretation of the various arguments reviewed nol, in fact. rather 
selective? the nagging idea, for example, that language in spite of everything, 
the 'preferred 
Or, for that 
note 107). 
of thinldng at Pingel's formal operative notes 93 - 96). 
language, as Liben has specUlated, thought indirectly? (See 
If we can draw one unified conclusion from the n,,",r'l"rl discussion, it is, perhaps, that 
does not detennine thought in any kind of direct interior way (i.e. as part of a kind 
introspective 'private world'), but can, to some extent, influence thought indirectly in so 
as it is something social. Thinking as Goody has asserted, also something in so 
as it is socially learnt. Yet to say our language and our thinking derive our 
interaction with the world around us, is a far from saying that they are interdependent. 
On the matler of the (non)relation of language to thinking, that is all we can But we can 
at least cast a few further doubts on the notion that .... 'E,U<l.f,'"' and thought are interrelated, by 
uncovering - ....... ·tH" ... " - certain inconsistencies in the way autonomous model of literacy 
has represented some of the perspectives on cognition we come across. 
Lets that 'thinking is something light Gng and Goody's 
motivations (reviewed in Chapter 2) of the cognitive writing, this assumption 
would in many ways appear to be less than straightforward. Both of them see writing (at least 
in so far as it has become 'widespread' and 'interiorized' as literacy - which is, of course, the 
at which it is supposed to with the cognitive process) as to some extent 
undermining the social. The of writing and print, Gng tells us, 
fostered the breakup of feudal .. v~""'''''''' and the rise of individualism'lS3, On an immediate 
level writing brings about the text-as-object serving as a basis of analysis and reflection 
hitherto but it consequently - on a societal level- individualism, causing 
people to tum away from the received truth of tradition an ever-to-be-constructed 
truth of introspection. Thought becomes fundamentally 'de-socialized', a process most 
famously in Descartes: 
By eighteenth century Descartes' of personaJ inquiry, silent cerebration. 
ousted dialectic, an art involving vocal exchange, as the acknowledged sovereign over 
human intellectual activity. new logic was not the art of discourse ... Rather, it was 
the art of thinking - that is, individualized, isolated intellectual activity, presumably 
uninvolved with communication ... I"', 
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At this point one could justifiably expect that Ong is about to sever thought from language. 
Maybe, on abstract level of conceptualization to which the written gives <U,.;\~t;::.,:>., 
thought is not just liberated from speech (a service essentially performed by writing), but from 
language itself. leading to a kind of 'thinking in pure meanings'. (See note 133). Instead, we 
learn that this 'isolated intellectual activity' has, so to speak, appropriated language for its 
own purposes. Thought remains (nested in language', but then a language that has. to all 
intents and purposes, ceased to social, at least in the fundamental sense both Ong and 
Goody have, in different contexts. insisted upon. 
One is tempted to say to Ong that he cannot have his cake and eat it But Ong will retort 
that there is nothing particularly contradictory all of this, it is merely the final straw in the 
intrinsic contamination of writing (see notes 3S - 36), the pre-emptiveness of a literacy that, 
not without a certain irony (writing was, after aJl, merely supposed to copy speech) 
continuaJly changes things (even language) to suit its own cognitive purposes. 
Significantly however, it is precisely at this point - where thinldng has stopped being social 
- that Oog (to a slightly lesser extent Goodyl53) begins to use concepts like abstraction, 
analysis and logic. Of course, Ong is careful not to appear too categoriCal (see also Chapter 
3, note 36): 
we [must not] imagine that orally based thought is 'prelogical' or 'mogical' in any 
simplistic sense - such as, for exampJe, in the sense that oral folk do not understand 
causal relationships. They know very well that if you push hard on a mobile object, 
the push causes it to movel56• 
Oral thinking 'can quite sophisticated and reflective in its own way', says Ong further, 
citing the elaborate explanations that Navaho narrators proffer in support of the significance 
of their stories. Yet one cannot but be struck by the similarities of the cognitive skills 
presumed by Ong to be the fruits of the ability to write, and those acquired by the eleven to 
twelve year old child who, within the Piagetian framework, proceeds from the concrete 
operational to the forma! operational stage. (See notes 79 - 83). As we saw earl language 
is not regarded as a significant factor in evolution. 
The characteristic of the oral mindset most extensively dealt with by Oog in discussion 
of the r_chodynamiCs o.f orality' Chapter 2, notes 56-65), is 'situational rather than 
abstract· As reported earher, Ong here draws strongly on Aleksandr Luria's research on 
verbal reasoning of illiterate and semi-literate peasants in a remote part of Uzbekistan. A 
significant factor, only fleetingly mentioned by Ong. is that Luria does not 'systematicaIly 
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his findings expressly lenns of orality - literacy differences·
15
? (The latter 
differences, as Curran reports, also to a large extent coincide with differences in milieu, 
as between remote rural villages and state run collective farms, reflecting obviously different 
levels of technology and educationI58). But Ong As such. Luria's research basically 
establishes the foHowing: oral people, presented with (pictures of) objects or geometrical 
shapes, will not categorize them according to some or other criterion (however 
determined), but rather relate each one individually to another object they are familiar with, 
or to some or other practical purpose. Confronted with a syllological statement, they will 
immediately problematize the content of the statement in terms of real life experience. rather 
than follow course of premise - deduction implicit in the syllogism. They are also unable 
to give a self-analysis without recourse to external events. By contrast, people who have even 
a measure of literacy will tend towards categorization, deduction and reflectionl59, / 
What would a Piaget of such findings? Clearly, there is no evidence of reasoning by 
implicatjon or of manipulation of abstract (the formal operative stage), and thinking is 
confined to concrete situations: 'illiterate subjects seemed not to operate with fonnal 
deductive procedures at all', concludes Ong l60, This to achieve formal operative 
thought WOUld. furthermore, seem to tally with the findings of at least certain Piaget-based 
studies on non-literate (oral) communities, notably that of Hallpike, who has argued that 
adults in the community he researched had. in 
operational thoughll61. 
not even reached the level of concrete 
And yet Piaget has stated his belief in the fonnal operative as a universal stage, even if it 
may be acquired most predominantly certain areas of specialization relating to specific 
aptirudes 162• If, as Curran reports, cross-cultural Piagetian studies on cognition (focusing 
predominantly on non-literate communities) have to focus on concrete rather than on 
formal operations, it is not 11A.1J:'I:)tIJ absence of the latter in these communities, but, 
quite simply, ~,aLl;)IJ the concrete operational framework offers more opportunities for 
terms 'culturally appropriate' tasks liable to be used as a measure of finding what 
cognitive abiHtyl6J. concrete operational relates to the manipulation of certain physical 
objects that are, to a large extent, universally known. Cross-cultural cognitive research 
interested formal reasoning WOUld, therefore, do better to foHow Piagetian theory rather 
than Piagetian 164. Curran again: 
European norms on Piagetian tasks are not a yardstick against which people of other 
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cultures can be compared. To use them as such would be blatant ethnocentrism. The 
same task and lhe same procedure does not necessarily tap the same psychological 
. d;;r. 1 1 16S processes 111 l.JJerent cu lura groups . 
Though obviously not Piagetian in origin (the Uzbeldstan studies were conducted in the early 
1930s). Luria's findings - most certainly as interpreted by Ong - can be questioned on the 
same grounds. In cases where the syllological procedures followed by Luria have been 
replicated in studies on other non-literate cultures, conclusions have to a large extent differed 
from those fonnulated. by Ong. With regard to reasoning based on syllogisms, Sylvia Scribner 
has used the tenn 'empiric' to refer to reasoning derived from the subject's personal 
knowledge or experience (falling outside the infonnation contalned in the premise), and the 
term 'theoretic' for reasoning purely within the contents of the premise. Her findings are 
similar to those of Luria, in so far as oral subjects most frequently opted for empiric solutions 
to syllological problems. Most of them do however give theoretic answers to syllogisms when 
the infonnation contained in the syllogism is compatible with their own knowledge, in other 
words. when they could have some reason for believing in the truth of the premise. Where 
illiterate people are able. in this way, to treat the syllogism as a self-contalned problem, their 
reasoning is shown to be as logical as thai of literates l66: 
Towards the end of his overview of Luria's findings, Ong momentarily considers the 
question of their scientific validity: 
One could argue that responses [to Luria's problems] were not optimal because the 
respondents were not used to being asked these kinds of questions ... 
He continues: 
But lack of familiariry is precisely the point: an oral culture simpJy does not deal in 
such items as geometrical figures, abstract categorization, fonnally logical reasoning 
processes, ... or articulated self-analysis, all of which derive not simpJy from thought 
itself but from [written] text-fonned Ihought. Luria's questions ... come from a world 
the oral respondent does not share l67 . 
What Ong fails to consider is the possibility that skills like abstract categorization and logical 
reasoning may well have come to the fore had Luria considered the way in which his oral 
subjects engaged with tasks and activities fanning part of their everyday lives. His remark 
that an oral culture 'does not deal in such items as geometrical figures' also completely 
disregards one very definite context in which oral cultures do deal in such figures. namely 
in the context of artistic decoration which frequently constitutes a symbolic representation of 
certain culturally important norms and values. In the South African context, the intricate 
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geometrical patterns of - amongst others - Ndebele mural art and Zulu beadwork spring to 
mind. Even so, it is remarkable that what is by Ong's own admission essentially an 
experiential (and therefore contextually determined) difference between the literate and the 
oral, should so comfortably translate into differences derived 'from thought'. We can take this 
one step further. Scribner has pointed out that the particular kind of formal approach required 
for the resolution of the kind of deductive problem presented in syllogisms is essentially a 
'genre' of language. This genre - which obviously relates to a certain use (conception?) of 
language - may well become more familiar through interaction with school environment, 
which would include the activities of reading and writingl68. Had Ong been less attached to 
the notion that language and thought are interdependent, he may well have been more subtle 
in his appraisal of cross-cultural studies of thinking, and more in line with recent 
developments in the field of cognition. 
We may note a few further inconsistencies in the notion of an oral mindset (still lodged in 
a perspective of language - thought interdependence). which particularly come to the fore 
when one compares Ong's characterizations of the oral with certain long-standing - if to some 
extent disputed - characterizations of the congenitally non-hearing. At issue are certain aspects 
of behaviour and conceptualization. To be brief: the most typical behavioural problems 
associated with the non-hearing are what Robert calls 'deficits in impulse control d69• 
which result in the perceived high predisposition of the non-hearing towards impulsiveness 
and emotional disturbance l7o. The root cause of these disadvantages has been the subject of 
some debate, which generally hinges on whether they are caused by loss of hearing per 
(Le. the absence of sound) or rather. by linguistic I communicative deficiency (lack of 
Recent approaches have tended to focus not so much on the foct deafness as 
such, but on its 'side-effects' within the broader social sphere child finds himself in. In 
this regard communication - or rather the lack of it - has come to be regarded as the main 
factor in the inability of many non-hearing children to effectively control their emotions, a 
situation that can to some extent be improved early use of manual communication 112. 
Alongside 'predisposition towards impulsiveness'. a second characterization of the non-
hearing. this time on a cognitive level, relates to the notion that non-hearing people think in 
more 'concrete' ways than the hearing. (This obviously reflects some of the views on 
language I experiential deficiency reviewed earlier in this chapter. Ameslan, for example, was 
long seen as a conglomeration of essentially iconic gestures ill-suited to abstraction - see 
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notes 109 - J 10). As in the case of oral people, this contention has been strongly disputed m, 
Disputed or not, what is remarkable as far as we are concerned. is that essentially the same 
allegations have been made about oral people, yet on the basis of totaJly different causes. 
Certainly, there are occasions where. specifically within the context of evolving power 
relations in increasingly technological societies, the qualification oral (taken as (illiterate') 
comes to denote actual deficiency: economic, educational and, in that sense, experiential But 
this has by and large nothing to do with the 'experiential deficiency' that disadvantages non-
hearing people, which, even though it also alludes to broader educational and social 
ramifications, singularly emphasizes difficulties in communication. The average person in the 
average more or less cohesive oral society simply does not share these difficulties. 
Yet, as we have seen, the thinking of oral people is situational and concrete. We are told 
that on a behavioural level they are, relative to literates, prone to emotional outbursts, if not 
actual violence: 
The individual is psychologically faced outward, he is a 'tribal' man, and, under 
duress, he directs his anxieties and hostilities outward toward the material world 
around him and chiefly to what he is most intimately aware of in that aurally or 
vocally received world, that is. to his fellow man 174, [See also note 27]. 
Feelings of guilt or remorse, freely associated with introspection, are, furthermore, essentially 
absent amongst oral people, and therefore a benefit of literacy (albeit, one would imagine, an 
ambiguous one)m. This echoes Altshuler's association of what he decribes as the 'generally 
egocentric view of the world' of the non-hearing with, amongst others. 'the absence of much 
thoughtful introspection,176. 
The contradictions inherent in these views of an 'oral personality structure' defeat further 
explanation. The very social integration which for the non-hearing would be an overcoming 
of deficiency, comes across, for the oral, as an actual disadvantage. preventing them from 
thinking and behaving like us. Entire generations of human societies are, in this sense, 
·pathologized'. The link - via language - between orality and psyche becomes nothing less 
than. absurd. 
On this note it would be appropriate to make a final remark on Ong's view of orality _ 
literacy as essentially based on a perceptual polarity between auditory and visual (verbomotor 
vs visuaHst I acoustic space vs visual space). 'We are not suggesting'. says Ong 
that typographic [literate] man uses his eyes more than earlier [oral] man had. Even 
primitive man is highly visual in the sense that he is a keen observer, detecting all 
sorts of minute visual clues in his environment that civilized man misses. What 
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happened emergence of alphabetic typography was not that man discovered 
the use of his eyes but that began to visual perception to verbalization to a 
d . 1 kn 111 egree prevIous y un own . 
Of course, is important about alphabetic topography is not only that it represents 
but, more specifically, that it represents language in a systematic, 
abstract, way. Dng upon the one aspect of visual experience which oral people can be 
said to lack (the visual representation of as words up of letters) as a basis for 
a general perceptory opposition brimming with intellecrual and behavioural consequences. A5 
this particular absence of representation becomes the foundation upon the 
whole theoretical edifice of orality - literacy is constructed. But what if shoe is, 
basis upon occasionally, on the other foot? What if visual (serving as 
which symbolic visual representations can be made) of literate people in some ways falls 
of that of oral people? At is much more than observation: what if the 
detected by the 'primitive in the pru:saJ;!e above are not, as Ong obviously suggests, 
merely resulting from acute perception, but are actually integrated into an 
organized system of discrete signs? Such a representational system will not be linguistic. but 
it can for all we know aspire to similar levels of discreteness and abstraction t18, and what if 
such visual systems acrually exist more abundantly in oral culrures than in ones? This 
possibility puts an emirely new focus on the visualist - acoustic opposition and renders it, in 
fact, entirely unless specifically applied to field of 'hWW}','"" More about this in 
Chapter 
If we furthermore, Dng's notions 'acoustic and 'auditory synthesis' (see 
notes 25 and 26) as fatally embroiled in the psychological, of remaining use could 
sound, that we earlier highlighted as distinctive of orality, to In this reSlJecI the 
following reflections of the anthropologist Steven Feld can, at least to some extent - and with 
the appropriate reservations - serve as a kind of springboard to OUf own. Different to us, Feld 
sees sound not as characteristic of orality as (notably because of the way like 
'acoustic have distorted orality'1~, but links its significance much more specifically 
to the ecologicaJ context of the society whose symbolical practices he has srudying, the 




the Kaluli must be acutely aware of sound, able to use 
-· .... h~ over vision. 1 was convinced that in a rainforest environment, 
auditory 
traditions 
- in biological survival terms must co-evolve with 
local sense of identity 
196 
On the basis he describes study took as follows: 
... I have the way Kaluli language, and aesthetics are interdependent. 
This not the form of a general musical ethnography - with on 
instruments, functions, performances, social - but a study of sound as a cultural 
system, a system of symbols that articulate and embody deeply felt meanings 
verbal and musical conception and action, while simultaneously linked to 
. tal d h' al ad . 180 processes, to environ men awareness, an to p YSIC aptation. 
The view we can adopt with regard to sound compared to Feld's, simultaneously broader 
and narrower. the sense that we are to see a certain 'indebtedness' to sound 
of an orality defined relation to a relative aO~iem:e writing, 
a definition to which Ong's 'primary orality' will not be inappropriate. Chapter note 
145). Narrower, so far as the effect of the orientation will be limited to the field 
of language. other words, the only thinking that will be of concern to us will thinking 
about the of language itself; conceptualization as such will be unaffected by linguistic 
conception. (In the case of the Kaluli people studied by Feld sound plays a more specific 
cognitive role in so far as it provides an indispensable source of metaphorical characterization 
of 
areas of experiencel81 , justifying, no doubt, Feld's expectation that 'auditory 
'co-evolve' with mental 
An important point, ... "", .. "".",,"",. 
to be inaccessible to us, 
like sense or 
we shall assume what 
- at least to some - that we speculate 
on it and, in that sense, 'reconstruct' it. are not about to ask oral definitional 
questions about language that they would - just like literate people a .. r ....... - in all 
probability' not be bothered to ask themselves. Where researchers like Finnegan have 'proved' 
that at certain oral societies are by a reflective attitude towards language 
note 27), we shall ua.:tl,",aJ 
an attitude is t.1.IJLU€UJ 'I' 
assume this to be true of oral 
~AILJIn.;1I or not), and 
in general 
But the 
oral COrlCelJtiO of language should certain consequences, not only in so as the use 
of is concerned, but, more pertinently, the way in which Dresents itself: 
is differently defined. Linguistic (hence, linguistic communication) would 
therefore show certain differences to that of societies oriented towards a conception of 
'~""Ul<.'" (the linguistic sign is visible, readjly visualizable). It is on the basis of 
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such differences, and such differences only, that Oral Theory could assign to itself a specific 
object of study. Where other disciplines may explain these differences in the light of 
pragmatic I contextual or cognitive factors, our interest will be to describe them as factors that 
are essentially linguistic. For this we shall need an aural linguistics, paying specific attention 
to linguistic representation as sound. As we shall see, this may well involve looking more 
closely at certain symbolic fields hitherto largely ignored by Oral Theory, and most certainly 
by linguistics, notably music. In Chapter 5 we shall take a few tentative steps towards laying 
the groundwork for such a field. 
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children a 'headstart' in reading, and their native Ameslan will give nOl]-w:::an 
ultimately facilitate their acquisition of ..:nnlCpn 
The notion of the primacy of oral over written language as far as modern linguistics 
is concerned is generally attributed to de Saussure. (See De Saussure, 
1959:23-37). See also, in this regard, Naomi distinction (1981: 149) between 
(spoken) language as a 'first order' and writing as a 'second order' representation. 
Baron, 1981:162. Emphasis added. Depending on one's definition of writing, this is 
to some extent a moot point. The most commonly referred to example of a writing 
system with no obvious link to speech is the ideographic system, which can 
be equally well read - and understood - by of a number of mutuaHy 
incomprehensible Chinese dialects. (See Sperling, in (ed)., 1978: 107-8; also 
Thorold, 1994:54). Western observers for a long were favourable to the notion 
that Chinese writing represented a 'universal . As Hagege (1985:81) 
reports, this writing system (known as wenyan) been unequivocally 
demonstrated to represent the Chinese language, even if (p.86) it never actually 
corresponded to its 'spoken use' (usage pari!). In any majority of historians 
and linguists concerned with writing consider a (the of 
the of a language) to be an essential that organization 
of discrete units limited in number) - of writing. (Baron, 
1981: 168). 
1 12. Emphasis original. 
The spectrogram of course made it possible to as patterns on a screen. 
Its usefulness in making speech accessible to the non-hearing however, extremely 
limited. Nickerson, in Liben (ed)., 1978: 
Harris (Roy). 1980:7-8. 
Hall, 1987:117-8. 
1980: 13. 
is defined as a coherent, self-sufficient system in 1959; Baron, 
1981; Hagege, 1985; and Bellugi and Klima, in Liben (ed)., 1978. 
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speech are bound up in a hundred ways with those of written that 
what is lost in all cases of aphasia or agraphia is the faculty of producing a 
or writing a given sign than the ability to by means 
'HU'nln of what it is, the signs of a regular 
added). 
1986:26. 
V<LIILLL:" this thesis with considerably less than Whorf. 
Whorf's ~~tinction between an overt linguistic (such as gender 
charactenstlc suffix) and a covert linguistic class (as is case in 
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English which lacks a distinguishing mark for gender). (See Whorf, in Carroll (ed)., 
1956:68-9). 
133. Levine, 1981 :98. 
134. Wardhaugh, 1993:203-5. 
135. Wardhaugh, 1993:204-5. See also Hagege's detailed discussion (1985:132-43) of the 
relation of language structure to thought, in which he shows himself broadly 
supportive of the 'weaker' version of the Sapir - Whorf thesis. 
136. Ong, 1967:152. 
137. Ong, 1967:44. 
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139. Ong, 1967:44. 
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(Hagege, 1985:66). 
143. Wardhaugh, 1993:203. 
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145. Street, 1984:70. 
146. See Lyons, 1. 1977. Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge Uiversity Press. Quoted in 
Street, 1984:70. 
147. See Lyons, 1. 1982. Personal Correspondence with Street. Referred to in Street, 
1984:72. 
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150. Wardhaugh, 1993:205. 
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sensation (as in the first example) or to an inference on the basis of unspecified 
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thinking, a more rational analysis of situations' than is the case in English, a kind of 
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the English. 
152. See James Byrne's (1885) General Principles of Structure of lAnguage. According to 
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language structure and two types of mentality, one quick-reacting, quick-thinking, and 
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having a complex overt 
extreme of the type being 
on the whole, with a simpler 
extreme an isolating type 
corresponding to the two 
extraversion identified by Jung. (Whorf, 
153. Ong, 1967:54. 
154. Ong, 1967:63-4. Emphasis added. 
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I Ong, 1986:57. 
157. Ong, 1986:50. 
158. Curran, in Claxton (ed)., 1988:183. 
159. See Ong, 1986:50-4. 
160. Ong, 1986:52. 
161. See Hallpike, C. 1979. The Foundations of Primitive Thought. London: Oxford 
University Press. Referred to in Curran, (ed)., 1988: 179. 
162. Piaget, 1972. Referred to in Curran, Claxton (ed)., 1 181. 
163. Curran, in Claxton (ed)., 1988: 179. 
164. Greenfield, P. 'Cross-Cultural and 
Progress', in Riegel, K. and 1. Meacham Individual in a 
World. Vo1. 1. The Hague: Mouton. in Claxton (ed)., 
1988: 181. 
Curran, Claxton (ed)., 1988: 181. 
Scribner, S. 'Modes of Thinking and Ways Culture and Logic 
Reconsidered', in Freedle, R. (ed)., 1977. Discourse Production and Comprehension. 
J.jH'~Uru..,. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. to in in Claxton (ed)., 
1988: 184. (See also Chapter 2, note 119). 
I Ong, 1986:55. 
168. Scribner, in Freedle (ed)., 1977. Referred to in Curran, in Claxton (ed)., 1988: 184. 
169. Harris (Robert), in Liben (ed)., 1978: 152. 
170. (Robert), in Liben (ed)., 1978:140-1. 
171. Harris (in Liben (ed)., 1978: 144) quotes K.Z. Altshuler as that 'audition is 
somehow necessary for internalized control of rage'. 1971. Studies 
of the Deaf: Relevance to Psychiatric Theory. American of Psychiatry, 
127: 1 1526, p.1521). 
(Robert), in Liben (ed)., 1978:152. 
(in Liben (ed)., 1978: 184) puts it as follows: '[t]he suggests 
condition of deafness imposes no Hmitations on intellectual capabilities 
of individuals. In addition, there is no evidence to that deaf people think in 
more ways than the hearing or that their intellectual functioning is in any 
sophisticated. As a group, deaf people function within 
UI:'.'1. ....... '" and they exhibit the same wide variability as 
134. here draws on Carothers, 1. 1 
Psychiatry 22: 307-20. 
1959. Referred to in Ong, 1967:1 
'Personality Traits and Depressive Symptoms . In 
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Wortis,1. (ed)., 1964. Recent Advances in Biological Psychiatry vol.6. New York: 
Plenum Press, 63-4. Quoted in Harris (Robert), in Liben (ed)., 1978: 141. 
177. Ong, 1967:50. 
178. I would suggest, by way of example, that the marks on the ground so skillfully 
interpreted for tracking purposes in hunter-gatherer societies like the !Kung, could no 
doubt be suggestive of a visual (and visualizabJe) system in this regard. See Lee, R. 
1979. The !Kung San: Men, Women and Work in a Foraging Society. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Referred to in Curran, in Claxton (ed)., 1989: 185. 
179. See Feld, in Tokumaru and Yamaguti (eds)., 1986:19-22. 
180. Feld, in Tokumaru and Yamaguti (eds)., 1986:21. 
181. This relates primarily to the role played by birds and bird sounds in the Kaluli 
conception of natural history. (Feld, 1982: I 30). 
CHAPTER 5 
r ......... ."u AN AURAL LINGUISTICS 
5.1 About the Auditory Conception of Language 
What I have been arguing so far comes to this: instead of 
anthropological I sociological or aesthetic I literary terms, Oral 
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field of interest in 
should concentrate on 
language. What is 
object of study in its own 
to us about orality as such - therefore justifying that it be an 
- is not that it strikes us as 'traditional'. nor that it constitutes 
a particular or expression, but that it IS used in a way other 
disciplines, notably either ignored or to account for. In fact, not just 
is it language used differently, it is language different by nature. 
How can the of orality be so different, still language? Western 
anthropologists discovered all the people in the world to communicate with each other 
in more or same way they do, using the same This is ordinarily called speech, 
what De Saussure to as parole. Structural and comparative linguists have been able to 
systematize the sounds they heard the people of a particular community produce by 
using the same techniques they had employed for their respective Indo-European native 
tongues, thereby reconstructing these sounds as an actual linguistic system - langue in De 
Saussure's all people this obviously derived from a 
particular human faculty could be regarded as 
established all people and cultures thus in 
Saussure's langage l • Having 
uniquely human phenomenon of 
language, the search for universality could henceforth extended into the various linguistic 
systems themselves, of which Noam Chomsky's proclamations of a 'universal 
grammar' no doubt constitute the most influential elaboration advanced in recent 
times
2
• A note on terminology: within the context of the present discusion, I propose 
Jonathan term 'materiality of ]anguage,3 purposes of referring to language in 
its ordinary, non-technical sense, undifferentiated terms of De Saussure's famous tripartite 
division. 
I am not to dispute that language, both broader materiality and its different 
conception, indeed, universal. it is for our purposes, to 
reflect on significance of the fact that what we know about it - not to mention we 
know about in which it is universal - we by and large from the ..... r"." ... t" and 
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reflections of linguists whose own Indo-European languages constitute but a fraction of the 
world's languages, and whose actual linguistic experience must be regarded as extremely 
limited, not just in terms of their narrow (predominantly Western) geographic origins, but in 
terms of the highly particular social classes and institutions they represent. Having made this 
point, it is also useful to remind ourselves that these linguists, notwithstanding the universalist 
aspirations of their theories, find themselves in profound disagreement as to what it is they 
are - or should be - studying. Indeed, it will be difficult to find academic fields more divided 
- or, for that matter, contradictory - than modem linguistics. As Roy Harris remarks: 
The history of modem linguistics is not the discoveries of previously unknown 
languages of the world. It is the history of conflicting views as to how we should set 
about the analysis of language. In that respect it has little in common with the history 
of geography, or of physiology, or any of the natural sciences'. 
This brings us back to the matter of linguistic conception. In the opening chapter of his The 
Language-Makers, Harris focuses on some of the ways in which the concept of language, 
taken for granted as it is (and therefore no doubt comfortably assumed to be shared by 
everyone), to a large extent turns out to derive from a certain peculiarity of experience. The 
following factors can be highlighted. First, there is the assumption of the 'educated European' 
that all languages are mutually translatable, an assumption that has informed his education 
from the outset. This ties in with the fact that, whether or not he is actually able to use more 
than one language, our educated European automatically thinks of himself as at least 
potentially bi- or multilingual. Languages are, in this sense, thought of as essentially 
interchangeable, an idea, as Harris points out, that 'has a lot to do with the linguistic history 
and geography of Europe'S. A second kind of 'cultural conditioning' central to the Western 
conception of language relates to the assumption that the same language can crop up in 
different civilizations widely separated in time and space, an idea brought home by the 
European experience of linguistic exportation, both within Europe (for example the spread of 
Latin as a result of the Roman conquests) and outside of its boundaries (Europe's colonization 
of large parts of the world). Related to this is the experience of one language (Latin) 
developing into several mutually incomprehensible languages (for example French, 
Portuguese, Italian)6. Last - but by no means least - in this determination of linguistic 
conception by matters historical is the European's experience of writing: 
The advent of writing was the cultural development which made the most radical 
alteration of all time to man's concept of what a language is. It opened up the 
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possibility of regarding articulated sound as a dispensable rather than an essential 
medium expression for languages; and even as being an intrinsically defective or 
imperfect medium7• 
It will be tempting to say that a conception of language based on the factors discussed here 
is, compared to that liable to formed by the oral monoglot on the basis of his linguistic 
experience in an isolated linguistically homogeneous society long untroubled by contacts with 
the outside world, obviously more valid. Our oral monoglot may well be party to such 
linguistic heresies as believing that there is a natural causal link between sounds he 
produces and whatever these sounds refer to and that, on the assumption that is only one 
reality, there could obviously be no other language than his. (In fact, he may well - for 
argument's - not even think of the sounds he makes in communicating with other people 
as from an underlying materiality 'language' at all, but rather think of them as 
spontaneous, constantly unique utterances that take on a supernaturally endowed meaning in 
response to certain stimuli). But to say that such a conception is inferior or 'wrong' wiH be 
similar to the Nahavo thinking that EngHsh is inferior to language because the verb in the 
does not formally discriminate between the physical properties of the thing which is its 
object. (See Chapter 4, note 130). Our of linguistic conceptions different to ours can be 
just as subject to the kind of simplistic rationalism that inspires superficial Whorfian 
pronouncements on linguistic structure. For, just as the linguistic structure of any surviving 
language is, to paraphrase Hagege, fundamentally equal to the ability of its speakers to 
establish some kind of working order and regularity the whirlpool of reality8, so is the 
conception of language held the average language user fundamentally equal to his 
succesful use a language to participation in a broader linguistic 'materiality'. What 
determines whether a particular conception of language is valid is, quite simply, whether -
from the point of view of the language user - it 'works'. 
The relativity of linguistic conception from the point of view of language users - which 
in that sense, the relativity of the materiality of language itself - receives a certain 
confirmation, albeit on a different level, in De Saussure's often quoted disc10sure to students 
of that, when it comes to defining the object of linguistics, 
[f]ar from it being the object that antedates the viewpoint, it would seem that it is the 
view?oi~t that creates the O?ject;... nothing us in advance that one way of 
consldenng the fact question takes precedence over the others or is in any way 
superior to them9• 
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De Saussure's insistence on the linguistic system (rather than the linguistic aptitude or the 
procedures of speech) as the appropriate object of linguistics has therefore been considered, 
not so much as a particular insight into the materiality of language, but as an attempt at 
formulating a methodology that would enable linguistics to pursue fresh avenues unrelated 
to the heavy philological emphasis characteristic of language studies in De Saussure's time. 
De Saussure is, above all, a linguist 'in search of a method'lO. 
As it turns out, it can be argued that De Saussure' s methodological lesson has to a large 
extent found more application in the social and human sciences in general than in the 
mainstream of linguistics in particular. His elaboration of the linguistic system is widely seen 
as providing the initial theoretical impetus for structuralism (and no doubt also, even if it is 
as a counterpoint, for what has come to be known as 'post-structuralism') which, notably 
through the work of Uvi-Strauss, has been a dominant force in anthropology II. De Saussure's 
insights into the nature of the linguistic sign has similarly been regarded as providing the 
theoretical basis for the larger part of recent t:O ........ ""h and American literary theoryl2, while his 
definition of a binomial linguistic sign (signifier I signified) has been put to extensive use in 
psychoanalysis'l. 
For all that, the most publicised developments in linguistic theory since the 1960's have 
to a large extent bypassed De Saussure's teachings. Noam Chomsky's generative grammar, 
which, in its various permutations and refinements I'! can be said to have dominated linguistic 
theory for all of three decades, to a extent constitutes a revival of 17th century Port-
Royal grammar with its view of linguistic structure as explicable in terms of rational 
processes
lS
• It could also be argued that Chomsky's fundamental interest in those properties 
of the human mind that enable us to acquire language tend, Saussurian terms, to orientate 
his linguistic object away from the linguistic system (langue) towards linguistic aptitude 
(langage)16. By contrast, the concern of pragmatics or speech act theory with language use 
in the context of communication has tilted the object of linguistic study towards speech 
(parole) 17. 
The oscillation of the object of linguistic study aptitude, system and speech is far 
from irrelevant to us, and we shall have to consider in more detail which one of these 'levels' 
would most conducive to the 'linguistics of sound' we wish to establish as the true 
discipline of Oral Theory. At the same time, however, the particular auditory conception of 
language we are postulating as definitive of orality cannot be expressed in terms of anyone 
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of these definitions of the object of linguistic study as such. One can of course postulate that 
oral societies 'use language differently' , thereby limiting their relevance to linguistics purely 
to the parole, but that will mean by and large ignoring their linguistic conception. But if we 
cannot pin down this different (conception of) language to either langage, langue or parole, 
how can we even begin talking about it in linguistic terms? What is more, how can we talk 
about it when - as we stated at the end of Chapter 4 what the oral person thinks about 
language is largely inaccessible to us? 
Other disciplines, no less universal ising in their aspirations, have been more courageous 
than linguistics in facing up to the uncomfortable possibility that their object of study is 
relative. I am talking about musicology. To quote Jean-Jacques Nattiez: 
[a]ny musicologist realizes that music is probably a universal fact (it appears that 
is no civilization without music), and realizes that the 'faculty of music' is written into 
the genetic destiny of humanity. like 'faculty of language'. The moment this is 
realized, however, the musicologist must be able to relativize the concept of music, 
and acknowledge that Western musicology is itself merely a form of cuJturaHy 
conditioned knowledgels. 
This realization, important as it is, will have no effect if it is not accompanied by a crucial 
methodological recognition: that the etic approach (analysis by means of the 'methodological 
tools and categories of the researcher') must complemented by the emic (analysis reflecting 
the viewpoints of 'the native informann19• 
In a discipline as devoted to abstraction as linguistics (a tendency exemplified in the 
deductively formulated theories of generative grammar)20, the distinction between the etic and 
emic viewpoints has had only marginal methodological validity - and then only within certain 
'sub-fields' like socio-linguistics specifically devoted to 'attitudes about language'2l, That the 
researcher's conception of language should be the only one to take into account when 
answering the question 'What is language?' is at least partly the result, one feels, of the 
assumption that the native speaker, notably of 'exotic' languages, does not really have a 
conception of language. Whatever theory there is to be of necessity has to be that of 
the researcher. This neglect of the emic in favour of the etic is to a large extent reminiscent 
of a structuralist methodology, according to which an understanding of the way the system 
operates is essentially the prerogative those who, in one way or another, stand outside it 
(or think they do)22. The native of central Brazil is fascinated by the mythological stories of 
his culture, but it is up to Levi-Strauss to demonstrate how these myths are constituted of 
interrelations reflecting 'mythical thinking' as a human phenomenon. The knowledge of the 
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Nahavo is the result of cultural conditioning, that of Levi-Strauss can rise above it. (See 
Chapter 2, note 41). 
Once again, the example of musicological research can be illuminating. Feld sees Bruno 
Nettl as implying a similar absence of theory amongst non-literate peoples (the distinction 
literate - non-literate has, significantly, also been much emphasized in music), when he points 
out that • ... in primitive music a scale does not exist in the mind of the native musicians, so 
the musicologist must deduce it from the melodies'23. As Feld remarks, it is not always easy 
to know whether this type of assertion seemingly implying a lack of theoretical knowledge 
goes to an absence of theory as such (giving it, in other words, cognitive implications), or 
merely points to the fact that theoretical considerations are not made explicit in the 
metalinguistic way to which sciences like linguistics and musicology have accustomed US24. 
In his own case, he finds ample evidence of musical-theoretical thinking amongst the Kaluli 
in their extended use of a special type of metaphor, employing tenns gleaned from the 
semantic field associated with water. Feld concludes: 
Kaluli musical theory ... verbally surfaces in metaphoric expression. This is hardly 
surprising, since theories are often expressed as systematic metaphors25 • 
Metaphoric categorizations may well, in the absence of a metalinguistic tenninology, offer 
keen insights into oral people's conceptualization about language. In any event, that there is 
a reflective concept of language particular to orality is, as we stated at the end of Chapter 4, 
something we take for granted, and even if it is, for no reason other than for our own poorly 
adjusted methodologies, by and large inaccessible, we cannot on account of that simply 
abandon the ernic approach as 'unworkable'. We should still, as would be the ultimate aim 
of this work, specUlate on its nature and try to integrate it into the etic theories that have 
achieved 'scientific' status, not in order to dignify what could otherwise be tenned 'primitive', 
but to make the scientific appraisal more valid26• Oral Theory is in an excellent position to 
undertake such a task. 
The relative sensitivity of musicology to the ernic has led it to concern itself more 
fundamentally than linguistics has done with the question of its own boundaries. De 
Saussure's answer to the 'What is language?' question is not, as we have seen, a statement 
about the materiality of language, but essentially a statement of method. (See note 10). This 
has been, given the atmosphere of methodological conflict that has penneated modern 
linguistics (see note 4), characteristic of affirmations generally as to what language is. 
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Ironically therefore, questions to the boundaries of language (as 
materiality) have in an probability had much greater pertinence within the framework of 
musicology than within that of linguistics, even if questions are primarily aimed, not 
at language, but music27. 
The most important emic conceptions of music that Nattiez upon, concern precisely 
the impossibility of defining the concept of music without in some way also referring to 
idUI:!LlCllI:!C. If, as he argues, 'the semantic surface of the concept "music" is displaced one 
culture to another,28, what is displaced along with it, more than not, is the (implied) 
concept language. 
conceptual fuzziness WOUld, one assumes, be particularly noticeable in cultures where 
there is no single word that to what in a Western sense is considered music. that 
matter, in how many languages is the concept of language lexically accounted for in ways 
different - perhaps profoundly different - to that Indo-European languages? Which 
metaphors are used? Certainly, I am not about to suggest that elements linguistic structure 
should be taken as indicative of a particular conceptualization such a notion was largely set 
aside in Chapter 4 - but given the methodological poverty that impedes proper considerations 
of emic views language, could to some extent offer a point of departure. An example 
of the delicateness of emic conceptions of both language and music is offerred, in this 
context, by the Inuit word nipi which, as Nattiez 'includes the things that we would 
designate by term "music", [but] is much more general our "music", since it 
encompasses noise as well as the sound of the spoken voice ,29. One of most important 
consequences of the approach been the recent tendency in ethnomusicology to avoid 
etic concept music altogether, ernie categorizations - appropriately paraphrased _ 
in stead
30
• (Feld's Sound and Sentiment uses this procedure). A related tendency can be 
remarked a conceptual movement within musicology which sees the latter's object of 
not as 'music', but rather as 'musical phenomena' or 'the musical,31. Could the object of 
linguistics be 'dispersed' in a similar fashion? 
Quite apart from rather fragmented status it presents in a global perspective, the concept 
of music has, of course, also been far from unified the West, with definitions generally 
vacillating between an emphasis on conditions of production (music as organization I 
combination of sounds) and an emphasis on conditions of effect (music as sounds that are 
pleasing to the ear)32. What Jean Molino calls the 'total musical fact' can include elements 
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as diverse as the conductor's body .... IIJO. ....... JO.'-' and the dimensions of a concert hall. 
however, its minimal condition is , it is this condition, taken together with other -
culturally variable - factors (for example conditions of production) which brings the 
conceptu alization 'music' 34. 
The identification of sound as most basic element musical fact reminds us, of 
course, our own argument that is, in a way, minimal condition orality, 
a situation which has led us to qualify our exploration of language of primary as 
an exploration of the auditory conception of language. Having recognized the importance of 
the emic point of view for linguistics, not to mention the way in which, in the case of 
musicology, it brings into question the very concept around which it is built, we are now in 
a to put orality and as it were, together, imagine the kind of linguistic 
object union would give to. To do this we can a brief step 
consider some of the main conclusions reached so far ........... "J<.'''''I',v is sound, is sound. 
Taken as activities, both the linguistic and the musical are and parcel of culture and, as 
such, are symbolical: they have meaning. (De Saussure's distinction between signification as 
arbitrary and symbolization35 as something more or less motivated is not 
relevant here). produced in are meaningful (as the discrete 
units of which, as the linguists tell us, aU linguistic systems consist), 
produced in music are also meaningful, but in a different way (the units of 
sounds 
as we 
shall consider in more detail on, continuous or 'suprasegmental' rather than discrete). 
this background, according to which criteria should oral people conceive of language? 
I would contend the following: within the etic conception language is isolated 
as on the basis the nature of its a procedure favoured if not caused 
(we shall return to this question later) - by the fact that language is experienced as something 
visual rather than auditory. From an ernic (oral) point of view, nn""A'''''''r there is 
reason to believe that it will be less the of the linguistic unit that will 
attract conceptual attention than the fact that it is meaningful (symbolic) sound. As object of 
an linguistics will consequently conceived of not in isolation, but in a 
with other more specifically. sounds that, culture 
fu1fil1 some kind symbolical function: . A significant consequence of 
version of the linguistic object, furthermore, is that it at least to some extent alters De 
Saussure's conception of the linguistic system as a 'self-contained whole and principle of 
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classification ,36 More about this later. 
To say that in orality the conception of language is indissociable from the conception of 
music, does not for one moment mean that oral people do not distinguish between language 
and music. Neither does it imply that the auditory conception of language, thus defined, is 
in any way less 'objective' or 'analytical' than the visualist. With regard to the latter, as we 
shall see in more detail further on (and as we have, in fact, to some extent already discovered 
in Roy Harris' discussion of linguistic conception earlier - see notes 5 - 7), the concept of 
language is not necessarily as unambiguously isolated as linguistics would want us to believe. 
Before dealing with these matters however, it would be useful to make a quick detour through 
the 'mainstream' of Oral Theory (as investigated in Chapters I - 3), to remind ourselves, as 
it were, of the continuous - albeit underplayed - presence of sound I music within it. But for 
what would seem an almost accidental methodological choice made by Oral Theory (at least 
as represented in the body of commentators reviewed in this study), the association of orality 
with sound I music could have been one of the main defining aspects of the field. 
5.2 Symbolical Sound I Music within Oral Theory 
In a footnote at the beginning of Oral Poetry, Finnegan3? draws attention to the absence of 
musicological analysis in her work, which, as she points out, would be required to give 'a full 
account of many instances of oral poetry'. At the same time, however, she to some extent 
justifies this oversight by explaining that she has 'in any case chosen to concentrate on the 
literary aspects of oral poetry and its social context'. A few years later. at a conference with 
the theme 'The Oral and the Literate in Music· 38, Finnegan gives a paper on the approaches 
to composition and performance she observed in her study of different musical genres39 
(classical music, jazz and rock) in the English town of Milton Keynes, and reflects on this 
as her 'tentative present venturing into the musical arena,40. Finnegan's paper (and indeed the 
theme of the conference as a whole) is interesting from our point of view, in so far as it 
emphasizes the importance of the orality - literacy question in a cultural field up to that point 
largely ignored by Oral Theory - at least in terms of its potential theoretical contribution41 _ 
namely music. After a brief overview of how the literate (what Roy Harris would term 
'scriptist' - see Chapter 4, note 125) fixation on the text-as-object used to bedevil research 
in oral tradition - a tendency, as she gratefully points out, since broadened to include the 
study of 'processes of performance and audience reception' (see our discussion of Barber and 
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and White, amongst others, in ""-' .. , .. 1-'.' ..... following observation: 
In the study of music we Western assumptions about the 
dominance of writing [as in to be equated with its 
written fonn, so that if something is not it is as not 'really' music, 
or at any rate not worth serious scholarly study. In traditional Western musicology 
'music' is usually defined as the musical work, in turn defined as its written 
fonnulation - the score - rather than, for process of playing or singing 
or the act of perfonnance42• 
I would argue that the scriptist bias of music (even of WP',!1.fp.lm - 'classical' - music) is in all 
probability less than that of literature, even if for no more profound reason than that in the 
overwhelming majority of cases - and even in a highly I - people's familiarity 
with music continues to stem from their being exposed to peiformance in one way or 
another. To read music is, compared to reading a story or a poem, an ff"P1rn ... I'1 specialized 
is 
As we noted earlier, there is, within the field 
relativity of definitions of the musical object. But 
cOlmposf~a by means of graphic .... r' .... 'o ..... , f<> f" .... ' 
to by the same kinds of anthropological 
graphic fonn (music of non-literate than 
oral, a differentiation which, not surprisingly, runs 
vs an oral mindset. 
awareness of 
The fact 
of literate societies) has 
from music not 
written text vis-a.-vis 
as the notion of a 
At issue, once again, are concepts like complexity, analycity, rationality. As we shall see, 
however, arguments in this regard, while overlapping with the literacy - orality paradigm (as 
fonnulated by Goody and Ong), actually tend to resemble the kind of Whorfian 
on linguistic structure considered before. 4, notes ] 40 - 146). 
Goody, Nattiez remarks that 'writing facilitates manipulation elementary 
in a way not pennitted by mere memory'. This not 
out, that 'musics of the oral tradition are "more 1"' ......... to 
ways use procedures more complex than 
cannot overlook the fact that the existence wntmg 




Nattiez's reference here to Gesualdo and Bach 
music, to some extent smacks of complimenting 
is quick 





essayist technique without taking "'"'''f','''''''-
(See Chapter note 120). That the 
mnemonic value, should also 
compositional technique 
written music I oral music question is 
thereof. Written vs oral becomes, 
musical structure, frequently juxtaposed 
a 
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milieu and institution of the latter. 
of music, quite apart from its 
on musical style and 
it is event quite rare that the 
at the level of actual writing or the absence 
for what are essentially differences of 
Western vs non-Western, 
advanced vs primitive fonnat. Most salient in this - at least in so far as European (in 
fact, classical) and African music (assuming that such a generalization is at all possible) are 
concerned - is the fonner's association with melody and the latter's with rhythm. In his 
groundbreaking - for the times - A History of Rudi explains this as foHows: 
Rhythm and its development are the fundamental African aims; fonn and fonnal 
development of melody in hannony are the one has to begin with 
movement and momentum on the one hand, the structure of fonns on the other .... In 
Africa, development, variety, and contrast come motion, through 
constant variation or mutation, often improvisational, through combination of 
several rhythmic and melodic In our I music, rhythm is an 
adjunct, not the prime consideration; ... Essentially, fonns in Western music are 
different melodies or the same melody variously different keys and 
rhythms, in contrasting major and minor modes, in a of harmonizations and 
instrumentations, in various inversions and variations These fonns are 
juxtaposed and contrasted to secure a and satisfying 
structural completeness45• 
is nothing in Blesh's reasoning to suggest 
complex than the (written) music of Europe, 
(oral) 
one were to 
Africa is per se less 
of course, that 
rhythm is in some way more fundamental (i.e. 'primitive') than melody. (Jousse's 
vital' comes to mind in this regard - see Chapter 4, note 33). Finnegan, for one, this: 
rhythm is not a physical, but a cultural concept. She also quotes Nettl as pointing out that 
'rhythmic manifestations [that] appear on their own' (such as in drumming, i.e. 
without melody') are characteristic of complex musical cultures46• Raymond Court 
essentially the same point. Musical systems predominantly oriented around rhythm are in no 
way 'primitive' and are as 'legitimate' as musical systems based on tonality47. Court at 
same however, manages to link the Western musical system's preference for the note 
(hauteur) - which he sees as integrated into a 'rigorously defined network of discontinuous 
- with the genie [specific mental inclination] of the West. 'It is indeed not by 
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observes Court, 'that the West has, in her appropriation [lecture] of basic sound [sonore brut], 
emphasized that aspect which best lent itself to systematization and rationalization,4s. In other 
words, Western music is not more sophisticated than say, African music, but it is more 
systematized and rational. Court's manoeuvre is subtle, but he does not quite escape the 
ethnocentrism he criticizes in others'9. 
A final factor we can mention as pointing to the similarity of views on the oral text and 
oral music, is the association of the latter with societal junction. Treating of the relation 
between music and myth, Ecro Tarasti observes that music and myth became 'disunited' in 
the West, a development which saw music 'develop as an autonomous discourse', through 
which it was able to gain in complexity50. Tarasti makes no mention of writing in this regard, 
but the idea of Western music as 'autonomous discourse' essentially freed from social context 
will no doubt strike a chord with Walter Ong. 
We pointed out at the beginning of Chapler 4 that 'oral vocal production as sound' has 
tended, within Oral Theory, to be regarded as a 'stylistic device' at the service of - and 
subordinated to - linguistic meaning. Ivan F6nagy's definition of vocal style [Ie style vocal] 
as 'implanted [greffeeJ onto the linguistic message,SI is apt in this regard. What is true for the 
sound of the voice is, we can assume, even more so for sound - defined as what could be 
regarded as musical within the oral context - in a more general sense: it is superimposed on -
rather than part of - textual meaning. But we must be careful not to oversimplify this duality. 
For example, it will be wrong to say that what is musical is ignored by Oral Theory. Many 
a researcher has commented on the close alliance in orality between music and text, if not to 
point out, as Elizabeth Tonkin does, that they are inseperables,. This kind of statement has 
been made particularly with reference to tonal languages, prevalent in parts of Africa, in 
which, as the musicologist Hugh Tracey (studying the Chopi migodo - see Chapter 3, notes 
152 - 153) has observed, 'the sounds of the words themselves almost suggest a flow of 
tunes'S3. Reflecting on how, in an oral society, poetry is often part of the very process of 
socialization, Finnegan (quoting S.A. Babalola's study on the Yoruba ijala) hints. 
significantly, at the possibility that such a sensitivity may welt be grounded in the sound of 
the language, particularly where it is tonal. 'Yoruba children' she remarks , , 
grow up with an increasing awareness of the potentialities of 'their tonal, metaphor-
saturated language which in its ordinary prose form is never far from music in the 
aural impression it gives,54. 
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Another noteworthy instance of the interaction between the linguistic and the musical, 
associated, once again, with tonal languages, is found in the drum languages (drum poetry) 
of certain Mrican societies, notably the Kele (Congo) and the Akan (Ghana), As reported by 
Finnegan, the tonal as well as rhythmic patterns of the languages can be reproduced on a two-
to three-toned drum, through which the drumming comes to represent 'the spoken utterances 
in a way intelligible to the listeners, and heard as actual words and groups of words'55, JunzQ 
Kawada refers to the drum language of the Mosi (Burkina Faso) as 'a system of instrumental 
transmission for verbal messages'56, Within the general ambit of the oral-formulaic theory, 
furthermore, the musical has been regarded, at least in certain traditions, as an important - and 
even determinant - aspect of oral-formulaic expression. In the Japanese The Tale of the Heike 
the music, in Ong's words, frequently 'stabilises the text', acting as a 'constraint' - i.e. a 
mnemonic device - through which the words of the text can be remembered almost verbatim. 
(See Chapter 1, note 62), Apart from syntactic and metrical considerations, the formula can 
frequently also be defined in musical terms. 
An important - dominant? - aspect of Oral Theory's attention to music in the instances 
characterized above goes, of course, to the fleetingness of the spoken word and the 
consequent need of the oral performer, within this context of evanescence, to make an impact 
on his audience, to be memorable. In this perspective music is considered not so much for 
its aesthetic enhancement of the performance, nor - which is what we are interested in - for 
the way in which it interacts with textual I linguistic meaning, but rather as a mnemonic 
device. This position will be particularly strongly held within an oral-formulaic framework 
(Ong's reference to The Tale of the Heike is perhaps illustrative of this), but will by no means 
be limited to it. (See our discussion of Vail and White in Chapter 3, especially the remark by 
Mounin - notes 159, 161). 
What seems to generally happen in Oral Theory is that sound I music is integrated into the 
contextual aspect of the oral performance where, alongside a myriad of other 'performance 
factors' (the performer's physical appearance, the place of performance, the prevalence of 
gesture and dance, the role and participation of the audience, not to mention socio-political 
and historical concerns) it serves as a kind of aid to our understanding and appreciation of 
the performance as literature (aside, we can suspect, from its more generally highlighted 
mnemonic value). Okpewho in this regard talks about the 'stability of a performance 
[depending] on a proper fit between the pace of the music and that of the words' - 'stability' 
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obviously being a factor of memory - but sees music as a distinct fonn 'with pecularities 
[its] own that nevertheless certain characteristics... the oral and give us 
a further understanding of the qualities of the oral culture' 57. we assume, with Finnegan, 
that study of the oral text has definitively gone beyond the scriptist-inclined study of text 
as object, the consideration of the musical in the sense understood here by Okpewho may 
become indispensable. (Let us not repeat here our arguments, elaborated in Chapter 3, 
as to the inevitably anthropological - and hence, from an aesthetic point of view, deprecating -
nature procedure, no matter how well-meaning). the essential point is that, 
relation to the oral text, sound is regarded not as constitutive of meaning but only as partially 
constitutive of it, and then constitutive in such a as to merely elucidate that of the 
meaning most easily to the Oral Theory researcher - and therefore, in a very real 
predetermined by him as the essential meaning - namely the linguistic meaning, 
meaning 'of the . Lord's conclusion with regard to the Homeric and the guslar 
traditions, that 'the tale's the thing,58 (rather than the music - the Balkan epics are, all, 
sung, and guslar is a musical instrument) has - contrary to his theory - remained by and 
undisputed. And yet, as Okpewho remarks, many oral narrators, particularly in Africa 
but elsewhere, find it extremely difficult to their tales without the accompanying 
music. To a Mandingo griot: 'music is the grioes soul'59. 
In our fonnulation of the theoretical basis for an aural linguistics, two - which are, 
In assumptions - have so far come to the Firstly we noted the importance of 
extending definitions of language to include emic conceptions. Reconstructed from oral 
point of such a conception would what we tenn linguistic sound (or speech 
sounds) as existing in a continuous relation, not only with other speech sounds but also - and 
perhaps more fundamentally - with sounds that are not primarily linguistic (in an sense) 
but are, within the culture concerned, part of a symbolical system. Secondly - flowing from 
the above - we noted the usefulness of the concept of referring to a system of 
symbolical sound) to the kind of linguistic investigation we are with. in 
the field of orality has constantly a close interaction between musical and linguistic 
expression. Furthermore, at in so far as conceptualizations of and music 
are reflected in the actual words (lexical units) of a language, there seems to be some 
evidence that fluctuations in the boundaries between musical and non-musical are not 
without implication for the relation between the musical and the linguistic; the two to some 
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degree overlap. 
The above seems 10 me a reasonable recapitulation of our argument. One item of concern, 
however, would be the word system. We concluded earlier that the auditory conception of 
language questions notions of the linguistic system as something 'self-contained' or 'whole' 
(see note 36), a consideration which, taken at face value, to a large extent refutes in this 
instance the very validity of the concept of system. Yet we have in the above summary not 
been at all shy to use the word 'system' in relation to non-linguistic symbolical sounds. If 
orality'S linguistic field is not, to paraphrase De Saussure, a 'self-suffrcient principle', it 
seems rather surprising that its musical fIeld should be. We shall take up this contradiction 
again when we come 10 discuss the sign. Crucial to any elaboration of aural I inguistics would 
be to establish which definition of the sign best suits its needs. For the time being, however, 
the term 'system' in relation to symbolical sound can be of some use to help distinguish the 
latter from noise. Noise frequently has meaning (I know, for example, that a certain 
discordant whining represents a hack-saw), but it does not form part of the sounds which a 
given culture, according to its own norms and tastes60, integrates into its music. As such, 
noise is per definition non-systemic61 • 
5.3 Aural Linguistics I Linguistics 
At this stage of our elaboration it would be appropriate to return to some more fully etic 
conceptions of language (we are, after all, situating our argument in the field of linguistics), 
and consider the pertinence of these to the linguistic slant we are giving to orality. Such an 
overview will be particularly useful in that it should, at the very least, make clear to us what 
aural linguistics is not. 
The association of orality (at least as taken in its customary orientation towards 'literature') 
with linguistics is of course, as Yai confirms, nothing new: 
Literary his lory will perhaps one day confirm the judgment that one of the distinctive 
features of the poetics of our times ... is that it allows itself to be carried away by 
linguistic theories62 
The first linguistic theory on which orality (in the guise of folklore) allowed itself to be thus 
'carried away' - and to which, according to Yai, it also contributed - was the structuralist 
linguistics inaugurated by De Saussure's view of Ihe linguistic system as a 'self-contained 
whole' consisting of elements (signs) that exist not by reference to what could be thought of 
as lying outside the system, but purely by reference to one another, language (a language) 
is 'characterized as a system based 
this theory can be traced to what we 
on the opposition of concrete units,63. Chiefly, 
identified, through Okpewho, as the taxonomist 
tradition of scholarship, in terms of which the tale is 'picked to pieces' so as to lay its 
underlying units and to determine the various ways in which can be assembled. (See 
Chapter 2, note 27). Whether conceived as component motifs I functions (Propp) or 
structural units (Levi-Strauss), these forms have also been related to language in a 
sense in so far as have been at by some, as potentially of actual 
linguistic structures lying, to quote William Hendricks, 'beyond the sentence,64, 
Aural linguistics, as should have clear by now, is not interested in textual form, 
whether in the sense component motif or in the more linguistic sense of 
of) discourse. Our concern is with a certain conception and use of language which we regard 
as characteristic of the situation of orality, which is certainly inclusive of but extends, 
ultimately, beyond the textual frameworks of genre or, that matter, of performance. As 
such, aural linguistics is not about verbal 
indebtedness to structuralism lies, .... "" .. "' ... ,... .. "" 
but about verbalization in general. Our 
on a totally different to that of an oral 
poetics. In this regard we already quoted Saussurian definitions of language, to which 
we can add his binomial (the as combination of signifier and signified) and relational 
definition of the linguistic sign. We shall review definitions in more detail further on. 
A second linguistic theory to have been incorporated the study of orality - albeit with 
considerably less impact - is Chomsky's transformational generative grammar. Yai mentions 
a number of articles6.5 attempting 'somewhat mechanically' to apply its principles to literature, 
but qualifies as 'virtually non-existent' transformational generative grammar's influence on 
the development oral poetics66• 
After a brief consideration what he to be the substantive achievements of 
'universal' or 'philosophical grammar' (as practised in the tradition of Port-Royal - see note 
15) and the - by contrast - more 'methodological' contributions of structuralist 
linguistics (see, this regard, note 10), Chomsky provides us with the following account 
of his linguistic interest: 
... to study the problem of rule-governed creativity in natural language, the problem 
of constructing grarnrnars that explicitly deep and structures and 
express relations between them, and the deeper problem of determining the 
universal conditions that limit the form and organization of rules in grammar of 
a human Janguage61. 
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Chomsky goes on to mention that the study of these questions gives rise 'to conclusions 
regarding mental processes of very much the sort that were developed... in the rationalist 
philosophy of mind that provided the intellectual background for universal grammar,68, 
Chomsky's project (which, as we have already noted, has over a substantial period 
dominated linguistic theory - see note 14) is, from a linguistic-theoretical point of view, of 
little relevance to us. On one level there is Chomsky's concern with the 'deep structure' of 
language which, as he approvingly notes in discussing the views of the philosophical 
grammarians, 'reflects the basic properties of thought and conception,69. (See also Chapter 4, 
note 65). Chomsky in at least one instance conceives of linguistics 'as a branch of cognitive 
psychology' 70; we, however, spent a large part of Chapter 4 trying to extricate language from 
its entanglement with thought. On a more immediate level, however, transformational 
generative grammar, with its theoretical reliance on 'ideal speaker-hearers'71, sets aside more 
fundamentally than any other linguistic theory what Roy Harris describes as 'the typical 
imperfections of ordinary spoken discourse - phenomena involving hesitations, slips of the 
tongue, interruptions, syntactic breakdowns, impromptu adaptations to context' 72. A further 
point is that pronunciation (i.e. sound) plays no role in the 'generative' (at the level of deep 
structure) and 'transformational' (at the level of surface structure) grammatical rules73 through 
which the speaker has the ability to produce a limitless array of sentences from a limited 
number of linguistic elements74 - an ability which, in the Chomskyen view, forms the essence 
of linguistic inquiry. Sound is, to again quote Harris, 'a superficial garb to a basically non-
phonic structure'. He continues: 
But suppose we strip away this superficial phonetic garb of the sentence, what lies 
underneath it? Something which must have all its words in place, their order 
detennined, their grammatical relations established, and their meanings assigned - but 
which simply lacks phonetic embodiment: a string of words with the sound turned off. 
In short, a linguistic abstraction for which there is only one conceivable archetype so 
far in human history; the sentence of writing7S. 
If Chomsky can be excluded from aural linguistics on account of his scriptist approach to 
language, so, to a large extent, can De Saussure. We shall return to this point presently. (See 
Chapter 4, note 125). But scriptism would surely be an unfair charge against a third linguistic 
theory we can consider here, namely pragmatics. the most readily advanced definition of 
which is the study of language usage76. (See note 17), Moreover pragmatics, as Colin 
Levinson remarks, at least partly developed 'as a reaction or antidote to Chomsky's treatment 
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of language as an abstract device, or mental ability, dissociable from the uses, users and 
functions of language,n. Pragmatics, conceiving of language as essentially a social 
instrument78 , constitutes the reintegration of language into the concretely contextual, a 
reintegration, it will be remembered, that authors like Finnegan, Barber and Vail and White 
have also demanded, within the context of Oral Theory, for the oral text, Furniss' conception 
of the oral text as a 'piece in a debate' comes to mind in this regard (see Chapter 3, note 70); 
Finnegan reports the 'performance-centred' approach as to a large extent having come to 
regard the oral text as fundamentally 'a communicative event in time'79. 
Certainly, the study of orality has in important ways benefitted from pragmatic and speech 
act oriented conceptions of language. Pragmatics also opens up the possibility, to the extent 
that it addresses itself to a distinction between speaker-meaning on the one hand (what we 
can broadly term 'message') and sentence-meaning on the other (linguistic meaning)@{), of 
paying particular attention to aspects like stress, intonation. speech tempo, pause and so on. 
Neither sign-based (Saussurian) nor sentence-based (Chomskyen) linguisticsS' integrates these 
factors into their respective notions of the linguistic object, regarding them as 'paralinguistic,Sl 
and consigning them to the sub-field of phonetics. Intonation can, for example, playa crucial 
role in conveying to the hearer the possible irony of a sentence (utterance) like linguistics is 
fascinating, in terms of which the utterance may take on a meaning totally opposite to its 
conventional (linguistic I sentence) meaningS] In the perspective of pragmatics such a 
difference in meaning is fundamental to the task of linguistic inquiry; in the sign or sentence-
based perspectives it is at best peripheral. 
These 'paralinguistic features' will certainly be a crucial preoccupation of aural linguistics 
as well - they are integral to the vocal sounds of orality. But where pragmatics WOUld, one 
could assume, be concerned with determining the role played by these features in the 
conveyance of the message, aural linguistiCS may well proceed differently. In order to 
understand this divergence of aural linguistics from pragmatics we have to briefly reflect on 
some commonly held assumptions - not only of pragmatics, but of linguistics generally _ 
about certain notions relating to the area of Janguage-in-contexl. Most important for our 
purposes are the notions of communication and - closely connected to it - of message. 
Given the inadequacies - generally related to its assumption that speaker-meaning coincides 
with sentence-meaning (see note 80) - of the so-called 'message model,84, linguistic 
communication is generally conceptualized in terms of what Akruajian et al refer to as an 
'inferential' approach: 
in the course of learning to 
that language, and 
presumptions, as well as a 
to presume certain helpful 
inference provide I'nrnml 
from what someone utters to what 
The presumptions in question 
'cultural' attributes. Our familiarity with 
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how to communicate in 
a variety of shared beliefs or 
.Ur.f.l.Ll':VLl':".\. The presumptions allow us 
(or speakers) and the 
short, effective patterns of inference 
be trying to communicate85 • 
to what could more generally called 
WOUld, then, enable us to 'disambiguate' 
statements by relating them to the context 10 which they occur, and to make accurate 
inferences regarding the speaker's use of his message may, for example, be cast in 
indirect or metaphorical terms (in other words not reducible to its sentence-meaning). 
Communication is successful to the extent that these inference the hearer from 
hearing the expression uttered to the speaker's """mn,,,"'I',,,I'''''' intent,S6. In other words, 
underlying the act of communication is an intention which, for all practical purposes, is the 
actual message. Levinson, drawing on Paul it as follows: 
communication consists of the 'sender' to think or 
do something, just by getting the ·"P'~P"I .. r· is trying to 
cause that thought or action. So communication is a r-n",.." ... " kind of intention that is 
achieved or satisfied just by being recognized. In communication, the 
'sender's' communicative intention knowledge to ... and 
'receiver,S7. 
as far as we are concerned, is that we see through its 
idea of communication equaling intention that has ..... r·nrr."" 'mutual knowledge', by and 
mirroring the message model's notion of communication a 
respectively encoding and decoding the message. The relative complexity of 
inferential approach lies in its multidimensional view of the communication channel; it 
and 
not, however, significantly alter the message model's view of the content of communication 
as 'message', nor of the relation between the two communicants. 
'Neither Saussure nor Wittgenstein', Roy Harris informs us - Ludwig Wittgenstein's 
philosophical writings constitute some of the original texts for what John Searle as 
'institutional theories of communication .88 - 'questions the lay assumption that is 
primarily a form of communication and that languages are to be viewed as communication 
De Saussure communication (which, as parole, he of course excludes 
object of linguistics) is telementational, it is concerned - as is shown in his illustration of 
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'speaking-circuit' (which to all intents and purposes is the 'message model' referred to 
above)90 - with, in Harris' words, 'the transference of a thought from A's mind to B'S,91. That 
thought as such is the substance of communication is, as Harris indicates, to a degree 
questioned in Wittgenstein' s formulations of the communicative process, in so far as he seems 
to allow for the possiblity that communication - at least in the context where the speaker's 
utterance is intended to elicit an action on the part of the hearer - can be 'automatic, a kind 
of triggering process': the action is carried out without some prior 'mental image' or 
thought92• But this consideration of Wittgenstein's is really besides the point. The fact is that 
both De Saussure and Wittgenstein, though 'with different nuances', regard thought as 
fundamentally inseperable from language, hence from speaking, hence from (linguistic) 
communication. Their agreement on this point can at least partly be related to their shared 
rejection of nomenclaturism9l (the idea that words 'stand' for things). Harris thus sums up 
their position: 
in the perspective adopted by Saussure and Wittgenstein, the function of a word is no 
longer to be explained by reference to the thought it allegedly expresses; nor the 
thought in tum to be explained by reference to some 'object' or feature of the external 
world which it mentally 'represents'. Instead the word, now treated as an indivisible 
unit of sound-with-sense, is explained by contrasting its role with that of other words 
in the linguistic system of which it forms part. The upshot of this revaluation is to 
make thought (or at least those forms of thought which are propositionally articulated 
and generally held to characterize human intellect) in all important respects language-
related. Thinking is no longer an autonomous, self-sustaining activity of the human 
mind, and speech merely its externalisation. On the contrary, speech and thought are 
interdependent, neither occurring without the other, and both made possible by 
language94 • 
The frequent use of words like idea, concept, and indeed intention in characterizations of the 
communicative message, would seem to bear out that De Saussure and Wittgenstein's 
association of thought with language (at least as expressed above) has survived pretty much 
in tact in present-day pragmatics. (The contention that thinking is determined by linguistic 
structure has of course, as we saw in Chapter 4, been by and large rejected, but De Saussure 
and Wittgenstein are concerned not with the relation between thinking and linguistic system 
but with the relation between thinking and the realization of the system as speech)9'. It is this 
notion of the interdependence of language - or rather speech - and thought that, I would 
contend, underlies what Searle calls the 'principle of expressibility': whatever can be meant 
can be sai.:fM. Searle is quick to concede that this is, of course, not necessarily true in fact: 
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I may not know the language I am using well enough to adequately express what I mean, or 
the language may indeed lack the resources required by me to this effect. But I can, in the 
fonner case, improve my knowledge of the language and, in the latter, 'in principle at least 
enrich the language by introducing new tenns or other devices into it'. As Searle points out, 
'where there are thoughts that cannot be expressed in a given language or in any language, 
it is a contingent fact and not a necessary truth'97. 
What needs to be remarked here, of course, is that Searle's argument is, to some extent at 
least, a circular one. When he says that what is meant can be said, he is, in fact, limiting the 
concept of meaning - without clearly stating it - to what he has predetennined - within the 
linguistic conception that is his - as the expressive potential of language, If language always 
expresses thought (which is, of course, what he implies in the quotation directly above), then 
it speaks for itself that whatever meaning a particular utterance has must of necessity be 
reducible to something that can be the product of thinking, that is amenable to logical analysis 
or explanation, in other words, that could have been said in the first place. What Searle's 
principle of expressivity therefore really means is this: whatever can be said, can be said in 
a different way. 
But what, we may ask, if what is communicated - i.e. the message - is not thought? The 
musicologist Charles Seeger has pointed out that '[a] large proportion of what is 
communicated by systems of human communication other than speech is not communicable 
by speech,98, Searle, to some extent perhaps, entertains such a possibility when he observes 
that 'the principle of expressivity does not imply that it is always possible to find or invent 
a fonn of expression that will produce all the effects in hearers that one means to produce; 
for example, literary or poetic effects, emotions, beliefs, and so on', Put differently, '[w]e 
need to distinguish what a speaker means from certain kinds of effects he intends to produce 
in his hearers ,99, What soon becomes clear, however, is that the only such effects that Searle 
regards as falling within the ambit of the speech act are those that are reducible to words, 
more specifically, those words defined by Austin as constituting 'perlocutionary acts': to 
scare, alarm, convince, enlighten, edify, and so on 1OO, Once again, meaning (even if 
reconceptualized as 'effect produced on the hearer') is, in a sense, prelimited according to 
what can be analysed by means of words, or, quite simple, said in a different way or 
paraphrased, 
Of course, the intention of this analysis is by no means to criticize Searle's notion, Within 
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in, what he ~~, ..... ~.~. sense. What is this the linguistic VV •• ",,",Ut 
conception? As we saw 
something that is 
interdependent - that any 
communication model the message as 
which means - on the assumption that thinking and speaking are 
'''''''';;'''!",'-' can be analysed in terms, which actually comes 
to saying that it can paraphrased. No message is irreducible. And we see, quite clearly, 
how such a conception of the message (which is also a conception of communication) In 
a sense, foregrounded by a certain view of language (a language) as linguistic system. The 
units of the deriving their meaning purely in terms of their differential relations to 
one another, can essentially the same meaning by a variety of different permutations. 
In Saussurian terms: same signified can by (combinations of) 
signifiers. This to the relation between signified being arbitrarylOl. 
If we could a language (which would, in fact, the 'auditory conceived' 
of orality) where sound carries meaning on top primary (to us) duty of differentiating 
between it should be clear that the 'communication' that takes place by means 
such a the 'messages' that are conveyed through it, will be far from adequately 
circumscribed - let alone explained - by the kinds notions evolved in pragmatics. In this 
context a more useful conception of communication, Jess predetermined by a 
conception may well be sought in definition of communication 
(intended as 'transmission of a form >I 02. 
Within the general framework of pragmatics we of course, question extent to 
which certain types of speech acts (for instance, the perlocutionary mentioned is 
universal to all linguistic communities. Also, all societies necessarily have same 
concept 'commanding' as we have?l03 our concern lies deeper. a the whole 
conception of a message as something paraphrasable, unified. resulting from some 
kind of 'act', will have to be modified. An instance of speaking that comes to 
mind - to name only the most obvious 
abundantly noted in oral societies. We 
or 'witty' or 'entertaining' and, 
used by the oral performer in order to 
that at least to some extent, 
metaphor as 'evaluative precedent' -
within context of Oral Theory, 
in this regard is the metaphorical, so 
accustomed to metaphors as 
as exceedingly devices 
his message 'stick' better. are not denying 
in this regard, Vail and s notion of the 
3, note 145). But, just as sound (music) has, 
'played second fiddle' to the latter'S 
./ 
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preoccupation with linguistic meaning (which, the context of the performance, becomes a 
'piece in a debate', a 'message'), so, in fact, has metaphor (inevitably. of course, given the 
linguistic conception that is ours: metaphor is but an 'indirect' way - basically paraphrasable -
of saying what you 'really mean,)I04. Aural linguistics would be interested in a different 
explanation. fact, the metaphorical aspect of speech would, in many ways, offer the most 
obvious starting point to any study concerned with the interplay - on level of meaning -
between language and soundlO5 • Through the sound(s) in which it is expressed or by which 
it is accompanied the metaphorical, in terms of an auditory conception of language, may 
less 'indirect' than we think, and its meaning anything but 'reducible'I06. 
This brief overview of the ways in which our project sets itself apart from some of the 
more dominant linguistic preoccupations of recent times, brings us to the point where we need 
to consider what is perhaps its most vital and perhaps also most controversial - orientation, 
namely that it seeks to address the language of orality as a system. In the course of this study 
we have come across some notions, relatively taken-for-granted, that, looked at closely. tum 
out to derive from a kind of cultural conditioning that we have labelled 'scriptist'. The notion 
in regard to which scriptism has been most frequenUy asserted is the notion of text as literary 
object. But there are other candidates, notably in the field of language. Within the context of 
our preceding critique of pragmatics and generative grammar, we can propose notions like 
'message' and 'sentence'. Both of them could quite plausibly be associated with a certain kind 
of analysis I abstraction that results from the experience of reading I writing which, while 
fruitful the point of view of understanding what something is about (a point no doubt 
overstressed by Ong), (as an inevitable breaking-up-into-manageable-parts) invites 
oversimplification to some extent, I wouJd the very problem with notion of 
message. To these we can add the notion of word, notoriously problematic from a linguistic 
point of view, that continues, in layman terms, to be most easily defined as 'having a 
on side'. (See Chapter 4, note 144). But it can be plausibly argued that the scriptism 
of these notions is most readily motivated in terms of the extent to which they form part of 
an analysis that regards language I linguistic communication as a system. As Roy Harris puts 
it: 
... the sy~ten:atic analysis of spoken languages depends essentiaJly on their 
conceptualizatIOn as systems amenable to representation in a medium other than 
sound lO7 • 
The fundamentally spatial (therefore non-auditory) character of linguistic system can be 
most easily understood in the light of what composes it: the linguistic sign, defined, by De 
Saussure, as pairing of a concept (signified) with an acoustic image (signifier)108, As 
Harris remarks, latter metaphor Saussure's on the primacy of the 
spoken - see 4, note 121) is unwisely perception >109. 
point however, conceded by De himself, is that it is only in writing (in other 
anything approaching tangibility, that it can be as something visual) that the sign 
'captured,no. Depriving oneself of the perceptible image supplied by writing means running 
the risk of 'being left with a shapeless mass' III, (Here we can be usefully reminded of 
'centering of sound - see 4, note 7). 
it 
can, of course, to some extent 
in relation to orality should not be taken in any 
by suggesting that the word 
sense, which will 
synonymous with words like 'field', 'area' and so on. But that will 
counterproductive to what is perhaps aural linguistics' most important motivation, namely to 
find an alternative to the evolutionist perspective that, more than anything else, has tended to 
prevent Oral Theory from delimiting a field of interest worthy of study in its own right. 
us re-endorse here contention that is inevitably conceptualized as 
no matter how hard we wish to protest to (See Chapter 
106). Theory, whatever the~on:~tlcal basis we ascribe to it - it oral-formulaic I HlrHHiliSI 
or performance-oriented I pragmatic - has never really 
anything other than a stage of evolution. The evolution 
se - ideological critique of literacy (see Chapter 
able to conceive of orality as 
well not be towards literacy per 
notes 114 - 120) can be 
but it is nevertheless something more or associated with 'modernity', 
, and lately more 
Against this background our use of the notion system - which we In the 
mode as consisting of discrete and differential units - is anything but incidental. 
exact degree of self-sufficiency or 'closedness' we attribute to the system may well be 
different to that of De Saussure and of structuralism in (we shall return to this further 
on), but this point is not immediately relevant. What for our purposes, central to the fact 
that linguistic is a is that it turns out to around a principle 
that is per definition only realizable on the level of the abstract. But contrary to Saussure, 
and Goody (representative, in fact, of the cultural conditioning of writing) aural 
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linguistics would assert that this abstraction can be made explicit - and as such, also lend 
itself to application beyond the purely linguistic - not only through the visual, but indeed 
through the auditory. There is no reason to believe that in its auditory conception language 
is necessarily a 'shapeless mass' nor, for that matter, that it is more concrete than it would 
be conceived of visually. The degree of abstraction is, in both cases, essentially the same. In 
terms of the visualist conception of language it comes to be represented in a system of 
meaningful graphic marks (writing), in terms of the auditory conception of language it comes 
to be represented in a system of meaningful sounds (music). 
It can be objected that what we have just done has been to reintroduce the issue of 
language - thought interdependence after we so emphatically set it aside earlier. (See Chapter 
4, as well as our critique of the message earlier in this chapter). In a sense this is true; 
abstraction can only be a function of thinking, and we have linked this thinking to the 
conceptualization of language as a system. What we really have done, however, has been to 
redefine thinking - or at least how thinking makes itself apparent. It turns out, in fact, that 
what we attempted to detach language from earlier is itself something essentially scriptist, a 
notion which regards thinking as manifested - and therefore amenable to development - in 
essentially, if not exclusively, spatial terms. Music, however - at least in the situation of 
orality - sees the manifestation of thinking in terms of time. 
Just as in the visualist conception language and writing frequently overlap - a fact 
ostensibly decried by modem linguistics, even though, as we have seen, it generally 
perpetuates this tendency - so in the auditory conception do language and music. Our above 
reasoning enables us to thus link our etic definition centred around 'abstract system' with the 
ernic 'definitions' of music I language speculated upon earlier. (See for example note 29). A 
related consequence is that it brings into question the familiar opposition of language to music 
on the basis of the former representing thought (an association we have dealt with 
extensively) while the latter, as Nattiez phrases it, 'is directed primarily at the emotions,ll2. 
Nattiez mentions Johann Sebastian Bach and Pierre Boulez as counterexamples to this claim, 
the relatively specialized nature of these examples indicating, perhaps, that the association of 
music with emotion is by and large true within the Western musical tradition. The linguistic 
and the musical are, after all, distinct areas of activity within Western notions of science and 
culture. But these counterexamples should not even be necessary as far as oral societies are 
concerned, for if we accept that music, like writing, represents a certain degree of abstraction 
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vis-a-vis spoken language, then the polarity vs emoU()fl loses an validity: language 
and music will both be more or intellectual, more or less "" ...... "n,nn<l 
Contrary to recent emphases on as 
suggest that orality (inclusive of the oral 
study as a system in itself (or rather, as we 
constituted around symbolical sound. (This 
activity or event, aural linguistics would 
constitutes a field of interest inviting 
see, as a system of interrelated systems), 
then, removed from that of 
a structural anthropology, seeing the performance as an element or form within a broader 
cultural system), The notion of system in relation to the oral has the effect, to put it bluntly, 
of 'intellectualising' the oral; the oral voice is fuBy rational, albeit proceding along modes 
of abstraction by and large unrecognizable from I visuaHst perspective. Let us 
restate here what enabled us to assert the of an in the first place: our 
conception of orality as. first and foremost, sound, and the COIlce1DtuaI parallel between such 
symboHcal sound and the music of Western culture which, 
'emotionality'. has all the same been shown to be systematic, 
of harmony and rhythm rather than others; in music there 
of organization underlying the mode of composition'lI3. 
Evolutionist views have always hinged on the relative un.'~eTl.r:e 
the oraL Aural linguistics, I believe, can come close to 
essence of orality as lying in its sound (amenable to sy~;telmauz.ul()fl 
complexity) rather than - as is frequently asserted - its rhythm, 
Of rhythm is an essential ingredient of symbolical sound, 







in Africa l14, but 
sound is also much more than rhythm; it is melody, tonality, timbre, intonation ... Jl5. 
association of orality with rhythm has an unmistakably 10ussian feel to it, rhythm 
the essential manifestation of laryngo-buccal gesture. (See Chapter 4, note 28). Two 
aspects come to the fore here. On the one hand rhythm is commonly thought of 
as evocative of presence, i.e. of what is concrete (it is, as 10usse has shown, essentially a 
movement of the body), on the other it is strongly Hnked to the expression of emotion. We 
vocal 
encountered 10usse's notion of the vocal gesture as a 'revivification' of an original 
impact. (See Chapter 4, note 44). F6nagy, generaHy within a similar framework, sees 
(conceived of not as sound, but essentially as a series of muscular 
contractions) as a kind of microrepresentation of the movements of the body in situations 
emotional response: danger (evoking fear). love (evoking tenderness) 16 
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Henri Meschonnic, orality as 'linguistics of rhythm' VlnmUIUf': linguistique) stresses 
svc:n0110£HC::U formation of the rhythm as or, more specifically, as decisive in the 
subject. In this relation between writing is set out as follows: 
[w]riting... as grouping together [rassemblant] those forms (linguistic 
and social) by codes [ou les codes... sont les the mass of 
discourses in which is understood and given 
the inclividual of it, [a mass of discourse] social relations and 
grammatical It is not an utterance through which a subject comes into 
formation [Sf realise] 117. 
To paraphrase: orality is formation and realization (we can say the embodiment) of the 
subject, literacy the submission of the subject to the rules and limitations of social. This 
conceptualization is strongly reminiscent of Julia Kristeva's psychoanalysis-derived distinction 
between the 'semiotic' and 'symbolic', the former revolving 'drives and 
impulses' of infancy and to vocal and kinetic rhythm' (it nature 
defies any kind of 'axiomatic the latter around 'family and structures' as 
manifested in a variety associated with the notion of lawlls . in terms of 
the general framework of our in this chapter: the musical is of order of the 
semiotic, the linguistic (as grammatical structure and sign), of the order of the symbolical ll9• 
Kristeva is, of course, with characterising what she terms 'poetic language' in 
of the semiotic and the symbolic; art and regard to which there is a 
poetry can to some extent be 
of the semiotic has, however, 
as the 'breach' of the latter by the former l2o. notion 
applied to oral societies (see Chapter 2, note 143) and is 
certainly open to the kind of evolutionist interpretation (the semiotic is 'savage'. the symbolic 
'domesticated') aural linguistics would tol21, As we have seen, the 
"L\.<UULUJ.UH./U as the writing of literate society. As such. it orality is as subject to 
is just as prone to abstraction, just as 
of course, through clifferent perceptual 
Towards an Aural-Linguistic Sign 
similarly subject to constraint, albeit, 
modes. 
us attempt a few observations on the nature of the sign that constitutes the system we 
have been talking about. The ideal, of would be to arrive at a more or unified 
conception of the linguistic sign (what we may tempted to call an aural-linguistic sign), 
which addresses the kinds of emic COlrlce:PU 
conceptions which derive from the 
Janguage we have been speculating about, 
of a language which. exactly like music, is 
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fundamentally made up of sound. In other words, we would ultimately like to redefine 
Saussure's linguistic sign. We can more or less conjecture what such a sign will look like. 
It will still be discrete and differential, but identity of the signifier will no longer be 
determined by its dual relation to a concept on the one hand and its relation to other signifiers 
on the other, but by something more: fact that it is of a larger suprasegmental 
combination of sound with meaning we can call, for want of a better term, musical. This 
musical aspect will not only present itself as a third 'term' alongside signifier and signified 
(changing the linguistic sign from binomial to triadic) but will in all probability also limit the 
degree of arbitrariness of their relation, making it - within limits of the more complex set 
of triadic relations - relatively motivated. At the same time the concept itself will cease to be 
unified as such, being an intrinsic part of a larger 'musical' meaning. The aural-linguistic sign 
will have the fundamental property of signifying two or more things at the same time 122 , 
invites the following reflection: the above 'property' of the aural-linguistic 
asuming, of course, that my prediction is correct - offers an interesting against which 
to set Derrida's deconstructionist notion of an essentially scattered, eternally 'ungraspable' 
meaning. which also constitutes one of the most notable critiques of the Saussurian sign. 
Saussure's -l'n,"I'''''1'\1 would lead us to believe, Derrida tells us that the Contrary to what 
concept is endlessly signs relate to each other not only on the basis of difference but, 
fact, also on the basis of differance; in this way they, as Selden puts it 'enforce an endless 
postponement of presence' 123 ('presence' in this sense fully locatable in the notion of 
meaning)I24. Against this, Han cogently that Derrida's concerns with an 'ultimate 
reality' (ultimate meaning I concept) are uncaHed for; what counts from a linguistic point 
view is the speaker assumes, 'for purposes of every-day Hving' and in context 
use, that meaning fully Also, as Hall points out, 'correlations 
linguistic forms and their referents must necessarily be at least slightly loose' for the simple 
reason that 'meanings" 'ideas' or 'concepts' are highly individual Language would 
not function as a means of communication if it were 'a completely tight, "wen-formed" 
system' 125. I would contend that the aural-linguistic sign, as set out above, could offer a useful 
theoretical basis - far simpler than that employed by Derrida - upon which to motivate a 
conception of the linguistic sign as essentially 'fluid'. But, taking point, the fluidity 
the aural-linguistic sign is far from being the ultimate fluidity envisaged by Derrida. 
However alluring the of a redefinition of the linguistic may be, it seems to me 
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for our more prudent to, rather than conceive of the aural-Hnguistic sign as a single 
theoretical concept, approach it as consisting of two essentially different types of the 
linguistic (for which the Saussurian definition will be considered sufficient) and the musical. 
Other than to advance that aural-linguistic sign wilt the of the interpenetration 
of these two signs (stemming from the aural-linguistic system being the result of the 
interpenetration of two kinds of symbolical systems), we shall attempt no actual definition 
it. We can merely hope to i1Justrate some of its peculiarity in tenns of the conceptual distance 
between our 
the other. 
conceptions of the linguistic sign on the one hand and the musical sign on 
We need, at the outset, to distinguish between the aural-linguistic sign and its representation 
I abstraction (much like De does for the linguistic sign vis-a.-vis writing). The auraJ-
linguistic sign is essentially a function of the voice, consisting of the relation between 
linguistic and musical sign as manifested in it. We could say that it exists in speech, but 
then with the important reservation that speech - as speaking - is culturaHy detennined. In 
cultures where there is, for example, no polarisation between 'speaking' 'singing' along 
lines similar to those obtaining Western culture '26, the musical sign that infonns the aural-
linguistic will no doubt relatively complex, a combination of two (or even more) musical 
signs related to different levels of vocal sound (tonality, intonation, rhythm all falling 
within the ambit of what that culture considers as speech. Where speaking (as to 
singing) is culturally fairly clearly defined, the musical sign will be comparatively simple. 
course, there may, particularly within the context of the perfonnance, be numerous other 
musical elements (instrumental sounds, non-Hnguistic vocal sounds, etc.) producing musical 
interacting with that the aural-linguistic. even to the extent of influencing its 
meaning. But these musical signs cannot be part of the aural-linguistic sign; they are 
representations or abstractions of it. Our references to the 'musical' I 'musical sign' the 
passage that follows refer, then, to the sound of speech as speech, a sound which, in addition 
to proper]y linguistic differential function has, in auditory conceived language, its own 
symbolical meaning that interferes with and even changes linguistic meaning. 
As we are primarily concerned with what distinguishes the aural-linguistic from the 
conventional (Saussurian) linguistic we shall be focusing our attention on the musical, 
more specifically, on conceptions of musical meaning. Before considering, however, how 
music can be said to 'mean' or 'signify' something. it will be useful, given our conception 
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of the aural-linguistic a sense, combining the linguistic with the musical, to 
consider at least one semiological point from which two SVrnD()lIcal fields can, 
perhaps, be COllceptulau:zeo together. 
Nattiez a Semiology of Music offers us a 
reflection) suggests that can done by moving from 
(implying an essentially one-to-one relation between signifier and 
rich source of 
'static' conception 
- see Derrida' s 
criticism referred to above) towards a more 'dynamic conception,127 of the sign, notably as 
developed by Sanders . The essence of Peirce's thinking (at as interpreted by 
Nattiez) relates to the fact that signifier (or representamen) to an object in relation 
to which it gives rise to (the interpretant), the about in the 
mind of the person to whom the 
the Saussurian position lies 
position of referent (the corlcelpt 
- as interpretant - itself. 
signifier is addressed. The 
in the fact that the notion of 
in De Saussure's terms) 




is addressed to 
someone. The signifier consequently has the potential to create an array of interpretants in 
relation to the same object, that are the seats of meaning as I as, in 
themselves, signifiers - in other words, the interpretants are actually the full 
(Saussurian) sense of the term. I-"PII"{,Hln sign can thus be said to institute an 
of signs, all reflecting a different 
conclude 
of the referent (object). This 
that the object of the is .............. , a virtual object, that does not exc:ept within 
and through the multiplicity interpretants ... 129• 
can perhaps rephrase Peirce's position as follows: the object to which the sign IS 
'virtual' in so far as its meaning in a • scattered , throughout the range of 
interpretants I signifiers I signs that come into being in reference to it. In other words, 
meaning is essentially multiple; there is no concept to be derived from a single sign. 
usefulness of the Peircian sign as far as Nattiez is concerned obviously lies in the 
semiological framework it provides for accounting for what he considers to be the most 
outstanding and also most troubling - of the musical sign, namely that it is 
when we listen to music. the 
multiple, varied and confused. 
on, the emotions that it evokes, are 
are object of an interpretation 
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that is thus always hazardous. Given the looseness of the associations between music 
and what it evokes, we can no longer say with certainty what constitutes the 
expressive, the natural, the conventional, the analogical, the arbitrary association 
h · d h . C ]'130 [between t e sign an w at It refers to . 
The kind of meaning Nattiez refers to here is largely referentialist - meaning established in 
relation to an 'extramusical universe'l3l. We shall return to this conception presently. But to 
get back to the polysemic nature of the Peircian sign: setting aside a rigorously Derridian 
viewpoint (see note 123 - 124). one can, within the context of language, no doubt be excused 
for finding the idea of a 'virtual meaning', an essential looseness between sign and meaning 
rather bewildering. The relation between signifier and signified may well, according to De 
Saussure, be arbitrary, but it is, after all, a highly conventionalized relation established on a 
collective (as opposed to an individual) level132. Nattiez gives the following example which, 
one suspects, may well be intended to reassure us. The word 'happiness' makes instant sense 
to the reader. In attempting to explain it, however, many different words like 'bliss', 
'satisfaction', 'contentment' and so on come to be attached to it - all new signs deriving from 
the original confrontation with 'happiness', signs that reflect meanings 'that vary from one 
reader to the next, according to the personal experiences of each'l33. 
Of course, Nattiez on purpose, one feels, chooses a word with a strongly subjective -
'abstract' - connotation to illustrate the applicability of the Peircian model to language. 
'Typewriter', by contrast, may well have served him less well. Hall's counterargument to 
Derrida's endless deferral of meaning comes to mind - there is no reason why it should not 
have a similarly sobering effect on the polysemy of the Peircian sign. Finally, we could argue 
that the explanations one gives of a concept do not necessarily represent its meaning as such. 
They are, within the context of 'putting something across to another person' merely 
minimalist approximations of the concept which can exist quite fully and in all certainty 
independent of the linguistic sign(s) which refer to it (at least, of course, to the extent that we 
divorce language from thought). In fact, Nattiez says exactly the same thing - but, 
significantly, only with regard to musical meaning. He warns us, quite explicitly, not to 
'confuse music's meaning, properly speaking, with translation of that meaning, since 
verbalizing music's meaning is itself a special type of symbolization,J34. 
In any event, the Peircian sign is far from unproblematical from a linguistic point of view, 
h t . . fl" I 135 W a ever Its ments or exp ammg po ysemy . Yet we can, perhaps, limit some of its more 
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disconcerting facets (related to the notion of an endless variety of meaning) by going back 
to the Saussurian notion of a system, taken in the sense of something coherent and self-
sufficient. For is meaning - as an integral part of signs existing in differential relations within 
a system - not also subject 10 these relations? Considered from this point of view, meaning 
is far from being 'endless', even potentially. The common notion of the meaning of certain 
things being 'culturally determined' surely derives from this perspective; culture is implicitly 
seen as a system. Natliez, for his part, takes up a generally non-structuralist stance136, 
attributing the determination of meaning not to differential relations of signs but rather -
within a generally hermeneutic framework - to what he terms the poietic and eSlhesic 
dimensions of the symbolical proces, (The former relates to the process of creation, the latter 
to the process of reception, while the third trace or 'neutral' dimension he refers to - the 
'physical and material embodiment of the symbol' - to all intents and purposes corresponds 
to the signifier. See Chapter I, note 96). 
There is a further point. We may well, in fact, question Nattiez's assumption of the 
polysemy of the musical sign on the grounds that it derives from an essentially Western 
division - criticized earlier • between language and music on the basis of the former 
expressing thought, the latter emotion. His implied contention, mentioned above, that 
verbalization can convey the meaning of the linguistic sign but that it cannot convey the 
meaning of the musical (see note 134), can be seen to derive, at least to some extent, from 
this kind of conceptual division: musical meaning is somehow more 'intimate' than linguistic 
meaning. And yet, we know of cases - and there may be more - where musical instruments 
are used to convey words (in other words linguistic meaning), such as in the various 'drum 
languages'. (See notes 55 and 56). Also, there are definite examples of oral societies, such 
as the Tepehua society researched by Charles Boiles, in which, as Tarasti reports, 'there exist 
fully prescribed equivalences between melodic phrases and semantic meanings' 137. A 
distinction between the linguistic and the musical sign along the lines of relative univocity 
on the one hand vs pJurivocity on the other may not be as straightforward or self-evident as 
we may think. 
If our attempt at finding a definition of the sign that would be equally applicable to 
language and music has been less than satisfactory, we may attempt to find some kind of 
justification for 'conceptualizing language and music together' by looking, not so much at 
how the sign is defined, but rather, at how the sign comes to be isolated or delimited as such. 
239 
In other words, we move our attention from internal relation between signifier and 
signified towards considering the relation (however defined) amongst 
themselves, the only qualification our assumption that the sign is, somehow, 
meaningful. 
Let us act in typically scriptist fashion the sign in its - to us - most tangible 
form, namely as it our purposes, phonological writing). 
advantage of this or()cedure is that it right into the sign without worrying 
about first defining it, and consider what CorlStltutc~s it in place, i.e. as signifier. 
linguistics the basic component the is the phoneme, broadly defined as that part 
of speech sound that is conditional for distinguishing between different linguistic 
phonemes are the quintessential units in that they make up the most fundamental 
. It is distinguished from the phonetic sound system of a language, its phonological "",,'rp ..... 
(the sound as it occurs in 
functional relation to other 
'discretized' form. 
the latter purely in terms of its 
10 other words, it presents the sound in 
All languages of the world can be broken up into phonemes. Can the same be said with 
regard to music? 
Nattiez describes as 
most counterpart to the phoneme is the note, which 
139, But the note as basic element or 'essential 
feature' of Western (classical) music cannot be summarily considered to fulfill the same 
function in other Nettl 
note ... might erroneously applied to another musical culture 
....... \AI ..... ., notes are the essential feature. Slight deviations from 
ears used to the tempered scale, might essential 
several obviously distinct could 
versions of a single tone l40, 
Notwithstanding difficulty in distinguishing what, within a given music, an 
essential and what not, the principle is clear enough: music (the musical 
is composed of p.lp."",,,·ntc which, in distinctive features they represent, are fundamental to 
the nature of the music concerned and - to go further - to the identity of its .. , ........ "" .... 
signs. These units would the notational basis of the musical system in question, 
The relation phoneme and signifier can be fairly easily characterized as 
between non-meaningful segment on the one hand and segment fully accessible to 
on the other. is generally referred to as the 'dual articulation' of the linguistic 
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made up of minimal endowed with meaning (also called the 'moneme'), 
. But the relation 
more difficult to establish 
which in turn consist non-meaningful Jinguistic units (the pmlne:me 
between basic meaningful segment is 
as far as music is COltlce:rn<~a To try and establish a 'dual articulation' the musical system 
is, by and large, a futile 
At what point, then, can basic musical segments be said to musical signs? This 
brings us, finally, to consider 'meaning' of music. How, and what, music signify? 
Benveniste sees music as consisting of units that are not endowed with capacity to signify; 
there is, consequently, no such thing as a musical sign l4J, As Nattiez comments however, 'in 
order to make this claim... notion of the sign must be limited to "something that refers to 
the exterior world'''. By thus limiting our conception of meaning to the modality' 
of verbal language, 'we run of overlooking the symbolic 144 
We earlier briefly came across 
music (see note 131), whereby 
'referentialist' (or extraversive, meaning of 
is, like language, taken to refer to what outside it. 
Frances gives the following account of this modality of meaning and how it place: 
[t]he kinship and melodic pattern in music, and the patterns of 
gestures that accompany behavior, represent one of the basic elements of music's 
expressive language.,. [T]he basic psychological states (calm, excitation, tension, 
relaxation, exaltation, despair) normally translate themselves as forms that 
have a given rhythm, as and ascents, as modalities for 
fragmentary forms within global forms (constant repetition, diversity, periodicity, 
evolution)... [T]he transposition of these rhythms, tendencies, and modalities of 
movement into sound-structure of music constitutes basic 
languageWi • 
We would be able to derive ara.ctenz,mCID (which cannot but remind 
evocation of 
psychological states' - see our discussion of 
116) a certain view of the musical sign 
between oral ity and the 
Meschonnic and Kristeva, notes 113 -
as 'rhythmic and melodic pattern'. Nattiez 
distinguishes three 'fields' of extrinisic (referential) meaning, namely the spatio-temporal, 
kinetic, and affective. These fields of are associated with psychological states or with 
the properties of the human body (heart rhythm, muscular contraction, depth of respiration) 
to the extent that they are frequently thought as having a natural basisl46• Yet associations 
high notes with an impression of hight and happiness, a certain kind of resonance with an 
impression of open space and calm, a certain of low note with an impression of darkness 
gloom are fundamentally cultural Nattiez points out, in Greek, and 
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Jewish music, many of these associations are reversed 141• 
But it is a second modality of musical meaning, qualified as absolutist, jOn/mlist or 
intrinsic which, to my mind, can be most fruitfully exploited by an aural linguistics. In this 
perspective music 'means itself 148. The interest of this type of meaning. as far as we are 
concerned, lies in its fundamental reference to time. Once again, we can regard as musical 
sign a certain kind of 'musical structure'. This time, however - and this is an important point 
- it is not isolated in tenns of the feeling or association it evokes. Extrinsic meaning being 
essentially culturally defined and as such - from the point of view of the researcher - largely 
inaccessible, will almost per definition find itself excluded from the meaning of the (aural)-
linguistic sign, in the same way as the musical has generally been marginalised by Oral 
Theory. Rather, musical structures are identified as signs in so far as they refer either to 
similar musical structures already heard or - crucially - lead us to expect the occurrence of 
similar types of musical units in future'·". Robert Austerlitz puts it as follows: 
the meaning that is conveyed by a musical text is basically deictic, cataphoric, in the 
sense that it is a prediction. The musical text makes reference to the future, in that it 
chal Jenges the listener to predict the shape of the musical substance to come in the 
immediately pending future - on the basis of the musical substance perceived in a 
given moment... If anything can be called meaning or semiosis in music, then it is the 
experience required to predict immediately impending musical substance ISO. 
One could be excused for finding this notion of musical meaning, based on what is, after all, 
purely a consideration of musical jonn, rather unconvincing. To say that, on the basis of my 
own experience I can, upon hearing a particular rhythmic I melodic pattern, place it in a 
certain relation to rhythmic I melodic patterns heard before, or predict the kinds of rhythmic 
I melodic patterns which will be subsequent to it, is all very well, but is it not, no matter how 
impressive it may be, what we would simply call knowledge about music? Why call it 
meaning? 
It is true that what is described above is essentially a type of knowledge, which is 
knowledge about music but also knowledge about culture; it is exactly the kind of knowledge 
that we would draw upon as background for our interpretation I appreciation I study of a 
particular oral utterance or group of utterances in a particular oral society. It is, of course, all 
we can do with this knowledge, for it is not meaning to us. 
Let us briefly return, at this point, to the drum languages mentioned earlier (see notes SS 
and 56) which, in the light of our postulated oral I aural relation of linguistic to musical 
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meaning, offer us perhaps an obvious - but by no means unique - vantage point. Drum 
language, Kawada tells us, 'eliminates segmental [differential] features of the spoken 
language, and reproduces only its suprasegmental features'. Writing - especially alphabetic 
I phonetic writing - of course does the reverse; it takes the segmentality I differenliality of 
speech sounds a step further by explicating the non-meaningful sounds in which it is 
constituted. And yet, as Kawada reflects, drum language can be likened 10 a writing system, 
at least in so far as it extends 'beyond the reach of the human voice"s,. This is a crucial 
insight, but which needs to be carried further. Drum language, as we have seen, has been 
documented in and associated with cultures using a particular kind of 'tonal' language. But 
can we not go beyond this association, and see drum language as a particular manifestation 
of a certain conception of language, a conception founded in the experience of language - and 
of linguistic meaning - as sound? Our isolation of drum language as such - as a symbolical 
practice peculiar to certain societies - may well have prevented us from seeing it in its 
broader relevance as an illustration of how linguistic meaning can be developed - integrated 
into symbolical abstract systems - through and in sound. But for our culturally conditioned 
juxtaposition of language I text on the one hand to music I sound I rhythm on the other, we 
may well discover that drum languages are far from the only illustrations of this principle, 
by and large unfamiliar to the 'literates' of this world. 
It is on the basis of this kind of insight, I believe, that Oral Theory as aural linguistics can 
make a difference. For our failure to recognize meaning, more especially linguistic meaning, 
does not mean that it is not there. It merely exists on a level of abstraction which, as a result 
of our visualisl conception of language, we are unable 10 apprehend. But aural linguistics can 
at least help us to speculate about this meaning. We make our most elaborate menial 
substitution
l52 
- our language - in terms of what we see, and it is in what we see - which is 
space - that we are able 10 elaborate certain further abstractions from it: writing, mathematical 
equations, etc. What if this process is realized in terms of what is heard, that is as sound, 
existing as durations of lime?153 This perspective can, perhaps, provide us with a clearer 
picture of the kind of intrinsic musical meaning highlighted above, a meaning which is, as 
concept of the aural-linguistic sign, also fully linguistic meaning. What would be meant is 
things like the following - or at least their possibility: before, now, after, beginning, repetition, 
sequence, irregularity, interruption, end ... 
When you run out of words - which in this case is not so much words as conceptual 
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categories - it is time to stop. In conclusion, a few remarks on the viability of aural linguistics 
as an actual research paradigm: could one do research and label it 'aural-linguistic'? Of 
course, a lot of what we have been saying is not new. Culler, for example, at the end of an 
article in which he particularly strongly emphathises with Tedlock's frustration at mainstream 
linguistics' exclusion of 'suprasegmental' features 154 (an exclusion which, significantly, Culler 
sees as the exclusion of the temporal dimension), dreams of a linguistics (ironically - but no 
doubt in a Derridian perspective - called a 'linguistics of writing'), which would 
seek to invert the usual relation between discrete, already codified signs and the 
material usually deemed irrelevant except as a means of manifestation. It would treat 
discrete signs as special cases of a generalised echoing, and explore whether a 
linguistics could be constructed on that model, and how far it could go. 
'The task of linguistics', Culler tells us further, 
has been to divide the signifying from the non-signifying, excluding the latter from 
linguistics, but if this boundary region is central to linguistics and its functioning ... 
then this geography must be revised, ... the problematic materiality of language which 
mayor may not carry meaning and produce effects, must lie at the centre of our 
concernsl55 . 
Culler is a literary theorist, and it is doubtful, his references to Tedlock notwithstanding, that 
he would expect a contribution to his linguistics of writing to come from the field of Oral 
Theory. In any event, if the objectives of Culler's linguistics of writing can, at least to some 
extent, be seen as similar to those of aural linguistics, I would be prepared to wager that they 
may well have a better chance of realization recast in the terms we have been talking about, 
which concern the integration, into the mainstream of linguistics, of the auditory conception 
of language. 
Studies on oral texts that specifically include a consideration of sound in their appraisal 
generally do so within the framework of an aural aesthetics 156. This is of course giving the 
aural a different function to the one we have been concerned with, but that does not mean that 
the insights it provides cannot be useful. It may well be, in fact, that an aural aesthetics is to 
some extent a first stage in the development of an aural linguistics. At any rate, the 
conceptual categories at our disposal fall, at least for the moment, far short of providing us 
with the means of giving a full account of the language of orality in its existence as sound, 
an account which - I hope to have shown - has nothing to do with measurement and 
quantification (electronic or otherwise), but everything with how we think. In the meantime, 
the main interest of aural linguistics can only be on a philosophical level 157, where it will 
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hopefully remind us that the simple is complex, the concrete is abstract, the traditional is 
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135. Tobin distinguishes between 'message' (relating to the pragmatic function) and 
'invariant meaning' (relating to the value of the linguistic sign at the level the 
linguistic system) to account for polysemy from a Saussurian perspective. He 
illustrates that same words generally to have different meanings (cases of 
homonymy I polysemy) can, in fact, be shown to have the same invariant meaning. 
to a extent counters the frequent argument that Saussurian sign does not 
allow for the occurrence of polysemy and homonymy. Tobin, 1990:51-8). 
See, for example, Nattiez's critique of (Nattiez, 1990: 19-28), in which denies 
the possibility of integrating the Saussurian Peircian models of the sign: 
'[m]eaning cannot simultaneously be both the relationship between signifier 
signified (the first step a chain interpretants) and a fixed, stable position within 
a system'. (Emphasis added). 
Tarasti, 1978:30. Boiles, 1973. chants instrumentaux Tepehua: un 
exemple de transmission musicale de signification. Musique en jeu 12. 
138. See Saussure, 1959:32-4. This is sometimes called the 'phonemic' system. 
139. Nattiez, 1990:81. 
140. Nettl, 1964: 102. 
141. See Martinez, 1980: 16. Roy Harris (1980:24-9) however problematizes this particular 
'design feature' of language, arguing that, depending on the prior definitions one has 
in regard to them, non-meaningful and meaningful units can be found similar 
relations in non-linguistic, and indeed non-human, means of communication. 
142. for example Ruwet, N. 1972. Langage, musique, poesie. Paris: Seuil. Referred to 
in Court, 1976: 13. Court, in fact, finds a kind of 'dual articulation' in music to the 
extent that musical sound as culturally organized system can be said to 'derive' from 
the fundamental sounds of nature. 
143. Benveniste, 1969. Semioiogie la langue. Semiotica 1: 1-12, 1 Referred 
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to in Nattiez, 1990:] 1 
144. Nattiez,] 990: 116. 
145. Frances, R. 1958. perception de La musique. Paris: Vrin, 299. Quoted in 
Nattiez, 1990: 118-9. 
N attiez, 1990: 12 L 
147. Nattiez, 1990: 1 
148. Nattiez, 1990: 110. Nattiez mentions a type of meaning that one could label 'formalist-
expressive' which, though referring to emotion (strictly speaking extra-musical), 
regards the latter as intrinsic to music. in this regard Hanslick, 1854. Du beau 
dans La musique. Paris: Macquet. 
149. Nattiez, 1990:111. 
150. See Austerlitz, R. 1983. Meaning Music: Is Music like Language If So, How? 
American Journal of Semiotics 2,3:1-12, pp.4 and 6. Quoted in Nattiez, 1990:117. 
151. Kawada, in Tokumaru and Yamaguti (eds)., 1986: 161. 
152. Mounin characterizes as symbolical 'all acts of mental substitution, that the 
tendency, associated naturally or conventionally with a given object or situation, to use 
all other objects of perception as susceptible to substitution for that object or situation, 
whenever that object or situation is difficult or impossible to grasp'. (See Mounin, 
1970. Introduction a La semioLogie. Paris: Minuit. Quoted in Nattiez, 1990:35). 
1 One may object that this sounds suspiciously like a speculation on the mental 
substitutions of somebody without vision. But remember we are talking about 
language, and about mental substitutions that are language-based. There are countless 
highly complex processes and systems of mental substitution that are not language-
based, as our argument against the notion of the interdependence of language and 
thought suggests. (See Chapter 4). These are visual I spatial, and are in no way 
determined or influenced by orality and its auditory conception of language. (See 
Chapter 4, note 1 
154. Tedlock, The Spoken Word and the Work of Interpretation. 
Culler, in Fabb and Durant (eds )., 1987: 183. 
156. Of which Feld (1982) gives a particularly rich account. See also Pensom, 1 ]96, 
where the Chanson de Roland is decribed as an 'aural text'. Liguistic meaning is 
shown to foregrounded in the metrical properties of the Chanson, which are, of 
course, 'extra-linguistic' and which Pensom frequently interprets by analogy with the 
structures of classical music. This aural style is, however, essentially exploited as a 
function of 'auditory memory', in other words. as mnemonic device (p.197). 
By which I do not wish to imply that no attempt should be made to also apply the 
ideas set out in this chapter to examples of actual oral material. The first step in such 
an initiative would be to determine how symbolical sound is evaluated in a given 
culture, followed by a consideration of the ways in which such an evaluation may be 
influenced by linguistic experience. This will be the real project of an aural linguistics, 
a project to which the present study would hopefully serve as a Prolegomenon. 
253 
Bibliography 
* The following only lists works directly consulted in the course of this study. Detailed 
references to other works, of interest to the various fields covered, are given in the 
endnotes. 
Af Klingtberg, B. 'Do the Legends of Today and Yesterday belong to the Same Genre?' in 
Rorich, L. and Wienker-Piepho, S. (eds). 1990. Storytelling in Contemporary Societies. 
Tiibingen: Gunter Narr Verlag. 
Akmajian, A., Demers, R., Farmer, A., and Hamish, R. 1990. Linguistics. An Introduction to 
umguage and Communication. Cambridge, Massachussetts: M.LT. Press. 
Alant,1. ]994. Towards a Linguistic Definition of Orality. Altemation ] ,I :42-51. 
Allen, 1. and Van Buren, P. (eds). 1971. Chomsky: Selected Readings. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Anozie, S. 1981. Structural Models and African Poetics. Towards a Pragmatic Theory of 
Literature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
A Sign is Born. Scientific American 273,6: 10. 
Barber, K. 1984. Yoruba Orild and Deconstructive Criticism. Research in African Literatures 
15,4:497-518. 
Barber, K. 'Interpreting Orfkl as History and as Literature', see Barber, K. and De Moraes 
Farias, P. (eds). 1989. 
Barber, K, and De Moraes Farias, P. (eds). 1989. Discourse and its Disguises: The 
Interpretation of African Oral Texts. Binningham, U.K.: University of Binningham, 
Barber, K. and De Moraes Farias, P. 'Introduction', see Barber, K. and De Moraes Farias, P. 
(eds)., 1989. 
Baron, N. 1981. Speech, Writing & Sign. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
Barthes, R. 1973, Mythologies, transl. A. Lavers. London: Gentry Books, 
Bellugi, U, and Klima, E, 'Structural Properties of American Sign Language', see Liben, L. 
(ed), 1978, 
Bennett, T. 'Introduction: Popular Culture and the "Tum to Gramsci"', in Bennett, T" Mercer, 
M, and Woollacott. 1. (eds). 1986. Popular Culture and Social Relations. Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press. 
Bennett, T. 1990. Outside Literature. London: Routledge. 
u .... "" .......... M. 1993. Women Like Meat. The Folklore and Foraging Ideology of the Kalahari 
Julhoan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Bjarkman. P. and Raskin, V. (eds). 1986. Real World Linguist: Linguistic Applications 
in the 19BOs. Norwood, New Jersey: 
Black, B. about Metaphor', see Ortony, A. (ed). 1979. 
Blakar, N. 'Language as a Means of Social Theoretical-Empirical Explorations of 
Language and Language Use as in a Social Matrix', in Mey, 1. (ed). 1979. 
Pragmalinguistics. Theory and Practice. The Hague: Mouton. 
Blesh, R. 1946. Shining Trumpets. A History of New York: Alfred Knopf. 
M. 1987. Freud, Proust and wean. Theory as Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cauvin, J. 1980. parole traditionnelle. Abidjan: Saint-Paul. 
Chalmers, 1995. The of Conscious Experience. Scientific American 
CJaxton, C. (ed). 1988. Growth Points in Cognition. New York: Routledge. 
Court, R. 1976. musical. Essai sur les fondements anthropologiques de I 'art. 
KJincksieck. 
Culler, J. 'Introduction', see De Saussure, 1959. 
Culler, 1. 'Towards a Linguistics of Writing', in Fabb, N., Attridge, D., Durant, A., and 
MacCabe, C. (eds). 1987. The Linguistics of Writing. Arguments between Language and 
Literature. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
V. 'Relative Universals: Perspectives on Culture and Cognition', see ,-,ILl.,.",,,,,,, C. (ed). 
1988. 
Damton, R. 1984. The Great Massacre and Episodes in French Cultural History. 
London: Allen Lane. 
Derrida, J. 1967. De la grammatoiogie. Edition de Minuit. 
De Saussure, 1959. Course General Linguistics, transL W. Baskin. New York: 
Philosophical Library. 
Diawara, M. 'Women, Servitude and History: the Oral Historical Traditions of Women in 
Servile Condition in the Kingdom (Mali) from Fifteenth to the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century', see Barber, K. and Moraes Farias, (eds). 1989. 
Plooy, H. 1985. uit die Lewe: Andre Jolles se Einfache Formen. Journal of 
255 
Literary Studies 1,4:20-37. 
Durant, A. 1984. Conditions of Music. London: Macmillan. 
Easthope, A. 1991. Literary into Cultural Studies. London: Routledge. 
Easthope, A. 1995. The Pleasures of Labour: Marxist Aesthetics in the 19905. Alternation 
2,1:5-15. 
Eco, U. 1979. The Role of the Reader. Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts. London: 
Hutchinson. 
Fage, J. 'The Development of African Historiography', see Ki-Zerbo, 1. (ed). 1990. 
Falck, C. 1989. Myth, Truth and Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Feld, S. 1982. Sound und Sentiment. Birds, Weeping, Poetics, and Song in Kaluli Expression. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Feld, S. 'Oralily and Consciousness', see Tokumaro, Y. and Yamaguli, O. (eds). 1986. 
Ferron, O. 1989. Junior Primary Mathematical Didactics. Durban: Bmlerworths. 
Finnegan, R. 1970. Oral Literature in Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Finnegan, R. 'Literacy versus Non-literacy: The Great Divide? Some Comments on the 
Significance of "Literature" in Non-Literate Cultures', in Finnegan, R. and Horton, R. (cds). 
1973. Modes of Thought. London: Faber & Faber. 
Finnegan, R. 1977. Oral Poetry. Its Nature, Significance and Social Context. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Finnegan, R. 'The Relation between Composition and Performance: Three Alternative Modes', 
see Tokumaru, Y. and Yamagmi, O. (eds). 1986. 
Finnegan, R. 'Speech, Language and Non-Literacy: the Limba of Sierra Leone', in Finnegan, 
R. and Horton, R. (eds). 1988. Literacy and Orality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Fiske, J. 1989. Reading the Popular. Boslon: Unwin Hyman. 
Fodor, J. 1975. The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 
Foley, 1. 1985. Oral·Formulaic Theory and Research. An Introduction and Annotated 
Bibliography. New York: Garland. 
Foley, J. 'Introduction', see Foley, 1. (ed). 1986. 
Foley, J. (cd). 1986. Oral Tradition in Literature. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 
Foley, 1. 1988. The Theory of Oral Composition. History and Methodology. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Foley, J. 1990. Traditional Oral Epic. The Odyssey, Beowulf, and the Serbo-Croatian Return 
256 
Song. Berkeley: of California Press. 
Foley, J. 1994. Words in Tradition, Words in Text: A KeSDcm [to Kelber, 1994a]. ,,"onunn 
65: 169-80. 
F6nagy, L 'Les cnaLl1c~~s d'une caracterologie vocale', see 
(eds). 1993. 
N. and Rey-Hulman. 
Foucault, M. 1976. L'archeologie du sa voir. Paris: GaHimard. 
Furniss, G. 'Typification and Evaluation: a Dynamic in Rhetoric' , see Barber, K. and 





Goody, J. (00). 1968. Literacy in 
Goody, J. 1977. 
Press. 
Domestication of the '1'71'170,0 Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Goody, J. 1986. Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society. Cambridge: 
University 
Goody, J. 1987. The Interface Between the Written and the Oral. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University 
Gorog-Karady, V. 1984. African Oral Narratives: An Introduction. Research in 
Literatures 1 161 
Graff, Legacies of Literacy. Contradictions 
and Bloomington: Indiana University 
Green, D. 'Problem-Solving: Representation and , see Claxton. C. (ed). 1 
Hagege, L'homme de paroles. Contribution linguistique aux sciences humaines. 
Paris: 
Hall. R. 1987. Linguistics and Pseudo-Linguistics: Selected Essays, 1965 - 1985. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamin. 
Harris, Development of the Individual and the Deaf , see Liben, 
(ed). 
1980. The Language-Makers. Duckworth. 
Harris R. 1988. Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein. How to Play ."Lln.-:.' with Words. 
London: Routledge. 
'Impulse Control in Deaf Research and Clinical ,see Liben, L. (ed). 
1978. 
257 
Hawkes, T. 1977. Structuralism and Semiotics. London: Methuen. 
Hendricks, W. 1973. Essays on Semiolinguislics and Verbal Art. The Hague: Mouton. 
Hughes, S. 'Salutary Lessons from the History of Linguistics', see Bjarkman, P. and Raskin, 
V. (eds). 1986. 
Jousse, M. 1990. The Oral Style, transl. E, Sienaert and R. Whitaker. New York: Garland. 
Kawada, J. 'Verbal and Non-Verbal Sounds: Some Considerations of the Basis of Oral 
Transmission of Music', see Tokumaru, Y. and Yamaguti, 0, (eds), 1986. 
Kelber, W, 1994a, Jesus and Tradition: Words in Time, Words in Space. Semeia 65: 139-67, 
Kelber, W. 1994b. Modalities of Communication, Cognition, and Physiology of Perception: 
Orality, Rhetoric, Scribality. Serneia 65:193-216. 
Kelly, A. 1989, The Curriculum. Theory and Practice, London: Paul Chapman. 
Kelley, D. 1988. The Evidence of Ihe Senses. A Realist Theory of Perception. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 
Ki-Zcrbo, J. (ed), 1990, General History of Africa. Methodology and African Prehistory. 
London: James Currey. 
Kristeva, J. 1984, Revolution in Poetic Language, transl. L. Roudiez. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Levine, E. 1981. The Ecology of Early Deafness. Guides to Fashioning Environments and 
Psychological Assessments. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Levinson, S. 1983. Pragmatics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Liben, L. (ed). 1978, Deaf Children: Developmental Perspectives, New York: Academic 
Press. 
Liben, L. 'Experiential Deficiencies: Developmental Perspectives', see Liben, L. (ed). 1978. 
Lord, A. 1968, The Singer of Tales. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Lord, A. 1986. 'The Merging of Two Worlds: Oral and Written Poetry as Carriers of Ancient 
Values', see Foley, J. (ed). 1986. 
Makouta-Mboukou, J-P, 1973. Black African Literature. Washington D.C.: Black Orpheus 
Press, 
Martinez, A. 1980. Elements de linguistique genera/e, Paris: Armand Colin, 
Mehler, J. 'Psychology and Psycholinguistics: The Impact of Chomsky and Piaget', see 
Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (ed). 1981. 
Meschonnic, H, 'L'oralitt, poetique de la voix', see Revel, N, and Rey-Hulman, D. (eds). 
258 
1993. 
Moore, T and Carling, C. 1982. Understanding Language: Towards a Post-Chomskyen 
Linguistics. London: Macmillan. 
Moores, D. 'Current Research and Theory with the Deaf: Educational Implications', see 
Liben, L. (ed). 1978. 
Nattiez, 1. 1990. Music and Discourse: Towards a Semiology of Music, trans!. C. Abbate. 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Nettl, B. 1964. Etlmomusicology. New York: Macmillan. 
Nickerson, R. 'On the Role of Vision in Language Acquisition by Deaf Children', see Liben, 
L. (ed). 1978. 
Okpewho, 1. 1983. Myth in Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Okpewho, 1. 1992. African Oral Literature. Backgrounds, Character, and Continuity. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Olson, D. 1977. From Utterance to Text: The Bias of Language in Speech and Writing. 
Harvard Educational Review 47,3:257-281. 
Ong, W. 1967. The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious 
History. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Ong, W. 1986. Orality and Literacy. The Techn%gizing of the Word. New York: Methuen. 
Ong, W. 1987. Orality-Literacy Studies and the Unity of the Human Race. Oral Tradition 
2,1:371-82. 
Opland, J. 1983. Xhosa Oral Poetry. Aspects of a Black South African Tradition. 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 
Orlony, A. 'Metaphor: A Multidimensional Problem', see Ortony, A. (ed). 1979. 
Ortony, A. (ed). 1979. Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pensom, R. 1982. Literary Technique in the Chanson de Roland. Geneve: Librairie Draz S.A. 
Piaget, 1. 'Schemes of Action and Language', see Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (ed). 1981. 
Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (ed). 1981. The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. 
Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press. 
Revel, N. and Rey-Hulman, D. (eds). 1993. Pour une anthropologie des voU:. Paris: 
L'Harmattan. 
Roudiez, L. 'Introduction', see Kristeva, J. 1984. 
Rousseau, J. 'Essay on the Origin of Language', in Gode, A. (ed). 1966. On the Origin of 
259 
Language. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Searle,1. 1969. Speech Acts. An in Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Seeger, C. 1977. Studies in 1975. University of California 
Press. 
Selden, R. 1985. A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory. Brighton: Harvester 
Press. 
Spencer,1. 1995. The Rhythms of Black Folk. 
New Jersey: Africa World Press. 
Religion and Pan-Africanism. Trenton, 
Sperling, G. 'Future Prospects in Language and Communication for the CongenitaHy Deaf', 
see Liben, L. (ed). 1978. 
Stiebel, L. Treating Trash Seriously: Teaching Popular 
in Education 14,1:47-53. 
in South Africa. Perspectives 
Street, B. 1984. Literacy in Theory and Practice. Cambridge: ................. . University Press. 
"""'."HlYLU '.' of Myth in Music. 1978. Myth and Music: A Semiotic Approach to 
Helsinki: Suomen Musiikkitieteel1inen Seura. 
Thorold, A. 1994. Towards an Anthropology of Writing 
1,1 
Tobin, 1990. Semiotics and Linguistics. New 
Y. and Yamaguti, O. (eds). 1986. The Oral and the 
Academia Music. 
It,,,'nt,, in Music. Tokyo: 
Tonkin, 'Oracy and the Disguises of Literacy', see Moraes P. 
(OOs). 1 
Turner, 1986. Performed Being: Word Art as a Human Inheritance. Oral Tradition 1,1 
109. 
Turner, N. 1994. A Brief Overview of Zulu Oral Traditions. Alternation 1,1 :58-67. 
Vail, L. and White, L. 1991. Power and the Praise Poem. Southern African Voices in History. 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 
1. 1985. Oral Tradition as History. London: James Currey. 
Vansina, 1. 'Oral Tradition and its Methodology', see Ki-Zerbo, J. (ed). J990. 
Van Wyk, 1. 1994. Dream Writing. Alternation 1,1:21-36. 
Wardhaugh, J 993. Investigating Language. Central Problems in Linguistics . ...., ........ u. 
260 
Massachussetts: Harvard University Press. 
West, F. 1975. The Way of Language. An Introduction. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
White, L. 'Poetic License: Ora] Poetry and History', see Barber, K. and De Moraes Farias, 
P. (OOs). 1989. 
Whorf, B. 'A Linguistic Consideration of Thinking in Primitive Communities', in Carroll, J. 
(ed). 1956. Language, Thought and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf 
Cambridge, Massachussetts: M.I.T. Press. 
Wilbur, R. 'The Interaction of Linguistic Theory and Research on American Sign Language', 
see Bjarkman, P. and Raskin, V. (oos). 1986. 
Yai, O. 'Issues in Oral Poetry: Criticism, Teaching and Translation', see Barber, K. and De 
Moraes Farias, P. (oos). 1989. 
